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1ABSTRACT
This study is undertaken on the premise that Islam and Islamic law is to be taken into
serious consideration in any future legislative reform of laws in Malaysia. Islam being
the religion of the country and the strong religious sentiment of the Muslims (who
form the majority in Malaysia) cannot be overlooked or dismissed lightly by the
legislators in Malaysia. Reformation of intellectual property laws is timely, as we are
now approaching to the dateline set by GATF-Trips agreement which aim is to
improve our standard of intellectual property protection. This study seeks to analyze
and evaluate the current legislation pertaining to intellectual property in Malaysia in
terms of the philosophy and rules governing the existence, ownership and exercise of
these rights and their consistency and inconsistency with Islam and Islamic law. The
main objective of this study is to prove that a coherent and logical conceptual
framework of ownership of intellectual property can be derived from an Islamic
perspective which not only offers the basis of rights but also defines the scope of
these rights. From the point of ownership of rights, support can be obtained from the
normative framework of property rights within the traditional classification of 'mal'
(property) and 'haqq al-milkiyyah' (ownership rights) under Islamic law. From the
point of exercise of rights, the exact scope can be defined from the analysis of
fundamental concepts which have been developed by Muslim jurists. It has been
established that Islam and Islamic law offers a sound and systematic paradigm, which
in deeper analysis, can satisfy both our current obligations under international
treatises, as well as our responsibility to practise our religion to the fullest.
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GLOSSARY
'Adah':normal period (as opposed to emergency).
'Adi' ('Adalah'): justice, upright and just.
'Adillah ':(pl. of 'dali! '): proofs, evidences, indications.
'Adillah aI-syari'yyah': proofs from the sources of Shari'ah.
'Ahadith': (p1. of 'hadith') narratives and reports of the deeds and sayings of the
Prophet.
'Ahkam' (p1. of 'hukm') : laws, values and ordinances.
'Ahi hail wa a! aqd':(lit. those with power to loose and bind) the consultative body.
'Ahi al-suq': members of the market.
'Ala qah ikhtisasiyyah' : special relationship.
'Ai-huquq al-adabiyyah wa al-fahmiyyah wa al-faniah wa a!- tijariah wa al-sina 'iyyah
al muta 'arf biha lii muallafin wa a!- musiqin wa al-mukhtarin' : rights related to
cultural, intellectual, artistic, commercial and industrial more known as author's,
musical and inventor's rights.
'Al-fl 'lu al-masyru': any legal act or recognised deed.
'Al-iltizam allazi yatimmu bil ijab- a! iradah a! munfaridah': dispositions which are
concluded without offer and acceptance.
'Al-taaddi ala haqqi al-ghair': the transgression of others rights.
'Amal': act, practice, precedent or labour.
'Amanah': trust! uberimai fidae contract.
'Amr' ('Amar') (p1. 'amir', 'umur') : command, matter, affair or injunctions in the
Qur'an in the form of commandments.
'Aqar':immovable property.
'Aqd' :contractual disposition.
'Aqi' :intellect, rationality, reason.
'Ariyah ':loan contract.
'Arkan' (p1. of 'rukn '):pillars, essential requirements.
'Ashab ':companions of the Prophet.
'As!' : root, origin, source or the accepted premise.
'Athar' :lit. impact, trace, vestige, also deeds or precedents of Companions of the
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Prophet.
'Ayah' (p1. 'ayat') :lit. sign, indication; a section of the Qur'anic text often referred
to as 'verse'.
'Ayn' :tangible goods/ substance.
'Bai'' :sale.
'Bai 'ah ':pledge of allegiance.
'Bara 'ah al-dhimmah al-asliyyah' : original absence of liability.
'Bath': null and void.; also the antonym of justice, right or rightness.
'Bayan': explanation, clarification.
'Bayt al-ma!': treasury.
'Dalalah': meaning, implication.
'Dalalah al-nass': inferred or implied meaning of a given text.
'Dali! ':proof, indication, evidence.
'Dallals' : brokers, contractors.
'Darurah': emergency! exigency. (During emergency a wider range of things may be
enjoyed).
'Daruriyyah': crucial or essential items.
'Dayn': debt, a thing owing.
'Dharr': (literally) harmful or injurious.
'Dhararfahish': excessive harm.
'Dhimmah': liability.
'Din': matters pertaining to religionl matters of faith.
'Diyah': blood money.
'Far': subsidiaiy, branch or the conclusion in an analogy.
'Fard': obligatory, obligation
'Fard 'ayn': personal obligation
'Fard kfayah' : collective obligation, imposition, duty, obligation.
'Fasad': corruption, immoral.
'Fasakh':dissolution of marriage initiated by the wife.
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'Fasid': corrupt, void, deficient (as opposed to 'batil' which is null and void).
'Fi '1 ghair mashru' :illegal conduct.
'Fiqh': is the identification of substantive legal rules from the Shari'ah principles.
'Fiqih' (p11. 'fuqaha') : jurist, one who is learned in jurisprudence.
'Fitrah': religious tithe payable once a year during fasting month, not proportionate
to income, but so much per head in the family.
'Ghalib': in most cases, most likely, in all probability.
'Ghasb': misappropriation of property.
'Ghayah': endresult, goal, purpose.
'Ghallah': produce, crop, fruits.
'Hajah': necessity, exigency.
'Hajiyyah': matters which are not essentially pertaining to the existence of the subject
matter but its non-existence will produce much hardship; matters which are ancillary
but important matters; less important than 'daruriyyah'.
'Hakam': conciliatory body.
'Hakainan': in the legal sense.
'Halal': lawful, legal, legitimate, permissible.
'Haqq': right, entitlement.
'Haqq al-Abd' ('haqq al-adami'): right of man, or private right.
'Haqq al-hadhanah': custodian rights.
'Haqq al-Ibtikar' : rights of origination.
'Haqq al-ikhtira' :patent rights.
'Haqq al-jiwar': the right of neighbourhood.
'Haqq al-shafah': the right to consume water or to irrigate land.
'Haqq al-tassarruf': rights of disposal/ disposition.
'Haqq al-wala': rights arising from a contract of agency.
'Haqq al-waza?f': rights arising from the appointment as a leader.
'Haqq Allah': Right of God, or public right.
'Haqq lii muall jf : author's right.
'Haqq mutlaqah': absolute, unqualified right.
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'Haram' ('hurmah'): forbidden, prohibited, unlawful,	 illegal.
'Hikr': real rights on land which is given in endowment or in perpetuity.
'Hisbah': the enforcement of market and public moral.
'Hissan': in the physical sense.
'Hiyazah or wad' yad': means occupancy and taking possession or control.
'Hudud': (p1. of 'hadd') the prescribed penalty for capital offences in Islam.
'Hukm' (p1. 'ahkam') as in 'hukm sharai':law, value or ruling of the Shari'ah.
'Hukama": those possessed with wisdom.
'Hurriyyah al-ama!': freedom to engage in occupation.
'Jbahah ': a permissible act.
'Iddah' : the waiting period following dissolution of marriage by death or divorce.
'Idhtirar' : emergency, exigency.
'Ihsan': benovelence, performance of good deeds.
'lhtikar': hoarding, monopoly.
'Ihya al-mawat': the reclamation of dead! unutilised land.
'Ijarah': lease/ hire/ tenancy.
'Ijazah' : authorisation.
'!jazah bil-fatwa' : licence to issue religious ruling.
'Ijazah bit-tadris': licence to teach.
'Ijazah bit-tadris wa!-fatwa' : licence to teach and issue religious ruling.
'Ijma': consensus of opinion among jurists.
'Ijtihad' :lit.exertion and usually the effort a jurist makes in order to deduce the law,
which is not self evident, from its sources.
'Ikhtilaf: juristic disagreement.
'Ikhrisas a! hajiz': exclusive assignment.
'Ikhtiyar': by choice, election, option.
'I!lah' :effective cause or ratio legis of a particular ruling.
'Em': knowledge, science, scholarship, eduction.
'Intaj al-zihni al-mubtakir': original intellectual creations.
'Int?fa' : enjoyment (of property), making use of, utilization, availing oneself of.
'Inqida' al-haqq' : the termination of right.
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'Iqtibas': adaptation, extraction, borrowing.
'Irtfaq' : rights of easement.
'Isaiah' : originality, authenticity, genuineness, purity of origin.
'Isti 'ma! al-haqq' : the use of right.
'Istfa' a! haqq': the fulfilment of right.
'Istihsan' to deem something good, juristic preference.
'Istislahat': technical vocabulary.
'Istinbat' :inference, deducing a somewhat hidden meaning from a given text.
'Istikhiaf': to appoint as successor.
'Istila' ala al-kala wa al-ajam' : finder of grazing field.
'Istila' ala al-ma 'adin wa ai-kunuz': finder of mines and treasure.
'Istiqrar' : permanence, stability, constancy.
'Istishab'
'Istislah': means taking the public interest into account (Schact's glossary in An Introduction
to Islamic Law)
'Istiyad': hunting.
'Ittifaq': consent I agreement.
'Izdn': affirmative permission.
'Jaizan mashru 'an' : valid and lawful.
'Jawaz ai-Shar'i' : lawful enjoyment under the Shari'ah.
'Jihad': holy war.
'Jumhur ulama': the dominant majority of the jurists.
'Kabiruna': an expression used to refer to the group of people who are senior than
others.
'Kala' : herbage.
'Karahah' (or 'karahiyyah') : abhorrence, abomination.
'Kathir': often, frequently.
'Khabar': news, report, also a synonym for 'hadith'.
'Khass' :specific, a word or a text which conveys a specific meaning.
'Khiiafah': the concept of stewardship.
'Khiyanah': an act of betrayal.
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'Kitabiyyah': People of the Book, a phrase used to refer to the Jews and the
Christians.
'Khulu': a special form of divorce whereby the wife redeems herself by purchasing
her freedom.
'La dharar wa la dhirar' no harm done nor harm done in return.
'Madhhab' (p1. 'madhahib'): juristic/theological school.
'Mafsadah': harm.
'Mahall al-haqq' : ' locus' or object of 'haqq'.
'Mahar': dowry for marriage.
'Majliyy': referring to the physical embodiments in which ideas are expressed.
'Makruh' : abominable, reprehensible acts.
'Ma!' : subject matter of legal transaction or property.
'Maliyyah': financial gains.
'Mandub': recommendable.
'Manfa 'ah': usufructuary rights.
'Mania 'ah mubahah' : usufrnctuary rights which are lawful.
'Man lahu haqqan faliwarathihi' : a claim (haqq) can be transmitted through
inheritance.
'Mansha": the inception! source, origin.
'Maqasid' (p1. of 'maqsud') :goals and objectives.
'Ma 'ruf : what is moral and desirable.
'Mashaf': written manuscript, often used to denote the written manuscript of the
Qur' an.
'Maslahah': considerations of public interest.
'Maslahah mursalah' : unrestricted public interest.
'Mazalim' : Board of Grievances.
'Mu 'add al-istighial' : excessive damage.
'Mu 'amalah': commercial transactions.
'Mu 'aqat': impermanent.
'Mubah' : permissible goods/ property.
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'Mubasharah' : direct.
'Mubtakir': newly created.
'Muhaddithin' : narrators of 'hadith 's.
'Muhtasib' : the market inspector.
'Mujarrad': personal rights, pure rights.
'Mujtahids': the persons who exercise independent opinion
'Mukallaf': a competent person who is in full possession of his faculties, legal
capacity or the party of incidence.
'Munkarat' : what is not desirable and is condemned.
'Muqayyad' : confined, qualified.
'Muqawala': contract, agreement.
'Musabib': the person causing damage.
'Mustawalli': capturer, the person who seize, expropriated.
'Mut'ah': consolatary gift upon divorce.
'Mutaqarrir': property rights, rights which are quantifiable and be legally transacted.
'Mutaqawwimah': property which can be valued in monetary terms.
'Mushtari 'aadi' : the ordinary consumer.
'Mutlaqah ':absolute, unqualified.
'Muzara 'ah' : agricultural joint venture agreement.
'Milkiyyah' : the concept of ownership.
'Mirath': inheritance.
'Nadir': rare, seldom, scarce, infrequent.
'Nadjassatihi': uncleanness.
'Na-fa-a': literally benefit or utility
'Nahy': prohibition.
'Najash': artificial price raising.
'Naqli': transmitted as e.g, in 'transmitted proofs' to be distinguished from 'rational
proofs'.
'Nar': fire.
'Nass' : a clear injunction, an explicit textual ruling (provision, only used in the
context of the provision of the Qur'an and the Sunnah).
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'Nata'ij' : the end resultl the consequence.
'Nawafil': superogatory.
'Nazr': an expressed vow to do any act or to dedicate property for any purpose
allowed by Islamic Law.
'Nikah': the contract of marriage.
'Nisbi': relative, comparative, proportional.
'Nusus' (p1. of 'nass') : clear textual rulings.
'Nusyuz': wife unlawfully refuses to obey lawful wishes or commands of husband.
'Qadi': judge.
'Qat'i': definitive, decisive, free of speculative content.
'Qisas' : just retaliation.
'Qur'an': the Holy Book.
'Quyud': limitations.
'Raqabah': substance.
'Riba' : usury/ interest.
'Riwayah': narration, transmission.
'Rukhsah' : concession or concessionary law, that is law which is modified due to the
presence of mitigating factors.
'Rukn': pillar, essential ingredient.
'Sabab' (p1. 'asbab'): cause, means of obtaining something.
'Sadaqah': alms, charity.
'Sadd al-zara 'i' : ( lit) blocking the means.
'Saghiruna': an expression used to denote a group of people who are junior among
others.
'Sahih': valid, authentic.
'Sahib al-haqq': the nght-owner/ bearer.
'Sama" : a certificate of audition.
'Sanad': basis, proof, authority.
xxxviii
'S/wi ": thing, object.
'Shakhsiah': personality.
'Shamil': comprehensive.
'Shari'ah': literally means the path denoting the way of life ordained by God.
'Shart' (p1. 'shurut'): condition.
'Shura': consultation.
'Sufaha": those who are ignorant.
'Sunnah': the deed, saying and practice of the Prophet.
'Su isti 'ma! al-haqq' : misuse of rights.
'Ta 'ah': an act of obedience or submission.
'Ta 'assuffi isti'mal al-haqq': the wrongful use of rights.
'Tahalli': abandonment
'Tahrim': prohibition, or rendering something into haram.
'Tahsiniyyah': matters which relates to the embellishment of a right.
'Tajawuz hudud al-shar'iyyah': the transgression of rights.
'Takhsis': specifying the general.
'Taklzf: liability, obligation.
'Talaq' : divorce initiated by the husband.
'Ta 'urn' : education, instruction.
'Ta 'uk' : dissolution of marriage upon dissolution of marriage.
'Taqlid': imitation, following the views and opinions of others.
Taqawwum' : having commercial value.
'Tasabbub' : indirect without causation.
'Tasarruf: disposal rights / alienation rights of the owned property.
'Tashri ": legislation.
'Taskhir' : exploitation, utilization, subjugation.
'Ta 'wid ad-darar' : make amends for the damage.
'Tawqit': temporary.
'Ta 'zir' : deterrence, discretionary penalty determined by the 'qadi'.
'Tazwir': a fabrication of a mark which corresponds exactly with the original mark.
'Thaman' : the purchase price.
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'Thamarah': literally means fruits. In legal terminology, it is used to refer to those
kinds of thing which emanate from a tangible property.
'Thubut': something which is or becomes a manifest and an indubitable fact or event.
'Tullab': student / disciple.
'Ulama': religious scholars.
'Ulu al-amr' : persons in authority and in charge of community affairs.
'Ummah': Muslim society.
'Un 'am' : a customary practice which is prevalent everywhere and on which the
people agree regardless of the passage of time.
'Urf khass' : a customary practice which is prevalent in a particular locality,
profession and trade.
Ustadh': teacher, spiritual leader.
'Usulfiqh': the branch of science on the method of deduction of legal principles in
Islamic scholarship.
'Wahy' : divine revelations.
'Wajib': obligatory, often synonymous to 'lard'.
'Wajib 'ayni': personal obligation.
'Wajib kafa'i' : collective obligation of the entire community.
'Wakalah': contracts of agency.
'Waqf': gift left in perpetuity, inalienable estate.
'Wazifah': the contract of employment / service.
'Wujub': obligation, rendering something obligatory.
'Wujud': something which is real, established or confirmed, as a truth or fact;
something which is necessitated, unavoidable or incumbent.
Wasilah': the means, method.
'Zann' ('Zanni'): speculation, doubt, conjecture.
'Zahir': manifest, apparent.
'Zakat': almsgiving, alms tax.
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NOTES ON TRANSLITERA11ON
The following system has been followed in transliterating Arabic words (without
diacritics).
.	 a
a
L.b
th
Ch
kh
dh
Jr
jz
LS
sh
LS
Jz
gh
(Ji
(fl
Jw
.i au
ay
Source: Encyclopedia of Islam (Second Edition)
The thesis uses the following methods:
1. Arabic terms that have been Anglicised, i.e which have entries in the Oxford
English Dictionary (1989) are non-italicised, but they are mentioned in the
Glossary, e.g Shari'ah, Islam, Zakat, Allah, Mufti, Sunnah, Qur'an, Ummah,
Qadi.
2. Arabic terms are italicised and with Arabic transliteration (without diacritics).
3. Malay terms (including those of Arabic origin) are underlined.
4. Latin and other foreign words are placed in inverted comas.
1INTRODUCTION
1	 Problem defined and statement of intent
Intellectual property law is a relatively new but increasingly important area of law in
Malaysia. If Philips(1986) points to the statistical significance and importance of
intellectual property law in the UK, initial research shows a very different situation
in Malaysia. In fact, in terms of research, the present writer is only aware of one
previous study at the Ph.D level (Khaw Lake Tee, LSE, 1990).
Despite there being a Copyright Act, a Patent Act, a Trademark Act and other relevant
Acts (Contracts Act and Civil Law Act 1957), one finds numerous infringements,
abuses and rampant disregard for these laws, the thriving businesses of "pirate
copying" and uncontrolled photocopying being just two examples. Without a doubt,
lack of understanding, awareness and enforcement are contributing reasons for the
existing state of affairs. However, it is when one asks what causes this lack of
understanding, awareness and enforcement, that one is led to the underlying cause of
inappropriate and sometimes irrelevant "wholesale import" of the U.K. laws into
Malaysia. Despite inheriting the British legal system upon independence, it is
increasingly recognised and acknowledged that reforms are needed in many areas of
the law to make them more suitable for Malaysia, intellectual property possibly being
one such area. The laws of the land must reflect the religious, cultural and social
values of Malaysian society as well as take into consideration the corresponding
economic and political factors. Laws which fail to satisfy this "local" requirement, are
bound to seem ineffective.
It is the aim of this study to analyse and evaluate the current legislation relating to
intellectual property in Malaysia and to suggest necessary reforms needed, taking into
consideration the society, with its institutions and values. Such a study is necessarily
an interdisciplinary effort and not one that is confmed to the analysis of the legislation
only. The position of Islam as the "religion of the state" and the renewed interest in
Islamic law in Malaysia, will also serve to introduce the view in Islamic scholarship
2on this matter of intellectual property. This prominent position given to Islam in the
Federal Constitution and the strong religous sentiment of the Muslims (who form the
majority in Malaysia), cannot be overlooked or dismissed lightly by the legislators and
on the contrary, must be taken into serious consideration in any future legislative
reforms. Although not known as having "intellectual property laws" Islam has a very
detailed moral code of ethics and laws which can apply to modern issues such as
copyright, patenting and misuse of information and trade marks.
It is our contention that while studies on Intellectual property laws in Malaysia are far
too scarce, there is a vacuum that exists on the legal framework of these rights. Little
has been done to analyze intellectual property laws from an Islamic point of view.
2.	 Objectives of the study
The aims of this study can be epitomised as follows:
i)To analyse and evaluate the current legislation on intellectual property in Malaysia.
This involves the following:
a) the analysis of the relevant Acts relating to intellectual property in Malaysia
b) a comparative analysis with the legislation in the UK and if possible, with
other common law countries and EC countries (this would also involve the
question of defmitions).
c) evaluation of Malaysian legislation as compared to the U.K and other common
law jurisdictions in terms of effectiveness and relevancy.
ii)	 To provide an understanding of Malaysian society in terms of the relationship
between religous, cultural and social values to the development of legislation. This
entails the following:
a) overview of "Malaysian" society (historical perspective).
b) analysis of the position and importance of religous and cultural values in
Malaysian society.
c) overview of the Malaysian legal system and the position of religion and
custom.
3iii)	 To study the position of Islam as "the religion of the state" and the Islamic
view on intellectual property. This requires the following:
a) an historical account of the position of Islam in Malaysia.
b) the scope and present position of Islamic law in Malaysia.
c) an elaboration of the Islamic view on intellectual property.
iv)	 To suggest relevant reforms to the intellectual property laws in Malaysia as
well as to propose how Islam can contribute to these reforms. This entails the
following:
a) the evaluation of the present intellectual property laws on in Malaysia in terms
of their consistency and inconsistency with Islamic principles,
b) where the present standards are inconsistent with the Islamic principles, to
suggest reforms by emulating other available alternatives which are practised
in other jurisdictions.
3.	 Scope of study and the outline of chapters.
This study is undertaken with the hypothesis that the present Intellectual Property laws
in Malaysia are to be tested in terms of their consistency with Islamic values and legal
theory. A study of this kind will not be sufficient if the laws governing intellectual
property are not examined from their theoretical and conceptual undertakings.
Therefore, in this study, we have concentrated on three main areas which constitute
the body of laws governing intellectual property i.e in terms of the philosophy and
rules governing the existence, ownership and exercise of intellectual property rights.
From the point of existence and ownership, this study endeavours to develop a
coherent and logical conceptual framework from an Islamic perspective, which can
be further developed to explain the basis of rights. A theoretical and conceptual
framework is needed for building a sound philosophical base for the formulation of
legal rules. From the point of existence and exercise of rights, this study attempts
to identify the Islamic parameters from the analysis of certain fundamental legal
concepts which have been developed by Muslim jurists.
4This study being a conceptual work, concentrates only on the main theoretical
construct which governs intellectual property, leaving aside the technical parts which
would not affect the validity of these rights. In choosing these areas, we have
basically adopted an approach based on logic from conceptual viewpoint and adding
some of the more distinct areas in intellectual property. It is felt that the scope of
analysis is sufficient to provide a relatively comprehensive comparative study of
intellectual property from Islamic perspective.
The thesis is divided into four parts. The first part looks at the historical background
of Intellectual Property legislations in Malaysia, their changes and future prospect.
This part comprises two chapters. Chapter one examines the position of Islam and the
Shari'ah in Islam, adopting a historical approach by looking into factors which
contribute to the minimal use of the Shari'ah in the current Malaysian legal system.
Chapter two focusses on the roots of the present intellectual property laws in
Malaysia. This chapter, which also adopts a historical approach, traces the
introduction of intellectual property law by the British and the changes and
developments which have occured since then.
The second part, comprising chapter three and four examines the existence and
position of ownership of intellectual property in Islamic Jurisprudence. Chapter three
analyses the normative framework of property rights under Islamic Law. It is first
examined whether the intellectual property constitute a 'ma!' (property) in Islamic
jurisprudence. Such an inquiry involves the examination of the meaning, definition
and classification of 'ma!'. For that purpose, it is pertinent that we address the
jurisprudential arguments against the recognition of intellectual property which
includes the prohibition against concealment of knowledge. Finally, the chapter
analyses the nature of the proprietary rights in intellectual property, emphasizing the
main criteria of property such as transferability, alienability, exclusivity and duration.
The focus of the inquiry is the distinction between intangible rights of intellectual
property and the rights in the physical embodiments of them.
Chapter four proceeds with the analysis of the justification and basis of intellectual
5property. For purposes of comparison and consistency of theme, the chapter traces the
evolution of the property conception in intangible rights in natural right theories by
focussing on the Locke's justification of property rights in intellectual ideas. One of
the issues central to the determination of existence of rights is to establish the basis
of such rights. For that purpose, it is pertinent that the basis of ownership rights as
have been expounded by Muslim jurists and scholars be examined. This in turn
involves the analysis of the concept of 'haqq' (legal rights) and 'milkiyyah'
(ownership). From the point of 'milkiyyah', this chapter analyses the mode of
acquisition of property under Islamic Law and questions whether the acquisition of
intellectual property can be accepted on any of the recognised bases of ownership in
Islamic scholarship.
The third part, which comprises chapter five, six and seven, deals with the
enjoyment of Intellectual Property in Malaysia and will go into detail of the various
subject-matters of Intellectual Property. This study examines the three main subject
matters of Intellectual Property : copyright, patents and trade marks and focussing on
the subsistence and the scope of those rights.
Copyright, being a non-monopoly right, has often been quoted as an important
impetus to the dissemination of works. Chapter five explains the role of copyright,
particularly, the way copyright laws mediate between control and access. This
delicate and precise balance between control and access becomes the focal point to
determine the formulation of copyright laws. To this end, issues which are central to
copyright are examined and particularly the twin issues of moral and economic rights.
As to the latter, the relevant key issues identified are the issues pertaining to the
subsistence and the scope of right. As the study cannot pretend to be exhaustive, we
have been selective in our choice of issues which ensures that most of the main issues
are well represented.
Chapter six explores and assesses of the acceptability of patents from an Islamic
perspective, from the point of view of the long-held assumption that patents are forms
of monopolistic rights. To achieve this, the linkage between patents, labour, profit
6motivation, wealth and economic parameters are examined from Islam's point of
view. The study also endeavours to identify an alternative theory which can be further
developed into a logically derived range of policy prescriptions which can be used to
determine the scope of patents. It is our contention that while the subsistence of
patents can be justified, the exact parameters of patents can also be determined from
an Islamic point of view.
Chapter seven proceeds to question the regulatory functions of trade marks in an open
market system, emphasizing on their informative function which directly serves
consumers' interests. From the Islamic perpective, the subsistence of trade marks can
be seen from the historical role of 'hisbah' (market inspector) which is examined in
full in this chapter. This hypothesis can be further substantiated with further
principles, which can be derived at, from the examination of general concepts on fair
trade and dealing in Islam. As far as the association between trade marks and
consumer's interest is concerned, this chapter assesses the consumer's participation
in trade marks. For that purpose the chapter examines the deployment of consumers
in the determination of confusion and deception in establishing infringements of trade
marks. Here, the exact nature of the symbiosis between trade marks and consumers
becomes the focal point.
In part four, which comprises chapter 8, analyses the various limits of Intellectual
Property, both within and without the Intellectual Property legislation. This chapter
attempts to identify factors which delineate intellectual property including limits drawn
in the name of public interest and limits drawn to maintain competitive forces in the
present free market mechanisms. The chapter seeks to analyse how these limits work
in avoiding the creation of monopolistic situations and reducing the abuse of the
competitive advantage conferred by intellectual property.
4.	 Methodology, Sources and Limitations.
Since this study involves the analysis of concepts and issues from Islamic
perspectives, the methodology adopted must necessarily be reflective of Islamic
7scholarship. As far as the sacred works are concerned, we have referred to the
authentic sources. The Qur'an is consistently referred to with the assistance of the
translation by Au, 'Abdullah Yusuf, The Glorious Qur'an : Translation and
Commentary (New Revised Edition), (1989), International Institute of Islamic
Thought, Maryland.
Equally, an authoritative body of 'hadiths' (stories of the Prophet) are referred to,
which includes the English translation of the Prophetic traditions:
i)	 Sahih Bukhari, of Al-Bukhari, Muhammad ibn. Ismail, Arabic-English,
translated into English by Muhammad Muhsin Khan (1962), S.G.Ali & Sons,
Lahore;
ii) Sahih Muslim of Muslim b. al-Hajjaj, , (rendered into English by Abdul Hamid
Siddiqi (1972-1975), Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore;
iii) Al-Muwatta' of Malik b. Anas, Abu Abd Allah al-Asbahi (d. 179H), which
is translated by Aishah 'Abd al-Rabman and Ya'qub Johnson, (1982),
Cambridge, (edited by Muhammad Fu'ad Abd al-Baqi, Cairo,
195 1)'Muwatta' of Imam Malilc.
Besides these English translations, this study consults the original Arabic texts which
are listed below:
i) Al-Jami' al-Sahih of Al-Tarmizi, Abi Isa Muhammad ibn. Isa ibn. Sawrah,,
(209-279H), edited by Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, (1937), Matba'ah Mustafa
al-Babi al-Halabi Wa-Awladuhu, Cairo;
ii) Sunan al- Darrimi of Al-Darimi, Abdullah ibn. Abd a! Rahman (d.255H), Dar
al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah, 2 vols.,(1984), Hadith Akadimi, Pakistan;
iii) Jami' Masanid al-Imam al-'A'zam of Al-Khuwarazmi, Muhammad ibn.
Mahmud, (d. 665H), (collection of the traditions transmitted from Abu
Hanifah by various authors), (1332H), Matba'ah Majlis Dairah al-Ma'rf at-
Ka 'inah, India;
iv) Al-Ta rghib wa al-Tarhib Mm al-Hadith al-Sharif of A1-Munziri, Abdul Azim
ibn Abdul Quwa, , (d. 656H) 4 Vols., ed. by Mustafa Muhammad 'Imarah,
Dar al-Ulwn, Egypt;
8v) Sunan Abu Dawud Wa Ma 'aiim al-Sunan ii Abi Sulaiman al-Khitabi of Al-
Munziri, (edited by Ibn. Qayyim al-Jawziyyah), (n.d) Dar al-Ma'ariflil-Tiba'ah
wal-Nasr, Beirut.
For a clearer elucidation of 'hadith 's, we have sought the assistance of the works of
other scholars which are as follows:
i) Al-Nawawi, Muhyiddin Abi Zakariyya Yahya Ibn. Sharaf (63 l-686H), Sharh
Sahih Muslim, (1978), Dar al-Qalain, Beirut;
ii) Al-'Ayni, Badr al-Din Mahmud b. Ahmad, Umdat al-Oari ii Sharh a!-
Bukhari,( 1 308H), Matba 'ah Dar al-iba 'ah al-Amirah; Al-Asqalani;
iii) Shihab al-Din Abi al-Fad! Ahmad b. Mi Muhammad Hajar (d. 852H0), Fat/i
al-Ban Ii Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, (1301H), Matba'ah al-Kubra al-Amiriyyah,
Cairo;
iv) Umdat al-Salik wa 'Uddat al-Nasik, translated into English by Noah ha him
Keller, The Reliance of the Traveller, (1991), Modern Printing Press, Dubai.
As far as jurisprudential works are concerned, we have sought guidance from
contemporary works of modern scholars. This is not to deny the fact that classical
works constitute the main references as far as Islamic scholarship is concerned. The
reference to classical works is somewhat limited due to the nature of our inquiry
which is best characterised as a contemporary issue. Contemporary works which
constitute the main references are listed below:
i)	 Al-Darini, Fathi et.al, Haag al-Ibtikar fi al-Figh al-Islami al-Mugaran, (1984),
Muassasah al-Risalah, Beirut;
ii) A1-Khafif, Mi, Al-Milkiyyah fi Al-Shari 'ah al-Islamiyvah Ma 'a al-Mugaranah
bi al-Shara 'i al-Wad'iyyah,(1966), Ma 'ahad al-Buhuth wa ai-Dirasat a!-
Arabiyyah, Cairo;
iii) Al-Ibadi, Abdul Salam Daud, Al-Milkivah fi al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyvah;
Tabi'atuha wa Wazifatuha wa Quvuduha; Dirasah Mu garanah bi al-Oawanin
wa an-Nuzum al-Wad'ivyah, 2 Vols, (1974), al-Maktabah al-Aqsa, Jordan;
iv) Al-Zarqa, Mustafa Ahmad, Ai-Madkhal ila Nazaniyyah al-Iltizam al-Ammah,
(1946), Marba'ah Ja,ni'ah, Damascus;
9iv)	 Mahmassani, Subhi, Rajab, The General Theor y of Law of Obligations and
Contracts Under Islamic Jurisprudence: A Comparative Study of The Islamic
Rites Form the Modem Standpoint (1948), the Arabic title is al-Nazarivyah al-
'Ammah ii al-Mu jabat wa al-Ugud Il al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah : bahth
Muparan fi al-Madhahib al-Mukhtalifah wa al-Oawanin al-Hadithah, (1983),
Dar al-Jim al-Malayin, Beirut, (3rd. edition).
Therefore in our task of defining the Islamic paradigm, we seek assistance from the
primary sources in the Qur'an and the 'Sunnah' and the writing of other Muslim
scholars. It should be noted at the outset the importance of the rule of reason and
logic especially on technical aspects which would not be within the domain of 'fiqh'
(jurisprudence). In determining conformity with Islamic principles, we have adopted
the cautious approach by using the rule of construction that unless a certain practice
is prohibited by the Qur'an and the Sunnah, then it should be accepted. In most
instances, where technical issues are not relevant as far as the subsistance and scope
of rights are concerned, these issues are left unexplored.
To overcome the problem of validity in our construction of the Qur'anic, Prophetic
and legal principles, we are assisted by guidance by many academicians in
universities and institute of higher learning who have contributed tremendously in
terms of intellectual ideas and thinking.
In choosing topical issues which are covered in this thesis we are also assisted by the
various discussions and the legal developments which have taken place in other
Muslim countries such as the comparative work by al-Fatlawi in Iraq and Mangalo's
excellent article on the UAE trade marks system. More and more discussion is
coming about in other Islamic/Muslim countries particularly in the Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates. These Muslim countries have been the focus of attention
because of the high percentage of piracy and counterfeiting in them.
With respect to the common law regime, the sources include:
i)	 legislation pertaining to intellectual property in Malaysia which includes the
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Copyright Act 1987, Trade Marks Act 1976 and Patents Act 1983. The recent 1994
amendments to the Trade Marks Act and the Patents Act have been incorporated. As
far as the Copyright Act is concerned, it has been announced that certain changes are
pending which are awaiting a reading in Parliament sometime this year. The
Malaysian government has also anounced the introduction of local legislation on
industrial designs and competition. These two legislative instruments are still in the
drafting stage. Like other legislative drafts, no access can be obtained to them and
this somewhat restricts our coverage of them. Finally, Malaysia being a member of
the Berne Convention, Paris Convention and GATT, these international treaties are
referred to, in order to assess Malaysia's obligations under them.
ii) Interviews have also been conducted with the officers in the Intellectual
Property Unit of the Ministry of Trade and of the enforcement section of the Ministry
of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs. These interviews are relevant to gauge the
policy directions of those involved in policy making and to provide an insight of the
local scenario of the enjoyment of intellectual property laws in Malaysia. Further
assistance is sought from consumer associations particularly the Consumer Association
of Penang which has enlightened us on the issues which concern 'local' needs.
iii) reports of decided cases in Malaysia, the U.K and other relevant jurisdictions.
The choice of jurisdictions is somewhat selective and not exhaustive. Despite its
selective nature, care has been taken to ensure that important and relevant decisions
pertaining to the present discussion are covered.
A study of this nature almost certainly has some limitations. The first and probably
the biggest limitation is the lack of literature and discussion of various issues
pertaining to Intellectual property in Islamic jurisprudence. In Malaysia, intellectual
property itself is an infant subject, even more the comparative study of intellectual
property and Islam. While some discussion has taken place on the acceptability of
intellectual property as a whole in Islamic jurisprudence, there has been no or little
discussion on various related issues. Added to this is the difficulty in understanding
the key concepts in intellectual property which are somewhat technical in nature. This
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is particularly true for patents, where most issues are related to economics and
science. A comprehensive analysis of intellectual property should be based on the
premise that these rules as a whole are an amalgam of economics and legal concepts.
Secondly, the presently available discussion of the Islamic perpective is restricted to
the justification and acceptance of intellectual property with little analysis on the scope
of right. This thesis endeavours to transcends the barrier of existence of right, by
considering as well the scope, the exercise and the limitation of rights.
A pioneering study like this also suffers from the unavailability of reference materials
on the methodology of analysis and comparison of intellectual property laws and the
Shari'ah. Despite these limitations, the choice of issues has been made as
comprehensive as possible, though the analysis and comparisons will have to be
judged by the readers themselves.
Another limitation is the lack of a conceptual framework which forms the basis of the
protection of intellectual property laws in Malaysia in guiding the formation of policy
principles and the formulation of legal rules. Most changes are made on a pragmatic
basis, therefore most principles are adopted piecemeal. There is therefore an acute
difficulty in discerning any coherent philosophy which determines the future
formulation of legal principles. From our discussion with the officials in the
Intellectual Property Unit of the Ministry of Trade, the need to maintain an
encouraging environment for foreign investment and technology transfer has been
quoted as the main factor in policy making. In this sense, it can be criticised that
while external factors are given priority, local factors play no influential role in
shaping policy direction.
It is our contention that Islam and Islamic jurisprudence offers a coherent and
conceptually systematic paradigm, which in deeper analysis, can satisfy both our
current obligations under international treaties, as well as our obligation to practice
our religion to the fullest. Such a study accords with the present renewed interest in
the 'Islamization' of laws. It has been recently announced that the Malaysian
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government has appointed a committee comprising of, among others, the present
Attorney General and Prof. Emeritus Ahmad Ibrahim, to undertake the task of
assimilating common law and Islamic principles. While it is difficult to anticipate
when full 'Islamization' will take effect, or if it ever will, a study of this kind can
offer, to a certain extent, the kind of direction and policy alternatives which can be
adopted in implementing laws which are consistent with Islamic principles and rules.
It is felt that no serious research has been conducted in the area outlined above and
that this study will contribute significantly to the development of a more relevant and
appropriate legislation on intellectual property in Malaysia that is sensitive to its
"local" needs.
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CHAPTER ONE
DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAM AND ISLAMIC LAW
IN MALAYSIA
I	 Introduction
Ample researches are conducted on the position of Islam in the colonial Malaya and
the contemporary Malaysia.' Most studies on Islam in the colonial Malaya are from
the historical perspectives, from the advent of Islam in Malaya to the actual
penetration of Islam and the Islamic values in the early 13th century. The supremacy
of Islam and the Islamic law during this period cannot be dismissed lightly. It was
readily accepted that if not for the active interference by the British, Islam would have
remained the law of the land in Malaysia now2.
This chapter, traces the role played by Islam and the Islamic law in Malaysia from
the moment Islam set foot in Malaya (as it then was) up till the present day. It is
important to understand the changes that took place during the British administration
for any study on the basis of today's religious law and institutions in Malaysia.
See Yegar, Moshe, Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya; Policies and Implementation,
(1979) The Magues Press, Jerusalem; Abdullah, Abu Bakar, Ke Arah Perlaksanaan Undang-undang Islam
di Malaysia: Masalah dan Penyelesaiannya, (1986) Pustaka Damai, Terengganu, Malaysia; Wilkinson, RJ,
Papers on Malay Subjects, Federated Malay States Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1908; Ibrahim,
Ahmad,Parallel S ystems of Law in Malaysia and Singapore, (1976) Vol 3 Part 1 JMCL, p.1-34, Hooker,
M.B, The Personal Laws of Malaysia; An Introduction (1976) Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur,
Hooker, M.B, Reading in Mala y Adat Laws, (1970) Singapore University Press, Singapore, Jusoh, Hamid
Pemakaian Undang-Undang Islam Kini dan Masa Depannya di Malaysia, Al-Ahkam, jilid I (Prof. Ahmad
Ibrahim dil), Ahmad Ibrahim, Islamic Law in Malaysia., JMCL 1981, Mackeen, Abdul Majeed Mohained,
Contemporary Islamic Legal Organization in Malaya. 1969, Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, and
standard text books on Malaysian Legal System such as the works of Wu Ming Aun, An Introduction to
the Malaysian Legal System, (1978) 2nd. ed., Heinemann Educational Books (Asia Ltd), Kuala Lumpur
and Yaacob, Abdul Monir, An Introduction to Malaysian Law, (1989), Penerbit University Kebangsaan
Malaysia, Bangi.
See Wilkinson, p.49 op.cit where he wrote;
"There can, however, be no doubt that Moslem law would have ended by becoming the law of Malaya had
not British law stepped in to check it."
See also Yegar's comment;, "it is accepted that the British penetration of Malaya dwing the last quarter of
the 19th. Century brought about radical changes in all areas of Malays' way of life, in its social, legal and
economic relationships, in the organisation of its government and even in its religious affairs."
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Before we go into a full discussion of the historical setting to the present mechanism
of application of the Islamic law, we will begin with a cursory examination on the
Shari'ah and its sources.
2	 The definition of Shari'ah and sources of law.
Literally, the term Shari'ah means the path denoting the way of life ordained by God
and hence is not confined to the corpus of a legal system as that of the civil law
system or common law system3. Principally in legal jurisprudence, the term Shari'ah
denotes the set of laws which are ordained by God, either through the Qur'an, which
is the book consisting His commandments or the practice of the Prophet Muhammad
(known as the Sunnah)4. While the Qur'an contains the letter of the rule as revealed
by God, the Sunnah represents the actualisation of the rule manifested in the actions,
sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h). Many of the rules contained
in the Shari'ah are not normally characterised as positive laws proper in any other
modem legal system5. The Qur'an and the Sunnah constitute the two major sources
of Islamic law. Muslims are asked to follow the dictates of the Qur'an and the
Sunnah in all matters governing their lives as Islam itself means a total submission to
the Will of God. Because of this need to fmd guidance and to find consistency with
the Divine Will, Muslim scholars have developed rules on construction and analogical
reasoning known as 'usulfiqh6'. Using these rules, Muslim scholars have developed
a body of legal rules known as 'fiqh '. The term 'flqh' in fact is the closest term to
This part contains only a cursory analysis of Shari'ah and its related concepts as this subject has been
analysed thoroughly in many works. Major works include, Ibrahim, Ahmad, Islamic Law in Malaya,
Hashim Kamali, Islamic Jurisprudence, and other works of Muslim scholars.
The main premise behind the primacy of the Qur'an and the Sunnah is the belief that the authority
to enact laws lies primarily in God.
This include among many, rules relating to 'ibadak' (forms of worship) and 'adab and akhiaq'
(morality and ethics).
6 
'Usulfiqh' is defined as the science of the principle whereby one reaches flqh in the true way. Most
of the definition of the legal term used here are based the works of Ahmad Ibrahim, Islamic Law in Malaya
op.cit and Kamali, Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, op.cit.
'Fiqh' is the identification of substantive legal rules from the Shari'ah principles.
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law in the modem sense.
The two most accepted methods of construction by the four Sunni schools of thought
are '{jma'8 and 'qiyas'. From these tools of constructions, rules are expounded on
the basis of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. These legal rules, however, have to be
founded and established by a text in the Qur'an and the Sunnah and should not result
in any change to the law embodied in the original prescription. Laws which are
expounded through these two mechanisms are normally accepted as valid and
represent the will of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. However, as compared to the
Qur'an and the Sunnah, rules derived through 'Ijma' and 'Qiyas' can be abrogated
and changed from time to time. 'Ijma' refers to the agreement of scholars on a
particular rule and hence provides the stamping of its validity and acceptability.
'Qiyas', on the other hand, denotes the method of analogical reasoning by deriving
analogy with an established rule in the Qur'an and Sunnah. Through 'qiyas', the
established rule in the text are extended to a new problem which is not directly
mentioned in the Qur'an and the Sunnah.9
Another related concept is 'if tihad' or the exercise of independent opinion guided by
the principles laid down in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The validity of 'iftihad' is
derived from the advice given by the Prophet (p.b.u.h) to Mu'adh ibn. Jabal to refer
to the Qur'an and the Sunnah in any matters and to use his independent thinking in
cases not covered by the Divine prescriptions. Elaborate rules were drawn on the
exercise of 'iftihad'. It is through the concept of 'if tihad' that legal reasoning and
jurisprudence in Islam flourished and contributed the formation of legal schools of
thought in the 7th and 8th A.D. The flexibility of 'jjtihad' as an instrument to
8 
'Ijma' refers to those legal opinion or 'ijtihad' which received consensus among scholars. The basic
validity and even existence of 'ijma' is the subject of disagreement among Muslim scholars. For a detailed
analysis see Kamali, Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, op.cit.
1 'Qiyas' (analogy) is a process of deduction by which a rule of law is applied in the absence of specific sacred text
to cases which, although not expressly, are implicitly governed by a legal text in view of a common effective cause('illah').
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propound laws was aptly described by a! Shafie, the founder of Shafi'ite school of
thought: "Whenever a ruler does his best and rules correctly, he will be doubly
rewarded (by God). If he does his best but the result is incorrect, he will also be
rewarded"t0
There are other tools of interpretation adopted by Muslim scholars which are
'istishab	 istihsan' 2' and 'istislah' 3'. These rules of construction are adopted by
different schools of law and hence are not regarded as primary sources of law.
3	 Malay states before the advent of British control
Since the coming of Islam to Malaya in the seventh century (A.D), Islam had had
tremendous influence in the life of the Malays, socially, politically and intellectually.
Scholars are in disagreement as to the actual date of Islamization of Malaya.
Abdullah (1986) is of the opinion that the first interaction between the Malays and
Islam occ.'rred in the 7th Century (A.D) through Arab traders which came to Kedah
and Palembang'4. Al Attas (1966), argues vehemently that the first conversion of
the Malays to Islam occsed in the 6th. Century (A.D).' 5
 Before the coming of
Islam, Peninsular Malaya was at that time under the influence of Javanese Hindu
rulers.
10 See Ahmad Ibrahim, Islamic Law in Malaya, Op.cit. Note that in the tenth century free reasoning was not
anymore allowed by the Sunni schools which made ':jtihad' akin to analogy.
1 
'Istishab' (deduction by presumption of continuity) means that once a rule has been confirmed it must remain in force
until a contrary rule is established (Abu Zahra, Tarikh al Mazahib al-lslamivya, Vol.11, p.138; Shorter Encyclopedia
of Islam)
12 
'Is:ihsan' refers to the method of analogical deduction preferred by the Hanafites as choosing the
better or 'favourable construction.
means taking the public interest into account (Schact's glossary in An Introduction to Islamic Law)
14 Beside traders from Arab lands, traders from India and China were also responsible to the
widespread of Islam to Peninsular Malaya.
15 To him, the islamizatioib of the archipelago underwent three phases. The first phase (from
aproximatel578-8O5/l200-1400j'was the phase of nominal conversiom or conversion of the body. The
second phase (from appmximately803-1 112/1400-1700) described as the period of the conversion of the
'spirit' saw he rising in%uencc and spread of philosophical mysticism, 'tasawwuf and 'kalam'. The third
phase (from 1112-1700 onwards) saw the continuation and consummation of the second phase coinciding
with the coming of the West. See Al Aflas, Syed Muhammad Naguib, (1966), Preliminary Statement On
A General Theory of The Malay-Indonesia Archipelago, Dewan Bahasa & Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur.
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Scholars are in agreement that Islam has brought a lot of changes to the Malays'
scope of thinking and intellectualism'6. At the political level, the Sultanates, which
were earlier influenced by Hindu concepts of 'dewa' (gods and goddesses in Hindu
religion) and semi-god, followed the concepts of the Sultanates from the Ottoman
Empire' 7. Socially, Malays pride themselves as Muslims, although they have very
restricted understanding of Islam. Islamic law was the governing law and the law of
general application. Many customary practices associated with Hindu influences were
retained; as a result many scholars agreed that the Islamic law which was enforced
during that time was a mixture of Islamic law and adat laws' 8. The assimilation of
Islam into the life of the Malays become a 'distinctive cultural phenomenon' and
constituted a 'comprehensive cultural variety'
When Islam first came to Malaya, it was a personal religion until the conversion of
the Malacan Sultanates in the thirteenth century (A.D). Many historians ascribed the
conversion of the Malacca sultanates to Islam as the paramount factor to the upgrading
of the status of Islam as an official religion and as a source of law. In Malacca, the
supremacy of the Islamic law was evident from the Malaccan digest or The Risalat
Hukum Kanun of A.D 152320. The Code consisted of criminal laws regulating
'qisas', 'hudud', 'taazir' and 'diyah'; transactions ('mu'amalah') such as trusts,
family law, evidence and procedural matters. The digest not only contained Islamic
16 Al Auas (1966) op.cit, argued that Islam has turned the world view of the Malay Muslims from the
crumbling world of mythology to the world of intelligence, reason and order through its rational theology
and metaphysics ('jim ai-ka!am and ':asawwuf') and the dissemination of Islamic legal thought (Islamic
jurisprudence and 'flqh').
17 See Mc Keen, op.cit.
18 See the works of Ahmad Ibrahim, WiLkinson and Yegar, op.cit.
19 Al-Attas (1966) aptly observed that this total assimilation is reflected in the Arabic script and the
Arabized lexicon and literature, certain modes of dress, musical and oral culture and socio-and legal
organisation.
20 Historians were of the view that the Malaccan digest was written after the dissolution of the
Malaccan sultanates under the Sultan of Riau. Unlike other digest, the Malaccan digest was based on a
set of laws which were actually enforced during the Malaccan Sultanate. For a text of the digest see, Fang,
Liaw Yock, Undang-undang Melaka A Critical edition, Singapore 1936.
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law but was also overlaid with relics of the Malay customary law 21 and relics of the
Hindu Law.22
The Malaccan digest became a model written law which was subsequently followed
by other Malay states including Pahang during the reign of Sultan Abdul Ghaffar
(1592-16 14 A.D), Perak (Ninety nine laws of Perak) which was administered in the
17th. Century (A.D) under the reign of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin Marhum Tanah Abang
and in Johore. In Johore besides this set of laws, 'Majallatul Ahkam' was also
translated and enforced for a period of time. 'Majallatul Ahkam' was a codification
of the Islamic Law based on the Hanafi school of law which was enforced in Turkey
in the early nineteenth century. Besides 'Majalatul Ahkam', the Hanafi
code of Qadri Pasha was adopted and translated as the 'Ahkam Shar'iyyah' Johore.
The state of Islamic law in Johore was quite advanced. Johore was the earliest state
to have a written constitution in Malaya (even among other Muslim / Islamic
countries). Even though Western historians asserted that the Constitution was drafted
by British, it was modelled after Islamic concepts of constitution 23. The influence
of Islamic concepts was clear as the Constitution sets out that the appointment of a
Sultan should be on the basis of 'bai 'ah' and 'istikhlaf' and with the consent of 'ahi
21 The two main body or sets of customary laws are the 'adat temenggong' and 'ada: perpatih'. Both
these set of laws were superimposed with Islamic influence. See Mat, Ismail, Adat and Islam in Malaysia:
A Study In Legal Conflict and Resolution, (u.p Ph.D thesis 1985, Temple University). He disagreed with
some Western scholars opinion that these customary laws were not influenced by Islam as they contained
elements which were contrary to Islam. To him the combination represented, rather, an attempt to reconcile
adat laws and Islamic law. He argued that the reduction of Islam as a personal and private law resulted in
the adat law being recognised as a separate body, the adjudication of which was unrelated to Islamic legal
thought.
It would seemed that most of the laws originate from Islamic law and some are direct translations
of books on Islamic jurisprudence. However, many of the sentences which were followed do not accord
with the imposition of penalties in Islam. (Ahmad Ibrahim, op. cit). Hooker explained this phenomenon
in his book. The Malaccan digest which consisted of six separate rules which are; (i) the Malacca law
"proper" which consisted of the general law, (ii) the maritime law (iii) Muslim marriage law, (iv) Muslim
law of sale (v) the laws of the state (vi) Johore laws. As far as the Islamic elements are concerned, there
are two types; one which is a mixture of Islamic laws and customary laws and the other which is Islamic
law proper. The first two sections of the Malacca digest existed and completed within the region of 1424-
1458. The Muslim law section which comprise of sub-sets (iii) and (iv) came much later, dating from the
sixteenth century. Thus as far as general laws were concerned, these were the result of reconcilation of adat
laws and Islamic law, see Hooker, M.B, (ed), (1986), Malaysian Le gal Essays, Malayan Law Journal,
Singapore par. p.431-457.
23 See also the Terengganu Constitution of 1911.
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hail wa a! aqd'. In addition, a Sultan under the Constitution is not above the law and
likewise is subjected to the supremacy of Islam and the Islamic Law.
This shows that prior to the arrival of British, some Malay states enforced Islamic
law even if not to the extent of the application of the entire body of laws known as
the Shari'ah. Islamic law became a major source of law and most disputes were
accordingly litigated and resolved on the basis of it. The application of Islamic law
was done on piece-meal basis and as there were no written statutes at that time,
juristic works by Muslim scholars in the Middle East became the major source of
law. A number of these works were translated into the Malay language to ease the
process of assimilation and application of the Islamic law.
The other states also applied Islamic law even though Islamic law remained uncodified
in these states. The state of Kelantan, situated north of Peninsular Malaya, was
known for its strict observance of Islam and the Islamic law under Sultan Muhammad
I and Sultan Muhammad II. Under their reigns, Islamic administration and judiciary
system in that state were set up. Terengganu, another state to the east of Malaya,
apparently, had the earliest history of the application of Islamic law. Traces of these
laws can be seen from the Inscripted stone (Batu Bersurat), the earliest evidence of
Islamic civilization in Peninsular Malaya.
In Perak, the influence of Islamic law can be seen from the Ninety- nine laws of
Perak, one of the rare written digests of Malay laws which was compiled the by
British administrators. These two digests represent the substantive laws which were
enforced and practised by the Malays at that time. This digest was heavily influenced
by Islamic law, consistent with other states which had Islam and Islamic law as the
24 Reference are made to works of scholars particularly of the school of Shafi'i Law, by the 14th
Century, among texts which are authoritative are those of Abu Shuja'aI-Ghayah (ca.1 106) and Nawawi
Minhaj al-Talibin (d. 1277), al-Mahalli (d.1459) and the works of commentators of Ibn Hajar al- Haitami
in aI-Tuhfah (d.1565) and al-Ramli (d.1596), Zain al-Din al-Malibari (d.1522) in Fath al-Mum.
Al-Attas argued that the correct date of this stone is 22nd. February, 1303 (AD) or 14th. Rejab,
702 (H). see Al Attas, Syed Muhammad Naguib, The Correct Date of Terengganu Inscri ption, Kuala
Lumpur. Muzium Negara, 1970.
20
major paradigm for any legal and social development. The Perak digest consisted of
99 legal dicta or judgements purpoted to have been delivered by the Persian Minister
Buzujmihr for the guidance of his master Nushirwan 'the just'. This digest owed a
lot of similarity with the Malaccan digest. In terms of substantive legal rules, the
application of Islamic law was quite wide. The digest governed matters ranging from
family, marriage, divorce and matrimonial property, public law and administration,
evidence and civil procedure, criminal law, inheritance and distribution of property
upon death, tort and negligence, property and rules regarding proper conduct and
ceremonial occasions26.
4	 Malay States under the administration of British
The prominence of Islamic law as the applicable law continued under the British
administration in most Malay states with the exception of Straits Settlement. 27 The
total imposition of English law in the Straits Settlement and the reasons given by the
British to this different treatment was somewhat unsatisfactory. Unlike other Malay
states, Straits Settlement was under direct British control. Decided cases in Kelantan,
Kedah, Perlis and Johore28 and the important Court of Appeal's decision of Ramah
v. Laton.29
 in the Federated Malay States illustrate the extensive application of
Islamic law.
The first step taken by the British upon getting control of the Malay states was to
26 For the translation of the digest, see Rigby, J; The Nine-Nine Laws of Perak; Hooker, M.B,
Readings in Malay Adat Laws, op.cit p.57.
27 In the case of Shaik Abdul Latif and others v. Shaik Elias Bux (1915) 1 F.M.S.L.R. 204 Braddell
CJ.0 in his judgement said:
"Before the first treaties the population of these states consisted solely of Mohammadan Malays with a large
industrial and mining Chinese community in their midst. The only law at that time applicable to Malays
was Mohammedan modified by local customs".
See Fatimah bt. Harris v. Haji Ismail bin Tamim, Law Reports of the State of Johore, 1938- 1940
pp.67-69.
The Court of Appeal of the Federated Malay State held in Ramah v. Laton (1927) 6 F.M.S.L.R. 127
that Muslim law is not foreign law but local law and the law of the land. The Court must take judicial
notice of it and must pmpound the law.
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appoint the British advisors 30. The function of the British advisors were to advise
the Sultans on matters relating to administration of states. Matters relating to Islam
and customs were outside the power of the advisors. This, however, was not strictly
followed. Because of the British narrow understanding of the Shari'ah as a law of
general application, the tendency was to construe the Shari'ah as a personal law in
a secular way, to govern only personal matters. 3 ' Hence in matters which are
regarded as part of public law, English law was introduced as law of general
application. The intrusion of English law came in two ways, by the introduction of
statutes which were modelled after English law and indirectly through the
interpretation of English judges 32. Another step taken by the British was the reform
30 The Malay states were theoretically independent of British rule and only expected to listen to British
advice, see Mighel v. Sultan of Johore, where the government of Johore was recognised as an independent
government and Duff Development Company v. Government of Kelantan on the independent status of the
Kelantan government. Instead most of the English statutes enforced in the straits Settlement were introduced
in the Malay States. This includes all the statutes governing copyright, industrial design, invention and
patent and trade mark and other commercial matters.
The British administrators' prejudices and misconceived ideas on Islam was clear in the judge's
statement in Ong Cheng Neo v. Yap Kwan Seng (1897) 1 S.S.L.R. SUPP.1,
"As to the Mohammedan Law, the entire Mohammedan Law is a personal Law. Founded in religion it
gives rights only to those who acknowledge Islamism". And in an earlier Penang case, Reg v. Willans
(1858) 3 Ky. 16, Maxwell R. stated as one of the objections to the continuance of the law of Kedah in
Penang what he called the nature of the Mohammedan Law. He said:
'Lord Coke laid it down in Calvin's Case 7 Rep. 10 that "if a Christian king should conquer a kingdom of
an infidel and bring them under his subjection, then ipso facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated", and
although Lord Mansfield treated this proposition as absurd, the Indian Law Commissioners are well justified
in asserting that a "system of law which according to its principles can only be administered by Mohametan
judges and Mohametan arbitrators, upon the testimony of Mohametan witnesses, is not a system which can
devolve ipso jure and without express acceptance upon the Government and people of different faith". It
seems to me impossible to hold any Christian country could be presumed to adopt or tolerate such a system
as its lex loci."
32 As a result of indiscriminate introduction of English law, western law which was modelled after
foreign values were enforced in the then Malaya and resulted in conflicts of values.
See Ainan v. Syed Abu Bakar (1939) M.LJ 209, held that as the Evidence Ordinance is a statute of general
application, section 112 of the Ordinance applies in question of legitimacy to the exclusion of the rule of
Islamic Law. Thus if a child is born to a woman less than six months alter her marriage to a man, the child
is deemed to be legitimate in the civil courts, although he is deemed to be illegitimate under the Islamic
Law. In Myriam v. Mohamed Ariff (1971) 1 MU 265, a mother who has remarried a stranger is entitled
to the custody of her infant child, even though it was provided under the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1961,
that "nothing in this Act which is contrary to the Muslim religion or custom of the Malays shall apply to
any person under the age of eighteen who professes the Muslim religion." In Commisioner of Religious
Affairs, Trengganu & Ors v. Tengku Manam (1969) 1 MU. 110, the High Court rejected the authority
of a 'fatwa' issued by the Mufti declaring a 'waqf' to be valid and held instead that the 'waqf' was void on
the authority of the decisions of the Privy Council from India and Africa. InNafsiah v.Abdul Majid (1969)
2 MU 175 the High Court held that a Muslim woman who had been seduced by a man on his promise
to many, could bring an action for breach of promise of marriage against him, although such an action
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and modernization of the administration of the Islamic law. The British administrators
were particularly embarrased with the manner in which Islamic law was enforced33.
Previously, Islamic law was expounded and decided by a local kadhi. As part of the
administrative reforms, Islamic law was incorporated into a religious system known
as the Shari'ah courts. Hence the jurisdiction of kadhis was limited, with more
serious cases tried before magistrates on the basis of English law. Nomination of
qadhis and muftis of the Shari'ah court were undertaken as the advice of the British
advisors and administrators. In the name of modernization, Islamic law itself was
codified in a series of Administration of Muslim Law Ordinances. From this
codification, the subject matter of the Shari'ah was extensively narrowed down'.
Only offences which were not considered as part of English concept of criminal law
were included within these ordinances. Even in matters which were purely of Islamic
penal origins, the penalty was minimized.
With the reorganisation of the administration of Islamic law and the gradual intrusion
of English concepts, English law radically restricted the extent to which and the
manner in which the Islamic law was applied in terms of subject matter. This legacy
remains until the present day where, in common with other modern Muslim states,
there are two parallel systems of law, the Shari'ah and the civil courts, both having
their own jurisdictions.
would not lie under the Islamic law.
Sadka, Emily in The Protected Malay States, 1874-1895, University of Malaya Press, Singapore,
1968.
Due to British intervention as mentioned above, Islamic law was confined to matters relating to
personal law and related procedural and evidential rules regulating the j's court. In the field of family
law this pertained to administration of family law, bethrothal, solemnisation of marriage, "idda' and the
marriage of widows, ',nahr'(dowiy), prohibited marriages, fonns of dissolution of marriage such as 'talaq',
'taklik', 'khulu', 'fasakh'; presumption of death, appointment of 'hakam', 'nusyuz', 'mur'ah '(consolatory
gift), maintenance of a wife, harta se pencharian, distribution of property on divorce, legitimacy of
children and adoption and married women's property. In the field of property, matters pertaining to general
inheritance, wills, customary land tenure, 'waqf' and 'nazr'. 'bayt-al mat', gifts, interpretation of wills,
mortgage by conditional sale. In the field of evidence, the procedure in matiimcnal offences, unlawful
sexual intercourse, consumption of intoxicating liquor, spiritual aspects of individual life such as friday
prayers, fasting in 'Ramadan', non payment of 'zakat' and 'fltrah', commencement of 'Ramadan'(Fasting
and the 'Eid',) conversion and adoption of Muslim Children, other miscellaneous offences, jurisdiction
and administration, number of witnesses, status of witnesses, quality of witnesses, direct and hearsay
testimony, acknowledgement ('iqrar'), procedure in criminal cases in Qadi's courts and procedure in civil
cases.
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5	 Islam in contemporary Malaysia.
From the foregoing , we have seen, the process of secularization of Islamic law and
the introduction of English law occured under the British administration. Another
important factor to the understanding of Islam in contemporary Malaysia is the
position of Islam under the Federal Constitution35. As far as the Federal Constitution
is concerned, Islam is the official religion of the state. This, according to the
scholars, is to be understood in the secular sense, that Islam is the official religion
only for ceremonial purposes. Malaysia remains as the British wanted it to be, a
secular state with secular laws37. This constitutional provision does not mean that
Islam is the supreme law of the land and hence any laws which are repugnant and
contrary to Islamic law are not void. 38
 Furthermore, Islamic law is excluded from
the definition of law under the Constitution 39. This anomaly, is not consistent with
the nature of Malays who pride themselves as Muslims and under the Constitution
the definition of a 'Malay' is synonymous to a 'Muslim'40.
For a detailed exposition of the position of Islam in the Federal Constitution, see Ibrahim, Ahmad,
The position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia, in The Constitution of Malaysia: its development:
1957-1977; Suffian & Anors, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1978. See also Lee & Anor, The
Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore, Malayan Law Journal, Singapore 1991.
Article 3 of the Federal Constitution provides that Islam is the religion of the Federation but other
religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation. Article 11 of the Federal
Constitution further provides that every person has the right to profess and practise his religion and subject
to the qualification in the Article to profess it, the qualification is that the law may control or restrict the
propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.
See the Federal Constitution's Commi.ners' report. The Commisioners initially rejected for the
inclusion of such provision in the Federal Constitution.
38 See Salleh Abas's decision in the Federal Court's decision of Che Omar bin Che Soh v. Public
Prosecutor, (1988) 2 MU 55. In this case there was an attempt to invalidate the death penalty for drug and
firearms offences on the basis of its inconsistency with Islamic law. The distinguished Judge noted that the
effect of A. 11 is to," purposely preserves the continuity of secular law prior to the Constitution.
A.160 of the Federal Constitution.
The definition of a Malay under the Constitution is ," a person who professes the religion of Islam,
habitually speaks the Malay language; conforms to Malay custom" and was horn or domiciled in the
Federation or in Singapore This trend of associating Malay and Islam was not unique of the Federal
Constitution. In Kelantan such definition was adopted in 1930, (No.18 of 1030), PerIls (1934), Johore
(1936) No.1 of 1936 Government Gazzette No.14 Vol XXVI April 8, 1936 and Terengganu (1941).
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Despite being the national religion, under the Constitution and as part of the division
of powers between the Federal and the states government, administration of Islam and
Muslim affairs is vested under the power of individual states and the 'Sultan's. The
Constitution provides that the 'Sultan' of each state is the head of religion for the
particular state. The power of the state to legislate on matters relating to Islam is
however, limited to the extent of its consistency to the Constitution4' and the matters
spelt out in the State list42. This constitutes a major obstacle to the development of
Islam and the Islamic law in Malaysia. Any laws which are passed by any of the
thirteen states on matters within their jurisdiction should be consistent with the Federal
Constitution. Indirectly, the Federal Constitution implicitly guaranteed the observance
of common law as the legal system which was inherited upon independence. Not only
are laws which are contrary to the written constitution become null and void, but the
civil courts can also review cases within the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah courts.
Common law is made supreme and Islam and the Shariah courts are deemed inferior
and subject to review by the civil courts.
The extent of conflict between the Federal Constitution and state enactments is
illustrated with the current conflict arising from the state of Kelantan's decision to
41 Article 11(4) of the Federal Constitution gives the Federation the power to overrule Islamic laws
decided by these states. Article 75 enshrines that," if any state law is inconsistent with a Federal law, the
Federal law shall prevail and the state law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency be void. Further article
4(1) states that all laws in conflict with Federal Laws are automatically null and void.
42 The Federal Constitution sets out among the subjects which are in the State List in the following:
"Muslim Law and personal and family law of persons professing the Muslim religion, including the Muslim
law relating to succession, testate and intestate, bethrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance,
adoption, legitimacy, guardianship, gifts, partitions and non-charitable trusts; Muslim wakafs and the
definition and regulation of charitable and religious trusts, the appointment of trustees and the incorporation
of persons in respect of Muslim religious and charitable endowments, institutions, trusts, charities ad
charitable institutions operating wholly within the State; Malay custom; 'zakat', 'fitrah' and Baiwl Mal or
similar Muslim revenue; mosques or any Muslim public place of worship, creation and punishment of
offences by persons professing the Muslim religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal list;
the constitution, organization and procedure of Muslim courts, which shall have jurisdiction only over
persons professing the Muslim religion and in respect only of any of the matters included in this paragraph,
but shall not have jurisdiction in respect of offences except in so far as conferred by Federal law; the
propogating doctrines and beliefs among persons professing the Muslim religion; the determination of
matters of Muslim law and doctrine and Malay custom".
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enact Islamic penal laws ('hudud')43. The governing law on criminal matters is the
Criminal Law Code which was modelled after the Indian Penal Code. As criminal
laws are not within state jurisdiction, for the 'hudud' laws to be enforceable, special
leave has to be obtained from the Federal Government. A political reason for the
rejection of 'hudud' laws is the conflict between the Kelantan government (which is
the only government ruled by opposition party) with the governing government in
Malaysia. Ironically, it was reported that the rejection is not on the basis of total
rejection of the supremacy of Islamic law but on the 'brand of Islam' projected by the
Kelantan Government. To reject the allegation that the ruling party is against the
application of Islamic law, the Federal Government has announced the setting up of
a commitee to study the application of 'hudud' law in Malaysia and to come up with
another version of 'hudud' law which may be more acceptable to the Malaysian
mixed population.
6	 Future of Islam and Islamic law in Malaysia.
Of recent, Islam has been an important agenda in the Malaysian political scene.
The governing party is also claiming to be committed to Islam as representative of the
modernist Islam as opposed to the opposition party; the Pan Islamic Party (PAS)
which is normally characterised as fundamentalist and orthodox 45. Since the 1970's,
influenced by the renaissance and revivalism of Islam in other countries, many
attempts were undertaken to inject Islamic values in administration, banking and
finance sectors. In terms of financial market, Malaysia is at the forefront in the
On the November 25th. 1993, the state assembly of Kelantan passed a law to introduce the Islamic
Shari'ah penal system. The bill if enforced in Kelantan would not face the challenge of non-Muslims as
Kelantan Muslims make up 95 percent of the total population.
For a detailed analysis, see Mutalib, Hussin Islam in Malaysia; From Revivalism to Islamic State,
Singapore University press, 1993, Singapore. There are other works as well, too numerous to cite here.
Dr. Mahathir constantly talked of the need not to use force in any Islamic policy but through
persuasion, good example and information (NST, 5 Feb.1986).
Inculcation of Islamic values (IIV) is an agenda introduced by the premier Dr. Mahathir to introduce
positive values which are not contradictoiy to modernization such as honesty, trust, efficiency, diligence,
moderation and thrift (NST 20 Nov. 1984). Although certain sectors in Malaysia are not convinced that
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application of Islamic concepts as the alternative to the existing dominant western
institutions and banking. A more recent report (New Horizon, Feb. 1993) cites
Malaysia as the best example of a country whose Government was in full support of
the reforms taking place in the banking and financial sector.47
Unfortunately, the same fervour is not seen in legal spheres. The most clear example
is the Federal Government's rejection of the Kelantan 'Hudud' Bill. The Federal
Government alleges that Kelantan's 'Hudud' laws are not the true version of Islamic
Law. To provide against the backlash of uprising calls for the implementation of
Islamic Law the Federal Government set-up a committee to study 'hudud' laws with
the intention to enforce Islamic law when the Malaysian society is ready for it. The
Attorney General has also announced the readiness of implementing Islamic law when
the time comes. The biggest challenge in implementing Islam in Malaysia is its
multiracial population48. Many fears that the present Islamisation policies will turn
Malaysia into an Islamic state and would result in open revolt among the non
Muslims.
The existing conflict between the civil courts and the Shari'ah courts has been
resolved by the amendment of the Constitution to effect the finality of the Shari'ah
Courts decisions49. As a result, Civil courts may no longer encroach in matters
within the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah courts. Attempts were also taken to breach the
gap between civil courts and the Shari'ah courts. The status of qadhi and the Shari'ah
courts were improved. Special courses were set-up to train qadhis and a special
there was a definite (positive) change in the government administration towards Islamization, however,
there are others who view that the HV policy and the other developments as an opportunity to implement
Islam in its full scope.
Other Islamic countries, including the Islamic Republic of iran are said to have requested for
Malaysia's 'blueprints' of its financial sector reforms. see New Straits Times, 22 March 1994.
Muslims now made up 55 percent of the total population. The population of Malaysia in 1991 was
18.2 million out of which 55 per cent of the population are Malay Muslims.
Federal Constitution Article 121 (A) provides that, "The Courts referred to in Clause (1) shall have
no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah courts".
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Shari'ah Appeal Court was established. To reduce intra-state conflict of laws,
harmonization of the various enactments on administration of Muslim law in various
states were set in place.
Applying the Islamic law is not by any means imposing foreign law as was the case
of introduction of English law. It is rather returning to the roots of Malay culture and
civilisation. The biggest obstacle is not amending the Federal Constitution but rather
the negative attitude prevailing amongst the Muslims in Malaysia. There are many
ways in which Islamic law can be given a more prominent role in the legal system in
Malaysia. One suggested way is to include Islamic Law as a source of law in the
Constitution. By so doing, any law which is passed by the federal Government
would have to be consistent to Islam and the Shari'ah. In this way the Government
is committed legally to enact only laws which are consistent to the Islamic law.
Another way is by introducing legal concepts known in Islamic law through judicial
interpretation on the basis of 'natural justice' as done by the English. In this way
Islamic concepts of justice could be introduced gradually on a case by case basis,
paving the way to substitute Islamic principles in place of common law principles.
Current political struggle with the opposition party shows the need to adopt a fresh
and pragmatic approach towards implementation of the Islamic law. For the first time
in many years, the Federal government has shown a shift of attitude. This is seen
with the recent Attorney General's announcement to implement Islamic law when the
time comes. It is hoped that this desire reflects a serious commitment and not a mere
political ginimick.
Finally, to use the arguments put forward by Hooker, a known scholar on Islam,
"Law must not be considered as an ultimate value in itself but as a means of realising
other values, including a variety of social and political goals. 50" That higher goal
within the context of Malaysia's deep root and linkage with Islam lies in Islam and
the Islamic law.
Hooker, M.B, The Personal Laws of Malaysia; An Introduction (1976) Oxford University Press,
Kuala Lumpur.
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2	 Conclusion
In this chapter, we began by looking into the root of the present legal dualism and
prominence of Common law in Malaysia. History has shown that Islam has made a
tremendous impact on the life of Muslims in Malaya and seeped into the Malay
civilisation to become an important, if not, indistinguishable part of it. The prevailing
legal system, thus, has to fit in with this external conditions and seek to accomplish
the value system which Islam represents. To do this is not as simple as the abolition
of the common law but to study how the Islamic law befits the present legal
mechanism.	 -
This effort is necessary even in the event that total islamization of laws in Malaysia
is not achieved. Passing laws which reflect the views and interest of Muslim is still
necessary as Islam is the official religion and Muslims are the dominant population
in Malaysia. It is with this hope that this study on Intellectual Property and Islam is
undertaken.
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CHAPTER TWO
INDUSTRIALIZATION, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE.
1.	 Introduction
For the historical reasons, the development of Intellectual and Industrial Property laws
in Malaysia are heavily based on the English Law. During colonial times, the
introduction of these laws was basically an endeavour to enhance the colonial
interests. Unfortunately, long after independence, no concerted effort has been
undertaken by the government to evaluate the present economic and social needs of
the country. Hence, many of the provisions of Intellectual property laws in Malaysia
are isolated from the country's economic development. Many key issues are left
unanswered. One of them is the debate whether the present patent system stimulates
local technology at a sufficient level, enough to realise the government's aspiration
to be a New Industrialized country by the year 2020.' As statistics disclose, the ratio
of local industry's participation in innovation and inventive activity is still
insignificant2.
With the current international commitment to the GATF's agreement on trade related
aspects on Intellectual Property, Malaysia's option is tied, either to follow the wave
1 One nFcc.ess story of the transfer of foreign technology is the case of the Palm Oil industry. With the
assistance of government bodies such as PORIM, FELDA. a lot of innovation had been done on industry,
which was twenty years ago a substantially foreign technology. See Ong, Augustine S.H, Stud y on
Industrial Property Use in the Palm Oil Industry in Malaysia, WIPO 1993. Now, there are a few
patents/inventions which are held by the local company, PORIM. Two patents concern farm mechanisation,
another concerns a process for the production of high concentration of tocopherols and tocotrienols from
palm-oil by products—palm fatty acid distillate. There is also a process patent to produce alkyl esters from
oils and fats. When the industry was first set -up, most technology was imported from abroad. Most of this
technology has been improved to adapt to local industry. Many innovations are not patented and kept as
inhouse technology. With the set-up of PORIM, more research was carried out to improve the industry.
2 The total number of local patent applications after the Patents Act 1983 from 1986 to 27 October
1990 is 3344. Out of which US constitute the largest number of applications (1248) followed by Japan
(776) and Great Britain(365). Malaysian applications comprise of only 74. Out of this 74, 45 are held by
individuals, 18 by cooperations and 11 by government agencies.
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of change or to be totally isolated from the international trade scenario3. In preserving
the current surge of foreign investment in Malaysia, the balance is tilted disparately
in favour of joining the GATT's agenda, in the hope of further profihiteration in the
exchange of foreign technology.
In terms of copyright protection, an upsurge of enforcement of rights is apparent in
the last five years4. Besides the enforcement role carried by the Ministry of Trade
to check infringement of copyright under the Trade Practices Act, performance of
copyright works are also administered by the Music Authors Copyright Protection.5
The Ministry of Trade is currently considering a few proposals to tighten copyright
laws which includes payment for photocopying and the protection of performer's right.
With these proposals, the public's ability to freely copy and evade the copyright laws
are further curtailed.
With more changes expected in the next five years in compliance with the GATT's
Malaysia was among 44 nations which was accused by the U.S of practising unfair trade practices.
Even though U.S threats is not the single factor behind legislative changes in relation to Intellectual property
rights in Malaysia, it remains a strong factor. In 1992, after much talks of bilateral agreement with the U.S
Malaysia acceded to Berne Convention with the view that multilateral convention will bring more benefit
to Malaysia.
On enforcement of copyright, the number of complaints of infringement have increased in proportion
to the increase of the rate of effectiveness of raids. When the government first launched the campaign
against counterfeiting and imitation in December 87, 77 complaints were received within a month. Out of
231 complaints received since 1987, there are three cases of failure noted. Phonographic work remains the
highest complaint -2,881 out of 3,596 cases amounting to the value of RM 5 916 635.40. Musical works
came second - with 609 cases followed by literary works - 49 cases. Following behind are other artistic
works (42 cases) and computer works (15 cases). A large number of offences are noted in Wilayah
Persekutuan, followed by Penang and Johore. Most complaints involved foreign rights.
Music Authors Copyright Protection (MACP) is a local company of the Performing Rights Society
(PRS) Ltd which is vested with the exclusive authority to enforce PRS' public performance rights in the
musical works and/or lyrics in Malaysia. It is a non profit company which administers the public
performance, broadcast and diffusion rights of musical and associated literary works and their successors
in title. Its administrative role throughout Malaysia is as a central body to which application for the licence
may be made by a person or a organisalion intending to publicly perform, broadcast or diffuse copyright
music. The MACP have also taken legal action against performance of musical works without consent.
It was reported in the STAR and New Straits Times that an injunction was granted by the High Court to
MACP for performance of 'Hey jude' composed by John Lennon and Paul Mc Cartney in the presence of
10 to 15 people in a nightclub in Kuala Lumpur. The MACP has received support from local music industry.
The latest success to MACP is the agreement of RTM (Radio & Televisyen Malaysia) as the biggest
broadcasting organisation in Malaysia to pay royalty for performance of musical works broadcasted in radio
and television from 1989.
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substantive requirements, Intellectual Property laws is a hot topic. Even if these
changes will not be entirely in favour of local needs, at least they will generate more
efforts into inculcating awareness and recognition of Intellectual property rights. In
certain aspects, these pressures are highly desirable in accelerating changes which are
long overdue such as unfair trade practices, and the protection of plant and industrial
variety and industrial designs.6
Leaving aside the complex interplay of international trade and Intellectual Property,
this chapter will trace the development of Intellectual Property laws in Malaysia since
the cessation of Penang to the British in 1786. Even though there has been
deliberation on this matter in other literature, no complete account of this is
available7. The first local legislation on patents was in 1871, Trade Marks in 1888,
Copyright in 1902 and design as late as 1931. It may be queried why copyright came
much later than patents and trade marks. Most of these laws were first introduced in
the Straits Settlement and later extended to the Federated Malay states and the
Unfederated Malay States even though in other matters, English Law in these states
was not infiltrated in total.
2	 The Straits Settlements (1791- 1866)
Straits Settlements consisted of Penang, Province Wellesley, Singapore, Malacca,
Pangkor Island, Dindings, Cocos Island and Christmas Island. The British first
occupation in Malaya (as it then was) was in Penang (or otherwise known at that time
as the Prince of Wales Island). Through a treaty with the King of Kedah, Captain
Light obtained a cession of the island. No formal administration of law was enforced
at that time until the passing of the first charter of justice in 1807 (as of 25th. March
1807). This charter not only endorsed the setting up of a Court of Judicature in
6 The Government has recently announced that a new law is proposed to curb unethical trade practices
such as cartels, monopolies, oligopolies and dumping of goods. In addition the Ministry is also working
on a policy of competition and unfair business practices to ensure better implementation of the rules and
regulations. Among the objectives of this law are to protect consumers and upgrade local productivity and
production quality. For further elaboration, see Chapter 8 of this thesis.
See L.A Sheridan (Cd), Malaya and Singapore, the Borneo Territories, The Development of their
Laws and Constitutions, Steven & Sons, London,, 1961, Laddie et.al, Copyright
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Penang but also applied the existing law of England. The charter expressly introduced
the law of England, as it stood then, into the colony. However, there was uncertainty
as to the actual legal effect of it. Local cases ruled out the application of English
Statutes in cases where there were modified by express provision and had abrogated
any law previously existing. 8 Singapore was acquired in 1819 through a
memorandum which was signed between Stamford Raffles and Sultan Hussein of
Johore. Malacca was first occupied in 1795 and subsequently retroceded in 1824. For
purpose of unification, the second charter of justice was passed in 1826. This second
Charter extended the Court of Judicature's jurisdiction to Singapore and Malacca.
This charter contained the same provision as the 1807 charter and introduced into the
colony the English law as it existed on the 26th. November, 1826. It is
questionable whether the Second Charter of Justice introduced the English common
law on Intellectual Property in the Straits Settlement.
In 1833, Statute 3 & 4 Wm. N c.85, was passed to bring the Straits Settlements
under the control of the East India Company. For a period of 33 years, Acts which
were passed in India were applied to the Straits Settlement if there were express or
implied order. In 1866, Straits Settlement was separated from India)0 There was no
evidence that Indian Acts governing Intellectual Property were extended to Straits
Settlement during this time.
In 1878, the Government of the Straits Settlement passed the Civil Law Ordinance.
This Ordinance brought into force the mercantile law of England into the Colony "as
8 See Rodyk v. Williamson (1834) 2 Ky Ec at p.9, Kamoo v. Thomas Turner Bassett (1808) 1 Ky 1,
In Re Goods of Abdullah (1835) 2 Ky. Ec.8, Moraiss v. de Souza I Ky.27. Regina v. Willans (1858) 3
Ky. 16, Fatimah v. Logan (1871) 1 Ky.255.
The practical effect of the Second Charter of Justice of 1826 in Malacca was to abrogate Dutch Law
and introduced the English law. See In the Goods of Abdullah 2 Ky. Ec.8, Moraiss v. de Souza 1 Ky. 27,
Regina v. Willans 3 Ky. 16, Jemalah v. Mahomed Ali I Ky. 386, Ismail bin Savoosah v. Madinasah
Merican 4 Ky. 315, In re Sinyak Rayoon 4 Ky. 331, and Scully v. Scully 4 Ky. 602. For a detail
discussion of the historical introduction of English Law in the Straits Settlement, see Bartholomew, G.W.
The Commercial Law of Malaysia, Singapore, Malayan Law Journal, 1965 and Sheridan, L.A. Malaya
and Singapore, The Borneo Territories, The Development of Their Laws and Constitutions., London,
Stevens and Sons Limited, 1961.
10 The Government of the Straits Settlements Act (c) 29 & 30 vic. c. 115 was passed to this effect.
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if such question or issue had arisen or had to be decided in England"." Issues arose
whether the expression "mercantile law" should be given a wide meaning and include
all undertakings related to merchants. Particularly, in two cases Vulcan Match Co.
v. Herm, Jebson & Co' 2 and Fraser & Co v. Nethersole' 3
 the Court dismissed the
suggestion that trade marks laws were part of mercantile law. Therefore the
Ordinance did not introduce into the Colony the Registration of Trade Marks Act,
1875'4and the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act' 5. Both Wood J (in the earlier
case) and Goidney J (of the latter case) were of the view that mercantile law generally
could not be held to refer to so specific and exceptional a subject.' 6 Two
observations can be discerned from the above-mentioned cases. Firstly, it is arguable
that, unless expressly enacted, the Second Charter of Justice had no relevance to the
introduction of the English concepts of common law trade marks into the Straits
Settlement. This is probably the reason why the court did not consider the application
of trade mark on the basis of common law rights. Secondly, as far as registered trade
marks were concerned, such rights were attained by way of registration and hence
registered trade mark rights could not be automatically recognised and enforced in the
Straits Settlement without the setting up of proper administration system locally.
" Section 6 reads:
"In all questions or issues which may hereafter arise or which may have to be decided in this
Colony, with respect to the law of partnership, joint stock companies, corporations, banks, and
banking, principals and agents, carriers by land and sea, marine insurance, average, life and
fire insurance, and with respect to mercantile law generally, the law to be administered in
England in the like case, at the corresponding period, if such question or issue had arisen or had
to be decided in england unless in any case other provision is or shall be made by any statute now
in force in this Colony or hereafter to be enacted".
12 (1884) I Ky. 650.
' (1887) 4 Ky. 269.
' 38 & 39 Vic c. 91.
46 & 47 Vic c. 57.
16 The learned judge commented: "The rights of the parties in actions which have reference to trade
marks are therefore dependent upon the general principles of the commercial law. This I understand to be
the meaning of Section 6 of Ordinance iv of 1878. Before I could say that the provisions of the English
Trade Marks Act were incorporated among the Ordinances of this Colony in the wholesale way suggested
on the part of the defendant, I should require words more specific than those used in the section referred
to above."
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2.2	 Post 1886-1946.
2.2.1	 Patents
It was not until 1871 that the legislative Council passed the Inventions Ordinance
1871.' This Ordinance brought into force the dual system providing both for local
patents and patent rights obtained in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. Even
though this Ordinance went through minor amendment in 191518, and 1922' it
remained the principal ordinance until 1924 where the system was changed into that
of entirely reinforcing patent rights obtained in the United Kingdom and Northern
Ireland. The 1871 Ordinance was modelled after the 1859 Indian Act20, with certain
modifications.2 ' The 1859 Act was passed when the Straits Settlements were placed
under Indian administration. Therefore not surprisingly Straits Settlement was
included as part of India as far as the definition of India is concerned.22
 Seemingly,
this Act would have been applicable if an Order in council was passed to the effect.
As there was no available evidence supporting this proposition, Straits Settlement was
a part of India only in so far as construing the provision of this Act in India. As an
illustration, public use and public knowledge of an invention in the Straits Settlement
No.12 of 1871.
18 Ordinance 56 of 1915 widened the power of Governor in Council. S.2 of the Ordinance opowered
the governor to avoid, suspend, grant or extend the duration of the exclusive privileges granted under the
principal ordinance. The Governor was also enpowered to licence the invention to someone else to make,
use or sell the invention. With the pending war, the Ordinance stipulated for the application of this
ordinance to those persons resident and carrying business in the territory of a State at war. The duration
of the ordinance was made to continue in force during the continuance of the state of war in Europe and
for a period of six months thereafter and no longer.
19 The 1922 Amendment NO. 24 of 1922 prolonged the duration of exclusive privileges to 16 years.
This applies to exclusive privileges which are granted under the Ordinance and have not expired.
Act No.XV of 1859.
21 The differences between the 1859 Indian Act and the 1871 Straits Settlement ordinance are not
many. Firstly, under the Indian Act, one cannot import invention and claim rights over the invention
unless he is also the inventor. Secondly, the period given to holders of British patent to apply for exclusive
rights in India is only 12 months, compared to 3 years in the Straits Settlement's Ordinance. Thirdly, the
requirement of novelty under the Indian Act is stricter. An invention is no longer considered as new if it
has been publicly known in any part of India or United Kingdom by means of a publication, either printed
or written or partly printed or partly written. Under the Straits Settlement Ordinance only public usage of
the invention may defeat the novelty of an invention.
According to the Statute, 'India' here refers to the territories which are or may become vested in
Her Majesty by the Statute.
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may defeat the newness of the invention as far as the 1859 Indian Act was concerned.
The principal feature of the 1871 Enactment was that it allowed the application of
exclusive rights of any inventions which were new. 23
 New within the context of this
ordinance was something which was not being publicly used in the United Kingdom,
or in any possession or dependency thereof. The provision would have been very
favourable to the local industry (if there was any) as an importer was also regarded
as inventor.2' The Ordinance also contained favourable terms to the inventor as pre-
registration use was not detrimental to the novelty of the invention if it was used by
the inventor himself or by his servants. In addition, there were wide terms of
compulsory licensing26, cessation of privileges27
 and revocation of privileges. The
Ordinance which also provided for the application of exclusive rights obtained in the
For application of new invention once granted given 16 years - see S.12 of the Ordinance.
24 Invention here includes improvement and manufacwre includes any art, process or manner of
producing, treating, preparing or making an article and any article prepared or produced by manufacture.
Inventor also includes the first importer into the state of the invention not publicly used or known in the
United Kingdom.
See S.3(2) & (3) of the Ordinance.
26 The circumstances which will wanant compulsory licensing areas
	 follows:
(i) where the invention has not being worked on a commercial scale and no satisfactory
reason given,
(ii) demand for the product is not being met
(iii) if any trade or new trade is prejudiced and it is in the public interest for the grant of
compulsory licences
(iv) any trade or industry is unfairly prejudiced by the condition attached by the grantee to
the purchase, hire, license or the use of the invention. Compulsory licence given upon payment
of royalty.
27 S.22 empowered the Governor in Council to declare the cessation of rights in cases where granting
of exclusive privileges may be mischiev ous to the State, or generally prejudicial to the public or if a
breach of any special condition has been committed.
Revocation of patents are allowed on these grounds:
(i) invention not new, the grantee not the inventor
(ii) invention not described in the specification
(iii) fraud in petition or specification
(iv) fraudulent misdescription of part of the invention. Non fraudulent misdescription of the
patent however is not a ground for revocation of patents.
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U.K 29 contained wide terms of infringement30. The 1871 Ordinance brought forth
features which are common until now such as registration, opposition proceedings and
legal proceedings under the High Courts. It was not evident how many inventions
were brought over by the British under this Ordinance, despite the laws being very
conducive and generous to transfer of technology. The dual system proved to be
difficult to administer. Most inventions came from the U.K and most of them were
already patented in the U.K. In 1924, it was changed to a registration system of
patent rights obtained in the United Kingdom.3'
2.2.2	 Copyright
The first copyright legislation in the Colony was not concerned with literature, artistic
or dramatic works. Surprisingly, the Straits Settlement's Council passed the
Telegraphic Copyright Ordinance 32 which provided for the exclusive right to the
person receiving a news telegram to publish such news. The duration of protection
provided by this Ordinance reflected the short life span of telegram news. Up to 48
hours from the time of first publication, no other person may print or publish the
news without consent in writing of the person who received such news. Apart from
local publication, transmission of any telegraphic messages abroad was also prohibited
within the period mentioned.33
 This Ordinance was extended to Labuan up until 1952
29 The Act provided for registration within 3 years of grant of rights in the U.K. Once granted, the
rights will be enforceable as long as it is enforceable in the UK -see S.14 of the Ordinance.
30 Among acts of infringement are: making, selling, using or putting into practice, counterfeiting
or imitating an invention which are patented. See s.23 of the Ordinance.
Ordinance 15 of 1924 introduced the registration of exclusive privileges obtained in the U.K. The
Ordinance provided for the owner of the exclusive right three years to apply for registration in the Straits
Settlement. The privileges and rights granted shall date from tbe date of the patent in the U.K and shall
continue in force only so long as the patent remains in force in the United Kingdom. Any amendments
which were made to the specification of exclusive rights in the U.K will also have to be notified to the
Straits Settlement Registry. The ordinance also set up a Registry and a Register of petitions and
applications.
32 No.XXIII / 79 (1902).
As to the reason of the introduction of this Ordinance in the Colony, see Khaw, Lake Tee
,Copyright Law in Malaysia, (1994), Butterworths Asia, Malaysia.
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when it was finally repealed, revoked and cancelled.
The first principal legislation related to copyright which was passed by the U.K
Parliament and extended to the Straits Settlement was the Imperial Copyright Act
191 i. This Act was not only extended to British Dominions, but also to self
governing dominions, protectorates and British possessions. One interesting feature
of this Act was that it governed all published work within the British dominions and
in the case of unpublished work, if the author was a British subject or was a resident
within the Dominion. The Act which contained generous provision for compulsory
licence remained the major Act on copyright in the Straits Settlement until after
independence.	 -
By virtue of S.14 of the Imperial Act, in 1914 an ordinance was passed basically to
regulate importation of copyright works from outside the Colony. This Ordinance
vested the Registrar of Imports and Exports with powers which were initially vested
in the Commissioners of Customs and Excise in the United Kingdom. Under the
Ordinance, the registrar was empowered to issue regulations as to what could be
imported into the Colony. The Ordinance also provided for the forfeiture, disposal or
destruction of works which were imported in contravention of the regulation.
Although it was made an offence to have the necessary apparatus to infringe the
provision, the act of piracy itself was not defined as the Ordinance was principally
concerned with regulating imports of printed works.
This ordinance was amended in 1918. The amendment was concerned
provisionally, to provide for more severe punishments for infringements of copyright.
The acts of infringement was enlarged, not only to the principal offender but also to
See Repeal Laws Ordinance, No.6 of 1952 (date of force 23rd. October, 1952).
1 & 2 Geo.5,c. 46.
Copyright Ordinance 1914, No XVffl.
Act No.24 of 1918.
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the accessories.38 With the amendment, it was an offence to import works from
outside the Colony otherwise than by ship. In addition, the amount of fine for
infringement was also enlarged.
2.2.3	 Trade Marks
In 1886, the first local ordinance was passed by the legislative council 39. Even
though this ordinance made reference to the Imperial Act 46 and 47 Vict.c.57 known
as the Patent Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883, it was not certain whether this
Imperial Act was actually extended to the colony. 40
 Case law seemed to indicate that
this was not the case, thus the law which was applicable before this ordinance was
not clear.
Prior to that, it was the British policy to prohibit the importation of foreign goods
which bore the names, brands, marks of manufacturers resident in the United
Kingdom, into the British possessions abroad. 4 ' It is not surprising that the first
Ordinance on trade marks did not regulate the use of trade marks in the course of
38 Punishment was inflicted not only to those who imported or brought or was concerned in importing
but also to those who ahpped or assisted those who are involved in shipping written works, and also to those
who harboured, kept or concealed or knowingly permitted or suffered or caused to be harboured, kept,
concealed any such works or knowingly acquired possession of such works.
Ordinance No.3 of 1888. This Ordinance was modelled after the Indian Merchandise Marks Act No
IV of 1889.
° S.3 of the Ordinance defined 'trade mark' as a trade mark which is protected by law in this Colony
and when the provisions of the one hundred and third section of the Imperial Act 46 and 47 Vict.c. 57
known as the Patents Designs and Trade Marks 1883 are applied to this Colony by Order of the Queen in
Council shall include any trade mark registered in the register of trade marks kept under the said Imperial
Act and any trade mark which either with or without registration is protected b y law in any British
possession or foreign State to which the provisions of the said section are under Order of the Queen in
Council for the time being applicable.
S.1O1 of the Imperial Act also provided for colonies and India if an Order in Council was passed to the
effect.
' See Cap XCIII, Trade of British Possession Abroad.
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trade but to prohibit the falsification and forging of trade marks 42 and trade
descriptions.43
For the offence of forging a trade mark, the mark had to be affixed to the goods
without the assent of the proprietor, or by the falsification of any genuine trade mark
by alteration, addition, effacement. A person who was employed in the course of
business was exempted from the offence upon proof that he took reasonable
precautions against committing the offence and had no reason to suspect the
genuineness of the mark. He was also expected to give information to the prosecutor.
Under the Ordinance, to be a false trade description, it had to be false to a material
degree.
The 1913 Amendment did not bring major changes. Later in 1917, the 1888
Ordinance was repealed45. The 1917 ordinance retained the essential features of the
1888 ordinance and the subsequent changes made thereto in 1913. For the first time
"trade mark" is defined and regulated in the context of its use as an indication of
goods with the manufacturer. 46
 Beside trade marks, the use of property marks were
also regulated.47
 Importation was made an offence under this Ordinance.
42 One principal feature of this ordinance was making it an offence for all forms of forging such as
falsely applying trade mark, making instrument for forging, application of false description or disposing
instrument for making false trade mark. The term 'trade mark' was not defined under this ordinance.
Trade description is defined as "any description, statement or other indication, direct or indirect
which concerns the number, quantity, measure, gauge, weight, place, country, mode of manufacture,
material or whether the goods are under existing patent, privilege or copyright."
Ordinance No.6 of 1913 widened the definition of 'trade description' to include the degree of
fineness of gold and silver goods.
Merchandise Marks No.9 of 1917.
'Trade mark' is defined as "a mark which is used for denoting that goods are the manufacture or
merchandise of a particular person".
' 'Property mark' is defined as "the mark which denotes that any movable property belongs to a
particular person".
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Changes occuned in 192248, 1926, 1938° and l940.' Such changes were not
in relation to substantive issues. In 1919 an ordinance was passed by the legislative
Council to prohibit the representation on trade marks of the Royal Arms and National
Flags52.
In 1936 the legislative council passed an ordinance which took effect of prohibiting
the importations
 or sale of articles for use in connection with Coronation
celebrations55
 which did not bear a mark or origin.56
 Infringing good were liable
to forfeiture under this Ordinance. Consistent with the earlier Ordinance which
exempted employees from being liable, the 1936 Ordinance put the fault on the
Act No 7 of 1922. The definition of 'false trade description' was widened to include description of
measurements and weights. Stamping of length of piece goods in transhipment or in the course of transit
was made an offence.
No. 17 of 1926 & No.19 of 1926.
5° No.33 of 1938 which introduced the compounding of offences under the Merchandise Mark
Ordinance. For those who were legally not competent such as minor, idiot or a lunatic or under some other
legal disablity, his offences may be compounded by someone else who are competent to contract on his
behalf.
51 No.41 of 1940 which came in force on 26th. October 1940, provided for the setting up of a district
court.
52 Straits Settlement No.8 of 1919. The Ordinance made it an offence for anyone to use in his business
or trade any representation of the Royal Arms or Royal Crests, Royal Crown, British National flags, or
any flags of the British Dominion which was so nearly resembling and may lead to mistake. The passing
of this Ordinance is consistent with S.106 of the Imperial Act 46 and 47 Vict.c. 57.
No.34 of 1936.
For the first time the word 'import' was defined as to mean "to bring or cause to be brought into
the Colony, or into any part thereof from a non-contiguous part, by land, sea or air, but excluding import
as a shipping agent for transhipment on through bill of lading or to carriage through a port without
transhipment".
A 'Coronation article' was defined as to mean "any article which consisted of or bore a
representation or a colourable imitation of a representation of His majesty the King, or any member of the
Royal Family or any Royal emblem, badge or device or the Union Flag, or the flag or badge of any part
of the British empire or any article consisting of or bearing any other mark, design or device which
rendered it suitable for use in connection with the celebration or commemoration of the Coronation of His
Majesty or which was otherwise in any way suitable for such use."
56 
'Countiy of origin' here means "the country of manufacture of an article or where an article has
been manufactured partly in one country and partly in another, the country in which the last manufacturing
process was done." Such mark of origin shall be in English language.
41
employer.51
As far as the use of trade mark as a connection between goods and the manufacturer,
registration was introduced in 193858. This provided for dual system of registration
of the U.K marks and local marks. 59 Marks were registrable either under part A or
part B.6° Most of the substantive provision of this Ordinance are common to the
current applicable Trade Mark law. Shortly after the passing of this Ordinance,
changes were made61.
2.2.4	 Designs
The first legislation relating to registered designs were introduced in the Straits
Settlement in 193162. Under this system, any registered proprietor or any one who
received right via assignment, transmission and other operation of law had to apply
for conferment of rights within three years. Once the exclusive rights were granted,
the proprietor not only received the same privileges and rights in the U.K but also
they subsisted on the same duration as rights obtained in the U.K. The certificate of
registration was a prima facie evidence of the entry having been made and of the
The employer was made liable for any act, omission, neglect or default of any agent or servant
employed by him and acting within the scope of his employment.
58 Ordinance No 38 of 1938.
A 'mark' is defined as 'to include a device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature,
word, letter, numeral or any combination thereof'. 'Trade mark' is defined as (with the exception of
certification trade mark) "a mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods for the purpose of
indicating or as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the goods and some person having
a right either as proprietor or as registered user to use the mark, whether with or without voluntary
indication of the identity of that person".
60 The registration system introduced in the Straits Settlement was modelled after the U.K Trade Mark
Act (1905) 5 Edw.7.c. 15 (as amended by Trade Mark act 1919) with modification.
61 No.2 1 of 1939. This ordinance shortened the duration of registration from twelve months from the
date of the commencement of this ordinance to six months from the expiry of the period within which
applications under section 8 may be made. No application for registration is valid after the expiration of
this period.
62 No.6 of 1931.
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contents thereof. The 1931 Ordinance was later amended in 1933 where an extra
ground was added for the revocation of exclusive rights.63
3	 Federated Malay States
The Federated Malay States consisted of Perak, Pahang, Selangor and Negeri
Sembilan. Perak fell under British administration via the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874,
Sungai Ujong in 1874, Negeri Sembilan in 1889 and Pahang in 1887. Under the
British administration, Residents were appointed to take charge of the administration
of the various Councils set-up in the states. It was under this capacity that numerous
Orders in Council were passed on inventions.M In Pahang, the legislative instrument
to provide for exclusive privileges of inventors was framed as early as 1897. This
Ordinance was never enforced. In 1909, the legislative council passed the Enactment
No. 13 of 1909 to validate any proceedings which were made by virtue of the 1897
enactment.
The four states were placed under one federation, i.e the Federated Malay States in
1895. From thereon, the Federal Council passed enactments which repealed the
former Orders in Council by the respective states. After the formation of Federation
of Malay States, a federal Enactment was passed in 1914. This Enactment
repealed all the previous ordinances which were passed by the respective states. This
63 No.10 of 1933. Prior publication referred herein was of prior publication of the design in the U.K
and not prior publication of the design in the Colony before the date registration in the Straits Settlement.
See also Straits Settlement No.17 of 1938 (date of force 14/9/1938) which reinforced the registration of the
U.K designs in the Colony.
Perak Order in Council, No 2 of 1896, Selangor Order in Council No.5 of 1896 and Negeri
Sembilan Order in Council No. 4 of 1896 (date of force 9/4/1896).
All petitions for and grants of exclusive privileges, all orders, declarations and payments, all
registers and books and all proceedings of whatever nature made, kept or had were declared to be of the
same force and effect and to be as valid for all intents and purposes as the same would have been if the
inventions enactment had come into force on the 29th. day of January 1897.
Inventions Enactment No 19 of 1914.
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enactment reinstated the system brought into force by the various Orders in
Council.67
 Although this Federal Enactment was also modelled after the 1871 Straits
Settlement Ordinance, certain modifications can be found. Unlike the Straits
Settlement 1871 Ordinance, this Ordinance only provides for local inventions. The
1925 Amendment changed this position. Rights obtained in the United Kingdom
were allowed to be registered in the Federated Malay States. This amendment also
extended the duration of exclusive privileges to 16 years.
3.1	 Copyright
In the Federated Malay States, copyright was introduced in 193O°. This Enactment
was modelled after the Indian Imperial Act 1914. It is not clear whether the Imperial
Act was ever extended to the Federated Malay States even though the Act contained
provision to that effect. By the promulgation of the Enactment, seemingly this was
not the case. A law was passed in 1936, to regulate importation of printed works
into the Federated Malay States.7'
In 1938, copyright was extended to works first published in Sarawak or to literary,
dramatic, musical or artistic works where the authors were subjects and residence of
Sarawak! Sarawak had already extended its copyright provision to works originated
from the Federated Malay States in 1935.
67 The Selangor Order in Council no. 5 of 1896 was also modelled after the 1871 Straits.ttlement
Ordinance.
The Federal Enactment introduced more extensive rules on revocation of grant, surrender of grant.
groundless threat, provisions as to anticipation and extra provision on the grant of exclusive privileges.
69 Enactment No 2 of 1925 which came into foite on 3rd. of April 1925. 2 other amendments were
made to the principal amendment. 3 of 1938 and I of 1948.
70 Enactment No. I of 1930.
Notification No. 3018, June 25, 1937, No.14, Vol.XXIX.
72 Notification No3882, August 19, 1938, No.18 Vol.XXX.
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3.2	 Trade Mark & Designs
No law was passed in the various states in their own respective capacity before the
formation of the Federated Malay States. The first law proclaimed in relation to trade
marks came after the Federation in 1910. This law was the same as the legislation on
fraudulent marks passed in Straits Settlement. 73 Minor changes were made to the
principal Ordinance in 191 i 74 and 1926.
As far as designs are concerned, the same law as in Straits Settlement was passed in
193276.
 This Enactment was later amended in 1933 principally for two purposes.
Firstly, to remove ambiguities on the rights conferred under the patent certificate.
Secondly, to improve the power of the Registrar to rectify any error in the Register
upon certain grounds!
4	 Unfederated Malay States
The Unfederated Malay States consisted of Kelantan, Penis, Kedah, Terengganu,
and Johore. The four earlier states were obtained from the Siamese in 1909 via the
Siamese Treaty. Johore went through a different phase, in 1914 through an
agreement with Temenggong Hussein, Johore accepted a British officer to advise on
the administration of the states. All these states were considered as protected states,
unlike the Straits Settlements which were part of the British colony. Theoretically,
these states were dependent of the British administration and were not bound to attend
to British's advice. However, in effect, most British's advice was taken seriously
F.M.S No.1 of 1910.
F.M.S No.! of 1911, amended by 6/1913 and later replaced by Federal Enactment 7/1917 (10th.
August 1917) which repealed Federal Enactment No.1 of 1910, 6/1911, 6/1913, S.16 amended by Federal
Enactment No.17 of 1926.
F.M.S Enactment No.17/1926 which amended Section 16 of the principal enactment.
76 The Registration of United Kingdom Designs Enactment, 1932.
Enactment No. 43 of 1933.
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even though the local law was not replaced by English law, we find many enactments
were passed to introduce English law. As the administration of these states was not
unified, different states passed their own respective enactments to deal with
Intellectual Property.
4..i.	 Patents
The earlier enactments in Kelantan and Kedah were concerned with the registration
of patent rights which have been obtained either in the United Kingdom or other parts
of Malaya.78
 Both these enactments provided for conferment of patent rights or
exclusive privileges granted in the Colony or the Federated Malay States. The
Kelantan Enactment was repealed in 1928. The 1928 Enactment contained the
same substantive provision as the 1916 Enactment. The reason why the 1916
Enactment was repealed only to reinstate the same substantive provisions in 1928 was
not clear. In 1936, the Kedah Enactment was amended to extend to letters patent
granted in the United Kingdom or in any other British dominion. With that
amendment, patent rights which were obtained in the United Kingdom and other
British dominion may be directly conferred in Kedah but not in Kelantan.
Johore's changes, as far as patent is concerned, followed closely that of Straits
Settlement. The 1911 Enactment was modelled after the 1871 Straits Settlement
Ordinance.80
 Further amendments were made in 192281 and 192482 and 1933.
The 1924 amendments introduced in Johore the changes introduced in the Straits
78 Kelantan Enactment No.3 of 1916 and the Inventions Enactment of Kedah 1332 No.66.
Enactment No.11 of 1928.
Enactment No.ffl of 1911, further amended by Enactment No.1 of 1915.
81 No.17 of 1922 which came in force on 17th. October 1922.
82 Enactment No.13 of 1924 which came into force on 25th. November 1924.
83 Enactment 8 of 1933.
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Settlement in 1922 and 1924M
In 1939, the 1911 Enactment was repealed and replaced with a system registering
only patent rights obtained in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.85
4.2	 Copyright, Trade Marks and Designs
There was no evidence of any legislative instruments passed in Kedah, Kelantan,
Terengganu and Perlis on copyright and trade marks. It is unclear as to what law was
applicable to these states regarding copyright and trade marks as English law was not
applicable per Se. The best view would be that in these states there was no law
applicable to copyright and trade marks. This vacuum continued until after the
formation of the Federation of Malaya.
Unlike Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu, Johore had its first legislation on copyright
in 1931 •86 The system introduced in Johore was different from those introduced to
other states. It provided for a deposit system for printed work in Johore 87. The
interesting characteristic of this ordinance was that it regulated all publication in
Johore, where no printing and publication could be done unless according to this
enactment.
As far as trade marks was concerned, the same development as in the Straits
Settlement can be discerned. The first law regulated the fraudulent use and forging
The Inventions Enactment No. 13 of 1924 which came in force on on 25th. November 1924
introduced dual system and the extension of patent duration to 16y. S.3 of the Enactment made renewal
of exclusive grants automatic.
85 Registration of United Kingdom Patents, No.7 of 1937.
86 Johore Enactment No. 9/1931.
87 The definition of 'book' was wider, includes annual sheet, trade secular, trade advertisements, or
any other employment papers relating to legal matters. The word 'printed' was defined as "printed on a
book, anything which is printed either by stone print or other similar print".
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of trade marks88.
Laws relating to registered designs could only be found in Kedah 89. This statute was
later amended on the point of appointment of Registrar and Deputy Registrar.
5	 Sarawak & North Borneo
Sarawak was ceded to James Brooke by the Sultan of Brunei in 1841. North Borneo
came under British administration in 1865. In 1888 both became protected States.
5.1	 Copyright
In Sarawak, only works composed or created in Sarawak or in any part of the British
Empire, including protectorates and mandated territories, or by Sarawak authors or
British Subjects were given copyright protection90. This Order introduced the shorter
version of Imperial Act91 . There were only three exceptions noted in the legislation
i.e quotation, publication of a report in the newspaper or periodical and reproduction
of speech in a public function and private use for non profit purpose.
In 1936 more substantive provisions similar to the Imperial Act were accepted in
Sarawak. Ironically, the jurisdiction of copyright was further narrowed down to
works first published within Sarawak or created by Sarawak residents and subjects.93
88 Merchandise Marks Enactment No. 4, 1918 of Johore. Under this enactment, the act of
counterfeiting was an infringement although the term 'counterfeit' was not expressly defined therein.
89 U.K Designs (Protection) No 26 of 1357.
Order No. C-8, 1935.
91 
'Copyright' was defined in the 1938 Act as "the exclusive right to publish, republish, produce,
reproduce, perform, dramatize or broadcast the abovementioned works."
Order No C-13 (Copyright), 1936.
One important provision introduced in this Act, similar to the Imperial Act was compulsory
licensing.
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In 1937, minor amendment was made to the pnncipal OrderY
In a series of Orders in 1936, copyright in works in Sarawak was extended. Firstly
to works first published in Eire, or by citizens of Eire and residents of Eire.95
Secondly, to works of Canada, Australia (including Norfolk Island, Papua and the
territory of New Guinea), the Dominion of New Zealand (including West Samoa),
The Union of South Africa (including South-West Africa) and Newfoundland. Later
in 1917, it was further extended to another 40 countries. 97
 Finally in 1939, the Order
was extended to recognise all works coming from the Beme Convention countries.98
North Borneo's copyright law was also based on the Imperial Act. Following that
Ordinance, regulations concerning the importation of copyright works from outside
the Colony was made in 1952'°°.
5.2	 Patent
In Sarawak the first legislation on patents was Order L-1 (Letters Patent) of 1927
Order No.C-13A (Copyright Amendment) 1937, (date of force 16th. June, 1937).
Notification 74/39 of the 4th. January, 1939.
Notification 1234/38 of 1st November, 1938.
Notification 1434/37 of the 7th. December, 1937.
98 Notification 140/39 of 2nd. January 1929. Firstly, right to prevent the reproduction of newspaper
or magazine article if such reproduction was forbidden by express declaration . Secondly, for works of
certain countries, the protection is conditional upon the publication of that work within 10 years of the first
publication in Sarawak and other part of the Majesty's dominions. Thirdly, for musical work of Greek and
Siam origin, the right to prevent public performance is dependant whether such act is prohibited by an
express declaration. Fourthly, works originating from Siam, the entire rights were conditional upon the
accomplishment of the conditions and formalities specified in that country.
Ordinance 4 of 1935.
The Copyright Regulations Ordinance No.9, 1952 of North Borneo. This ordinance has the same
objective of the 1914 ordinance, to prevent importation of works from outside the Colony. Notice should
be given by the owner of the work who are desirous of preventing copies from being imported in the colony.
The subject matter of the ordinance is "books or other printed work" as every part or division of a book,
pamphlet, sheet of letter press, sheet of music, map, plan, chart or table separately published.
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which came into operation on 16th August, 1927.101 The Order provided for those
who hold a grant of letters patent in the Great Britain or in the Federated Malay States
to apply for petition for grant of such rights in the Sarawak.
North Borneo adopted the Straits Settlements Inventions Ordinance in 1887.102 In
1908, the Governor of North Borneo passed a second proclamation, only to reinstate
the same substantive provisions)03
 Along with the changes in other states, the dual
system was abolished in 1937.' In 1949, the North Borneo 1937 Enactment was
extended to Labuan and changes were made to the principal Ordinance to that
effect)°5
5.3	 Trade Marks and Designs
In relation to trade marks in Sarawak, a registration system was adopted in 1934106.
The Order provided for the exclusive right to the use of a mark in connection with
particular class of goods. Damages can be obtained against unauthorised user. To bring
the legislative provisions on trade marks consistent with other states, an Order was
passed to prohibit the use of marks similar to Royal Arms, Royal Crests, Sarawak
Arms, British National flags or other flags of any of British's dominions.'°7
Labuan incorporated the Straits Settlement's law relating to fraudulent marking of
101 See also Order No.26 of 1922 (copies missing) and the Rules passed thereon under No.CVX, 1922.
102 See Proclamation I of 1887 (copy missing from the IALS Library).
103 See Proclamation II of 1908 which came into force on 1st. of July, 1908.
104 See the Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance No.9/ 1937 which came into force on
3rd of March 1938.
	 -
105 See Ordinance No.16 of 1949 (11/8/1949) and No.4 of 1950 (3/5/1950). Minor amendments were
made in 1956, see No.! of 1956 (12/5/56).
106 Order No T-3, 1934.
Order No. T-3 (Trade Marks) 1934.
50
merchandise in 1891.108 A register of trade marks was set up in 1893.b09 These
two laws were repealed in 1928110. The 1928 Ordinance was a shorter version of
the Straits Settlement 1938 Ordinance on registration of trade marks. In 1947, Straits
Settlement's Ordinances on trade marks and merchandise marks ceased to apply in
Labuan, and Labuan is united with the North Borneo. 11 ' In its place came the
Merchandise Marks Ordinance 1928. The principal law was amended to reinstate
marks which were registered before the unification (or pre occupation marks)."2
Designs registered in the United Kingdom were enforced in the North Borneo in
194O." In 1951, the Straits Settlement's United Kingdom Designs (Protection)
Ordinance, 1938 were repealed."4
6.	 The Federation of Malaya & Post Independence
Upon the formation of the Federation of Malaya, laws relating to patents, trade
marks and designs were consolidated. In the case of invention and designs, the same
system of registration of patents/ designs granted in the United Kingdom was
retained."5
 Both these laws applied only to West Malaysia. The laws in Sabah and
108 Ordinance No.ffl of 1891. (1st April 1891).
Ordinance No.IV of 1893. (1st. November, 1893).
110 Ordinance No. 2 of 1928.
" Merchandise Marks (Unification) No.15 of 1947.
112 Merchandise Marks (Amendment) No.16 of 1947.
113 Ordinance No.2 of 1940. (13th. January, 1940).
114 No.39 of 1951 (date of force 8th. December, 1951). The Ordinance also substituted the word
'colony' with 'state'.
See Federation of Malaya, The Registration of United Kingdom Patents Ordinance, No.9 of 1951,
and United Kingdom Designs (Protection) Act, 1949.
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Sarawak remain unchanged"6
In relation to trade marks, the law in West Malaysia was consolidated in l95O"'.
Most of the features of the previous law relating to trade mark and merchandise marks
were retained. Again, the laws in North Borneo and Sarawak remain unchanged."8
The law relating to copyright remained unchanged in all states until 1969. Upon
independence there were several laws applicable in Malaysia. In Penang and Malacca,
the applicable law was the Imperial Act 1911 (as amended by no.24/19 18). In
Federated Malay States, Enactment Cap 73 was still in force and in Sabah and
Sarawak the law in force was the United Kingdom 1956 Act. In 1969 all these laws
were repealed and on its place was the Copyright Act 1969. This Act was further
repealed in 1987 with modifications done after the accession to Berne Convention.
7	 Conclusion
A few observations can be made from the above elucidation of the various legislations
proclaimed in Malaysia, since the reception of English law. Firstly, it is clear from
the nature of the laws passed that the earlier laws pertaining to Intellectual Property
were principally aimed to safeguard the British interest and trade. Among the first
step taken is to bvtbess infringement of British's Intellectual Property rights by
reinforcing the importation of copyright works into the colony and the prohibition of
the fraudulent use of goods which may contain the U.K registered marks. The
transition to a full registration system for trade marks and patents came in effect
several years later when the British trade in Malaya (as it then was) flourished.
116 In North Borneo the law applicable relating to patents is Registration of UK Patents Ordinance
No.9/1937. In relation to designs the law is the Ordinance No.2 of 1940. In Sarawak, the law relating to
patents is Order Li (letters Patent) 1927.
117 Trade Mark Ordinance, No.26 of 1950 and Merchandise Marks Ordinance, No.10 of 1950.
118 Sarawak Order No.T.3 1934 as amended by Order No.T.3 (Trade Marks) 1934; Sabah-
Merchandise Marks (Unification) Ordinance 1947.
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As far as patents for invention is concerned, the first system introduced was a dual
system, providing for the registration of both local and the U.K patents. The
requirement of 'novelty' is also very minimal. This criteria is reflective of old
English statutes which were carefully drafted for the espousal of importation of
outside technology and manufacturing activities. The idea of relaxing the criteria of
novelty may no longer be acceptable according to present standards. However, the
idea of treating foreign patents on a different basis than local patents may finds its
significance in a different form. From the latest amendment to the current Patent Act,
foreign applications of patents granted elsewhere will not be subjected to full
substantive examination. The rationale is to reduce administrative burden and cost in
examining patent applications which had been granted elsewhere' .
In relation to trade marks, two different sets of laws were put in force by the British
administrators. The laws relating to fraudulent use of merchandise marks were first
introduced. The laws relating to registration of trade marks came much later. This
dualism is preserved till this day, signified in the Trade Marks Act 1976 and the
Trade Practices Act 1972.
As far as copyright is concerned, the deposit system as administered in Johore has
many important significance, if taken up by the legislators in Malaysia today. Having
depository system ensures the accumulation of publications in Malaysia in a single /
several banks. Thus, by having a deposit system, there would be an easy and ready
source of reference available for the public.
119 See S.29(A) (2) of the 1983 Act as amended in 1993 which states:
"If a patent or other title of industrial property protection has been granted to the applicant or his predecessor
in title in a prescribed countly outside malaysia or under a prescribed treaty or Convention for an invention
which is the same or essentially the same as the invention claimed in the application, the applicant may,
instead of requesting for a substantive examination, request for a modified substantive examination".
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CONCEPT OF 'MAL' AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
L	 Introduction
The concept of 'property' and 'ownership' is discussed in the Islamic jurisprudence
as 'ma!' and 'milkiyyah' respectively. The word 'ma!' refers to the 'res' or subject
matter of legal transactions and the word 'milkiyyah' is discussed by Muslim scholars
in the context of rights of ownership. In the Islamic jurisprudence, there are three
types of 'res' of property;
i) 'ayn' (tangible goods);
ii) 'dayn' (debt) and;
iii) 'manfa 'ah' (usufruct)'.
The legality of intellectual creations was not directly discussed by classical Muslim
scholars as the issue did not exist then. Some of the contemporary scholars justify
these intellectual property rights on the basis of 'maslahah mursalah' (public
interest)2. This chapter will examine the criteria of 'ma!' as understood and discussed
in the four major schools of jurisprudence namely; Shafi'i, Hanafi, Hambali and
Maliki. This chapter will discuss, the concept of 'ma!' in the context of "it capable
of being the subject matter of the property rights.3"
Most of the arguments relating to the acceptance of intellectual property as 'ma!' are
discussed by Al-Darini in his scholarly work entitled 'Haag al-Ibtikar'4. Other
With the exception of the Hanafi school of law, see the discussion at page 67.
2 See for example the views of Dr. Khalid Abdullah Abid in his book, 'Mabadi' al-Tashri' al-Islami',
1986.
Bell, Modem law of Personal Property in En gland and Ireland, Butterworths, London (1989) p.3.
4 a1-Danni, Fathi et.al. Hagg al-ibtikarfi al-Fiqh al-Islami al-Mugaran, Muassasah al-Risalah, Beirut,
1984 (hereinafter refened to as Ibtikar).
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writings are also referred to such as Sanhuri's 'Masadir a! Haag'5 and 'al Wasit Fi
a! Oanun al Madani', Subhi Mahmasanni's, 'The General Theory of Law of
Obligations and Contract Under Islamic Jurisprudence'6, Al Khafif in 'Miikivvah7'
and 'Ahkam a! Mu 'amalah a! Shari'iyvah8 ', and Al Ibadi's excellent work on the
comparative analysis of ownership in the civil and the Islamic laws9.
This chapter will argue that the intangible right of intellectual property is a form of
usufructuary right ('manfa 'ah') within the classification of 'ma!'. The focus of the
inquiry is as follows:
i. The nature of rights in Intellectual Property,
ii. The classification of things as the subject matter of property in English Law,
iii. The meaning, definition and classification of 'mal' in the Islamic Law,
iv. The meaning and understanding of 'manfa 'ah' in the Islamic Law.
This inquiry will next focus on the jurisprudential arguments on the concept of
ownership in intellectual property. In this respect, the arguments given by Al-Qarafi
and Ibn. Hazm are analysed. Another objection to the recognition of intellectual
property is the concern that recognising exclusive rights over 'ideas' may be in
possible contradiction to the religious prohibition against the concealment of 'jim'.
In this chapter, the various Qur'anic injunctions and Prophetic 'hadiths' pertaining
'jim' are analysed. It is the contention of this thesis that the recognition of intellectual
Sanhuri, Abd. aI-Razzaq, Masadir a! Haag /1 al-Figh al-Islami, (1954), Cairn, 6 vols. in 2,
hereinafter refened to as Masadir al-Haag.
6 Mahmassani, Subhi, The General Theory of Law of Obligations and Contracts Under Islamic
Jurisprudence: A Comparative Study of The Islamic Rites From the Modern Standpoint (1948) hereinafter
referred to as The General Theory of Law and Obligations. Dar al-llm al-Malayin, Beirut (3rd.ed)
Al Khafif, Au, Al Milkiyyah fi Al Shari'ah al Islamiyyah Ma 'a al-Mu garanah bi al-Shara '1 a!-
Wad'iyyah, Al Qahirah:Maahad al-Buhuth wa al-Dirasat al-Arabiyyah, 1966, hereinafter referred to as
Milkiyyah.
8 Al Khafif, Ali, Ahkam a!-Mu'amalah al-Shar'iyyah, Cairo, 1948.
Al-Ibadi, Abdul Salam Daud, Al-Milkiyyah fi al-Shari'ah a!-Islamiyyah; Tabi'atuha wa Wazifatuha
wa Qu yuduha; Dirasah Muqaranah bi al-Qawanin wa an-Nuzum aI-Wad'i yyah, 2 Vols, al-Maktabah at-
Aqsa, Jordan, 1974.
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property does not fall within the said prohibition.
Having established that intellectual property is 'ma!' and that recognition of
intellectual property is valid i Islamic jurisprudence, this chapter will proceed with
the analysis on the nature of exclusive rights in intellectual property. Being intangible
property, the nature of 'ma!' in intellectual property differs from other forms of
property. In this section, the focus of the inquiry are the followings:
i. The distinction between intangible rights of Intellectual Property and the rights
in the physical embodiments.
ii. The nature of rights vis-a vis the third party.
iii. Other related issues.
2	 Terms and definition.
One may take as a starting point a definition directed to layman provided by WIPO;
Intellectual Property'° refers to:
"pieces of information which can be incorporated in tangible objects at the
same time in an unlimited number of copies at different location anywhere in
the world. The property is not in those copies but in the information reflected
in those copies."
Distinctions are often drawn between information in the abstract ('idea') and in
particular expressed form' 2. However, the boundary between 'idea' and 'expression'
10 For the purpose of this chapter, the term intellectual property is used in its widest sense to cover
all forms of intangible rights over ideas. The distinction between intellectual property and industrial property
would not be relevant for our purposes.
World Intellectual Property Organization, Background Reading on Intellectual Property, 3 (1988),
cited in Leaffer, M.A (ed), International Treatises on Intellectual Property, The Bureau of National Affairs,
Washington, 1990 par. p.3.
12 See Plix Products v Frant M Winstone 3 IPR 390 where Prichard J distinguished between the
general idea or basic concept of a work and the transfonnation of basic concept into a concrete form.
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is not clear, all depends on level of abstraction' 3. As much as we disagree with the
proposition that Intellectual Property rights involves the ownership of information at
the lowest level of abstraction, as implicated in the definition of WIPO above. In
practice, Intellectual Property rights do give control over questions of, whether,
when, how and to whom information is disseminated, and give at least some control
over its use.
In the convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization'4,
Intellectual Property was defined in Article 2 as:
"all rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific,
literary or artistic fields".
And in subsection (viii) of the said provision:
"Intellectual Property shall include:
literary, artistic and scientific works; performances of performing artists,
phonograms and broadcasts; inventions in all fields of human endeavour;
scientific discoveries; industrial design; trade mark, service marks and
commercial names and designations; protection against unfair competition and
all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific,
literary or artistic fields".
In this respect, a better way of defining Intellectual Property is by looking at the
bundle of rights one has over 'jdeas" 5. Hughes for example define Intellectual
Property as "non physical property which stems from, is identified as, and whose
13 See also lbcos Computers Ltd v Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd (1994) FSR 275, LB.
Plastics v Swish (1974) RPC 551, Computer Associates v Altal, (1992) 982 F.2d 693 (2nd. Cir), Nichols
v Universal Pictures 4 S F 2d 119 at 121 (2nd Cir 1930).
14 The Convention was signed at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. For a copy of the Convention, see
Leaffer, op.cit p.566.
15 The word 'ideas' here has to be understood as 'applied ideas' as opposed to 'pure ideas', the latter
not being the subject matter of intellectual property.
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value is based upon some idea or ideas" 6. It is clear that in defining Intellectual
Property, one has to be careful to distinguish between absolute property rights in ideas
(which are not seen as the effect of Intellectual Property) and the rights to control the
use of the ideas in specified ways (which are). Hence, Hughes argues that 'where X
is the idea, Intellectual Property is defined by the external functions of X' 17
the subject matter of
The term used by Muslim scholars to describehthese intangible rights is 'ibtikar"8
'Ibtikar' refers to intellectual ideas which are the product of one's labour, effort and
expenditure, these ideas being new and not being invented by a prior person' 9. The
term 'ibtikar' here according to the Faruqi Law Dictionary means invention or creation;
'mubtakir' means newly created, novel, new or original and 'intaj al-zihni al-
mubtakir' means inventive intellectual creation. While 'ibtikar' is used in a wide
context to cover all fields of Intellectual Property, other terms are also used such as
used the term 'al- huquq al-adabiyyah wa al-fahmiyyah wa al-faniah wa al-tijariah
wa al-sina 'iyyah al-muta 'arf biha lil-muallafin wa al-musiqin wa al-mukhtarin'
20(rights related to cultural, intellectual, artistic, commercial and industrial more
known as author's, musical and inventor's rights.) Other terms being used by others
are 'haqq lii muallf' (author's rights) and 'haqq a! ikhtira' (inventions/patents rights).
3	 Classification of 'things' and related terms.
In the classical English law, the confinement of property to mere corporeal substances
is reflected by Austin who defined 'things' as:
permanent objects, not being persons, as are sensible or perceptible through
the sense. Or (changing the expression) things are such permanent external
16 Hughes, Justin, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol 77
p.287 par. p.294.
" Hughes, p.294, op.cit.
See Darini, Fathi, Hagg al-Ibtikar. p9
See al-Danni p.9 op.cit.
20 See Subhi Mahmasanni, op. cit.
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objects as are not person"21.
This classical view is subjected to frequent changes. The notion of the subject matter
of ownership has expanded to include choses in action, certain rights and other
intangible rights such as intellectual property. Salmond took the view that the true
subject matter of ownership was in all cases a right, on the ground that it would be
a logical absurdity if the subject-matter was sometimes a material object and
sometimes a right22.
Unlike Salmond who argued that all rights were necessarily ownership rights, the
English law differentiates between rights which are treated as 'things' and those which
are not. Commonly recognised rights which are not considered as 'things' include the
right of expression and right to own one's body. Hence we see that the meaning of
'rights' is wider than the meaning of 'things', Dias argues that the meaning of
ownership is coterminous with that of 'things' 23. This conclusion is consistent with
the jurisprudential argument on the nature of ownership of copyright and patents,
21 Austin, Jurisprudence, Vol.2, edited by R.Campbell, London, John Murray (1873), cited in
Bhalla, The Institution of Property: Legally, Historicall y and Philosophically Regarded, Eastern Book
Company, Delhi, 1984 p.250.
See Fitzgerald. PJ, Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th.ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London (1966).
23 See Dias, R.W.M., Jurisprudence, 5th. ed. (1985), Buuerworths, London p.295. See also the
objection by Pn)fessor Williams on this point. He argued that associating ownership with the concept of
'things' as amounting to a substitution of the word 'things' for 'rights'. See Williams, Language and the
Law (1945) 61 LQR 386 cited in Dias, p.297, op.cit.
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which to him are treated as 'things' 24. On the other hand, on the same basis, there
is a wealth of jurisprudential debate whether 'ideas', 'information' and trade secrets
can be considered as property.
Lawson & Rudden (1982) classify the ownership rights of patents and copyright as
a form of choses in action 26. In English law the classification of property in the
sense of subject matter of ownership is as follows: land, goods, tangible movables
other than money, choses in action i.e intangibles movables such as debts, patents
and copyright, money and funds. Patents and copyrights are considered as choses in
action because like debt their value depends on the intangible rights and not the
physical medium. This classification ignores statutory provisions which characterise
Intellectual Property as personal property, without being a thing in action27.
In Islamic jurisprudence, the subject matter of property can consist of 'ayn' (physical
things), 'dayn' (debt), 'manfa 'ah' (usufruct) and certain 'haqq' (rights). Al Khafif,
24 See Dias, op.cit p. 296. For an illustration of the judicial reluctance to afford general protection to
all intangible 'things' see the case of Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Company Limited v.
Taylor and Others, (1937) 58 C.L.R 479. Dixon J. (as he then was) of the Australian High Court summed
up the Position at p.509:
"(The courts) have not in British jurisdiction thrown the protection of an injunction around all the
intangible elements of value, that is, value in exchange, which may flow from the exercise by
an individual of his powers or resources whether in the organisation of a business or undertaking
or the use of ingenuity, knowledge, skill or labour. This is sufficiently evidenced by the history
of the law of copyright and by the fact that the exclusive right to invention, trade marks, designs,
trade name and reputation are dealt with in english law as special heads or protected interests and
not under a wide generalisations."
For an alternative view, see, Libling, D.F, The concept of property: property in intangibles, 1978, LQR,
Vol 94 p.103-119.
See Roberts, RJ, Is Information Property?, Intellectual Property Journal, (1987) p.209 - 215;
Soltysinski, Si, Are Trade Secrets Property?, (1986) IIC, Vol. 17 p.33 1-355; Hammond, Grant, The
Legal Protection of Ideas, Pt.! and II, (1992) 8 CLSR 111.
26 See p.20, Lawson & Rudden, The Law of Property, 2nd. Ed. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982 par.
Ch.11 on classifications of things.
27 S.30 of the U.K Patents Act 1977 which characterise patents as personal property without being a
thing in action. See also S.1(1), S.90(l) and 96(1) of the U.K CDPA 1988 which characterise copyright
as personal property. The position is the same with trade marks, see S.22 of the 1994 U.K Trade Mark Act.
60
explained the distinction between 'shai", 'am' and 'manfa 'ah '28• In Islamic
jurisprudence, the term 'shai" is used to signify everything which is in existence
either in the physical sense ('hissan') or in the legal sense ('hakaman'). The later
refers to intangible things which exists in notions such as words (non printed).
Everything which is known to exist is classified as 'shai'. 'Am' refers to all corporeal
things which may be 'ma!' or non 'ma!'.
'Manfa 'ah' comes from the root word 'na-Ia-a', which literally means "benefit" or
"utility" and is used in contrast to 'dharr' (harmful or injurious). Al-Khafif argued
that rights of 'manfa 'ah' was contingent upon the existence and the legality of the
physical embodiments and hence not considered as a right which can stand on its own.
Mahmassani in his work, agrees on the last issue and points out that there are certain
'manfa 'ah' which are not 'ma!' such as the enjoyment of sunlight, air and the right
of neighbourhood ('haqq al-jiwar') which to him are not capable of being the subject
matter of legal transactions29.
'Dayn' is another form of property. 'Dayn' refers to debt, financial obligation and
liability ('dhimmah') and therefore in many respects similar to the conception of
'choses in action' in the English Law30.
4.	 The meaning of 'ma!' under the established rules of Fiph (Islamic
Jurisprudence)
The term 'ma!' comes from the root word 'ma-wa-la' which means to enrich.3'
'Ma!' is discussed in Islamic Jurisprudence in the perspective of legal transactions or
28 See the al Khafif, All, Al Milkiyyah , op.cit. pgs.9- 11.
29 The General Theory of Law of Obligations and Contracts, op.cit. vol.! p.11.
See Sanhwi, Masadir al-Hagp fi al-Fiqh al-Islami. vol.! p.1 3-20.
31 Al Mawrid. A Modem Arabic-English Dictionary, Dar al 'flm lil Malayin. (1992).
61
'res in Commercio'. 32 The concept of ownership or 'milkiyyah' is wider and it
includes proprietary and non proprietary rights. 33
 A modern definition of 'ma!' is
"[a]ll that has commercial value," or"[t]hose corporeal, usufructuy and other rights
of any kinds of any kind the exchange of which is customary are to be regarded as
property (ma!) of commercial value." It includes both movables and immovables,
both specific objects and their use (or income which they produce), both what a man
owns and has in his possession, and what is owed to him (i.e choses in action).
Al-Darini, classifies intellectual property rights using the established Islamic legal
rules, by means of 'Qiyas'35 - to usufructuary rights ('manfa'ah') of tangible goods.
Muslim scholars have discussed 'manfa 'ah' in the context of rights issuing of, and
incidental to, the rights of ownership of tangible property such as in the context of
right to 'intjfa" (right of enjoyment) and the right to 'irtjfaq' (easement) 36. In this
respect, there is a critical conceptual gap between the understanding of the concept
of 'manfa 'ah' in classical works and Al-Darini's view. The concept of 'mania 'ah' in
classical works refers to the collaterals of tangible property and hence treated as
incidentals to physical property. Intangible rights of Intellectual Property, while
manifested in physical embodiments, exist independently and are not dependent upon
the physical elements. The physical embodiments are mere vehicles and do not
determine the proprietary nature of the intangible property.
32 See Schact, Joseph, Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1964. p.134.
Among non pmprietoiy rights considered as 'milkiyyah' are 'haqq a!.hadanah'(rights of
guardianship), 'haqq al- wakalah' (right of agency) and 'haqq al-nikah'(right accruing from a marriage
contract).
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, J.Norinan D. Anderson, Islamic Law, Vol.VI,
ed. by Frederick H.Lawson, (Tubigen: Mohr,1976).
'Qiyas' is defined as "the accord of a known thing by reason of the equality of the one with the
other in respect of the effective cause ('illah') of its law" , Al Subki, Jama' al-Jawami Vol.iv.p.1. It is the
application or extension of the law established by a binding authority to a particular case. 'Qiyas' is
accepted by all schools of jurisprudence as one the sources of Islamic Law. See Prof. Ahmad b. Ibrahim,
Sources and Development of Muslim Law, (1965), p.23.
Subhi Mahmasanni, The General Theor y of Law of Obligations and Contract under Islamic
Jurisprudence, op. cit. vol.1 pgs. 20-25.
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Despite this conceptual gap, Al-Darini's view can be accepted on many basis.
Firstly, the essential element of 'manfa 'ah' is its utility. This is the view of Imam Izzu
ib. As Salam, who opined that the 'athar' 37 (effect) of 'manfa 'ah' enjoyment and
benefit.38 Secondly, even though the proprietary of intellectual property is
independent of physicality, intellectual property in most cases requires tangible
medium. In this respect, the usufructv4r j rights of intellectual inventions differ from
usufructvar rights of tangible property in two ways; source and origin. While the
source and origin of usufructuary rights of tangible property are the physical property
itself, the origin and source of intellectual inventions is human intellect or effort which
can only be understood notionally.
Under Islamic jurisprudence, usufructuary rights in intellectual ideas, when residing
permanently in the medium which it is expressed in, is analogous to the usufructuary
right of tangible property when separated from its origin. The exploitation of the
usufruct is independent of and separate from the origin and source of the intellectual
property, leaving the origin as clear evidence of the link between the author and his
intellectual creations. 39 Tangible property however cannot be separated from its
usufruct in the sense that the tangible property itself has to be possessed if its usufruct
When the 'Shari'a' value consist not a connection of one thing with the other, it is either a quality
of an act by a legally responsible person ('mukallaf), such as the quality of an act being allowed (jbahah')
or prohibited ('hurrnah') in the Shari'a, or it is the effect Cathar') of such an act - such as ownership.
which is the effect of the act of purchase. These are some of the meanings, expounded by the jurists,
whereby a declaratory law under the Shari'a derives its character. See Ahmad b. Mohd. Ibrahim, Sources
and Development of Muslim Law, p.34 op.cit.
38 The oft-quoted statement from Imain Izzu ibn. As- Salam is 'a! gharad a! azhar mm jami' at
amwal'. See also the loose definition given by Imam lbn Arafah at p. 73 supra. He defines 'manfa'ah' as
intangible rights which cannot be apprehended notionally. Arguably, this includes the intangible rights of
intellectual property.
The relationship between the author and his intellectual creations is described as a special
relationship ('alaqah ikhtisasiyah') by the author in the sense that it is a direct relationship and not
intemipted by another person. Al-Darnni argued that because of this direct relationship, one's ideas reflect
a person's personality 'shakhsiyah'. This means that the originator of an idea does not only owns it for
purposes of transactions but is also held responsible to it. See al-Darini, p.16, op.cit.
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is to be used.4°
5.	 The position of usufructuary rights 'manfa 'ah' and intellectual creation under
the classification of 'ma!' accordin g to the schools of jurisprudence.
5.1	 The Hanafi school of jurisprudence
The classical Hanafi jurists did not generally accept 'manfaah' as 'ma!' (with certain
exceptions) because one of the requirements to constitute property under this school
of jurisprudence is the physical possession. In 'Majallatul Ahkam', 'ma!' is defined
as 'what is by nature inclined and liked by humans (i.e something which apt to benefit
humans) and can be stored and preserved until the time of need." Through this
definition, it is clear that the Hanafis define 'ma!' from its linguistic meaning41 . Al-
Khafif defines 'ma!' as something which is capable of being possessed, physically
acquired, where normal enjoyment is possible in ordinary times ('adah')42 (as
opposed to 'idhtirar' (times of emergency).
From the above, it is clear that the criterion of 'ma!', according to the Hanafis are:
(i) something which is by nature liked by humans,
(ii) physical or corporeal goods which can be possessed, acquired and stored.
By this conception, non-tangible 'things' such as sunlight and 'i!m' are not 'ma!'.
Similarly, 'things' which are trivial in amount are not capable of being consumed by
normal enjoyment such as a grain of rice or a blade of grass, are not 'mat'. Likewise
'mubah' things such as fish and birds are not considered as 'ma!' until they are
acquired and possessed.
40 To understand this concept the most easiest example is a contract of hire of a chattel, the chattel
remains under the possession of the hiree on trust to be utilised until the end of the contractual period when
the chattel has to be returned.
41 The rootword of this word is 'ma-wa-la', 'yamilu', 'mal'.
42 See al Khafif, All, Ahkam al Mu'amalah al Shar'iyyah, op. cit. p.9.
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The general rule is that ail these requirements need to be satisfied in times of
'ikhtiyar' and not in times of emergency ('idhtirar'). Hence, wine is not considered
as 'ma!' as according to the normal ruling the consumption of wine is prohibited. The
skin, bones and other parts of dead animals, are 'ma!', in contrast to the flesh of dead
animals (or animals which have not been ritually slaughtered), as the prohibition of
dead animals is in the context of consumption of the flesh.
With the requirement of corporeality, intangible rights such as 'manfa 'ah' and 'haqq'
are not considered as 'ma!'. Further, these intangible rights are not permanent
('isriqrar'), they are contingent upon the possession of the physical embodiments and
cannot exist on their own. For example, the right to reside a house will only arise
upon acquiring the ownership of the house. Thus according to this view, any
transgression of usufructory rights will not give rise to any damages. When a
property is wrongly confiscated, the tangible property should be returned. The
Hanafis do not require the compensation of any unlawful use and enjoyment of the
confiscated good. Secondly, the Hanafis do not accept the transmissibility of
'manfa 'ah' upon death. Hence, a contract of lease will expire upon the death of the
lessor.
The Hanafis, however, accepted the validity of certain transactions involving
'manfa'ah' such as the contract of lease ('jarah'). In this respect, the Hanafis draw
a distinction between 'ma!' and 'milkiyyah' and stipulate that even though 'manfa'ah'
rights are not 'ma!', they can be the subject of 'mi!kiyyah'. In some exceptional
circumstances, the Hanafis have recognised 'manfa'ah' as 'ma!' via the application
of 'istihsan'. Hence when the property of orphans or a 'waaf' property is unlawfully
appropriated, any unlawful enjoyment and usage of it should be compensated43.
Other scholars criticise the views of the Hanafis. To them the Hanafi conception of
'ma!' is not consistent with accepted legal practice. In the Qur' an for example,
For fwiher elaboration, see Badran, Abu al-'Aynayn Badran, AI-Shari'ah aI-Islamiyyah; Tarikhuha
wa-Nazarfrvah aI-Milkiyyah wal-'Upud, (n.d) Muassasah Shihab al-Jami'ah, Alexandria par. pgs 304 &
305.
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'manfa 'ah' is accepted as a valid dowry, and hence should be 'ma!' as only 'ma!' can
be given as dowry. Many contemporary Hanafi jurists accept the proprietary
nature of 'manfaah' as property as it is customarily regarded as having commercial
value ('mutaqawwimah 't5.
5.2.	 The Shafi'i school of jurisprudence.
Property is anything ('ma') which it is permitted under the Shari'ah to benefit, either
corporeally or by usufruct... Unlike the Hanafis who emphasize the corporeality
of a thing the Shafi'is emphasize its utility and value47. A thing will be of 'value'
if it has commercial value in the sense of being traded or that which necessitates
compensation when damaged. The Shafi'is also exclude whatever is expressly
prohibited in the Qur'an.
The use of the relative pronoun ('ma') in the definition given by Al-Zarkashi above,
which means "whatever", "all that", indicates the inexhaustiveness of the definition
and arguably may include intellectual creations. What determines whether something
is of value or not is the accepted 'urf' (customs) among the people at large according
to Imam Sayuti.
See Surah a! Nisa: 24;
"Thus hath Allah ordained (prohibitions) against you: except for these, all others are lawful, provided ye
seek (them in marriage) with gifts from your property".
See also Surahal Ra'd: 16:
"Ia yamlikuna Ii anfusihim nafan wa Ia dharran."
' See al Zarqa, a! Madkha! ila Nazariyyah a! Iltizam a! Ammah, Matba'ah Jami'ah, Damshik,
(1959) par. pgs. 113-120.
See Qawaid al Zarkashi, p.323 as cited in Haqg al-Ibtikar p.23, op.cit.
See al RaShid, Abdullah ibn Abd. al-Rahman, AI-Amwal aI-Mubahah Wa Ahkam Tamlikuha fi al-
Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah, 2 vols, (1984) Sharikak aI-Tiba'ah aI-'Arabiyyah, cairo. vol.I.p.28.
P.23 Haga al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
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5.3	 The Hambali school of jurisprudence.
'Ma!' is something which is permitted to be enjoyed ('manfa 'ah mubahah') in normal
circumstances i.e not in necessity or exigency ('darurah' or 'hajah )49 Thus the
conception of 'ma!' according to the Hambalis is near to that of the Shafi'is. The
emphasis is not on corporeal existence but on utility and value. From this definition
it has been extended to include every benefit which is of commercial value among the
community. Likewise, the Hambalis exclude those goods which are expressly
prohibited in the Shari 'ah from the domain of 'ma!'.
5.4	 The Maliki school of jurisprudence.
'Ma!' is anything which can be owned and which all the incidental rights of
ownership can be exercised50. Imam al-Shatibi, who is one of the main Maliki
jurists, is of the view that property refers to the legal entitlement of an owner, as
ownership is the relationship between the owner and the thing owned. Imam Al-
Qarafi added that such legal entitlement may vest in corporeal and non-corporeal
things. (Again the use of the word "'ma" here indicates the inexhaustiveness of the
definition). Thus with this relationship, it is clear that an owner has a right to prevent
others from encroaching his legal entitlements on the property or exploiting it without
his consent51.
Other scholars disagree with the Malikis' approach on equating 'milkiyyah' and 'ma!'.
They point out that not everything which is classified as 'milkiyyah' is 'ma!'.
Mi!kiyyah as understood in Islamic jurisprudence, which is the bundle of rights
possessed by somebody, includes non-proprietory rights such as rights of
guardianship, rights of 'waka!ah' and rights of 'wazfah'.
See Ibn Quddamah, aI-MuRhni, cited in Haqg al-ibtikar p.23, op. cit.
° See al Shatibi al-Muwafaqah, cited in Haqg al-ibtikar p.35, op. cit.
Al-Qarafi al-Furuq, cited in Ibtikar p.32, op. cit.
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With such a wide definition, one can argue that the Malikis include both tangible
property and usufruct in their conception of 'ma!'.
5.5	 Views of other jurists on the conce pt of property.
Imam Ibn. Arafah defines 'manfaah' as things which can only be apprehended
notionally and not in the normal sensory meaning. He defines property to include both
corporeal and chattels. Imam Ibn.Arafah further distinguishes 'manfaah' which resides
in tangible things and can be indirectly possessed and exploited from those which
cannot be exploited. The latter is not considered as property. Examples of the latter
is the intellectual character or the attribute of inventiveness of a creation52.
It has long been accepted since the period of the Companions of the Prophet
('Ashab )53 that a contract of employment or labour is valid on the basis of the
acceptance of 'manfa 'ah' of labour as a valid subject of contract. On the same line
of argument, intellectual creations have a prior right as (they are) of greater effect
('athar') and greater significance ('intfa").
Imam Shatibi views property differently. To him ownership is the essence of
property. No ownership is possible unless something which has benefit and
commercial value. Arguably 'manfa 'ah' which has all these attributes can be owned
as property. Thus ownership here does not mean corporeality but equally reside in
corporeal, 'manfa 'ah' and nghtsM.
It is clear that corporeality is not the essential element of property. As to physical
possession, this is not necessary as intellectual creations can be posessed indirectly
through the medium which it is attached. There should not be any difficulty in
accepting intellectual creations as 'manfa 'ah' and consequently, valid property under
52 Ibn Arafah, Sharh Hudud, cited in Haag al-Ibtikar p.90, op. cit.
This is the period under the first four Caliphs; Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman and Ali.
Cited in Haag al-ibtikar p.35, op. cit.
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the Islamic Law.
In conclusion, the basis of recognition of intellectual creations as property under
Islamic Law lies on two grounds:
i. 'Manfaah' which is allowed under the Shari'a
ii. 'Ui-f' or recognised custom55.
The outcome is the same for those jurists who argue that the bases of property under
Islamic Law are "commercial value" and 'uif'. Intellectual creations have been
accepted by 'urf' (recognised custom) to have commercial value ('taqawwum'). The
'jumhur ulama' (majority of the jurists) accept this determination so long as there is
no contrary 'nass' (definitive principle of the law). The 'jumhur ulama' (the majority
of the scholars) also agree that anything which is forbidden under the Shari'ah cannot
be accepted as recognised property. Hence, the subject matter of Intellectual Property
is also subjected to the fulfilment of the requirement of legality. The elaboration on
the concept of 'halal' and 'haram' and its application on Intellectual Property will be
dealt with separately in each subject-matter: copyright, trade mark and patent. On
this basis, content based restrictions are part and parcel of an Islamic perspective of
Intellectual Property56.
Earlier in this chapter, it has been pointed out that intellectual creations can be a form
of usufructuary right ('manfa'ah'). From the above discussion of the position of
'Urf is defined as 'recurring practices which are acceptable to people of sound nature'? Urf 'am'
means customary practices which are prevalent everywhere and on which the people agree regardless of the
passage of time while 'urf kizas' means customary practices which are prevalent in a particular locality,
profession or trade. Conditions of valid 'urf' are;
i)'urf must represent a common and recurrent phenomenon; Article 14 Maiallah a! Ahkam a! Ad!ivvah:
"effect is only given to custom which is of regular occurance".
ii)Custom must also be in existence at the time a transaction is concluded. In contracts and commercial
transactions, effect is given only to customs which are prevalent at the time the transaction is concluded
and not to customs of subsequent origin. For further elaboration see the work of Kamali, Muhammad
Hashim, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 1991, p.286.
56 The precise understanding of what is considered as 'halal' and 'haram' is coloured by jwistic
disagreement. This thesis will not elaborate on the whole corpus of literature and arguments on this matter.
For further reference see, El-Helbawy et. al, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam being the translation
of Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, Al-Halal wal-Haram fl-Islam, American Trust Publications, USA (19—).
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'manfa 'ah' within the classification of 'ma!' as understood in Islamic Jurisprudence,
this study proceeds to the discussion of other jurisprudential arguments against the
recognition of Intellectual property. The discussion will question the plausibility of
these arguments and contend that these objections are not sustainable.
6.	 Jurisprudential objections against the reco gnition of Intellectual Property.
Ibn Hazm in 'al-Muhalia', denies the proprietary nature of intangible rights in written
works. To him, the transaction of books are allowed since what is being traded is
mere papers and ink. 'Jim' to him is not 'ma!' and hence cannot be the subject matter
of transactions as 'jim' is not tangible. He cites numerous 'athar' and 'khabar' to
demonstrate that transaction of 'mashaf was discouraged by the Prophet. Not only
is the buying and selling of 'mashaf was discouraged, even the reduction to writing
of 'jim' was discouraged by the Prophet(p.b.u.h) 57. Ibn Harm rejects the validity of
these 'athar' and argues that it is clear that 'bai' (transaction) is expressly legalised
in the Qur'an. Hence to him, there is no basis for the rule against the transaction of
books. He does not, however, recognise the proprietory nature of 'jim '58•
Imam Al-Qarafi, doubts whether 'jjtjhad' (juristic independent opinion which is the
result of intellectual exercise on certain issues), is property and can be owned59.
Recognised techique in Islamic jurisprudence is that of 'qiyas '(analogy) in Islamic
jurisprudence, from accepted premise ('as!') to the conclusion ('far"). Imam al-Qarafi
applies this to the fruits of the intellect and reasons that as the 'as!' (the origin) of
such 'if tihad' is the intellect, which cannot be inherited, thus its subsidiary ('far')
equally cannot be inherited. Even if the author can claim a right over his intellectual
The argument that the reduction of 'jim' was discouraged by the Prophet (p.b.u.h) may have
originated from the Prophet's discouragement of the writing of 'hadiths' during his lifetime.
58 Ibn Hazm, Au ibn Ahmad, (d.1301) , al-Muhalla, Idarah al-Tibaah al-Munisah, Vol 9 p.44-47.
Al Qarafi, Al Furug, cited in Haag a! Ibtikar, op. cit. pgs.55-80.
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products, it is a personal right and not proprietary and cannot be alienated60.
Furthermore 'ijtihad' is a religious exercise and anything to do with religion cannot
be inherited.
Al-Darini refutes such a contention by quoting a 'hadith' which narrates that when a
person dies and has a right which has not been fulfilled, such rights can be
inherited61.
More fundamentally, Al-Darini argues that the mental faculty or the intellect is not the
'asi' but the source or inception ('mans/ia') of intellectual creations. Once these ideas
are manifested in a medium which exist independently from the 'mans/ia', that nature
changes. The proprietary nature only vests when they are manifested in some
medium. This right can be inherited. Furthermore, to apply the legal position of an
'asi' to a 'far' is not correct in this circumstance because of differing 'illah' or
effective cause and nature. In fact, the corporeal part and the usufruct exist
independently, therefore, it is not proper to apply the same legal rule.
Secondly, refuting al-Qarafi, it is possible that knowledge can be separated from its
origin i.e author or the knowleglable person. As reported from a 'hadith' that the
religious deeds of a person stop with his demise except in three instances; 'sadaqah' (voluntary
alms-giving), beneficial knowledge he has passed on and the prayers of his children to
him.63.
Thirdly, Al-Qarafi argues that seeking knowledge is an obligation and hence a form
of obedience ('ta'a/z'). Any form of religious duty cannot be made a form of
commercial transaction. Al-Darini answers (that) it is not true that all religious
60 Even on this view, it may be argued that intellectual property does not reside in information at the
highest, most powerful, level of abstraction and therefore is not inconsistent with the concepts of 'ilm'.
61 P55, Haag al-Ibtikar op. cit.
62 See pgs.60, 62 and 74 Haag al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
63 See pgs.65 and 73 Haag al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
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endeavours are the absolute rights of Allah the Almighty. The Qur'an has consistently
urged Muslims not to neglect the mundane rewards. The Qur'an itself emphasizes the
balance of earthly and heavenly deeds. The fact that an act is a religious deed does
not stop someone from making a living out of it. The Prophet (p.b.u.h) during his
lifetime accepted the recitation of the Qur'an' as a valid 'mahar'(dowry) for marriage.
It is also reported that some 'muhaddithin '(narrators of 'hadiths') transmitted 'hadith'
and accepted token of money for their services.
In light of the above, it is arguable that Intellectual Property can be property right on
these bases:
(i) the position of Intellectual creation should not be confused with the position
of intellect. An intellectual creation, once expressed, can exist on its own and
give rise to a different entity, separated from its origins.
(ii) with regard to (i) above, because of its severability from its 'as!', it has a
separate value and hence can be transacted separately from the 'as!'. In the
same way, the value of 'manfa 'ah' is unconnected to the value of its 'as!',
such as in the case of compensation for the use of confiscated goods.
The extension of the concept of 'manfa 'ah' to Intellectual Property is
methodologically correct. This study will further analyse another important objection
against the recognition of Intellectual Property, i.e the objection against any form of
exclusivity in 'jim'.
7.	 The possible conflicts between the recognition of Intellectual Pro perty and the
religious objections against concealment of 'jim' (knowledge).
The Qur'an contain numerous injunctions against the concealment of 'jim'
64 See p.72 HaQg al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
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(knowledge)65, either in the form of religious knowledge or concealment of action.
These injunctions are expressed in the following terms:
2:42: "and cover not the truth with falsehood, nor conceal the Truth when
you know (what it is)."
2:140: "Ah! Who is more unjust than those who conceal the testimony they
have from Allah".
2:146, referring to the People of the book: "but some of them conceal the
Truth which they themselves know."
2:174: "Those who conceal Allah's revelation in the Book and purchase for
them a miserable profit".
3:7 1, referring to the People of the book: "ye people of the Book, why do
you clothe the truth with falsehood and conceal the Truth when ye have
knowledge. (see also 3:187)
4:42: "but never will they hide a single fact from Allah".
5:99 : "the Messenger's duty is but to proclaim (the Message) but Allah
knoweth all that ye reveal and ye conceal."
5:106: "we shall not hide the evidence before Allah".
Part of the rationale of the prohibition is the requirement that human beings should
refrain from being dishonest in their dealing with others. This is made clear through
other Qur'anic 'ayah's; as follows:
2:228, referring to pregnancy which will defer the comencement of divorce
"Nor is it lawful for them to hide what Allah hath created in their wombs".
2:283, referring to the creation of deposit in trust in a journey; "Let the
Trustee (faithfully) discharge His trust and let him fear God. Conceal not
evidence, for whoever conceals it his heart is tainted."
The word 'jim' comes from the rootword 'a-li-ma'. In the Qur'an the word al'ilm is used to denote
'al-yaqin' in the sense of religious truth or religious knowledge; see E.W.Lane. This word and its
derivatives occurred 105 times in the Qur'an. It word has many connotations; science, knowledge,
learning, lore and information. With its wide meaning, Muslim scholars often use the word to denote both
religious knowledge and other sciences.
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3:167, refening to the hypocrites: "saying with their lips what was in their
hearts but Allah hath full knowledge of what they conceal".
5:6 1, referring to evidence of murder: "Remember ye slew a man and fell into
a dispute among yourselves as to the crime, but Allah was to bring forth what
you did hide.(see also 2:72)
5:106, referring to testimony of bequest: " we shall not hide the evidence
before Allah".
21:110, warning to the hypocrites: "It is he who knows what is open in speech
and what ye hide (in your hearts)."
The 'iilah' (effective cause) of this prohibition is the 'concealment of knowledge' and
not the prohibition of 'transactions' involving knowledge. Another effective cause in
the prohibition against the concealment of knowledge is the possibility that by doing
so will lead to falsehood and telling lies, an act which is a sin.
Narrated Ali: the Prophet said: "Do not tell a lie against me for whoever tells
a lie against me (intentionally) then he will surely enter the Hell fire."
Narrated Abdullah az-Zubair: I said to my father,"I do not hear from you any
narration (Hadith) of Allah's Messenger as I hear (his narrations) from so and
so?" Az Zubair replied,"I was always with him (the Prophet) and I heard him
saying,"Whoever tells a lie against me (intentionally) then (surely) let him
occupy, his seat in Hell fire.67"
In addition, there are numerous 'hadiths' which prohibit the concealment of
knowledge. In a 'hadith' reported by Abu Hurairah the Prophet said:
"Whoever is asked of 'jim', which he learns and conceals it will be lashed
Concealment of 'hadiths' for example is considered as an act of telling lies against the Pmphet
(p.b.u.h).
67 For other variations of the 'hadith' reported by Anas, Salama and Abu Hurairah, see 'hadith' No
108,109,110 in Sahih Bukhari, op.cit.
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with the bridle of fire from hell".
In another 'hadith' reported by Abi Sa'id al Khudri, the Prophet said:
"Whoever conceal 'jim' which would benefit others in religious matters, will
be lashed with the bridle of fire form Hell on the Day of Judgement69."
It should be noted here that Muslim scholars have differentiated between the position
of religious knowledge and other knowledge. The term 'jim' in Islamic scholarship is
used to denote all forms of knowledge; be it religious or other sciences. As far as
religious knowledge is concerned, its spreading to others is obligatory.
Narrated Abdullah ibn. Mas'ud: the Prophet (s.a.w) said:" Do not wish to be
like anyone except in two cases: (the first is) the person, whom Allah has
given wealth and he spends it righteously; (the second is) the one whom Allah
has given wisdom (the holy Qur'an) and he acts according to it and teaches it
to others70.
According to Prophetic 'hadith's, those who acquire religious knowledge and spread
it to others are superior to them.
'Hadith' narrated by Abu Musa: the Prophet said:
"The example of guidance and knowledge with which Allah has sent me is
like abundant rain falling on the earth, some of which was fertile soil that
absorbed rain water and brought for that vegetation and grass in abundance.
(And) another portion of it was hard and held the rain water and Allah
benefitted the people with it and they utilized it for drinking, making their
animals drink from it and for irrigation of the land for cultivation. (And) a
portion of it was barren which could neither hold the water nor bring forth
vegetation (then that land gave no benefits). The first is example of the person
al-Munziri, Abdul Azim ibn Abdul Quwa, al-Ta rghib wa al-Tarhib mm al.Hadith al-Sharif, Vol
1 Dar al Fikr, p.121; hereinafter referred to as al-Targhib.
Al-Targhib, op.cit p.121.
Sahih Bukhari, translation into English by HIIal Yakin Lan, Vol II, Book fflp.59.
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who comprehends Allah's religion and gets benefit (from knowledge) which
Allah has revealed through me (the Prophet) and learns and then teaches
others. The last example is that of a person who do not care for it and does
not take Allah's guidance revealed through me (he is like that barren land)71.
It is explicit from the Qur'an itself that religious knowledge is a common property
which is inherited from the Prophet.
"It is essential to know a thing first before saying upon it, according to the
statement of Allah. So know Muhammad (s.a.w) that none has the right to be
worshipped but Allah (Q47: 19). So Allah stated that one should acquire
knowledge first. And religious scholars are inheritors of the Prophets i.e they
inherit knowledge. And whoever gains knowledge is lucky and gains a great
thing. And whoever followed a way to seek (religious) knowledge, Allah will
make easy for him the way to Paradise. Allah (s.w.t) said,"It is only those
who have knowledge among His slaves fear Allah (Q35:28) and Allah said,"
But none will grasp their meaning except those who have knowledge (Q29:43).
And also Allah's statement: And they will say: had we but listened or used
our intelligence we would have been among the dwellers of the blazing
fire.(Q67: 10) And Allah also said," Are those who know equal to those who
do not know." (Q39:9)72
In other 'hadiths', it is accepted that a person retains certain rights over his knowledge
such as the right to choose the recipient of knowledge and to safeguard religious
knowledge which includes imparting it only at the 	 proper time and to the proper
Sahih Bukhari, op.cit p.67.
72 Sahih Bukhari, op.cit p.59. See also 'hadith' 2.2.(5) in Umdat al-Salik wa 'Uddat al-Nasik,
Translated into English by Noah ha him Keller, The Reliance of the Traveller Modern Printing Press,
Dubai, 1991 par. p.4.
Hadith reported by Abi al-Darda that the Prophet (p.b.u.h) said:
"Whoever travels a path seeking knowledge Allah makes easy for him a path to paradise.Angels lower their
wings for the seeker of knowledge out of pleasure in what he seeks. Those in the heavens and the earth,
and the very fish in the water ask Allah to forgive the person endowed with sacred Knowledge. The
superiority of the learned Muslim over the devotee is like the superiority of the moon over all the stals. The
learned are the heirs of the prophets. The prophets have not bequcitwd dinar nor dirham, but have only left
Sacred Knowledge, and whoever takes it has taken an enormous share."
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person.
Narrated Anas bin Malik: Once Mu'adh was along Allah's Messenger as a
companon rider. Allah's Messenger said,"O Mu'adh bin Jabal". Mu'adh
replied, "Labbaik and saddaik" 0 Allah's Messenger!". The Prophet
said,"There is none who testifies sincerely that none has the right to be
worshipped but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger, except that allah will
save him from Hell fire." Mu'adh said,"O Allah's Messenger! Should I not
inform the people about it so that they may have glad tidings?". he replied,
When the people hear about it, they will solely depend on it". Then Mu'adh
narrated the above mentioned 'hadith' just before his death, being afraid of
conriitting a sin (by not telling knowledge)73.
This right to choose the recipient of 'jim' is clear from the following 'hadith':
'Hadith' reported by Anas ibn. Malik, that the Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "Seeking
knowledge is obligatory on all Muslims. The one who gives knowledge to
those who do not deserve it is like the one who puts fake jewels and gems to
a pigs's neck.74"
In another 'athar':
It is reported that Harir ibn. Salman ibn. Samir said:
Do not narrate falsehood to 'al-hu/cama "(those possessed with wisdom), do
not narrate wisdom to 'al-sufaha" (those who are ignorant) for they will lie
against you, do not conceal knowledge to those who deserve it for you will
commit a sin, do not narrate it to those who do not deserve it for you will
become ignorant. Indeed, you are obliged to observe the right in your
knowledge as you are obliged to observe the right in your property.75"
Sahih Bukhari, p.96, op.cit.
74 
al.Targhib p.96, op. cit.
Abu Muhammad Abduilah ibn. Abd al Rahman (d.255H), Sunan al-Darrimi, Dar a! Sunnah a!
Nabawiyyah, vol.1 p.105.
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The Prophet asked Muslims to respect and revere those who are knowledgeable. This
obligation to respect or revere those possessed with knowledge is part of the Islamic
conception of ethics and good conduct.
'Hadith' reported by Ubadah ibn. Samit :that the Prophet said: "Those are not
among my people who do not exalt 'kabiruna' (the senior among us) and have
compassion for the 'saghiruna' (the junior among us) and do not recognise
those who are knowledgeable".76
In a variation of the above hadith reported by Wa'ilah ibn al Asqa', that the Prophet
(p.b.u.h) said:
"Those are not among my people, who do not have compassion for
'saghiruna' (people with lower ranking) and exalt others 'kabiruna' (in higher
ranking)."77
And in another variation of the above 'hadiths', reported by Amru ibn. Shu'aib: that
the Prophet said:
"Those are not among my people, who do not have compassion for people
with (the junior among us) or 'saghiruna' and recognise the honour of
'kabiruna' (the senior among us).78"
From the above discussion, it is thus arguable that, apart from religious knowledge
which is a common property, other forms of 'urn' can be a subject matter of property.
With regard to 'religious knowledge', it is still arguable that a narrow basis of right
can be discerned particularly with regard to the rights of 'muhaddithin' to decide to
whom to transmit the 'hadith's. There are many reasons for this proposition namely:
1.	 It is clear from the above hadiths, that a person has certain form of rights
over his 'jim'. The rights may be in the form of choosing the right recipient and the
76 
al-Tai ghib, p.114, op.cit.
aI-Targhib, p.114 op.cit.
78 aI-Targhib p.114, op.cit.
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right time of disclosure. Abu Hassan Au An Nadawi79 is of the opinion that an
author has the freedom to decide what to do with his intellectual creation 80, He
drew support from the practice of the 'muhaddithin' who were selective in their
transmission of 'hadith'. This proposition is consistent with our earlier contention
that, with due regard to the various abstraction level of ownership of information,
Intellectual Property in most cases, involve the control of external use of
'information' 81 . The author however cannot prevent others from benefitting from his
intellectual ideas82. What he has is the right to stop others from commercially
exploiting his intellectual creations without his consent.
ii. Secondly, the 'hadiths' also indicate that a person with knowledge has another
right, which is the right to be revered and respected. In the context of Intellectual
Property, what more that a person deserves but the recognition that he is the author
or the person who brainchilds an idea. This underpins the recognition of moral rights
of authors and inventors. Thus, it is arguable that, so long as Intellectual Property
rights serve this important role, their validity can be sustained.
iii. Ideas can be a subject of benefit (in4fa') as knowledge is one of the objectives
al-Ibtikar, p. 150, op.cit.
80 These are the rights of the copyright owner under S.13(l) Copyright Act 1987; to control the doing
of various acts in Malaysia such as reproducing the work in a material form, performance, showing or
playing (as emended A.775/90), broadcasting the work, communicating the work by cable and distributing
the work to the public by sale, rental, lease or lending (A.775190). The exclusive rights extends to the
whole or substantial part of the work, either in its original or derivative form.
81 See the discussion on page 59 supra.
82 Under the Malaysian Copyright Act 1987, there are acts which do not need the consent of the
owner,(i) acts done by way of fair dealing for purpose of non-profit research, private study, criticism or
the reporting of current events; (ii) acts done by way of parody, pastiche or caricature; (iii) the inclusion
of work for teaching purposes which will include the use of work for the purpose of examination by way
of setting the questions, communicating the questions to the candidates or answering the questions (S.13
(2)(ff) A.775190); (iv) the performance, showing or playing of the work to the public of a work for
charitable or educational purpose by a non-profit making club or institution; (v) the use of a work for
judicial processes, the making of quotations, and the reproduction of works for purpose of providing
information;(see also S.13(3) as amended to include the use of a work in the proceedings of a royal
commission, a legislative body and a statutory or Goveriunent inquiry; and (vi) the use of work by or under
the direction or control of Government, national libraries and archives and certain prescribed institutions
so long as it is in the public interest, compatible with fair practice and statutory regulations and that no
profit made therefrom.
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of the 'Shari 'ah'. Likewise ideas can be a basis in differentiating between one person
and others.
In Surah 39: Al Z2onar, 9:
"Say:"Are those equal, those who know and those who do not know"
and 'hadith' on the superiority of those who have knowledge to support this
contention83. This indicate that 'ideas', unlike religious knowledge, can become the
subject of private property.
iv. In fact the exercise of intellectual faculty and thinking is very much
encouraged under the ShariahM. The scholars in the past have emphasized on the
criteria of creative and intellectual capacity on 'mujtahids' which is described as 'aqi'.
Knowledge and learning is a 'fard kfayah' (communal obligation) and hence by
conferring proprietary rights on Intellectual property, will enhance and promote the
objectives of the Shari'ah.85.
v. There is no direct prescription nor express prohibition under the 'Shari 'ah'
against the conception of rights over 'urn' and hence Intellectual Property can be
recognised.
vi. Furthermore the author should not be deprived of his lawful livelihood. If one
can say that the labour of cattle belongs to the owner, why can't one argue that the
product of one's ideas belongs to him?.
vii. It has been mentioned that the rationale in the prohibition against the prohibition
83 It is arguable here that the basis of differentiating as understood in both the context of the provision
of the Qur'an and the Prophetic 'hadiths' can be in terms of moral recognition as well as economic
entitlements.
84 Seeking knowledge is a duty and a form of 'ibadah'. See Qur'an 39:9," Say, 'Are those who
know and those who do not know equal?"
35:28, "Only the knowledgeable of His slaves fear Allah".
58:11, "Allah raises those of you who believe and those who have been given knowledge above
degrees".
85 See Al-Danni, Hag€ al-Ibtikar p.14 op. cit. He argued that the conferment of propnetoiy rights to
Intellectual Property is consistent with the obligation of seeking knowledge in Islam.
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of ' is the possibility of falsehood and fraud. In the context of Intellectual
Property, the recognition of rights does not lead to the concealment of truth. There
are many good reasons to believe that Intellectual Property will result in the reverse.
By granting Intellectual Property rights, more works will be disseminated. In the
context of patents, technical knowledge is made available to the public through the
disclosure requirements. Such information can form a rich source of technical
information to others. The recognition of the economic entitlements of copyright
owners assists the preparation of works for publication and hence in the long run
benefits the users86. Accurate representation is made when referring to other works,
as copyright law requires acknowledgement of the original author.
viii. Most important, recognition of Intellectual property does not lead to the
concealment of knowledge or information. Earlier on, this point has been deliberated
in our attempt to provide a satisfactory definition to Intellectual Property rights. The
property rights in Intellectual Property do not refer to the information contained in the
ideas but to the exclusive rights to control the use of these ideas in certain ways, as
provided in the statutes. In other words, the propertisation of 'ideas' does not lead
to the monopolisation of 'ideas' but only the exclusive control over87 their vehicle.
This distinction is very important in Intellectual Property and we shall see the
elaboration of this rule and its implications in chapter 8 of this thesis.
86 This role of preparation of works is no longer a small factor in the field of publication particularly
in databases. Copyright proponent of databases emphasize on the need to give proper reward to publishers
for their role in editing and preparing works. For example in the case of Internet, the quality and accuracy
of information contained therein is well known. Recognising copyright in databases will further enhance the
quality of works.
87 see these cases ;Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206-207 (C.C.E.D. Pa.1853) (No 13, 514):
"(The author's) exclusive property in the creation of his mind cannot be vested in the author as
abstractions, but only in the concrete form which he has given them, and the language in which
he has clothed them. When he has sold his book, the only property which he reserves to himself,
or which the law gives to him, is the exclusive right to multiply the copies of that particular
combination of characters which exhibits to the eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed.
This is what the law terms copy, or copyright".
Mr. Justice ErIe of Jeffre ys v. Boosey ,1O Eng. Rep, 681 (1854) wmte:
"The subject of property is the order of words in the author's composition; not the words
themselves, they being analogous to the elements of mailer, which are not appropriated unless
combined, not the ideas expressed by those words, they existing in the mind alone, which is (sic)
not capable of appropriation".
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In conclusion, it is arguable that Intellectual Property, in most cases, results in
diffusion of knowledge. In this regard, the recognition of Intellectual Property serve
the function of 'ilm'(knowledge) in Islam i.e that of dissemination and easy access.
In a 'hadith' reported by Samurah ibn. Jundab: that the Prophet (p.b.u.h) said:
"There is no other form of 'sadaqah' that equals knowledge which is being
disseminated"88
An in another 'hadith' reported by Ibn Abbas, that the Prophet said:
"Advise each other in 'jim'. Indeed the betrayal or 'khiyanah' of one of you
in 'jim' is worse that his betrayal in property. Allah will judge your
responsibility"89.
The discussion now turns to the nature of 'mal' in Intellectual Property. The study
focusses on the differences and similarity of the characteristics of Intellectual Property
as compared to tangible property.
8.	 Nature of property right in Intellectual Property
In this part, the objective of the inquiry is the nature of proprietory rights in
Intellectual Property. Bearing in mind that Intellectual Property is an intangible right,
many factors deserve special consideration such as the rules pertaining to alienability,
transferability and duration. The nature of exclusive rights in Intellectual Property
differs markedly from those in tangible property. The most important distinction in
this regard is that between the ownership rights of Intellectual Property and the
ownership rights in the physical embodiments. This distinctions carry great
significance particularly in delineating the ambit of the exclusive rights of a right-
owner ('sahib al-haq') of Intellectual property and the rights of others or the third
party.
88 Al-Ta rghib p.119, op.cit.
89 Al-Targhib, p.123, op. cit.
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Of greater significance is the rule that not all 'ideas' qualify to be protected as
Intellectual Property. In this respect, the ambit of protectable and non-protectable
ideas differ according to the fields of Intellectual Property. These rules and their
differences will be examined in detail in the respective chapters relating to copyright,
patent and trade-mark.
9. The distinction between protectable and non protectable subject matter
Not all intellectual ideas qualify to be protected as Intellectual Property. Under the
common law, in copyright, a work has to exist, with a minimum level of originality;
in a patent the invention must be novel i.e not anticipated by prior art, amount to an
inventive step and capable of being industrially applied. For trade marks, the marks
must be capable of distinguishing the product from other products. Al-Darini, rightly
pointed out that being 'new' means that an intellectual creation is not a repetition, or
reproduction of previous creation even though in a different form9°. He however does
not deliberate on the yardstick to be applied in determining the requirement of 'new'
here. He acknowledges that knowledge cannot be described as new in the strict sense
as the present knowledge exists on the accumulated knowledge of the past. There is
also a possibility that the idea can be of a forgotten civiisation of the past. Thus the
'isaiah' (strength of origin) of the intellectual creations is relative ('nisbi') and not
absolute ('mutlaqah )91
10. Accepted characteristics of 'ma!'
10.1 Al-Darini contends that the ri ghts of the author in his intellectual creations is
which he describes as
that of tangible property rightsA'mutaqarrir' (quantifiable rights) and not pure rights
90 Despite this assertion he admits that translation and other derivative works such as compilation and
encyclopedias are entitled for separate copyright. See S.6.2 of chapter five of this thesis for further analysis.
91 See footnote 1 p. 18 Haga al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
It is recognised as tangible property rights as these intellectual creations are attached to tangible
things. In this sense the meaning of tangible property under Islamic Law is wider than Common Law as
it incorporates 'manfaah' and rights which are 'mali' and 'non mali'.
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('mujarrad').93 'Mujarrad' right is personal to the right owner, indisposable and
terminates with his death. Again the 'illah' (effective cause) is the fact that such
intellectual creations are reflections of the author's intellect and the author has a
resposibility over them. Secondly they are the fruits of intellect which can be
separated from the intellect itself. An intellectual creation is found in a medium such
as book which is capable of being physically possessed. The relationship between
author and intellectual creations is direct as there is no intermedium. And the reason
why it is a proprietary right is because its medium is tangible95. In contrast, al-
Sanhuri argues that Intellectual Property rights are personal rights and not property
rights. He argues that Intellectual Property lacks the accepted characteristics of 'ma!'
such as perpetuity, inheritability and tangibility. It has been elucidated and argued
earlier that perpetuity and tangibility are not essential requirements of 'ma!' and hence
Intellectual Property is arguably 'mal'.
10.2 Abu Hassan Au an-Nadawi views the rights of an author as similar to the
rights of a manufacturer? 7 If the manufacturer can own the manufactured goods,
on the same basis an author can own the product of his labour, time, effort and
expenditure.
10.3 As far as the determination of the value of the 'manfaah' is concerned, this can
'Mutaqarrir' here means rights which can be disclaimed ('isqat') (according to Hanafi, Maliki and
Hambali schools of jurisprudence)
Examples of 'mujarrad' rights are 'haqq a! nikah' (rights accruing from marriage), 'haqq a! wala'
(rights arising from contracts of agency). 'haqq a! waza '/' (rights crising from appointment as a leader)
and 'haqq a! hadhanah' (custodian rights). Right for payment of 'diyah' (bloodmoney) is also a form of
personal right as it is personal to the heir of the deceased and cannot be transferred to another person.
See p.43, Hagq al-Ibtikar, op. cit where al-Darini argued that rights over Intellectual Property is
'haqq aini mali mutaqarrir'.
Al-Wasit fi al-Qanun al-Madani, op. cit. vol.8 pgs.274-491 par. at 281.
P.149, Hagg al-ibtikar, op. cit. Arguably An Nadawi is referring to both the author's moral and
economic rights. In Malaysia, S.25 (2) of the 1978 Act endorses the author's right of paternity or authorship.
right of publication and right of integrity or right to withdraw or disallow and the right to object to any
changes in the work whith may affect the integrity of the work as the basic minimum protection as those
under the Berne Convention. See also Mokhtar Hi. Jamaluddin v. Pustaka Sistem Pelajaran (1986) 2 MU
376.
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be done according to the accepted practice in the business circle. For example in the
case of copyright, this can be done according to the number of copies produced and
published.
10.4 With the recognition of Intellectual Property as 'ma!', any violation of
intellectual creations rights is considered as misappropriation of property. 98 Remedies
for misappropriation of property are in the form of damages and restitution?9
10.5 On this basis, the author as the rightful owner has the power to enforce his
rights over his intellectual creations in the court of law in cases of infringement.
11.	 Transmissibility, alienability and inheritability
11.1 Since the ownership of intellectual inventions is that of tangible property ( and
'mutaqarrir'), it follows that it can be transferred and transacted upon, inherited'°°
and be disposed through will'0 '. Abu Hassan Mi An Nadawi is of the view that this
right of inheritance cannot be sold to another person, thus the inheritor cannot accept
royalty'°2. Prof. Wahbi Sulaiman Gahawazji (p.l'7l) added that if the inheritor
ee Majalla A.88 I on the basis of the legal maxim : one who should not reap the property of others
without due cause. Subhi Mahmasanni, The General Theory of Law of Obli gations and Contracts under
Islamic Jurisprudence. See also Sura an Nisa' : 29:
0 ye who believe, eat not up your property among yourself in vanities; but let there be
amongst you traffic and trade by mutual goodwill."
See Majalla A.890/l. The same position can be seen in common law.
'°° Following the 'hadith':
"whoever dies leaving property or rights, then it can be inherited by the family".(translation mine)
101 In contrast to the common law practice which allows the alienation and transmission of copyright,
the civil law differentiates between economic rights and moral rights. While economic rights can be
alienated and transmitted, there are restrictions to the disposal of moral rights, which are considered as
personality rights. For more elaboration, see Stewart, S.M, International Co pyright and Neighbouring
Rights, (1989), 2nd. ed. Butterworths, London, particularly para 15.1 -15.16.
' See p.153 Haqg al-Ibtikar, op. cit. Compare to s.25 of the 1987 Act which gives the inheritor or
personal representative of the deceased author the same rights as the owner as far as action against
infringement and recovery of damages is concerned.
85
passed away this copyright will not be re-inherited by further successor)°3
11.2 All these incidental rights to ownership vest in the intangible sense of the
creations and not on the corporeal medium. Earlier we have pointed out the
importance of distinguishing between the proprietary rights over the physical
embodiments and the proprietary rights over the intangible property such as copyright.
This distinction is very important in Intellectual Property. Al-Darini explained this
by differentiating between 'as!' and 'thamarah"°4. Property which may be the
source of other proprietary rights is known as 'asi'. While property which originated
from other things is called 'thamarah"°5. Included in the second group of property
is the income from the hire of chattels and movable property, fruits, labour from
animals and others which derived from the original property'°6.
11.3 Any subsequent change to the medium of the intellectual creations does not
effect the ownership rights over it'°7. This issue of change of medium is particularly
important in the context of copyright such as in the case of translation and
compilations. In copyright, any change of medium necessarily results in a separate
copyright. In a translation, the translator has a right over his translation, subject to
an independent and separate copyright of the original author!° 8
 This right subsists
103 
al-Ibtikar, op.cit.
See Hagg al-Ibtikar p.45, op. cit.
105 
'Thamarah' literally means fruits. In legal terminology it is used to refer to those kind of 'things'
which springs or originates from property.
106 See Al-Zarqa, Mustafa Ahmad, A1-Madkhal ila An-Nazariyvah at- iltizam al-'Ammah fi Al-Figh
Al-Islami, (1946) Vol.3 p.217-218. He points out that 'thamarah' is also known as 'ghullah' or 'kharaj'.
The term 'kharaf is more popular among Muslim scholars, consistent with the Prophetic hadith, "al- Kharaj
bi al-dhaman".
107 P.45 Hagg al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
108 Under Common Law, translation being a secondary work on the existing sowte is also protected
provided that it satisfies the requirement of originality i.e sufficient skill, labour and judgement expended
by the author in creating the work. See Byrne v. Statist Co. (1914) 1 KB 622 & Cummins v Bond (1927)
1 Ch. 167. See also Longman Malaysia Sdn Bhd. v Pustaka Delta Pelajaran Sdn. Bhd. (1987) 2 MU 359,
which followed Byrne v. Statist Co. to hold that a translation of a textbook from English to Bahasa Malaysia
is protected under the Copyright Act. With the effect of A.775/90 derivative works protected under the 1987
86
in the language translated and not in the original language which it is written. In a
translation, often the translator has contributed original effort in his understanding of
the meaning and context of the translated text and his composition and choice of
words.
Muslim scholars argued that any translation of a protected work can only be
undertaken with the consent of the original author.'° 9 This was the view of Abd.
Hamid Tahar in his short articl&'°. Prof. Wahbi Sulaiman Ghawazji further
elaborated that copyright also subsists in a compilation of previous works)"
11.4 The lawful rights of the Intellectual Property owner over his intellectual creation
remain even though his power over it is not perfect" 2. In western jurisprudence,
as the concept of property refers to that bundle of rights, the imperfections of those
rights do not affect his title or ownership."3
11.5 The ownership rights of tangible property is permanent but the ownership
rights of 'ma.nfa'ah' is temporary ('tawqit') i.e subjected to time and place" 4. Most
Muslim scholars agreed that physicality affects the duration of property rights.
Act has been extended to include all works eligible for copyright which includes (1) translations,
adaptations, arrangements and other transformations of copyright works and (2) collection of copyright
works which by reason of the selection and arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creation.
Note that Malaysian 1987 Copyright Act, like most other copyright legislations in the developing
countries, allows the production and publication of translation for purpose of teaching, scholarship or
research, upon a licence granted by the Copyright Tribunal in these circumstances; translation has not been
done by the owner within one year after the first publication of the work, or if it is so published, it is out
of print, or request to translate has been denied by the owner.
See p.186, Hagg al-ibtikar, op. ciL
' P.170, Hapg al-ibtikar, op. cit. See also S.8(l) of the 1987 Act in note 7 supra.
112 See p.42 Hagg al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
"3 See People v. Walker (1933) 33 Cal. App. 2d 18, 20, "Since property or title is a complex bundle
of rights, duties, powers and immunities, the pruning away of some or a great many of these elements does
not entirely destroy the title.....
Note that the Malaysian 1987 Act still recognise the perpetual copyright of an unpublished works
(in the U.K it was abolished in 1988), see S.l7 (2).
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Despite this the jurists agree that it can be transmitted through inheritance and
disposed off through will"5. The basis of the transmissibility is the Prophetic
'hadith': "man lahu haqqan faliwarathihi" (who has a valid claim (haqq), that can
be transmitted through inheritance).
Since the proprietary nature of intellectual inventions is temporary ('tawqit') i.e not
permanent - as distinct from tangible property- it is confined to the time, place, nature
and characteristics of the transaction." 6 As far as the duration of copyright is
concerned, Muslim scholars have argued that the duration of protected rights is 60
years after the demise of the author' The ulama' draw this rule with analogy to
the duration of ground rent and with analogy to rights of dwelling on 'waaJ' lands and
long lease of buildings. The ulama' also take into consideration the fact that
intellectual creations are 'nisbi' (relative) i.e the product of the accumulation of
inherited past knowledge.
After the termination of 60 years, the rights in the work becomes the shared property
of the uminah (society)" 8 . This does not mean that publication of the work is
prohibited altogether. Effort must be taken to continue to disseminate the ideas
through publication and the money gained given to charity. The value of the
usufructory rights of the intellectual creations depends on the number of copies
published and manufactured.
See p.51 Hagg al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
116 Similar rights are hire-purchase rights of land or vehicles which usufructory rights are only valid
until the satisfaction of the contractual agreement.
The duration of copyright for a literary, musical or artistic work (other than photograph) is the life
of the author plus 50 years after his death, while that for all other works is 50 years after publication, or
in the case of broadcast, after the broadcast is first made (S.13(1)) Malaysian Copyright Act 1987.
118 In Common Law system, works which copyright has expired falls under Public Domain free for
all to use. In contrast, Italy and France have an established domaine public payant, a pool of royalties of
expired copyright works, for the purpose of promotion of arts. See al-Darini's suggestion for a body to
be set up to administer the exploitation of expired copyright works and to channel the funds into charitable
means such as education, setting up of educational institutions or mosque. In addition, this body will also
ensure that no illegitimate exploitation of the expired copyright works is taking place.(p.l21) Haga a!-
ibtikar, op. cit..
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11.6 Having regard to all this the nature of ownership rights over intellectual
creations are similar in many aspects to that of tangible property'
In the above discussion, it is shown that in many instances, intellectual property
corresponds to ordinary characteristics of tangible property. In the next section, the
distinction between the ownership right in intellectual property and the ownership right
of physical embodiments, a characteristic which marks the uniqueness of intellectual
property is deliberated. This important distinction is further seen in the context of
alienation of the physical embodiments and its consequences in the delineation of the
exclusive rights of the Intellectual Property owner and others.
12.	 Distinction between the intangible right in Intellectual Property and the
property rights in the physical embodiments
In classical English law, the distinction between tangible and intangible property has
been aptly pointed out by Blackstone'20. To him, hereditaments are of two kind:
corporeal and incorporeal. Corporeal consists of such as affect the senses; such as
may be seen and handled by the body: incorporeal are not the subject of sensation,
can neither be seen nor handled, are creatures of the mind, and exist only in
contemplation'21 . Even though this incorporeal right "is a right issuing out of a
thing corporate (whether real or personal) or concerning, or annexed to or exercisable
within the same", it should not be confused with the right over the physical
embodiments' 22. He argued that "corporeal hereditaments are the substance, which
must always be seen, always handled: incorporeal hereditaments are but a sort of
See p.51 Haag al-ibtikar, op.cit.
Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Law of England, Book of the Second, 14th. Ed. A
Strahan, London, (1803). Whether or not his view is representative view of modem property lawyers,
it is a distinction very much used by rules on Intellectual Property.
121 
see p.17, op.cit.
122 See p.20 where he said," And indeed, if we would fix a clear notion of an incorporeal
hereditament we must be careful not to confound together the profits produced, and the things, or
hereditament, which produces them."
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accident, which is inhered and are supported by that substance; and may belong, or
may not belong to it, without any visible alteration therein". To him, a right of
incorporeal property is a contingent right and cannot stand on its own, "collateral to
or issuing out of" and "can never been the object of sense", nor is "capable of being
shown to the eye, nor being delivered into bodil y possession"23.
On the same line of analysis, Al-Darini, distinguished between the intangible rights
of Intellectual Property and the rights of ownership of the physical embodiments. With
this term, he is referring to the "intellectual ideas per Se" regardless the medium
123A-	 -('majliyy') in which these ideas are expressed or manifested (e.g books in the case of
rights over a written work)'. These intellectual creations are intangible in the sense
that they cannot be understood in the normal perceptory sense as they do not embody
themselves in physical substance but has to be apprehended notionally. Being
intangible, the only means of benefitting and exploiting these intellectual creations are
through the medium.
This distinction between the ownership of Intellectual Property and the ownership of
the physical embodiments is very important in the context of copyright. The transfer
of title to the physical material does not necessarily transfer the title to the copyright,
any more than the assignment of the copyright necessarily transfers the title to the
physical mateHal'. This conflict is also apparent in the issue of ownership of
copyright in letters and the physical ownership of the letter of the receiver. The
author is prima facie the first owner of the copyright in it and can restrain the receiver
of the letter from publishing it. The receiver of the letter enjoys the ordinary incidents
123 See p.20, op. cit.
123A	 Al-Darini's terminology to describe the medium in which the ideas are expressed.
See al-Darini Hagp al-ibtikar p.9 op.cit.
' See Copinger 5-1 and the cases of Time Life International (Nederlands) B.V v. Interstate Parcel
Express Co. Pry Ltd (1978) F.S.R 251 (HICt. of Australia), Cooper v. Stephens, 1 Ch. (1895) 567 and
Marshall (W) & Co. Ltd v. Bull A.H Ltd (1901) 85 L.T 77. In Time Life's case, the court held that the sale
of a book does not necessarily confer on the Plaintiff any right, either by way of assignment or licence to
exercise any of the exclusive rights incidental to the copyright of the book. In Coo per's case the court held
that the sale of blocks from printing drawings did not result in the transfer of the copyright in the drawings
and did not entitled the buyer to reproduce the drawings. In Marshall's case the sale of electro-blocks used
for the printing of designs did not transfer the copyright in the designs.
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of ownership of the letter and he has an unqualified title to the material, short of
publishing the letter' 26, as the latter conduct may constitute an act of breach of
confidence.'27
13	 The rights of the Intellectual Property owner and others
This dichotomy is further illustrated in copyright in the context of the rights of the
publisher over a manuscript and the ownership rights of a buyer over a written work.
In this instance, Al-Darini envisages a number of scenarios whereby contractual
undertakings are entered into between author and publisher'28.
(i) In most instances, like common law, publication agreements are subject to
normal rules under the law of contract.
(ii) If the author publishes his work at his own expense, then the author retains
his publication right as well as the ownership of the printed materials. If the author
enters into an agreement with the publisher to distribute his work by transferring his
right over the printed materials, then ownership of these printed materials belongs in
this instance with the publisher.
(iii) Another instance contemplated by Al-Danni is the transfer of publication right,
which under common law will be known as a licence to publish. In this instance,
because only the publication right is transferred and not the copyright of the book,
the publisher is bound by the terms of the agreement between him and the author. In
this instance, the position of the publisher is like that of a licensee whereby he does
not own the original 'manfa 'ah', and hence he cannot reprint or make extra copies
of the protected work without the permission of the author. As for the author, he may
126 See Pope v. Curl 2 Atk. 342, Oliver v. Oliver 11 C.B., N.S, 139.
127 See Philip v. Pennel (1907) 2 Ch. 577 where the court confirm the rule that the writer of letters
has a proprietary right in them sufficient to entitle him to restrain the publication, but, that on the other
hand, the receiver of the letters is entitled to use them in some way, although not to publish them by way
of the multiplication of copies. In this case the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to use the
information contained in letters or documents written by another person which had lawfully come into their
possession without any express or implied authority given by the author of the letter, but they were not
entitled to publish these letters or any extracts therefmm or paraphrases thereof.
See p.122, 144 of 'Al-ibtikar'.
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no longer make copies of the book without the publisher's consent as he has
transferred his publication right to him. Once the author has disposed of his
publication right, he cannot effectively enter into another contract with another
publisher with respect to the same publication right. This contractual undertaking
between the author and the publisher, can for this reason be understood as an
exclusive licence under the common law' 29. The value of the 'manfa'ah' of the
intellectual creations in this transaction will be determined from the number of copies
published under the contract, the cost of publication and the sale price.
(iv) Al-Darini does not contemplate the possibility of total transfer of intangible
rights in a written work (known as assignment in the common law jurisdiction). Under
the common law, the outright disposal of copyright is possible through assignment,
whereby the publisher will enjoy the full legal title to the copyright and will alone be
entitled to enforce the right against third parties' 30. This point will be further taken
up in chapter five pertaining to copyright'3'.
13.2 Transfer of rights to the consumer.
The transfer of usufructory rights to the buyer or consumer is by an outright sale and
not through a contract of hire. Under a contract of hire of the 'manfa 'ah' of tangible
property, the consumer only possesses the book as a trust ('amanah )I32 The
consumer or the buyer does not own the original 'manfa 'ah', he thus, would not have
the right to make copies or photostate copies of the book as the only legitimate
passing of usufructory rights is by sale. The rights of public libraries, universities and
129 Under common law, an exclusive licensee may sue for infringement of copyright but must (where
the exclusive licensee and copyright owner have concurrent rights of action) join his licensor as a party to
the action, except where an interlocutory injunction is sought. For further details, see Copinger. op.cit para
15-1 - 15-24.
'3° It should be noted that under the MCA 87 and under the U.K CDPA 88, an assignment should
be in writing.
13! See S.11 of Ch.5 of this thesis.
132 P.113 Haqg al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
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educational institutions are those of user rights' 33. A consumer only owns that part
of 'manfa'ah' which is contained in the tangible medium which is the subject of
sale'.
This distinction is recognised by statute. Despite the exclusiveness of the rights of the
intellectual property owner, the law has allowed certain freedoms to the consumer.
For instance, in the context of the copyright of computer software, the law allows
the making of back-up copies of programmes' 35 and decompilations of programmes
for private purposes. In the context of patents, the law grants an implied licence to
repair, rebuilt and extend a patented product without necessarily infringing the rights
of the patent owner'.
Referring to another work and borrowing ideas or 'iqtibas' is permitted so long as the
original author is acknowledged. Plagiarism and copying of the whole book or
substantial part of it is wrong on the basis of 'Sura an Nisa' : 29,
0 Ye who believe, eat not up your property among yourself in vanities; but
let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual goodwill.'37
P.117 Hagg al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
Pg.1 16 Hagp al-Ibtikar, op. cit.
See S.40 (1) (a) (b) of the 1987 Malaysian Copyright Act.
136 See British Leyland v. Ai-msti-ong (1986) R.P.C, (1986) 1 All. E.R p.850, where the House of Lords
rejected an infringement action on the basis of reverse engineering or indirect copying of a drawing or
design of an object. The House of Lords introduced a new concept; non-derogation of grant to allow the
purchaser of a patented goods the right to repair the patented goods so as to maintain it in good working
order. Hence, in this case, the owner of the patented goods were not entitled to use their copyright in such
a way as to maintain a monopoly in the supply of spare parts for their cars.
Under the U.K Copyright Act 1988, s.16(3)(a), to constitute an infringement, a substantial part
of a protected work should be copied. The court in Ladbrooke v. William Hill [1964]! WL.R. 273 decided
that 'it depends much more on the quality than the quantity of what has been taken.' The Malaysian Court
has taken the same stand in Lon gman Malaysia Sdn Bhd. v. Pustaka delta Sdn. Bhd. (1987) 2 ML.J 359.
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j4,	 Conclusion
In this chapter, it is submitted that the recognition of Intellectual Property does not
result in inconsistency with the ordinary requirements of 'mat' in Islamic
jurisprudence. With the exception of the classical Hanafites jurists, the majority view
is that intangible rights are a form of 'ma!'. By the application of 'qiyas' the
intangible rights of Intellectual Property is more akin to 'manfa 'ah' within the
classification of 'ma!' in Islamic jurisprudence.
It is also argued that a jurisprudential objection against the recognition of Intellectual
Property cannot be sustained. Firstly, it has been pointed out that Intellectual
Property does not lead to concealment of 'jim' and hence do not fall within the
prohibition against the concealment of 'jim'. Secondly, it is argued that a! Qarafi's
objection against the proprietory nature of 'iftihad' is not sustainable. Using the
methodological tool in jurisprudential arguments, al-Qarafi's arguments are seriously
flawed.
With regard to the special nature of Intellectual Property, it is shown that in most
cases the ordinary rules on 'ma!' such as valuation, alienability, transferability and
durability cannot easily be fit into Intellectual Property. Being intangible, Intellectual
Property is subjected to special rules, some of which have been discussed in this
chapter. Firstly, Intellectual Property has its special rules on non-protectable subject
matter. Secondly, there should not be any confusion between the ownership of
Intellectual Property and the ownership of the physical embodiments or manifestations.
Such distinction carries great consequence particularly in respect of alienability
through sale of the physical embodiments. In other aspects, the nature of exclusive
rights in Intellectual Property is similar to other property rights.
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CHAPTER FOUR
'HAQQ', 'MILKIYYAH'
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
1	 Introduction
The concept of 'ma!' as propounded and elaborated by Muslim jurists in the past has
been elucidated in the previous chapter. It is argued that the intangible rights over
"intellectual ideas", though not discussed by past Muslim jurists, are established as
a form of 'manfa 'ah'. In the present chapter, we will proceed to discuss the concept
of 'haqq' in Islam and to raise the question of the recognition or otherwise of the
legal rights over Intellectual Property. Muslim jurists have discussed at length over
the subject of 'haqq, milkiyyah' and the basis of acquisition of property rights but
their works do not generally take into account the concept of ownership of intellectual
property.
In this chapter, it will be argued that ownership of intellectual property, on a
theoretical basis, is valid upon the exertion of labour in the creation of new utility.
The conceptualisation of this kind of ownership, if seen from the perspective on the
basis of 'haqq', ciystallises upon labour and work ('ama!). On the theoretical side,
support for this proposition can be drawn from the rules governing the acquisition of
ownership of 'mubah' property ('res nullius'). It would not be valid to characterise
intellectual property as a form of natural resource (as that of 'mubah'). However, it
is important to investigate the meaning of acquisition of property in natural resources
('mubah'), as this may provide a rich fund of insight, reminder and argument which
can be drawn on for the present debate as to the ownership of Intellectual Property.
The acquisition of ownership of the 'mubah' property and Intellectual Property is, on
a certain level, similar. Firstly, Intellectual property involves the creation of
something new, something which has never existed before, or even if it did exist,
involves the improvement or adaptation of a previous entity. Secondly, Intellectual
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Property involves the combination of available resources and information in the form
of knowledge and ideas, which are common to us as a whole and to some degree
regarded as common resources. Thirdly, it will be argued that the process of labour
which is involved in the creation of a work, an invention or a trade mark, (albeit being
an intellectual labour), is a valid basis for rights over Intellectual Property. It is our
contention that these basic principles of ownership justify the initial allocation of
Intellectual property rights and suggest certain limitations thereto. These theoretical
bases are predicated on the assumption that certain amount of labour is required in the
creation of Intellectual Property.
The focus of our study is the following:
(i) Justifications of Intellectual Property in the Western jurisprudence.
Bearing in mind that there are a myriad of justifications sought for the recognition of
Intellectual Property, be it either from natural law perspectives or on utilitarian
grounds, this chapter will only concentrate on the labour theory and not on
alternatives such as theories of personality. It is submitted that this theory as
postulated by Locke and Nozick t constitutes the most important theory in Intellectual
Property by virtue of its influence on case laws and statutes2.
(ii) the meaning and definition of 'haqq' and 'mi!kiyyah' in the Qur' an,
(iii) the meaning and definition of 'haqq' and milkiyyah' given by the Muslim
jurists,
(iii)	 the nature and ambit of 'haqq',
(iv) the basis of ownership or 'haqq al-milkiyyah' in Islam,
(v) the role of labour and work or 'ama!' as a basis of ownership.
R.Nozick, Anarchy, State And Utopia 18 (1974), referred to in Hughes, Justin, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, The Georgetown Law Journal, Vol 77 p.287.
2 See for example Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides:
"Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author".
See also the preamble to the Massachusetts Act of March 17, 1783:
"As the principal encouragement such persons can have to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature,
must exist in the legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and as such security
is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more peculiarly a man'sown than that which
is procured by the labor of his mind". Cited in Ginsburg, Jane C, A tale of Two Copyrights: Literary
Property in Revolutionary France and America , Tulane Law Review, Vol 64 (1990) no.5 p.991-1023.
96
(vi)	 'amal' as a basis of 'haqq' and 'haqq a! milkiyyah' of Intellectual creations.
2	 The normative framework of labour theory in Western jurisprudence
Reference to natural right theories are sought by many western scholars to support
Intellectual property rights 3. Questions are raised whether a writer or an inventor
owns the work he creates. Using a right based argument many philosophers such as
Locke4 and Hegel5 hold that the writer's or the inventor's interest is considered in
itself sufficiently important from a moral point of view to justify holding people to be
under a duty to promote it6. According to Locke, the first to labour on something
creates a relationship between the writer or inventor and his work. 7 Economic
activity on ideas signifies the mixture of one's labour with the idea and hence annexes
Enough study has been undertaken on the justifications of property rights. For detailed discussions,
see Hammond, R.G, Personal Property, Commentary and Materials, (1992) Oxford University Press,
Oxford; Macpherson,C.B. (ed), Property, Mainstream and Critical Positions, (1978) Basil Blackwell,
Oxford; Reeve, Andrew, Property, (1986) Macmillan; Waidron, Jeremy, The Right to Private Property,
(1988) Clarendon Press, Oxford.
' Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, (edited by Peter Laslett), (1988), Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Hegel, G.W.F, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, (edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by H.B.
Nisbet), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. His 'personality' theory of property rights differs
markedly from the labour theory. It is not within the province of this thesis to discuss his theory in relation
to Intellectual Property.
6 John Locke, Two Treatises on Civil Government, Book II, paras 25-51(1690). The main criticism
against Locke's conception is that (I) the incompatibility of the two arguments; ownership of limb and
ownership of product of labour, an argument which may entail that parents are also entitled to property
rights in their children (ii) alleged inconsistency with liberty (iii) is property the only fitting benefit?. See
Becker, Lawrence C., Property Rights, Philosophical Foundation(1980), Routledge, Chapman and Hall.
"....yet every Man has a Property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself. The
Labour of his body, and the work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatever then he removes
out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to
it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common
state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right
of other Men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have
a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for
others."
Ch.5.27, Locke, John, op cit.
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the idea to be one's property. 8 In this sense, the writer or the inventor has, natural
property rights over his work, so important that they impose duties on others to
refrain from interfering with or undermining his rights over his work.9
The theological premises of Locke's account of ownership are unmistakable'°.
Natural resources of the world are the subject of original donation from God to man,
as created objects intended for human use." Locke justifies the assignment of
natural resources to those who work on them as labounng on natural resources "does
not lessen but increase(s) the common stock of mankind".' 2 This right is not without
limitation. To Locke, there must be "enough and as good" of resources remaining
for others. Secondly, this right is limited to one's need and does not entitle a person
to waste or negligently destroy natural resources.' 3 Thirdly, a person's entitlement
to natural resources are limited to the extent of his labour and so long as he keeps the
8 Locke also accepts the proposition that humans acquire property through possession such as gathering
nuts from the ground, picking an apple from a tree, and killing a deer.
Natural property rights here are understood not in the sense that the individuals concerned are born
with them (in the way that one says, rights to life and liberty are said to be natural) but rather in the sense
that the force of these rights obtains and can be recognised as valid by moral and rational people, quite
apart from any provisions of positive law. And they perhaps are also natural in the sense that the sort of
relationship out of which these rights and duties are generated has important roots in the nature of a human
being, see Waidron, op.cit.
This concept is shared in Islam. All property originated from God. Man is bestowed with the
power to consume and utilise property in his capacity as 'kha!jfah' (regent) of God. See al-Ibadi's work,
al-Milkiyyah, 1975.
For other classical Western views see, Bishop of Oxford in his introduction, Property, its Duties & Rights,
Historically, Philosophically & Religiously Regarded (1913), where he wrote that the concept of property
is understood in the light of Bible doctrine of stewardship. According to this concept, God is the Creator
and absolute owner of all things or persons. Hence everything that we 'own' is in our capacity as stewards
to manage for the purpose of His Kingdom. Ownership, in old Biblical terms is relative and dependant,
limited at every point by the purpose for which it was entrusted to us. See also Blackstone, A Commentary
of the Laws of England, Vol II pares 2-5, 14-15 (1765-1769).
See ch.5.26, Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government, ed Laslett.P, Cambridge University Press,
1988, p.285- 302.
12 See ch.5.34, and ch.5.37, Locke, op cit.
' See ch.5.31 and ch.5.37, Locke, op cit.
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resources in constant use.' 4 In this sense Locke does not regard enclosure as giving
property rights or even special rights to the land.
Grunebaum (l989)' attributes Locke's theory into two streams of thought: the
utilitarian and the deontological approach. The first considers appropriation as
justified by the good consequences that flow from private ownership; more good,
more agricultural production and greater incentive to work hard. The second justifies
rights over one's labour when they become mixed with the object of one's labour so
the object then becomes one's own. Munzer' 6 (1988) emphasises the "labour
entitlement' theory, i.e one is entitled to the product of one's labour.
Hughes' 7 forcefully argues that 'propertisation" 8 of ideas easily fits the Lockean
approach to acquisition of property in three ways:
(i) that the production of ideas requires a person's labour,
(ii) that those ideas are appropriated from a "common" property which is not
significantly devalued by the idea's removal,
(iii) ideas can be made property without breaching the non waste condition.
Two theories were advanced to support the proposition that Intellectual Property
involves labour. The first theory posits that people should be rewarded for involving
themselves in intellectual activities as labouring on these activities is unpleasant.'9
This is known as the avoidance theory of labour. The second theory advances the
view that involvement in Intellectual Property brings positive values to society and
See ch.5.32, Locke, op cit.
Grunebaum, J.O., Private Ownership, (1989), Routledge & Paul. London.
16 Munzer, Stephen, A Theory of Property, (1990) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
0
op.cit.
18 This term is used loosely to refer to the act of acquisition of property rights. See for instance,
Sherwood-Edwards, M., The Redundancy of Originality, LIC Vol 25 No. 5 (1994) p.658-689.
19 Here Hughes quoted Lawrence Becker's proposition that labour is something unpleasant enough so
that people do it only in the expectation of benefit, see Hughes, op.cit.
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hence they should be rewarded for "how much value they add to other people's lives,
regardless of whether they are motivated by such reward".
The role of labour in the production of Intellectual Property can be seen in the
distinction between thinking up an idea which may not involve labour and the
execution of idea which refers to the process of employing the idea as the core of a
finished product. Hughes argues that this distinction is represented by the dichotomy
between idea and expression which is well accepted in copyright.
The similarity between natural resources and the 'common' property in Intellectual
Property is not in the sense that "ideas exist in some platonist form, ready to be
plucked". The similarity can be seen in other ways such as the inexhaustibility of
resources. Intellectual Property is non rivairous, one person's use does not deplete
the 'common' in any sense. Indeed Hughes argued that "(the) field of ideas seem to
expand with use. The common does not only contain ideas which cannot be granted
property status, but also property rights which have expired. This guarantees that
there is a constant common field of ideas, ready to be used for the production of
ideas. In this way, Locke's discussion of" as good and as many" does not pose a
hurdle to the propertization of ideas. As to the non waste condition, Hughes argued
that unlike food, ideas are not perishable and therefore always retain future value.
Besides the important work of Hughes, other writers such as Litman and Yen 2° have
shown how natural right theories justify the initial allocation of Intellectual Property
and suggest limits to the extent of these 21 . Copyright's relationship with that part of
natural resources or 'res naturae' is clearly represented by the creation of a public
20 Litman, Jessica, The Public Domain, Emory Law Journal Vol.39 (1990) 39 and Yen, Alfred C.,
Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, Vol. 51 (1990) Ohio State Law Journal,
517-559.
21 For other theoretical analyses of labour theory, see Ricketson, Sam, New Wine into Old Bottles:
Technological Change and Intellectual Property Rights, Prometheus, Vol.10. No.1, June 1992; Gordon,
Wendy J, An Inquiry Into The Merits Of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistenc y, Consent and
Encouragement Theory, Stanford Law Review, Vol.41 (4-6) 1989 p.1343-1409; Vaver, David Some
Agnostic Observations on Intellectual Property, Intellectual Property Journal, Vol.6 No.2 June 1991 p.125-
153; Spector, Horacio M., An Outline of Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights,
(1989) 8 EIPR, 270-273.
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domain. Reference to natural right theories does not warrant an absolute conception
of rights over Intellectual Property. In fact careful use of natural law principles
creates a vibrant public domain in two ways. Firstly, the practical idea embodied in
the Roman notions of 'res communes' and 'ferae naturae' admonish the natural law
thinker not to extend copyright beyond the bounds of what human institutions such
as copyright can practically accomplish. 23 In this sense, this view accords with
Hughes who regards the idea/expression dichotomy as one important limit to
copyright. Secondly, the moral principles which suggest the extension of copyright
also justify the dedication of the author's work to the public. Yen and Litman
forcefully argued that authorship is not an individual effort, unlike Locke's theory.
This means that the author alone should not be rewarded for his effort without some
form of recognition of society's contribution.24 Public domain represents the limit to
the property claim of authors' in their works, from which the future authors can
borrow and to which they must contribute.
22 
'Res comunes' are things that under natural law common to all such as the air, running water, the
sea and the seashore. 'Ferae naturae' refers to wild animals that are inherently free, and can be propertised
by the reduction into possession. In this respect, Yen argued that natural law theories originated with and
were substantially influenced by Roman Law which seeped into common law thinking in the 18th. Centwy.
To the Romans, natural law was the construction of rules which simply reflected the way things were. The
English, however, regarded natural law as a prescription of the way things are. This can be seen in Locke's
conception of natural law in which he had drawn limits to the doctrine of occupancy and labour. l'hings
which are not capable of possession cannot be the subject matter of property rights but can only be subjected
to temporary right of use. See Yen, op.cit.
23 Referring to the limits of copyright, Yen points out that the idea/expression dichotomy should
prevent the extension of copyright beyond the most concrete and obvious facets of a work. Therefore,
theory of labour and possession postulates that there should be a recognition of the existence of inherent
physical or metaphysical limits on things a person may claim as property. Thus, it is logical, that a literal
infringement is within the idea/expression dichotomy but claims that a work's perspective, style, or "total
concept and feel" would not be. See Yen, op.cit.
24 Yen described authorship as (something which) "is not the creation of works which spring like
Athena from the head of Zeus, but the conscious and unconscious intake, digestion and transformation of
input gained from the author's experience within a broader society". Litman described authorship as "a
combination of absorption, astigmatism, and amnesia is not intended to diminish its merit.........All works
of authorship, even the most creative, include some elements adapted from raw material that the author
first encountered in someone else's works....". See Yen & Litman, op.cit.
The concern that originality in copyright as not to be understood as ineffable creation from nothing
justifies Professor Litman in her article for the creation of a strong public domain as an important source
of raw material for future writers. She argued that the public domain should be understood not as the realm
of material that is undeserving of protection, but as a "device that permits the rest of the system to work
by leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to do". See Litman, op.cit.
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To conclude, despite certain valid reservations, labour theory remains a significant
theory in justifying Intellectual Property rights. Its invocation is illustrated in case law
and legal instruments. With respect to copyright, labour theory could be said to be
the impetus to the birth of modem copyright law as illustrated in the case of Millar
v. Taylo?6 or in the case of Wheatan v. Peters 27 in the United States.
In the case of patents, the labour thesis was enshrined in the French patent law of
179128. The thesis postulates that a man has a natural right to the products of his
mind, which to some thinkers are of higher value than physical products. 29 This
thesis, unfortunately, was not widely accepted in the common law system whereby
by virtue of registration, exclusive rights under patents were not automatic. Rights
were given to the person who is first to file and register at the patent registry and
therefore the proposition that inventors have inherent rights over their inventions is not
true in practice. Even more contradictory to the idea of natural rights is the fact that
exclusive rights under a patent are not permanent.
26 (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 98 ER 201. For a detailed analysis, see Birrell, A, Seven Lectures on the Law
and History of Copyright in Books, (1899) Cassell & Company Ltd. London; Rose, Mark, The Author as
Pmprietor Donaldson v. Beckett and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, Representations, 1988 p.5!.
The case led to a debate as to the existence of common law rights of perpetual copyright in the author. The
House of Lords, later reversed this case in Donaldson v. Beckett 4 Burrow's 2408; 2 Brown's Parliamentary
Cases, 129, which held that the Statute of Anne had abolished common law copyright and replaced it with
a limited statutory right. See also the comment made by Lord Mansfield in Sayre v Moore which is quoted
in Cary v Longman 1 East 358, 361 n.b, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 150 n.b (1801).
27 33 U.S (8 Pet) 591 (1834), where the court states,
"that an author, at common law, has property in his manuscript....cannot be doubted; but this is very
different right from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future publication of the
work, after the author shall have published it to the world.....that every man is entitled to the fruits of his
own labor, must be admitted; but he can enjoy them only, except by statutory provision, under the rules
of property which regulate society, and which define the rights of things in general".
28 The French Constitutional Assembly declared: -
"that every novel idea whose realization or development can become useful to society belongs primarily to
him who conceived it, and that it would be a violation of the rights of man in their very essence if an
industrial invention were not regarded as the property of its creator". Law of January 7, 1791 cited in
Machiup, Fritz & Penrose, Edith, The Patent Controversy, Journal of Economic History, May 1950, No.1
p.1-29.
29 In this respect Maciced succrnttly summarised the whole issue in these terms: "Just as the mind of
man is admitted to be of a much higher nature than his body, so is the service rendered to his mind of a
much higher nature than his body. Hence ideas are loftier species of property than material wealth." See
Henry Dunning Macleod, the Elements of Political Economy (1958) London p.181 cited by Machlup, op.cit
par. f.n. 35 p.12.
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Furthermore, since inventors contribute significant advancement in art and science,
therefore they should not be deprived of their rightful reward and income by
permitting free-riders. 30 This notion assumes that the market system cannot guarantee
efficient rewards to inventors, and therefore the state should intervene to provide a
temporary monopoly.
With the above elucidation of labour theory as a basis of Intellectual Property, we
will now turn to the acceptability of Intellectual Property within Islamic law. The
position of Intellectual Property in Islamic law depends primarily on the understanding
of the concept of 'haqq' and 'milkiyyah'.
3	 THE CONCEPT OF 'HA 00' AND 'MILKIYYAH' IN ISLAM
3.1	 'Hagq ' and 'milki',rvah' in the context of the Qur'an.
The word 'haqq' and its derivatives are used in the Qur'an 272 times 31 . Despite its
frequent usage in the Qur'an, there is no standard meaning of the term 'haqq'.
'Haqq' is most popularly used in the Qur'an to indicate ('al-thubut') i.e something
which is or becomes a manifest and an indubitable fact or event. This is seen in 32:13
when the Qur'an refers to the day of Judgement:
"But the word from Me will come true ('haqqa'), I will fill Hell with Jinns
and men altogether" 32
References in the Qur'an to 'haqq' are also used to indicate something which is real,
established or confirmed, as a truth or a fact;( 'al-wujud') i.e something which is
3° This proposition is supported by many utilitarian thinkers. Among them is John Stuart Mill who
presented the argument in a very succirKtway, where he said,"
"That he, the inventor, ought to be both compensated and rewarded ... will not be denied.., it would be a
gross immorality of the law to set everybody free to use a person's work without his consent, and without
giving him an equivalent". Mill, Principles of Political Economy, p.932, cited in Machiup, p. 17 op.cit.
See al-Baqi, Mohammad Fu'ad Abdul, al-Mu'jam al-Mufahris Ii Alfaz aI-Our'an al-Karim, Darul
Fikr, (1987).
32 Ali, Abdullah Yusuf, The Holy Qur'an, Text, Translation and Commentary, (1989), Amana
Corporation.
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necessitated, unavoidable or incumbent. Thus we see the word 'haqq 'is used to refer
to death as something which is unavoidable, incumbent or real in 50:19:
"And the stupor of death comes with truth (bi-al-haqq)".
In other instances the word 'haqq' is used to contrast it with 'batil '(falsehood), which
if used in this context connotes suitableness to the requirements of wisdom, justice,
right or rightness. This can be found in 'Surah Saba" 34: 49•33 In 'Surah a!
Baqarah' 2:109 it refers to the truth, reality or fact? In 'Surah Au Imran' 3:21
it connotes rightness to the exigencies of the case (when referring to a judgement).35
Beside these primary siginifications the word 'haqq' carries the connotation of equity
and justice in 'Surah al-An 'am' 6:151 36, a right or due as in 'Surah Az-Zariyyah'
51: anything that is owed; as a fee, hire or pay and as a price as in 'Surah a!
Baqarah' 2: 282 38 and in 'Surah a! Baqarah' 2:121 referring to a duty or
obligation.39 So important is the word 'haqq' that it is used as an epithet of one of
the names of God to mean the Really-existing, whose existence, and divinity are
proved to be true, or the Creator according to the requirements of wisdom, justice,
"Say:"The truth (al-haqq) has arrived and falsehood neither createss anything new, nor restores
anything".
(After referring to the People of the book),"From selfish envy, after the Truth (al-haqq) hath
become manifest unto them, but forgive and overlook, Till Allah, accomplishes His purposes for Allah hath
power over all things".
"As to those who deny the signs of Allah, and in defiance of right (bi ghairil-haqq), slay the
Prophets".
36 fa1(e not life which Allah hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law" (bil-haqq).
"And in their wealth and possessions (was remembered) the right of (haqq) the (needy) Him who
asked, and him who (for some reason) was prevented (from asking)".
Referring to transactions which involves obligations in a fixed of time," reduce them to writing, let
a scribe write down faithfully as between the parties, as Allah has taught him, so let him write, let him
who incurs the liability dictate (aI-haqq), but let him fear his Lord Allah".
"Those to whom we have send the Book, study it as it should be studied (haqqa tilawatih): they
are the ones that believe therein: Those who reject faith therein- the loss is their own."
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right or rightness 4°
3.2	 Definition of 'haag' and 'milkiyyah' by jurists.
Classical jurists had not attempted to give a juridical definition of the term 'haqq'.
In many of their works, these jurists relied on the semantic meaning of 'haqq '."
This gap is nevertheless filled with works of contemporary jurists.
One popular way of defining 'haqq' is in the context of 'maslahah' (benefits/
interests). Prof. Sanhuri for example defines 'haqq' as the pecuniary interests which
are prescribed through legislative power to individuals 42. By confining 'haqq' as only
pecuniary interest, his definition ignores other non pecuniary rights such as personal
rights which are equally guaranteed in Is1am. In a similar vein, rights cannot be
equated with 'maslahah '(interest) albeit the idea of right itself is predicated on the
basis of 'maslahah' upon which the right rests. The two concepts are intertwined but
not similar. Thus we see any exercise of a right which is not coincidental to the
'maslahah' of the right, which forms the basis of the right, can be considered as a
wrongful exercise of right and may lead to the limitation, waiver or in certain
instances even termination of the right. Furthermore, rights ('haqq'), as opposed
Lane, E.W, Arabic English Lexicon, (1984) Islamic Texts Society Trust. Cambridge.
4! See the excellent analysis by Al-Ibadi, Abdul Salam Daud, Al-Milkiyyah /1 al-Shari'ah al-Jslamiyvah;
Tabi'atu/za wa Wazifatuha wa Quyuduha; Dirasah Muqaranah bi al-Qawanin Wa an-Nuzum al-Wo4'iyvah,
2 VoIs, (1974), al-Maktabah aI-Aqsa, Jordan.
42 Masadir aI-hagg, Vol. 1 p.4. Definition according to modern legislation. Masadir al-haqq vol.1 p.4.
He later pointed out at p.9 that in the Shari'ah 'haqq' is defined as including both proprietary and nonproprIetarY rights.
See the criticism of this view by Kamali, Muhammad Hashim, Fundamental Rights of the
Individual: An Analysis of (Haag) Right in Islamic Law, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences,
Vol.10 No.3 Fall 1993, pgs 341-366.
See the views of Kamali, op.cit. This view has obtained support among contemporary scholars, see
al-Darini,Nazariyyah aI-Ta'asuf/I Isti'mal al-Hag, (1977), Muassasah al-Risalah, Beirut and Al-Haag,
Wa Mada Sultan al-Daulah fi-Taqyidihi, (1984), Muassasah al-Risalah, Beirut. The term abuse of right
(tajawuz al-haqq) is often distinguished with wrongful exercise of rights (al-ta 'assufft isti 'mal al-haqq).
This distinction is more acceptable as the concept of abuse of rights, even though found in modem
legislation in the Middle East, has been criticised heavily by many scholars. See D'Emilia, Antonio, The
Abuse of Rights According to Muslim Jurists, Actorum Academiae Universalis Jurisprudentiae Comparative,
Vol.ffl, Pt. 111, 75-106, par. his comment on p.105. This distinction will be further taken up in Ch.8 of this
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to permissive power ('ibahah') have elements of exclusivity of power which are not
typically reflected by 'maslahah '.'
Another strand of thought is to define 'haqq' in the context of 'hukm' (value or ruling
of the Shari'ah). Al-Zarqa, a prominent contemporary Muslim jurist defines 'haqq'
as the exclusive assignment given by the Shari'ah either in the form of power or
obligation.47 Al- Qarafi's view reflected this stream of thought. To him a right is
one which arises from the Communication from the lawgiver ('al-khatib') either in
the form of command or prohibitions. According to this view, the idea of 'haqq' is
synonymous to 'hukm', thus no rights may arise in the absence of an effective
command from God. The proponents of this view derive support from the 'hadith'
of the Prophet to the effect that God's right over His servants is for them to worship
Him and not to associate Him with others.
In contrast, another view defines 'haqq' as 'exclusive assignment' ('ikhtisas al
hajiz'). Al-Darini defines 'haqq' as the exclusive appropriation or power over
something, or a demand addressed to another party which the Shari'ah has validated
in order to realise a certain benefit. 48 Abu Sinnah defines 'haqq' as a right which
is established in the Shari'ah, either for humans or for God, over someone else.49
According to this view 'haqq' is not confined to those rights which are already
thesis.
See also the definition given by Al-Khafif. To him, the term 'haqq' refers to the benefits which
are prescribed by the Shari'ah, Kitab aI-Hagg wa ai-Zimmah p.36, c/f al-Sabuni, Abdul Rahman, Al-Sabuni,
Abdul Rahman, Al-Madkhal li-Dirasah al-Tasvri' al-Islami (1979), Matba'ah Riyadh, Damsyik, Vol. 2. pgs. 7,8.
'Hukrn' is defined in 'usul al.flqh' as "communication from the Lawgiver pertaining to the conduct
of the legally competent person (mukallaf) consisting of a demand, an option, or an enactment (al-wa 'dY',
see Kamali, op.cit.
Al-Zarqa, Mustapha Ahmad, Al-Figh al-Islami fi Thaubihi al-Jadi4 Al-Madkhal ha an-Nazariyyah
al-Jirizam al-A nvnah fi al-Figh al-Islami, (1946) Vol.3, Damsyik par. p.10.
48 
c/f Al-Sabuni, Abdul Rahman, Al-Madkizal li-Dirasah al-Tasyri' al-Jslami (1979), Matba'ah
Riyadh, Damsyik, Vol. 2 par.p.l0.
Abu Sinnah, Ahmad F, Nazarivvah al-J-iagp in Al-Figh al-Jslami Asas al-Tashri', edited by
Muhammad T. 'Uwaydah, (1971/1391 H), Matabi' al-Ahram al-Tijariyyah, Cairo p. 175.
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established, either in the Qur'an or Sunnah. This conception allows Muslims the
freedom to evolve new rights which are not dealt with in the Qur'an and Sunnah so
long as they are coincidental to the will of these two main sources of Islam.5°
While 'milkiyyah' is a form of 'haqq', not all 'haqq' is 'milkiyyah'. 'Haqq' refers to
all kinds of exclusive power while ownership is seen more in the context of
relationship of a person vis a vis a thing, in relation to another person.
Ibadi (1974) argues that the classical definitions of 'milkiyyah' (ownership) are
seriously flawed as they do not represent the accurate characteristic of ownership. He
points out that there are three strands of thought to these definitions. Firstly, some
classical jurists described 'milkiyyah' as a legitimate state of affairs which is God
given. Among those who belong to this group are Abi al-Makarim in Sharh an-
Nipayah, Shihab ad-Din al-Qarafi, Taj ad-Din Abdul Wahab as-Subki and Al-
Zarkashi.5'
The second group of jurists defined ownership in terms of its indicia. Al-Karabisi
defines 'milkiyyah' as consisting of all rights of disposal. On a similar plane, al-
Qadhi Hussein defines 'milkiyyah' as the ability to benefit or consume ('al-int(fa') and
dispose of property which may vary according to the subject matter of the
ownership.52 The third group of jurists defines ownership as the abstract concept
which refers to the relationship between the owner and the owned property. Among
those in the third group are Muhammad ibn Arafah, Ibn al-Dihan and Sadr al-
Shari' ah.53
50 For other definitions, see Al-Ibadi, op.cit.,par. pages 94-102. He defines 'haqq' as the exclusive
power which are established in the Shari'ah, giving rise to power or obligation, in both horizontal
relationship between man and other fellow human beings and vertical relationship between man and God.
This group defines 'milkiyyah' in terms of it being a God-given right and prescribed by the
Shari'ah. See Al-Ibadi, op.cit. par. pg . 140-144.
52 Referred to in Al-Ibadi, op.cit.
Sadr al-Shari'ah defines 'milkiyyah' as the legal relationship between a person and a thing, his
exclusive rights to dispose of it and to restrain or forbid others from interfering with his rights. Muhammad
ibn. Arafah defines it as the entitlement to dispose of something with all powers which are allowed under
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Al-Ibadi adds that 'milkiyyah' should consist of these indicia:
i. exclusive right
ii. the right of enjoyment ('intfa') and disposal ('tasarruf') of the owned property
iii. in certain circumstances, these rights may be restrained from being exercised
such as for persons under age or those suffering from insanity.
iv. these rules and power should have support from valid sources of Shariah.M
3.3	 Nature of 'haag' in Islamic scholarship.
From the above jurisprudential debate on the definition of 'haqq' we can describe the
nature of 'haqq' in the following terms:
i.	 the idea of 'haqq' is related to something which is apt to benefit and of interest
to a person. In this relation Muslim scholars have elaborated on the essentials of
'haqq'. The idea of 'haqq' includes four indicia:
a) subject matter of 'haqq' ('mahall al-haqq')- i.e something which is proven or
established by the authority of the Shari'ah. The subject matter of 'haqq' must
either be a 'haqq mutlaqah '(absolute, unqualified right), 'raqabah' (tangible),
'manfa 'ah '(usufructuary right) or 'dayn '(choses in action). As it has been
argued in the previous chapter that Intellectual property is a form of
'manfa 'ah', this part is clear.
b) the holder of the right ('sahib al-haqq'). If it pertains to human right, the
holder of the right will be man and if it pertains to God's right, the holder of
the right will be God.
c) the party to whom the 'haqq' is addressed, that is the party of incidence
('mukallaf), who is bound by a duty to respect the right. In the context of
Intellectual Property, the right bearer of 'haqq' is either an author, inventor
or a trade mark proprietor and the public is the party of incidence.
the Shar'iah, either in deed or jural, or something which is done in 'niyabah' (by proxy or
mandawfagency). See p.144 al-Ibadi.
See Al-Ibadi, Abdul Salam Daud, op.cit.
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d)	 there must also be affirmative permission ('izn') from the lawgiver, or failing
that, there must be at least no prohibition concerning it.
ii. there should be a basis in the Qur'an and Sunnah for the recognition of a valid
'haqq'. In this respect, there must be affirmative permission from the Lawgiver, or
failing that, at least be no prohibition concerning it. This criteria would prove
problematic as reference to the rights of man in the Qur'an in the form of absolute
rulings are not many. In this relation Kamali argues that,
"The norm in the Shari'ah is that rights and obligations do not exist unless
there is evidence to suggest otherwise. Such a norm is termed "original
absence of liability" ('bara 'ah al-dhimmah al-asliyyah') by which is meant a
presumption that can only be overruled by positive evidence.56
However, even though the Qur'an does not provide a detailed list of the basic rights
and liberties, there is an abundance of principles which may provide support for the
existence of rights or for that matter the enforcement against encroachment of rights.
Therefore the absence of direct ruling is understandably not confined to intellectual
property only, but to many other valid rights.
Kamali further argues that in many instances, the Qur'an and the Sunnah when
referring to the idea of 'haqq', garb them in the form of duty or obligation. This
means that the idea of right is subservient to duty. The emphasis in Islam is more on
the fulfilment of duty than the satisfaction of individuals' right. This, according to
Kamali, does not mean that there is no recognition of rights but in many instances it
is the fulfilment of duty which is given priorit 7. In the previous chapter we have
identified the various Qur'anic injunctions and Prophetic 'hadith's which support the
view that the learning, seeking and dissemination of knowledge is a duty. Muslims
are also dutybound not to conceal any knowledge and to respect those who are
See Kamali, p. 345 op.cit.
56 See p.347 Kamali, op.cit.
See p.363 ibid.
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engaged in activities pertaining to education. It is thus arguable that even though the
Qur'an and the Sunnah do not directly recognise any form of proprietary right on
'knowledge', this does not mean that there will be no recognition of property rights
over knowledge-based products.
On the other hand, this also means that the idea of 'haqq' in Islam is geared towards
an orientation of right and duty. Kamali, described this harmonious union at p.357:
"In the Qur'an, right and duty merge into justice so much so that they
become, in principle, an extension of one another"58.
This orientation between right and duty is very important in the context of Intellectual
Property. For example, in the context of copyright, the right of the public to have
access to published works for the promotion of learning and education is not only an
important balance but a duty. The precise balance of rights and other higher
objectives will be further elaborated in chapter 8 of this thesis.
In this relation to this, Muslim jurists have identified six valid bases of 'haqq' which
relate to the existence and the subsistence of legal rights.
(a)	 'Adillah al syari 'yyah' which refers to the commands of God and His
prohibition either in the form of command ('amar'), prohibitions ('nahy') or
permissibility ('ibahah')
(b) Transactions ('aqd') which are concluded by two parties.
(c) Dispositions which are concluded without offer and acceptance ('al-iltizam
allazi yatimmu bil ijab- al iradah a! munfaridah').
(d) Inheritance ('a! mirath').
(e) Any legal act or recognised deed ('al-fl 'lu al-masyru') may also give rise to
rights. In the context of ownership, possession and work or labour will give
rise to a valid ownership claim.
(f) Finally, the Shari'ah also recognises that violation of other rights may give
rise to rights on the person who is being violated. This is known as 'al-taaddi
58 Kamali, p.357 ibid.
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ala haqqi a!- ghair'.59
The first and the fifth basis of 'haqq' will be relevant to the present discussion. This
will be later developed in the discussion of basis of ownership rights over 'intellectual
creations'.
iii. A 'haqq' is an exclusive right and should be distinguished from a mere
permissibility ('ibahah'). The nature of exclusion of 'haqq' is not absolute. Firstly,
a 'haqq' is subservient to a set of higher values such as justice ('ad! '). These rules on
the use of right ('isti'mal a! haqq'), the fulfilment of right ('istfa' al haqq'), the
termination of right ('inqida' a! haqq') and the wrongful use of rights ('ta 'assuffi
isti 'ma! al-haqq) have been developed by Muslim jurists. The basis of this orientation
of 'haqq' and the concept of justice is the Qur'anic injunctions in 57:25; 4:135; 60:8;
5:8; 4:58.60 The precise scope of this oentation is very important, and this balancing
of rights between the 'sahib a! haqq' and the 'mukallaf will be further developed in
our discussion of limits and the extent of Intellectual Property rights in chapter 8 of
this thesis.
iv. 'Haqq al-milkiyyah' is the most perfect form of right. The idea of the nature
of exclusionary rights in ownership as being the most perfect form of exclusive right
has to be seen in the context of the concept of ownership in Islam. Firstly, property
I ownership is a God-given right and hence should be exercised according to the
See Abu Sinnah, op.cit. par.pgs. 190-195.
60 57:25:"We sent aforetime Our Messenger with clear signs and sent down with them the book and
the balance (of right and wrong) that men may stand forth in justice".
4:135: when addressing a challenge to the unbelievers,"Say: 0 my people! Do whatever you can
I will do (my part): soon will ye know who it is whose end will be (best) in the Hereaftec
certain it is that the wrongdoers will not prosper'.
60:8 : "Allah forbids you not with regard to those who fight you not for (your) faith nor drive you
out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them. For Allah loveth those who do
Just".
5:8 :"O ye who believe! Stand out firmly For allah, as witness to fair dealing, and let not the
hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from Justice. Be just, that is next
to piety : and fear Allah. For Allah is well acquainted with all that you do".
4:58:" Allah doth command you to render back your Trusts to those to whom they are due and
when you judge between man and man, that ye judge with justice; verily how excellent is the
teaching which he giveth you! For Allah is He who heareth and seeth all things".
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dictates of the Shari'ah. Secondly, everything in this world is created by God 6' for
man to consume and utilize. Man is encouraged to work for wealth and is promised
for due returns commensurate to his labour. 62 Thirdly, property, as a God given
right, is not absolute. It is to be utilized according to God's will and it forms a trial
/test for man. Property which is utilized in good ways will merit reward and vice
versa.63 On top of that there is a share of the needy in property, hence the
obligation to give 'zakat'.TM
From the above discussion, it is submitted that rights over Intellectual creation can
find support within the conceptions of 'haqq' and 'milkiyyah'. Firstly, despite the
absence of direct rulings in the Qur'an and Sunnah, Muslims are given the flexibility
to formulate other forms of 'haqq' as the Qur'an and Sunnah themselves do not
constitute an exhaustive list of legal rights. Secondly, one of the valid bases of
'haqq' is 'ama!' (labour) and hence arguably, intellectual creations which owe their
birth entirely to combinations found in the human mind, and which, but for his
ingenuity, would not have existed, are loftier and more worthy of recognition.
The conception of 'ama!' as the basis of recognition of Intellectual Property will be
further elaborated in the next section. More fundamentally, the conception of 'haqq'
and 'milkiyyah' is not absolute. Hence, in certain circumstances, 'haqq' and
'milkiyyah' would be subservient to other higher goals. This, and the concept of
'khilafah' constitute two main limitations to ensure the correct orientation of duty and
61 i. God created all 'the heavens and the earth and all in between', (2:21-22,29),'the east and the
west (2:115),"night and day' (3:190-191; 7:6-7) jinn and man (15:26), in short, all creation
(11:19)
ii. All creations are in 'natural submission' to God in their 'own mode' (7:54, 22:18; 24:41),
iii. The universe contains signs for man of God's Omnipotence, Omniscience and Lordship
and is meant to be recognised by 'men of understanding' (3:127, 190-191; 7:6-7; 13:4; 14:32-34).
62 i.Man is to utilize and develop nature as God has created everything for man (2:21-22; 6:95,103,
15:16-23; 16:3-21; 31:20) but according to God's will (3:32; 4:59).
ii.Man must do good works with self and property (2:112, 208; 61:11) and gets returns
commensurate (53:39).
63 Property is one of the trials! tests for man and he will be rewarded accordingly (2:155; 3:186; 8:28;
17:64; 18:46).
In one's property is the share of the needy (5:19) and the need to give zakat so as to purify oneself
and one's property (9:103).
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'haqq'.
4	 THE BASIS OF OWNERSHIP OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ISLAM;
THE LABOUR APPROACH.
In this part we will examine the basis of ownership and raise the question whether
labouring on "intellectual ideas" will give rise to a form of ownership rights over the
finished product. The focus of our study in this part is
(i) the basis of 'ama!' as a justification of property in the Qur'an, and
(ii) the application of 'amal' in the context of the discussion of the aquisition of
'mubah' property' ('res nullius').
4.1	 The basis of 'ama!' in the Qur'an.
Effort and labour is much encouraged in the Qur'an, in which case the Qur'an
consistently calls for rewarding of one's effort. In 62:10, the Qur'an encourages man
to work and create wealth, " and when the prayer is finished, then disperse in the
land and seek God's bounty". Out of which a person's entitlement to his effort is
clearly addressed in Surah 4:32 where the Qur'an states that "Men have a right to
what they have earned and women are entitled to what they have earned". In 'Surah
al-Baqarah', a person's right to spend their lawful earning is guaranteed. The ayah
states," 0 believers, spend of the lawfullpure substance you have earned and of the
resources we have in store for you in the earth." Beside 'a-ma-la' and its
derivatives, the other term used to signify effort is 'ka-sa-ba' and 'sa 'a'. For the
purpose of this chapter, these Qur'anic provisions are listed below:
2:134: "That was a People that hath passed away. They shall reap the fruit of what
they did and ye of what ye do! of their merits; there is no question in your
case."
6:132: "To all are degrees (or ranks) according to their deed: For thy Lord is not
65 See Q2:267.
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unmindful of anything that they do".
17:19: "those who do wish for the (things of) the Hereafter, and strive therefore will
all due striving and have faith, they are the ones whose striving is acceptable
(to Allah)".
20:15, "Verily the hour is coming, my design is to keep it hidden- for every soul to
receive its rewards by the measure of its endeavour".
46:19: "And to all are (assigned) degrees according to the deeds which they (have
done) and in order that (Allah) may recompense their deeds, and no injustice
be done to them".
53:39; "That man can have nothing but what he strives for".
53:40, "that (the fruit of) his striving will soon come in light".
76:22, "Verily this is a reward for you and your endeavour is accepted and
recognised."
79:35, "The Day when man shall remember (all that he strove for).
92:4, "Whoever works any act of Righteousness and has Faith his endeavour will
not be rejected: We shall record it in his favour." (repeated in 2 1:94).
Scholars regard these provisions as applicable to both earthly as well as heavenly
merits. Any conscientious endeavour, either for heavenly merits or earthly gain are
equally highly appreciated and recognised in the Qur'an. From the foregoings Qur'anic
injunctions, the argument that an author or an inventor is entitled to his/her
work/invention as it is a product of his/her labour and effort, is therefore
substantiated.
4.2	 The discussion on 'amal' as a basis of rights in contemporary works
Classical scholars discussed 'amal' primarily in the context of first acquisition of
'mubah' goods. Four classic example where ownership arises through first acquisition
are, 'ihya al-mawat' (reclamation of dead land), 'al-istiyad' (hunting), 'al-istila' ala
al-kala wa al-ajam' (finder of grazing field) and 'al-istila' ala al-ma 'adin wa al-
kunuz' (finder of mines and treasure). Many jurists equate 'mubah' goods and
common property. This is the stand taken by Hanafites school of thought with the
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support of the Prophet's tradition:
"Men are co-sharers in three things- water, herbage ('at- ka1a') and fire
('an-nar')67."
The idea of common property in the above quoted natural resources does not in
anyway suggest that these natural resources cannot be privately owned. There is a
view that private ownership of these common resources is possible. This is the
view taken by Ibn Abidin, who had interpreted the term of 'haqq' in the above hadith
as referring to permissibility or general rights of others to consume water or to irrigate
land - 'haqq al-shafah '- if there is no other source of water nearby. To him anybody
who first found a source of water and exercised his possession over it has prior right
to it, he is the owner of it and not anyone else.69
Acquisition of property through 'hiyazah or wad' yad' means occupancy and taking
possession or control over 'mubah' goods70. 'Hiyazah' gives rise to ownership to
'Al-kala' is defined in the Majallah as grass which grows by itself on land either on owned property
or unowned property.(See Article 1234 Majallah aI-Ahkam). So long as it grows by itself, owner of the
land cannot prevent others from availing of this grazing rights.(See Majallah al-A hkam Article 1257).
67 
'Al-nar' (fire) here means fire which is started by man in the wilderness. This fire is privately owned
by the person who started it. But the others have general right for 'isrila' , 'istidfa' or 'istidha 'ah' which
is the right to warm oneself, and illuminated by light of the fire but he cannot take the whole
thing.(Majallah al-A hkam Article 1261)
There is an argument that natural genetic resources are the common heritage of mankind (that)
should be available without restriction. This has caused global conflict between industrialised countries and
developing countries. The latter who possess the most of wild genetic resources dispute that and argue that
they have a kind of property rights over these genetic resources. See Sedjo, Roger, Property Rights,
Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological Change, 35 The Journal of Law and Economics , No.!, 1192,
119-213. See also Straus, Joseph, The Rio Biodiversity Convention and Intellectual Property, IIC, Vol.
24, No.5/1993, p.602-615.
Careful consideration of property concepts in Islam will warrant that wild trees and animals are common
property. However it is also recognised that one in authority has a power of control over his jurisdiction
and this includes the power to restrict or control any acquisition of 'mubah' property.
69 Raddul Mukhrar 4:283, referred to in Ibn. Quddamah, Muwaffaq al-Din (d. 620H), Al-Mughni,
(n.d), Dar al-Kutub a!- 'Ilmiyyah, Beirut, 12 vols. par. pgs.563- 593. vol.5.
70 
'Mubah' property is property which is originally not owned by anybody such as water in the river
or other natural sources, wild animals, and wild trees and fruits. Everyone alike is entitled to possess and
consume these natural resources as far as their physical ability admits. See Al-Zarqa. Mustafa Ahrnad, j
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the 'mustawaili', as long as the 'mubah' goods are not owned by anybody.7 ' With
the exception of the degree of possession needed, there is no fundamental
disagreement in this area among the major schools of jurisprudence.12
Contemporary scholars have extended it to other 'free' gifts created for mankind as
a whole. In this sense, 'jim' being God-given, arguably, is a form of these 'free'
gifts. Scholars have further developed the first acqusition theory to that of labour
theory, i.e a man can only get what he strives for. They argued that labour is the basis
for appropriation of wealth and property. This creative labour theory is also not
something new in Islamic scholarship. Among the first to associate labour to economic
gain is Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) where he writes at p.3 13:
"the effort to (obtain sustenance) depends on God's determination and
inspiration. Everything comes from God. but human Labour is necessary for
every profit and capital accumulation.
at p.3 14" it has thus becomes clear that gains and profits, in their entirety or
for most of the part, are value realized from human labour."73
Madkhal ila Nazarfr,'ah al-Iltizam al-A mmah, (1946), Matba 'ah Jami'ah, Damascus. The Hanafites defined
'mubah' property as property which is freely available to be owned after 'isrila' or possession. In many
instances, the Hanafites used the term 'mubah' goods in ontra-distinction with 'mamluk' property i.e goods
which are readily owned either under private property or public property. A1-Khafif defines 'mubah'
property as everything which is created by God for human consumption, on the condition that these
resources are not possessed by anybody else. See Ahkam a! Mu 'amalah a! Shari 'ivyah', (1948), Marba 'ah
al-Majazi, Cairo.
See Al-Sabuni, Abdul Rahman, Al-Madkhal li-Dirasah al-Tasyri' al-Islami (1979), Ma:ba'ah
Riyadh, Damsyik, Vol. 2. Such activities will give rise to ownership rights either on 'aqar'(immovable)
or 'manqul'(movable) property. See Majallah Article 1198-1200.
The Hanafites have drawn a distinction between two forms of possession:
i. 'haqiqi'-actual or de facto- through possession or taking control,
ii. 'hukmi' or jural/de jure. In this instance, acquistion is complete by the use of hunting tools which
render the animals powerless and cannot run away.
The Hanafites, Malikites and Hambalites regarded 'istila hukmi' as sufficient so long as it is accompanied
by intention to possess, such as in the case of animals caught by tools set up with the intention of hunting.
This view was not shared by Shafie and Ahmad who views that actual possession must take place. See Al-
Rashid, Abdullah ibn Abd al-Rahman, Al Amwal al-Mubahah Wa Ahkam Tamlikuha fi al-Shari'ah a!-
!slaamiyyah, 2 vols, (1984), Sharikah al-Tiba 'ah al-Arabiyyah, Cairo.
The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History, trans. by Franz Rosenthal, Princeton University
Press, 1980.
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Muhammad Baqer Sadr, (1935-198O) gave the most systematic analysis of theory
of acquisition of property rights75 in his analysis of theory of distribution before
production. The premise of his theory is the conception that natural resources such
as springs, roots of mine, open oceans and rivers and animals in the wilderness
belong to nobody. He quoted these traditions in support of his contention:
Al-Allamah al-Huh in 'Tadhkirah': "He does not possess the vein which is in
the earth. He who reaches it from another side that he will take it".
Al-Shaykh al-Tusi in 'al-Mabsut'," Water of seas, rivers or streams springing
up in the plane or hilly waste land, all these are 'mubah' (free for all). Any
one can make use of what he wants and how he wishes."
Al-Allamah al-Huh in 'Qawa'id': "A prey does not become one's property
by its entering one's land, nor a fish by leaping up to one's boat."
'Al-Tadhkirah'," A man does not become the owner of the snow falling under
his possession merely by its falling on his land."76
He further argues that the right of an individual in the natural wealth, to distinguish
him from others, is the reflection of his labour. Labour, according to him, is the sole
basis of acquiring appropriative rights in the wealth of nature. This right differs
in its theoretical sense in accordance with the difference in the natural resources and
'Iqtisaduna' (Our Economics), Vol.2 Pt.! , Chapter 3 p.'73 ,English translation, 1984, World
Organization for Islamic Services, Tehran.
Sadr' s scholarly work on the economic analysis of Islamic principles of acquisition of ownership
remains the most important work on economic thought in Muslim literature. Even though the work came
within Shi'i circles and understanding, Sadr's analysis was not confined to mere Shi'i scholars. Due to this,
his work is well accepted and well regarded in the Sunni world. For a detailed analysis of his work, see
Mallat, Chibli, The Renewal of Islamic Law; Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi'i International,
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
76 p.175, 'Iqtisadwza'.
P.178 ibid.
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the kind of wealth78. Further, he explains the source of his theory to that body of
juristic discussions particularly on 'ihya al-mawat', the founder of mines and spring
water and hunting of wild animals.
To restate the theoretical basis of this theory, we may refer to the following
discussions:
(i) the land is his who reclaims and revives it, as stated in the Prophetic
traditions.
(ii) He who digs up a mine till it is opened up, has a greater right 79 and claim
to it and the ownership of the quantity uncovered from the pit and such other
material.
(iii) he who digs up a natural spring of water is more entitled to have it.
(iv) If an individual takes possession of a wild (an-nafir) animal by hunting, wood
by gathering it, or a natural stone by carrying it, or water by scooping it up
in a pail or such other vessel from the river, it is his property by possession
or custody80.
From the above discussion, Sack argues that the special rights on sources of nature
are established on the basis of work81 . In the case of reclamation of land, the nature
of labour exerted on the land must resuscitate the land, reviving the land into a fertile
land. It is this new creation of utility which according to him, is the basis of the
entitlement of that person, as the utility would not have existed if not of his effort.
Thus, in the case of reclamation of land, mere enclosure is not sufficient for the
emanation of rights.82 There must be, firstly, active labour, i.e the work must be of
78 P.185 ibid, examples are set out below.
' (s.i.c) In translation the quotations used relatives (greater, more entitled) to express the thresholds
for priority over ones who strive to such extent.
P.177 ibid.
P.189 ibid.
See p.184 ibid. Enclosure to him is an act of monopolization and but not active labour.
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economic nature; and secondly, the creation of new circumstances or a definite
utility83. Hence, work expended on already fertile land does not produce any rights
on the land as no new circumstances are created. Once these two criteria are fulfilled,
the worker by virtue of his active labour is entitled to a special right to the land. He
should be able to appropriate the product of his work, reap the fruits of his labour
and to exclude others from interfering with his exclusive enjoyment to the product of
his labourM. Because the basis of the worker's entitlement is the creation of new
circumstances and new utility, his special rights to the product of his labour will last
as long as the utility is maintained. Hence, Sadr argued that neglect and
abandonment of work on the reclaimed land will sever his appropriative link with the
land85. When this happens, the land will revert to the 'common' for others to
appropriate86.
Basis of rights over wild animals emanates from the activity of hunting. In hunting,
he argued the capture of the animals by overpowering them creates a new utility by
rendering these wild animals as the subject of benefit for human consumption. For
hunting, possession of the hunted animals are not relevant to his appropriative rights
thereto. So long as he has subjugated the animals to his power, nobody can interfere
with this rights, even by possession of the hunted animals87.
On the other hand, simple possession of a stone found lying on the ground or the
collecting of water from rivers is enough to justify ownership rights to it. This
difference emanates from the difference of nature of natural resources and the nature
83 See his comment at p.1 90, ibid. on the creation of new utility in the reclamation of dead land, "since
this utility was not available in the land before its reclamation but resulted from the operation of reclamation,
the worker becomes the owner of the utility, it being the product of his labour and work; and his ownership
of the utility results in preventing others from stealing of him of this utility or of despoiling it by depriving
him of it by their seizure of the land from him and of their utilization of it instead of him, for thereby they
deprive him of the utility which he had created by his strenuous labour, acquired by a duly lawful right'.
See also p.192 ibid.
84 See p.189, 190, 191 ibid.
85 See p. 204 ibid.
See p.192 and 206 ibid.
87 See p.196 and 201 ibid.
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of economic work needed to each separate subject matter. Sadr argued that the basis
of pcession in respect to natural resources such as stones and water is simple
possession. Allah has created these things to be used, hence the simple availing of
it entitles the person to own it88.
On the same basis, the founder of a natural spring, or he who excavates a well is
more entitled to the spring and the well. However, due to the nature of water which
can be shared without ordinarily denying the originator's rights, he cannot prevent
others from availing themselves of the spring water or water from the well if there is
excess to his needs 89. The nature of exclusive rights in water hence differs in degree
of absoluteness to that of the rights over reclaimed land. Exclusive enjoyment over
land may not be obtained without total denial of others9°.
In short the theory justifies appropriation of ownership on the basis of economic work
which produces new circumstances or a definite new utility. Neglect and abandonment
of the property will cause the status of property to revert to that of 'mubah' and the
ownership will be extinguished. This is the import of a sound tradition narrated by
Abdullah ibn. Sinan on the authority of Ahlu'l-bayt which says:
"He who lights upon a property or a camel in a deserted tract of land
exhausted or gone astray, its owner abandoning it, having not pursued it,
another person takes it up, maintains it, spend for it to live out of its sheer
exhaustion and inamination, that will be becoming his property indisputably
and the former has no right in it. This is like a 'mubah' (free to all).9'
Sadr further distinguishes between the labour theory as understood in Islam and
capitalism. According to him, capitalism regards private special rights over the
88 P.203 ibid.
89 See p.197 ibid.
90 See p.194 ibid.
' P.183, ibid.
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natural resources as an expression of the man's freedom which he enjoys under the
aegis of the capitalist system. In Islam it is an expression of the activity of man and
his pursuit of labour for the utilization and fructification.
On the difference between Islam's labour theory and Marxism, the distinguishing
factor is what constitutes ownership rights. While Marxism justifies only the
ownership of the value added upon the labour of the worker, Islam confers on the
worker the ownership of the product of his labour. According to him, the creation
of new utility entitles the worker to the product of his labour and his rights subsist as
long as the utility remains. Nobody else can interfere with his ownership by exerting
fresh labour. Hence under this theory, appropriation of rights goes to the first person
who expands economic work and creates new utility93.
Sadr's analysis of the nature of rights of first acquisition can aptly be summarised the
table below.
RIGHTS OF FIRST ACQUISITION ___________
reclamation of dead	 founder of stone	 founder of spring
land
nature of economic	 possession and	 possession	 possession
work	 economic work
nature of right	 right of 'raqabah'	 ownership	 ownership
degree of exclusivity	 absolute	 relative	 relative
5	 The basis for the extension of the labour theory to justify rights over
Intellectual Property.
i) Firstly, an initial caveat on our extension of labour theory to Intellectual Property
should be noted. It is not accurate to describe 'ideas' as the subject matter of
Intellectual property as similar in nature to the understanding of 'natural resources'.
P.209 ibid.
P.210 ibid.
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Many technical ideas are inherently complicated and hence cannot be regarded as
common. On the other hand, 'ideas' originate from a common pool of knowledge
which is inherited from past generations. It is from this characteristic that many
would not hesitate to ascribe the common ownership of certain forms of knowledge
such as that of religious knowledge in Islam. Secondly, it is clear in the Qur'an that
knowledge ('jim), as the composite of all information, originates as a form of gift
from God.
In this respect it is most appropriate to quote from Pendleton:
"In a technologically advanced society no one can meaningfully be said to
create information; rather they may innovate and synthesise, but necessarily
they must build on existing stocks of knowledge. It follows that, in a limited
sense, some aspects of technology are the common heritage of mankind".
ii) Secondly, 'ama!' (work and labour) can as, a general rule, be a basis for
appropriation of wealth. In our discussion above, we have seen that the application
of 'ama!' in juristic books are confined to the context of ownership of 'mubah'
property. The Qur'an is emphatic that everyone should be rewarded commensurate
to his effort and hence all forms of 'amal' should be rewarded provided that the
economic gain is not obtained by virtue of work on someone else's property. Islamic
scholars have argued that 'labour' should be the basis of property. This theory of
economic gain based on creative labour is aptly described by Beheshty (1988)
"We are the rightful owner of our labour, be it production work or a service.
Entitlement of an individual to his labour constitutes the pith of all kinds of
ownership. So far as his productive work continues to be there, he is the
rightful owner of the same. Like wise if his work entails formation of an
object manifesting his accumulated labour, he is also considered to be its
owner"95.
M.Pendleton, Intellectual Property, Information-based Society and A New International Economic
Order The Policy Options?, Opinion, 1985, 2 EIPR 31.
Beheshti, Ayatollah, Ownership in Islam, translated by Ali Reza Afghani, (1988), Foundation of
Islamic Thought, p.31.
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In the second form of labour i.e services, Beheshty draws a distinction between "a
person who is engaged in a sustained work and it does not exist in a crystallised
form". In this sense he is referring to services performed by sellers, cloth sellers,
etc who do not form catalyst for factors of production.
iii) The requirement of active labour, or creative work as stipulated by Sadr in his
analysis above illustrates the need to have a certain threshold of endeavour for
propertisation to be effectively materialized. This proposition draws support from the
junstic view that mere fencing, either with soil or stone in the case of revival of land,
is not enough to confer rights over the land. Secondly, Ibn. Quddamah has also
illustrated instances whereby dead-land was given by the states to individuals. Such
lands were not considered as appropriated until work had been done on the land.
With regard to the different form of 'labour' from mere possession in the case of
water and hunting and 'active labour' in the case of revival of land, this distinction
can be rationalised in the 'propertisation' of 'ideas' as well. The requirement of
'originality' in copyright is of a lower threshold than the requirement of novelty in
patents97. Such differences can be rationalised as to the degree of claim of priority
right. In this respect, in the case of authorship, it is conceded that to a certain extent
authorship results from the "conscious and unconscious intake, digestion and
transformation of input gained from the author's experience within a broader
society"98. While, in the case of patents, due to the requirement of novelty, such
P.31-33, ibid.
See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206-207 (C.C.E.D. Pa.1853) (No 13, 514):
"(The author's) exclusive property in the creation of his mind cannot be vested in the author as abstractions,
but only in the concrete form which he has given them, and the language in which he has clothed them.
When he has sold his book, the only property which he reserves to himself, or which the law gives to him,
is the exclusive right to multiply the copies of that particular combination of characters which exhibits to
the eyes of another the ideas intended to be conveyed. This is what the law terms copy, or copyright".
Mr. Justice Erie of Jeffreys v. Boosey ,I0 Eng. Rep, 681 (1854) wrote:
"The subject of property is the order of words in the author's composition; not the words themselves, they
being analogous to the elements of matter, which are not appropriated unless combined, not the ideas
expressed by those words, they existing in the mind alone, which is (sic) not capable of appropriation".
See Litman, op.cit. In this perspective, we are assuming that the philosophical underpinnings of
the theory of 'originality' in copyright in common law jurisdictions are legitimate. For a different theory
see Aide, Christopher, A More Comprehensive Soul: Romantic Conceptions of Authorship and the
Copyright Doctrine of Moral Right, University of Toronto Law Review, Vol.48 (1990), 211-228. The
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conflict of rights, is unlikely.
vi) Further, support can also be drawn from the Prophetic 'hadith':
"Whoever has preceded other Muslims in something which has never been
acquired before, he has the right of priority over it"Y9
With regard to 'intellectual creations', therefore, it must satisfy the requirement of the
creation of new utility, a different product than the one which existed in common. In
this respect, even though the common law jurisdictions used different yardsticks of
'creativity' and originality' to different subject matter, it is not within the province
of this thesis to challenge these accepted thresholds.
iv) Further lessons can be obtained from the juristic discussion of 'ihya a!-
mawat'which defines the boundary of the application of the concept of 'amal'.
Firstly, the concept rule out the ownership of something which is previously owned.
Secondly, acquisition of rights will not arise if the subject matter is something which
is already 'common'. Arguably, copyright and patents have eliminated 'common'
subject-matter from their protection'. Thirdly, Muslim jurists have further ruled
out the acquisition of something which may result in conflict with public needs.
Among the types of land which are not allowed to be revived are public road,
passages which connect a place with another village or land adjacent to another
village. The jurists further limited the application of 'revival of land' to lands within
the periphery of a village'0'.
v) Fourthly, consistent with the distinction drawn between the labour theory and the
exchange value in socialist countries, it is submitted here that labour and work
Romantic conceptions emphasized on the author's originality and creative genius, and the bond which exists
between an author and his or her work.
'Man vasbiqu ila ma lam yasbiq ilaihi Muslim fahua ahhaqqu bihi', referred to in Al-Mughni, op.
cit. vol.5 p.569.
See Hughes & Litman, op.cit.
101 This inherent need to balance the conflicting interests in Intellectual property will be dealt with in
detail in Ch. 8 of this thesis.
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justifies the ownership of the whole intangible value of intellectual creations. This is
despite the arguments that the process of authorship and inventorship are accumulative
processes'°2.
vi) As far as the nature of this right is concerned, it would be that of a special right
against the use of one's property without one's permission. This priority right to the
product of his labour can manifest itself in different forms such as that of possession
of land and possession of water as illustrated in Sadr's illustration. Arguably, this
will rationalise the difference between the degree of exclusionary power between
different subject matters. More fundamentally, this in turn, depends on how far
others' right will be balanced without upsetting the owner's priority right. In the case
of copyright, it is not a monopoly right. Under copyright a similar work can be
protected if it is independently derived. Copyright allows such duplication of interest
as one interest does not prejudice the right of priority of the other.
vii) Sadr argues that this right of priority is not permanent. He argues that a thing will
revert back to the common upon neglect and abandonment. While his proposition may
not find support with the Shafi'i school of thought, its relevance to ownership of
Intellectual property, particularly in the case of trade mark, is arguable'°3.
Therefore, 'priority rights' should be maintained so long as the mark is still in use.
Non-use of a mark marks the abandonment ('tahalli') of the mark. Furthermore,
Intellectual Property cannot be permanent and ceases upon the expiration of its life-
time as provided under the law.
See (iii) supra.
103 His concern for the maintenance of the 'common' by imposing constant maintanence and labour
can find support in Maliki school of thought. Jurists have differences of opinion on owned lands which are
left neglected after being reclaimed. The Malikis argue that this type of land reverts to the 'common'. This
view is not shared by the Hanafites who views that so long as the land is under the dominion of an owner
and the owner is known, such land cannot be considered as dead land. The Hanafites fuither sought
reference to the Prophetic 'hadith' indicating that such land should not be under the dominion of a known
owner. In another hadith, the Prophet declared that such property should not be under the ownership of a
Muslim. See the discussion in A1-Mughni, op.cit.
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6	 Conclusion
In this chapter, it has been shown that theorising on intellectual property is possible
through the understanding of the concepts of 'haqq' and 'milkiyyah' in Islamic
scholarship. It is argued that the concept of 'haqq' is flexible and non exhaustive,
allowing for further extension in other forms of 'haqq' which may not be anticipated
by classical scholars. In the case of Intellectual Property, the concepts of 'haqq' and
'milkiyyah' do not only justify the initial allocation of rights but also the subsistence
and limitation of rights.
Rights over intellectual creations subsist by virtue of labour ('ama! '). It is established
that the general theory of acquisition of wealth through labour is more consistent with
the Qur'anic injunctions. This concept should not, therefore, be confmed to the
discussion of first acquisition through possession ('hiyazah') and revival ('ihya a!-
mawat') only. Secondly, the author/inventor's entitlement to the product of his mental
labour is legitimate. Mental labour, in any case, should not be any different from
any other kind of physical labour. In this respect we can draw support from
Beheshty's work:
"The scope of the term "labour" is large enough to accoiøodate terms like
"physical" as well as "mental exertions"°4.
Furthermore, to discriminate mental labour from other forms of exertions and
endeavour would be inconsistent with the Qur'anic injunctions on 'ama!'. The wanton
disregard to the authors/inventors lawful entitlement would be a great injustice.
A careful consideration of the principles of 'first acquisition' further provides us with
certain principles which mark the boundary of the labour theory. Firstly, it calls for
the creation of something new, which has never existed before. Secondly, the
subject-matter acquired should not be owned by someone else. Thirdly, acquisition
of rights is subjected to the higher threshold of public interest and needs. This last
104 See footnote at p.44, op.cit.
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requirement accords with the nature of 'haqq' and 'milkiyyah' which is not absolute.
In cases of conflict with public interest, certain adjustments have to be made. This
is further substantiated with the orientation between 'haqq' and duty. With regards to
Intellectual property, such reorientation is necessary and a precise balance should be
struck between an individual's interest and the public's access for 'jim'.
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CHAPTER FIVE
COPYRIGHT: INCENTIVE THEORY
AND DISSEMINATION OF WORKS
1.	 Introduction
There is a widely held belief among developing countries that copyright protection is
an unnecessary obstacle towards dissemination of literature, thereby affecting their
capacities for intellectual development. This belief is further heightened with the
expansion of copyright into new technological subject-matter such as computer
programs, reprography and recently, the multimedia networks. Contrary to this belief,
copyright has long mediated between the need of authors for economic gain and the
right of access for the public to written works'. The balancing role played by
copyright depends on the understanding of the role of copyright. The concept of
copyright reproduced the fundamental contradiction between control and access. A
stress on the interests of past "authors" could generate arguments for broad copyright
protection, while an emphasis on the interests of future "authors" and the public could
generate an equally compelling arguments for delimitations on the scope of
copyright2.
This chapter will seek to explain and assess how copyright has resolved this unique
balance between protection and dissemination. In chapter 3 we have pointed out that
one of the principal concerns of 'jim' in Islam is its diffusion. Without repeating
those arguments in detail, it is necessary to investigate to what extent copyright has
fulfilled that role from its historical context. The chapter seeks to focus on the
historical evolution of moral ownership of 'ideas' both in Western and Muslim
See the arguments given by Ladd, David, Securing the Future of Copyright: A Humanist Endeavour,
HC Vol.16 No.1/1985 p76- 83. He suggests that there is an increasing trend in copyright towards the
dissemination and access of copyright works which is made easier by the introduction of new technology
such as reprography and databases. He maintains that copyright policy should aim at plenty for consumers.
Authorship is essential to public purposes, howevec public uses of protected works i.e government uses,
should not be borne as a subsidy from authors and publishers, but paid as a social cost.
2 See Jaszi, Peter, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorshi p", Duke Law
Journal, (1991) 455-499.
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literatures.
One of the means to ensure dissemination of knowledge is through the recognition of
moral rights. It is arguable that the acknowledgment of moral rights of authorship
signifies the social appreciation and recognition to the contribution of authors for their
endeavour. This chapter highlights the present precepts of moral rights in Malaysia
and analyses the modem standards of moral rights in Malaysia in terms of their
conformity with the standards imposed by the Shari'ah.
The chapter then proceeds to discuss the economic significance of copyright. Within
this framework, key issues pertaining to copyright will be evaluated individually as
they are understood in Malaysia and other common law jurisdictions. As far as the
position in the Shari'ah is concerned, we are assisted by the various opinions of
Muslim scholars who have undertaken the task of analysing the acceptability of
copyright precepts within the Shari'ah. For clarity, the following issues are highlighted
in this chapter:
(i) subject matter of protection,
(ii) originality,
(iii) idea / fixation dichotomy,
(iv) ambit of exclusive rights,
(v) exceptions to exclusive rights,
It is important to note here that (i), (ii), (iii) are crucial to the subsistence of right.
While (iv) and (v), are linked to the determination of scope of copyright. From the
analysis of the subsistence and the scope of copyright, it is evident that copyright
laws are couched in a way to mediate between control and access.
2.	 Moral justifications of copyright in historical context in the Western literature
It is crucial that proper appreciation is made to the historical significance of moral
ownership of copyright both in Western and Islamic literatures. It is only by this
appreciation that one can realise the parallelism between the two worlds, particularly
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on factors and roots of recognition of copyright rights and their linkages to the growth
of intellectual academia.
The existence and forms of moral ownership of copyright in history is well-
documented in the work of Streibich. Streibich 3 maintains that the moral right to
protection of intellectual property emanates from the natural need of the human mind
in order to sustain mental development. Since the beginning of written history, there
had existed a moral or natural right of ownership to intellectual property, which
manifested itself in different ways at different times 4. This right existed in the form
of censorship of the ancient civilisations of Mesopotamia 5
 and Egypt; the plagiarism
of Greece and Rome6; and the control of the Church during the Middle Ages until
the Age of Printing7. In the latter period, it was a common practice that copies of
books contained an asthema, at the end of the books, against any person who would
steal or destroy them8.
During the middle ages in the U.K. the ownership of intellectual property, with the
exception of profane music, was vested in the Church or its institutions. During this
period, the church played its most important role in providing the impetus of the
growth of religious works, the preservation of manuscripts and therein developed the
Streibich, Harold C., The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual property: Part 1- From the
Beginning to the Age of Printing, (1975) Memphis State University Law Review, Vol.6 p.'-35.
Vukmir disputes Streibich's proposition that moral right principles have been observed from time
immemorial, even though in different forms. He argues that until the end of the Middle Ages, the author's
right generally were limited to a ban on plagiarism and it was not until the eighteenth century that the notion
of moral right as understood now even began to be discussed.
This is evidenced by the mutilation and defacement of monuments, temples and tombs, where the
names, titles and heroic deeds of prior rulers and gods were stricken therefrom in an attempt to erase their
existence from history. Striebich, op.cit. p.3.
6 This period was illustrated with the 'stigmatization' of plagiarism as a crime and the persecution of
free thinkers. Streibich, op. cit. p.8.
Censorship was carried out by the Church to protect the status quo, so that conformity to the
accepted religious doctrines could be enforced and not be undermined by revolutionary ideas. Streibich p.7.
8 See p.12 Streibich, op.cit.
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foundation of the Western university system, which was an outgrowth of monastic
schools. These medieval universities helped to decentralize and effectively diluted the
total censorship control of the Roman Catholic Church. Promotion of freedom of ideas
or secularization of knowledge under the banner of these medieval universities,
contributed to the growth of intellectual academia and libraries. Regulations regarding
the production and distribution of manuscripts were imposed to ensure the preservation
of written works. These universities maintained the property right and title of all the
manuscripts which remained in the university9.
Censorship, either to enforce certain religious views or to control the propagation of
radical ideas against the royalty was the cornerstone to the publishing industry in the
U.K. made effective as licence to publish were granted by Royals in the early
l6th.Century. During the reign of Henry VII and Mary I, licence to publish had to
be sought in the form of privileges, patents and monopolies. This system of
monopolies was designed as a means of protection of the developing book industry,
often supported by state effort to control of the book market, rather than as an
institution complying with the needs of authors. This censorship control was further
assumed by the Stationer's Company which was empowered the right to regulate the
publishing industry by the Royal Charter of 1557. The preamble states that the
Charter is being granted to control 'scandalous, malicious, schismatical and heretical
books"° The Stationer's Company was given the right to control entry into trade by
regulating apprenticeship, the prohibition on printing by non-members and the rights
of search and seizure in pursuit of illegal books. Despite further changes made to the
publishing industry, censorship informed all the early copyright legislations."
The roots of moral ownership of ideas within the Islamic cultural heritage occurred
much earlier than that in the U.K. These rights grow within the Islamic world, alike
P.34, ibid.
Cited in Feather, J., The History of British Publishin g, (1988), Routledge, London p32.
11 See also Boytha, S., The Justification of the Protection of Authors' Right as Reflected in Their
Historical Development, RIDA, 15th. Jan 1992, p.53.
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its Western counterpart, out of the same concern i.e the incentive for intellectual and
technological growth.
2.1	 The historical groundings of moral ownershi p of 'ideas' in Islamic scholarship.
There have been sporadic remarks on plagiarism where such practice is condemned
and criticised, indicative of the intolerance of such conduct in Islam' 2. Ibn Khaldun
(732-808 H.) in his celebrated work 'Muqaddimah' 13, describes some of the tactics
which were employed by authors such as ascribing the work of an earlier author to
himself with the aid of certain tricks by changing the wording and arrangement of the
contents. There are also remarks on spurious poetry which finds echo in Ibn
Qutaiba's (d.276H) critical analysis of poetry. He describes poetry as a science, 'jim',
just the same as theology, 'din', where one has to learn many things properly and
accurately for the proper understanding of what one hears'4.
Ibn Sallam, a known poetry critics (d 276H) for example wrote on instances of false
attribution, non attribution and forgery in the transmission of poetry and hadith. Ibn.
Sallam wrote:
"One of those who corrupted and adulterated poetry and transmitted all kinds
of worthless verse was Mohamad b. Ishaq ibn. Yassar.....People then accepted
such poetry on his authority. He used to excuse himself by saying,"I know
nothing about poetry. It is brought to me and I transmit it,"but that was no
excuse for him. He included in the Sira poems by men who never wrote any
12 Streibich gives due recognition to Muslim's role in the preservation of manuscripts and the
channeling of classical works back to modern civilisation. see p.16, op.cit.
13 
'Muqo4dimah' is an important historical-sociohwicil work in Islamic scholarship. Its significance
has not been bypassed by any other works. vol.2 p.391-395.
See W.N. Arafat, Landmarks of Literary Criticism in 3rd. Centur y A.H., The Islamic Quarterly,
Vol XIII No.1, Jan-Maich 1969 p.72. The reasons for the generally critical attitude of this period are
perhaps: the interest in collecting and recording pre-Islamic as well as early Islamic poetry, and the
corresponding tendency to supplement any deficiencies, which in turn generated further awareness of
deliberate forging; the critical spirit which accompanied the beginnings of scholarship; the rationalism as
well as the tendency to inquiry which came with Hellemc influences; connected with that, the influence of
the scholasticism generally, and lastly, perhaps the sheer bulk of the invented material.
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poetry at all, and poems by women too. He even went as far as 'Ad and
Thamud and recorded many poems by them which were not poetry but mere
words put together and provided with rhymes. Could he not have asked
himself who had transmitted this poetry and who had handed it down
thousands of years when God, exalted be He, says,"And He destroyed the
first 'Ad and Thamud and left none remaining"?".t5
The condemnation of plagiarism and copying is consistent with the principles on
creativity and originality. Creativity and originality have been highly regarded in the
Islamic historical academia and scholarship. Crafts, textiles, pottery, bookbinding:
all were normally signed with the author's name, dated and inscribed with the place
of manufacture to indicate origin and authorship.' 6 The state was active in the
dissemination of knowledge. Incentives in terms of state grants, patronage and wages
were given to Muslim scholars involved in writing and translating books.' 7 In
addition, the state enabled scholars and scientist to spend all their time on researching,
inventing, arabicising, translating and writing of scientific works. The state's
involvement in intellectual pursuit was paid off well. As a result, academic
institutions, public libraries and observatories were established'8.
There is one interesting report of enforcement against imitation of architectural works
effected through the command of Mas'ud, Prince of Ghazneh. It was reported by
Baihaqi that Mas'ud (first half of eleventh century) acted as an architect. He enforced
his copyright on the engineering drawings effected through the Prince's command that
u Quoted by Arafat, op.cit. p.73.
16 An early instance of inscription of the place of production on bookbinding is the Manafi'manuscript
(an early Persian bookbinding AD 500), where date and place of publication is the city of Maragheh in
Northwest Iran.
17 See Hassan & Hull, Islamic Technology, (1986), Cambridge University Press, par. 8-9. He
recounts that financial means are provided to scholars, they were paid salaries and pension. Caliph al
Mu'tadid (d.290AH/AD 920) for example provided in his palace lodgings and rooms for all branches of
science, and professors were paid salaries for teaching there.
See Hassan & Huh, ibid. par. at p.10.
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this building should not be copied.'9
Germane to the understanding of moral rights in Islamic scholarship is the discussion
on the methods adopted to check the accuracy of transmission of 'sacred works' such
as 'hadith' and other works such as jurisprudential works and poetry. For 'hadith',
this checking of transmission entails the scrutiny of the the narrators background and
the accuracy of their narration is checked. Once this test of ingenuity is satisfied, his
right to be named as the narrator is kept intact perpetually. For jurisprudential works,
works which have satisfied the test of authenticity are given a certificate which is
called 'ijaza'. 'Ijaza' indicates the authorization to teach. This method was developed
in the Islamic culture at least as early as 4th/lOth C.'Hijrah'. It first originated in
religious sciences to guarantee the authoritative transmission of religious knowledge
and later seeped into the studies of legal sciences in legal colleges in many forms i.e
'ijaza bil-fatwa' (licence to issue religious ruling), 'ijaza bit-tadris' (licence to teach),
'ijaza bit-tadris wal-fatwa' (licence to teach and issue religious ruling).
The significance of 'ijaza' as a recognition of ownership of intellectual ideas is
illustrated in the process of book writing20. Most books were written under dictation
in the process of learning. The teacher would grant a licence for his student to take
note of his lectures. This book would later be attested with the signature of the
professor and that copy alone will be regarded as a true copy of the professor's work.
Not everybody was given a licence to take note. Some were given the licence to teach.
Even though a particular work might have been authenticated with the author's name,
not everybody could transmit the content of the book unless he received a certificate
19 
"As such it was said that nowhere a similar garden palace is shown and no 'padishah' commanded
to build a similar structure and he (Mas'ud) did everything thanks to his knowledge and calculation and by
his noble hand he made the plans since he was outstandingly skilled in the art of handling the instruments
and particularly in the measunng..."Quoted in Giuzalian, "Qalamdani" p. 106-107. See Ettinghausen,
Richard, Islamic Alt and Archealogy, Collected Papers, (1984). Gebr. Mann Ver Lag.
20 See also Sibai, Mohamed Makki, Moscue Libraries, An Historical Study, 1987,Mansell
Publishing limited, London & New York.
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to teach and a certificate of audition ('sama' )2 I• The latter certificate was appended
to the book certifying that a particular person had personally studied the book under
the author and was given an authority to teach the content of the book. These
methods played an important role as transmission of knowledge in Islamic scholarship
at that time was through personal contact. Even if a book had been authenticated as
that of the author, authorisation to teach and to issue religious rulings had to be given
from the teacher to the master. In all instances, legitimate authorisation must be
sought from the original author. Through this filter, the accuracy, authenticity of
written works were kept intact.
Hence, we see that, unlike the role of anathema in the preservation of sacred works,
the concept of 'ijaza' marks the legitimate channel of knowledge. It also acts as a
point of reference, emphasizing the importance of the linkage between not only of the
author and the work but also the author and the audience. Should the reader have
difficulties in comprehending any of the concepts which the author is conveying to
him, correct attribution of 'authorship' ensures that he can turn to the correct source
for assistance. In this respect, the concept of 'Ijaza' is comparable to the concept of
copyright in broadcasting works in the U.K under the prevailing Copyright Designs
and Patents Act 1988. Whereby under the Act, the author of a broadcasting work
include those who assume the responsibility to the content of the works. This need
to preserve authenticity of works is further illustrated in the following discussion on
the legal or juridical basis of moral rights in Islam.
21 The musmi' (the certifier) could himself be the author (nw'aI1J) of the work being studied, or he
could be another scholar authorized to teach the book, in which case he cited his authority going back
directly to the author, or through one or more authorized scholars intervening between the author and
himself. See Makdisi, George, The Rise of Colle ges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (1981),
Edinburg University Press, Edinburgh.
See S.9(2)(b) of the 1988 CDPA whereby an author of a broadcast is the person who makes it which
includes the transmitter of a programme if he has responsibility to any extent for its content and the person
providing the programme who makes with the person transmitting it the alTangements necessaiy for its
transmission. (S.6(3).
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3.1 The evolution of moral ri ght principles in common law jurisdictions
Despite the dicta that there exists recognition of moral rights principles, moral rights
play little role in the evolution of copyright laws in the common law. Due to this,
some maintain that principles of moral rights are traces of Roman law. 23
 The
romantic conception of moral right predicates on the distinction between "intellectual"
and "physical" property, and the assumption that the former is superior than the
latter. The central romantic conceptions of the author is by the appreciation that a
work of art results from the overflow, utterance or projection of the thoughts and
feelings of the author. The author himself becomes the major element generating both
the artistic product and the criterion by which it is to be judged. Romanticism
emphasizes the unity of the work and the author and the metaphor of the author as the
creator.
The romanticism's conception is highly individualistic in its approach to authorship
and stresses on the author's work as the emanation or manifestation of his personality,
thoughts, ideas, sentiments and feelings. The focal point of romanticism is the
preservation of the way in which the author presents his work to the world and the
way in which his identification with the work is maintained. The common law, on
the other hand, perceived authorship not as a result of the authors' genius and
creativity but on the basis of the skill and labour expended on a work. Because of
this differing philosophy and outlook on the concept of authorship, Romanticism
23 Vukmir, Mladen, The Roots of Anglo-American Intellectual Property Law in Roman Law, IDEA -
The Journal of Law and Technology v. 32 (1992) p.123-154. Vukrnir maintains that the concept of moral
rights both in the U.K and the U.S were influenced by Roman conceptions of natural right theories. The
influence of Roman law on common law was thought to have been taken place in the twelve and thirteenth
centwy. These traces of Roman law was deeply incorporated in English law even after the open reaction
against Roman Law in the 14th. centwy. He reveals the instances whereby Roman law assist to shape
copyright laws into a coherent set of criteria particularly in the shaping of major concept such as incorporeal
right and fair use.
24 Aide, Christopher, A More Comprehensive Soul: Romantic Conce ptions of Authorship and the
Copyright Doctrine of Moral Right, University of Toronto Law Review, Vol.48 (1990) p. 211-228.
The romantic conceptions emphasized on the physcological and intellectual link between the author
and his work. What is the difference between writers and their work, and labourers and their work?.
Romantic theory provides ready answers - originality, innate genius, and the mystery of artistic creation
are among the ideas which come to the mind as distinguishing features. See Aide, p.228 ibid.
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concepts never took ground in the U.K.
In contrast, the central notion of 'authorship' in Islam, is less individualistic as that
of the Romanticism. The emphasis of 'authorship' as an obverse of responsibility,
carries with it the notion that his work should be preserved, not as a recognition of his
personality but to preserve the authenticity of his work. This notion of responsibility
will be the focal point of our discussion in the next section.
3.2	 The legal and juridical basis of moral rights in Islamic scholarship
The insistence on accuracy and legitimacy in the transmission of knowledge-based
works is coincidental to the religious requirements that 'knowledge' should only be
transmitted to the proper audience. The following 'hadith' is instructive on this
matter.
'Hadith' reported by Anas ibn. Malik, that the Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, "Seeking
knowledge is obligatory on all Muslims, the one who gives knowledge to
those who do not deserve it is like the one who puts on fake treasures, jewels,
gems and gold to a pig's neck."
By appreciating this principle, valuable literature and written works are not corrupted
by inaccuracies or errors. Arguably, ensuring legitimacy of transmission of knowledge
is a form of 'rights' which is due to knowledge as the following 'athar' illustrates;
It is reported that Harir ibn. Salman ibn. Samir said:
"Do not narrate falsehood to al-hukama' (those possessed with wisdom), do
not narrate wisdom to al-sufaha' (those who are ignorant) for they will angry
against you, do not conceal knowledge to those who deserve it for you will
commit a sin, do not narrate to those who do not deserve it for you will
become ignorant. Indeed, you are obliged to observe the right in your
26 
al-Ta rghib p.96, op. cit.
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knowledge as you are obliged to observe the ri ght in your property.27"
The Qur'an itself confirms the special status of those poessed with 'knowledge' and
'wisdom'. Thus it befits to respect them as a form of religious observance which
is further made clear in the following 'hadith'. Hence conformity to these religious
requirements is the personal right of a person who initiates or divulges a work. The
kind of reverence expected for these categories of people falls within the following
'hadith':
'Hadith' reported by Ubadah ibn. Samit :that the Prophet said: "Those are not
among my people who do not exalt 'kabiruna' (the senior people among us)
and have compassion for the 'saghiruna' (the junior among us) and do not
recognise those who are knowledgeable".29
It should be appreciated that the religious requirement to honour and respect,
appertains only to intellectual works. The courteous treatment of transmitters on
poetry, 'hadith' and other religious knowledge indicates that such a strict requirement
may not fit non intellectual works30. Arguably, the need to preserve accuracy and
legitimacy of information may be a less crucial factor in utilitarian works. Thus, we
see that the role of moral rights of knowledge in Islamic scholarship lies in the
multifold purpose and aim of moral rights, the deep appreciation of the intellectual
27 Abu Muhammad Abdullah ibn. Abd al Rahman (d.255H), Sunan al-Darrimi, Dar al Sunnah al
Nabawiyyah, vol.1 p.'05.
See 39:9, "Say: Are those equal, those who know and those who do not know? It is those who are
endued with understanding that receive admonition".
29 al-Targhib, p.1 14, op.cit.
This different treatment between different categories of work finds its juridical basis in Continental
jurisprudence and also in common law countries. See Dietz, Adolf, The Artist's Right of Integrity Under
Copyright Law - A Comparative Approach, IIC No.211994 p.177-194 par. p.185 where he points out that
technical and utilitarian works are treated differently from artistic works. Such distinction finds favour in
the U.K CDPA 1988 certain works are excluded from moral rights such as computer programs and computer
generated works. For further analysis of the U.K provisions, see Dworkin, Gerald, Moral Ri ghts and the
Common Law Countries, Australian Intellectual Property Journal, Vol.5, Feb. 1994, p.5-36. See also, Berg,
Jeff, Moral Rights: A Legal, Historical and Anthropological Reappraisal, IPJ, Vol.6 No.3, Sept. 1991, p34 I-
376.
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linkage between authors and their works, the responsibility of the authors to guide
others and the need to check the legitimacy and accuracy of transmission of
knowledge. The threshold of moral rights is high in Islam, and this is further echoed
by a renown contemporary scholar, Al-Darrini. 3 ' Al-Darrini argues that if a man can
own products of technology, equally he can own the ideas behind it.32
From the above discussion, it can be deduced that the premise of moral rights
recognition in Islam is the need for accuracy and correct channelling of knowledge
and information. The emphasis on the correct attribution of authorship, the prohibition
against false attribution ensures that knowledge is being disseminated correctly and
recourse can be made to the author to check the accuracy of the work. This emphasis
on representing the truth means that it would be justifiable for the author to object to
any derogatory treatment of his work so as to represent him as possessing certain
opinions or views which in fact he did not, which may affect his reputation as a
writer and severely affect his reputation. In this regard, Al-Fatlawi argues that the
author's right to object against derogatary modification should be balanced with
other's duty / right to correct errors. 33 Consistently, an author may even withdraw
his work if later his ideas have been changed and his work no longer represents his
views.
In addition, the emphasis on the author's personal responsibility for his work would
include the negative right to prevent false attribution on his work. A person should
be able to prevent his name from being associated to a work of which he is not the
author.
The recognition of these rights is mandatory under the implicit categories of 'rights
attached to knowledge' adduced by the above Prophetic 'hadiths'. Furthermore, it is
31 Another scholar Al-Sanhuri accepted the four moral rights; rights of paternity, rights of integrity,
rights of publication and right of retraction, Al- Wasit fl-al Qanun al-Madani, par.at p.309.
32 P.18, 'Haqq al-Ibtikar', op.cit.
Al-Fatlawi, Suhail Husin, Huquq al-Mu 'allif al-Ma 'nawi fil ..Qanun al-Iraqi. Dirasah Muqaranah,
(1978), Wizarah al-Thaqafah wal-Funun, Iraq par. p.125.
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also necessary that the author should have a right to control reproduction of his work,
which stems from the need to check the accuracy on translation. However, this right
should not justify unjustifiable refusal to consent for translation for that it would be
against his obligation to disseminate ideas as upheld in the Qur'an.
Finally, it is implicit in the 'hadith's which allows the choosing of audience of 'jim',
the recognition that a person who initiates work has a right to decide how, when and
to whom a work is to be disclosed. This would imply the possibility of control of
uses of work and the right to control the disclosure of a work to the world.
The analysis, thus far, highlights that these so called moral rights emanates from the
linkage between the author and his work. These rights are imposed, as being the
person who initiates the work, he is personally responsible to its accuracy and
authenticity. In terms of practice, being the obverse of responsibility, these rights
may not be unnecessarily wide that they become unnecgessary obstacle to the
dissemination of works. A balance has to be struck between the moral interest of the
authors and the legitimate expectation of the public. Pursuant to this, we will further
explicate the scope and role of moral rights in modern copyright system, focussing
particularly on common law jurisdictions. From here we can discern those crucial
streams of thought which are influential to the shaping of moral rights in Malaysia.
Provisions from international conventions are also referred to, to provide the necessary
framework from which necessary standards of protection may be emulated by national
legislations.
4	 Moral right precepts in modern copyright systems
The receptacle of moral rights is embodied in Article 27(2) of the United Nations
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 6 bis of the Berne
Which provides that "everyone has the right to protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he is the author". This provision is
emphatic that moral rights are of equal standing with material rights of authors.
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Convention.35 The essential features of moral rights as enshrined in the Berne
Conventions are:
(I)	 they exist independently of economic rights,
(ii) they susbsist even after the transmission of economic rights,
(iii) the right to claim authorship is a positive right even though the convention
does not stipulate on the methods of assertion.
Most common law jurisdictions offer recognition to two types of moral rights, right
of attribution or authorship and the right to oppose modifications and uses of his work
which adversely affects his reputation 36. In the U.K prior to the C.D.P.A 1988 which
incorporates moral right concepts legislatively, adaptation rights 37 and right of
integrity are pursued, to a limited extent, through traditional common law avenues of
defamation, passing off and also through contractual agreements. Such a practice falls
short to the threshold of A.6 bis of Berne Convention. Passing off is confined to
commercial contexts, and the defamation right dies with the author; also, both rights
presuppose some element of misattribution38.
Article 6 bis of the Berne Convention provides that:
(1)Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honour or reputation.
(2)The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be
maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or
institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. However, those
countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide
for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may
provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained. For further analysis, see
Ricketson, Sam, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986,
(1987) Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, London.
36 There are four types of moral rights:
(i) right of paternity,
(ii) right of integrity,
(iii) the right not to be falsely attributed as author or director (false attribution of work),
(iv) right of disclosure.
Even though there is an acceptance that an adaptation work constitute an original work, it has now
been recognised that such adaptation should not be done without the author's consent.
See Goldstein, Paul, Adaptation Rights and Moral Rights in the United Kingdom, the United States
and the Federal Republic of Germany, IIC 1/1983 p.43. See these cases Frisby v British Broadcasting
, 2 All E.R. 106 (1967); Gilliam v American Broadcastin g Companies, Inc. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.1976).
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The hesitation in accepting moral rights precepts lies in the fear that such rights may
impede dissemination of works and reproduction of works 39. Due to this, the juridical
basis of integrity right is discretionary and the law has imposed certain limitations to
the exercise of this right. It is important that a balance should be struck between the
conflicting interests of authors and the numerous industries related to copyright works.
Moral rights if pursued strictly, may dampen the efficacy of commercialization of
copyright works. Even countries with deep traditions of moral rights have imposed
certain conditions to qualify the exercise of integrity rights40. In France for example,
moral rights are conceived as discretionary rights, the exercise of which must not be
justified in detail - apart from clear cases of apparent misuse41.
See also the cogent arguments given by Dworkin, Gerald,in The Moral Right and English Copyright Law,
tIC Vol.12 No.4/1981, Moral Rights and the Common Law Countries, AIPJ, Vol.5, Feb.1994, No.1 p.5-
36.
See Dworkin, Gerald, Moral Ri ghts and the Common Law Countries, AIPJ, Vol.5, Feb.1994,
No.! p.5-36 par. p.34;
"The simple fact is that moral rights impinge upon economic activity and, where they exist, cannot be
ignored. It may be that some fears are exaggerated and that the opposition to moral rights has at times
bordered on the hysterical; but industry hostility, to unqualified moral rights in the United Kingdom, and
to general moral rights legislation in the United States, cannot be simply be dismissed as irrational or
unreasonable. Those exploiting copyright works have good reason to be concerned about the existence of
high-sounding rights which may be used by authors or their estates to interfere with or block the way in
which they wish to use the product they have acquired. They have a legitimate point of view."
40 Dietz, Adolf, The Artist's Right of Integrity Under Copyright Law - A Comparative Approach, tIC
No.2/1994 p.177-194.
In these countries, the basis of integrity right is defined by the acceptance that the relation of creation
between work and author and that a work is the reflection of the author's personality. Romantic notions of
authorship influence the recognition of moral rights particularly paternity and integrity rights. The right of
paternity allows an author to claim (or disclaim) authorship of the work in question. The right of integrity
grants an author to restrain any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his work that would be
prejudicial to the author's honour and reputation, even though the ownership of a work's copyright may
belong to another.
41 Dietz, Adolf, The Artist's Ri ght of Integrity Under Copyright Law - A Comparative Approach, tIC
No.2/1994 p.177-194 par. p.185. Most jurisdictions including Germany allow only the objection against
gross distortions or gross injuries of the work or their contribution to it. Other criterion which have been
taken into account are for example, the nature and extent of the alteration of the work and also how far the
latter is reversible or irreversible; the number of people or the size of the public addressed by the user of
the work in altered form; the fact whether the author created the work in an employment relationship or
as a self-employed author, or else whether a commissioning party did not have a decisive influence on the
final result of the creation; also the possible consequences for the professional life of the author and, of
course, for his/her reputation have to be taken into account.
142
In Malaysia, moral rights are enshrined in S.25 of the MCA 198742. That section
provides for the right to be named as the author of the work and the right to object
against the modification of his work which are adverse to his reputation. These moral
rights exist independently of economic rights and can be exercised even if the
ownership of the copyright of the work is no longer with the author of his heirs. It
is thus clear that the treatment of moral rights in Malaysia is, to a certain extent, in
conformity with the Berne Convention43. In Mokhtar Hj Kamaluddin v Pustaka
Sistem Pe1ajaranthe Malaysian Court has awarded aggravated damages for wrongful
attribution of authorship. In this case there had been a mistake with the printing of
the author's name implying another person to be the author.
From the above discussion, thus far, and from the important assumption that proper
recognition of moral rights enhances the economic value of work, moral rights are
complementary to economic rights. It is crucial therefore, for such rights to achieve
its purpose, that all necessary elements are fulfilled. It is arguable, however, that the
provisions pertaining to them in Malaysia falls short of the high standards set in
Islamic scholarship. It is crucial that these unfounded fears of moral rights should be
properly eliminated. The correct approach should be that of proper orientation
42 S.25 of the MCA provides:
Subject to this section, where copyright subsists in a work, no person may, without the consent of the
author, or after the author's death, of his personal representative, do or authorize the doing of any of the
following acts:
(a) the presentation of the work, by any means whatsoever, under a name other than that of the author,
and
(b) the presentation of the work by any means whatsoever, in a modified form if the modification-
(i) significantly alters the work; and
(ii) is such that is might reasonably be regarded as adversely affecting the author's honour or reputation.
(3)except for modification for purposes of publishing, reproducing, perfonning in public, broadcasting or
communicating by cable
(4) The author or, after his death, his personal representative, may exercise the rights conferred by this
section notwithstanding that the copyright in the work is not at the time of the act complained of, vested
in the author or personal representative, as the case may be.
Khaw, however argues that the above provision on moral rights falls short of the Beme
requirements. Firstly, the provision does not secure the right to be identified as the author. For instance,
the Act does not cover instances whereby a work is presented without any attribution whatsoever. Secondly,
right of integrity will subsist upon subsistence of copyright. Thirdly, the right to oppose modification does
not include the use of work which may be derogatoiy to the author's interest. See Khaw, Lake Tee,
Copyright Law in Malaysia, (1994) Butterworths, Malaysia, p.173.
' (1986) 2 ML! 376.
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between the moral rights of the authors and the need of the business industry. Within
this framework, the approach adopted by some of the continental countries, as
pointed out above, may be a possible paradigm to emulate.
5.	 Recognition of economic rights
In this section, the key issues pertaining the economic aspects of copyright are
analysed. These key issues are related to two main aspects of copyright; subsistence
of right and scope of right. In the former, the issues involved are subject-matter or
protection, authorship, idea-expression dichotomy and originality. The second group
pertains to scope of right. Among key issues identified within this group are scope
of exclusive right, alienability and transmissiblity of copyright.
Before dealing with those key concepts in copyright, it is crucial to investigate, first,
the acceptability of economic aspects of copyright in Islamic scholarship. In this
respect, it should be noted that despite assertions that some authors write without
expectation of direct monetary reward45, the economic rights of authors are well
founded in jurisprudence. Muslim scholars have argued that the economic rights of an
author are concomitant to his moral right for recognition, attribution, and
authorship. There are traditional scholars who are reluctant to recognise property
See Plant, Arnold, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books Economica Vol.1 (1934) p.167,
who argues that book production can subsist without copyright. He emphasizes on the publishers' natural
head start and tacit understanding among publishers that works should not be pirated. Without copyright,
he argues, there will be more competition in publishing books and hence in order to check against rival,
induce the publishers to adopt low price policy, which in turns benefits the readers. He critically questions
the accuracy of the economic theory that copyright is essential in order that the monopoly profits from
successful books might cover the losses. He argues that copyright monopoly, like patent monopoly,
enables the privileged producers to increase their receipts from successful products by restricting the supply.
This tendency leads to the discrimination of unsucceisf,il works. He suggests the introduction of the royalty
system at a general scale particularly on books which may not elicit revenue. He further emphasizes on the
need to ensure low prices for books and enable the continuance of authors whose books the public want.
4'
See Mahmasanni, S.R; Al-Nazarivvah al-A mmah lil-Mujabat wa al-Ugud fi al-Shari'ah al-Jslamiyvah (1983), Dar
al-Jim al-Malayin, Beirut (3rd.ed.) p.19; Al-Khafif, Ali, Al-Miikivvah fi al-Shari'ah al-Jslamiyvah (1966), Maahad
al.Buhuth wa al-Dirasat al-A rabiyyah, Cairo, p.8; Fathi et.al, Hagg al-Jbtikar fi al-Figh al-Islami al-Mugaran, (1984),
Muassasah al-Risalah, Beirut at footnote no.1 p.13-14.
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rights in literary works, which to them are categories of "knowledge". 47
 Objection
may lie in the fear that copyright may lead to concealment of information. As Ibn.
Rushd's opinion goes, "the right of those in want of knowledge is greater". It is a
duty of those with knowledge to disseminate his ideas to others.48
On the other hand, there are scholars who highlight the positive contributions of
authors and their need for economic gains. Al-Darrini, for example, argues that an
author should be rewarded for his effort in disseminating knowledge through
publication,49 a duty which is classified by the Muslims jurists as 'fard kfayah'. The
basis of this right emanates from the Qur'anic injunctions which promise the awarding
of rewards to those who strive in 'jim', 'ta'lim' and thinking50. It is also argued that
it is in the public interest that intellectual ideas are rewarded so that it can serve as
an incentive for further creativity. 51
 It would be contrary to the 'maqasid al-
Shari 'ah' (the objectives of the 'Shari 'ah') if such efforts are not recognized as
striving in knowledge and creativity is highly encouraged in the Qur'an.
6.1	 Subject matter of protection.
Under the MCA 1987, works which are eligible for copyright are literary works,
musical works, artistic works, films, sound recordings, broadcasts, and typographical
arrangement in a published editions.52
According to the conception of Hanafites 'jim' or knowledge as something which cannot be owned
or mven oroorietary characteristics. See the discussion in Ch.3.
4..
P.84, 104, 105 of Ibtikar, op.cit. See also the views of Prof Wahbi Sulaiman Ghawazji (p.1 80); Prof
Abd. Hanud Tahhaz and Wahbah Zulaihi (at p.188); Ibtikar, op.cit.
50 For further arguments, see Ch.3.
See Id, Khalid Abdullah, Mabadi' aI-Tashri' al-Islami, (1986). pgs.260-262.
52 See S.7(1) of the MCA 1987. Such right wiil subsist if the published edition is not a mere
reproduction of previous typographical arrangement of a previous edition of the same work or works. See
S.9 of the MCA 1987.
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In practice, the criteria of protection does not depend on them being factually a
'literary' or 'artistic work'. Other works have been accepted under the epithet of
"literary work" such as computer programs or compilations of information. The criteria
of literary here is anything which is in writing or other notation form. Similarly the
term 'artistic' is not to be construed according to the normal, ordinary understanding.
With the wide ambit of 'drawings' under the category of 'artistic' works, even
drawings of functional and utilitarian article such as industrial designs are capable of
protection under the umbrella of artistic works53. Hence, unlike the civil law s*tem
of author's right, the rights granted under copyright give effect to the 'sweat of the
brow' philosophy and extend protection to 'anything which is worth copying'TM.
6.2	 Original and derivative works
With regard to works, both original and derivative works are protected in Malaysia.
Derivative works consists of adaptation of original work in different versions
There has been questions whether the MCA includes three dimensional utilitarian articles by reason
of the protection of the design drawings. There has been conflicting decisions on this matter, see Alfa Laval
AB v. Salcon Centrimax Engineering Sdn. Bhd High Court of Malaya at K.L. Civil Suit No D12234/91,
7(199 1) IP Asia, 26.
In cases where existing subject matter is used for the creation of new work, it is normally
considered as original so long as he has expended sufficient independent skill and labour. This
determination is not an easy task particularly to adaptation work. The court will have to consider whether
the revised version is substantial enough to be considered as a new work. In L.B. (Plastics) Ltd v Swish
Products Ltd (1979) R.P.0 551, it was held that where there has been a previous drawing or a model from
which the drawing is prepared, or some sketches have been made which are in part redrawn, the new
drawing may be entitled to copyright as a whole because of the amount of skill and labour involved in
producing it.
The MCA lists "adaptation" to include any of the following,
(a) in relation to a literary work, a version of the work (whether in its original language or a different
language) in which it is converted into a dramatic work.
(b) in relation to a dramatic work, a version of the work (whether in its original language or a different
language) in which it is converted into a literary work;
(c) in relation to a literary or dramatic work-
(i) a translation of the work
(ii)a version of the work in which the story or action is conveyed wholly or mainly by means of pictures
in a form suitable for reproduction in a book or in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical.
(d) in relation to a literary work in the form of a computer program, a version of the work, whether or not
in the language, code or notation in which the work was originally expressed not being a reproduction
of the work;
(e) in relation to a musical work, an arrangement or transcription of the work;
(f) in relation to a literary or artistic work, a version of the work (whether in its original language or a
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which includes translations, arrangements or other transformations of the works56.
Derivative works even though are based on existing subject matter are entitled to their
own copyright57 even though they infringe another work58.
Even though an adaptation work may be considered as a work sufficient for the
purpose of copyright, adaptation cannot be carried out unless the consent of the
original author is sought. This is because adaptation of a work is the copyright
owner's exclusive right. This view is echoed by Muslim scholars. Al-Sanhuri
maintains that right of adaptation or 'iqtibas' impinges upon the freedom of work
or 'hurriyah al-ama!'. He concedes that such adaptation can only be done with the
consent of the original author.6° The Muslim scholars, however, have not discussed
the position of adapted works which are carried out without the consent of the original
owner61.
different language) in which it is converted into a film.
se See S.8 (1) and (2) MCA, 1987.
' This is despite by doing so, unprotectable subject matter such as infonnation is included in the
realm of copyright. Such is the effect of copyright in compilation of telephone listing, train schedule,
television listing and other forms of listing. Copyright has also been upheld even in cases where the effort
taken in compiling is for other purpose such as in the case of Football League Ltd. v Littlewoods Pools Ltd
(1959) Ch. 637. In this case the purpose of compiling is to set the date of matches and not for the creation
of fixture list. Despite that Upjohn J. held that copyright subsisted in the list, and that part of the skill and
labour involved in its preparation was that of working out the appropriate dates of matches. Unlike in the
U.S whereby as a result of the Supreme Court's decision's in Feist Publications Inc. v Rural Telephone
Service Co.Inc, 113 L.Ed. 2d 358 (1991) only the original part of a compilation is protected. See the
disagreement set by Sherwood-Edwards, Mark, to this requirement of originality, The Redundancy of
Originality, (1994) UC p.658-689.
58 This is provided that the derivative work constitute an original work. See S.7 (4) of the MCA 1987
which states that:
"A work shall not be ineligible for copyright by reason only that the making of the work, or the doing of
any act in relation to the work involves an infringement of copyright in some other work. 	 -
If the work cannot substitute an original work, then remain the consideration of infringement.
Sanhuri, op.cit at pgs. 299, 307 and 325.
60 See also the view of Prof. Abd. Hamid Tahaz, p.186, Prof. Wahbi Sulaiman Ghawazji p.170,
Ibtikar, op.cit.
61 Under common law, such works would be entitled to copyright. In Stowe V. Thomas, 23 F.Cas.
201, the issue was whether a copyright owner may stop another person from translating her work without
her authorisation. The court had to consider whether the translation can be considered as a new work. In
the course of judgement, the court held that "a translation, may in loose phraseology, be called a transcript
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Concomitant to the acceptance of the right to adapt a work is the acceptance of
copyright of derivative works. Al-Darrini and Al-S anhuri accept that derivative works,
which include translation, compilation of works and encyclopedias, should be
protected on the basis that these effort require a certain level of originality of
thought62. There should be at least a certain amount of original summary or analysis
contributed by the person who adapt any original work.63 For example in a
translation, Al-Darrini argues, that originality exists from the choice of words and
context of the translated works.M Such requirement accords with the emphasis in
Islam on accuracy and truth as advocated above. This will also entail that the original
author should have the right to check the accuracy of translation or the adaptation of
the work so that the content of his work is not misrepresented.
6.3	 Non-discrimination of subject matter
The prevailing attitude in modern copyright system is the non-discrimination of
subject matter. Works are to be protected regardless of their quality, quantity,
purpose and content. Hence in many instances the court in the U.K has refused to
entertain the arguments that protection of the work would be contrary to ethical and
moral concerns67. This doctrine has been carried to works of irreligious tendency,
or copy of her thoughts or conceptions, but not in the correct sense can it be called a copy of her book".
(p.208).
62 See p.10 of 'Ibtikar' and p3 11 of Al-Wasit, op.cit.
63 See Sanhuri, Abd. aI-Razzaq, al-Wasit fi al-Qanun al-Madani, (1962) par. p.296. vol.8.
P.10, ibid. See also the views of Prof Abd. Harnid Tahaz, p.186 and Prof Wahbi Sulaiman
Ghawazji p.170 in Al-Darini, Fathi et.al, Hagg al-Ibtikar fi al-Figh al-Islami al-Muqaran, (1984),
Muassasah al-Risalah, Beirut.
65 The same policy consideration arose in Australia. See Howell, Robert G, Copyright & Obscenity:
Should Copyright Regulate Content, WI, Vol.8, No.2 p.139-188.
See also S.7(2) of the MCA 1987 which states that works shall be protected irrespective of their
quality and the purpose for which they are created.
67 While in the past immoral and indecent works have been refused copyright in the present day the
court will not be too willing to do that. See Gl yn v Western Feature Film (1916) 1 Ch. 261, Stephens v
Avery (1988) F.S.R 510, Murray v. Benbow (1822), Stockdale v. Onwhyu (1826) 5 B.0 510. Copinger notes
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immoral or indecent works, libelous works or works against the public policy. The
court in the U.K for example has allowed works attacking Christian belief so long as
it is not done in an offensive manner. However the U.K court has in one instance
indicated that it will refuse the enforcement of copyright where by doing so will be
against public policy70. Another method which has been adopted to control
undesirable works is by the refusal of injunctive and remedial relief if these works are
copied. Both these methods have been adopted in the U.K and Canada.
the possibility that the principle could still effectively be invoked to refuse protection in relation to a work
which was considered to be no more then pornography. However, he concedes that there is still the
question as to what is pornographic according to the moral code of the day, where art and pornography may
overlap.
See Barnard v White & Co (1923-28) Mac.C.C.218 (form for credit betting on football matches not
against public policy); see also Sitwell v Sun Engraving Co. Ltd (1936-45) Mac.C.C. 137 (poem alleged to
be libellous). In Hime v Dale (1809) 2 Camp, 27n Lord Ellenborough accepted the principle that if a work
appeared so gross a libel as to affect public morals then it would not be protected, but did not consider the
work in question of such a nature.
69 See R v Lemon (1979) A.C. 617, involving an alleged blasphemous libel concerning the Christian
religion published in the magazine 'Gay News'. The above statement is obiter as in this case the work
concerned was held to be blaspemous. See also Chaplin v Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd (1966) Ch.71,
where although the presiding judges considered the book in question to contain blasphemous passages, the
point was not taken as to whether this affected the subsistence of copyright in the book, or the court's
willingness to intervene to protect such copyright.
70 See A.G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd. A.G v Observer Ltd. A.G v Times Newspaper Ltd;(1989) 2
F.S.R 181. This case concerns a work which were written by an ex-spy (Mr. Wright) who was under the
obligation not to disclose any information regarding his work for reasons of national security. His books
were published in Australia (Heinemann Publishers) and then in the U.S. Later extracts of the book was
published in the U.K. The A.G of the U.K brought action against the U.K newspapers for breach of
confidence. In the course of establishing breach of confidence, the courts had to consider whether the courts
can enforce the copyright of the book by restraining the publication of the book by any third parties without
the consent of the publisher. When the matters came to the House of Lords, Lord Brightman was of the
view that anybody is at liberty to publish the work in the U.K as it is likely that neither Wright nor
Heinemann has any copyright which would be recognised in the U.K (Lord Brightman p.31 8). Lord
Griffiths (p.327) advocated that in this instance the copyright in the book belongs to the Crown. Lord
Jauncey (p.345-46) & Lord Keith (p.311) refused relief on the ground that the U.K court will not enforce
copyright claims of works which were against the public interest.
See Aldrich v. One Stop Video Ltd (1987) 13 B.C.L.R. (2d) 106, 13 C.I.P.R. 202, 17 C.P.R. (3d)
27 (S.C) where Davies I, denied relief for unauthorized copying of pho nographic videotapes by balancing
the policies favouring the creator of the work against the opposing public interest of an increasing concern
about "the quality and quantity of materials which pctray and communicate with human sexuality",
particularly the undue exploitation of women and children. See the arguments given by Howell in favour
of content-based restrictions on the similar lines as trade marks and patents; Howell, Robert G., Copyright
and Obscenity: Should Copyright Regulate Contez*9, Intellectual Property Journal, Vo18. No.2 July p.139-
188.
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Even though these two methods are effective, to a certain extent, in filtering the
circulation of works which are deemed 'undesirable' on any of the abovementioned
grounds, it remains to be seen whether that would conform to Islamic principles.
Firstly, the notion of property rights in Islam is coloured with and depends on the
permissibility of use of a thing. Crucial to the existence of a valid right is the
existence of a valid subject-matter. One of the essential requirements of 'mal' in
Islam is its conformity to the rules of 'halal' and 'haram' in Islamic scholarship72.
Upon these basic principles, it would seem that works which criticise the religion, or
any other sacred notions in Islam would not qualify for protection.
Secondly, the Islamic notions of ethics and morality differ substantially from their
western counterparts. Some of these notions are not based on popular understanding
of moral standards, but consists of standards which are imposed by the religion. It
is therefore necessary, to decide, in the first place, whether a particular work
complies with these requirements before copyright is even given. The compliance
with these religious rnles affects the very existence of right and not simply the
exercise of rights73.
With the above reservations, it is, therefore, neces sary that an express derogation is
drawn legislatively, on the exclusion of works which are contrary to Islamic religion
and Islamic notions of ethics and morality. One alternative is to emulate the new
U.A.E copyright legislation. A.36 of the U.A.E Copyright and Authorship Protection
Law makes registration subject to the work's approval by the Censorship Department
and its conformity with the Printing and Publication Law. The provision in effect
requires that the work be morally unobjectionable (or be edited to pass censorship)74.
72 A.199 of the 'Majallah' states that it is necessary that a thing sold should be 'ma! mutaqawwim'.
A.21 1 states the effect of sale of non-'mutaqawwim' property. Such sale is 'batil'.
See also A.34 and 35 of the 'Majallah'. A.34 provides that when the receiving of a thing is
forbidden, the giving of it is also forbidden. A35 states that when it is forbidden that a thing should be
done, it is also forbidden that it should be asked for.
74 Copyright and Authorship Protection Law No.40/1992. For an analysis of the law, see Azar, PhilipJ
and Wolfson, Herbert S, Draft Federal Copyright Law, MEED July 1992 p.8. At the time of the writing
of the article, this statute was still in draft stage. It is noted that this law has been implemented as of 30th.
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However, the practice of eliminating 'unwanted' works through registration may be
contrary to the philosophy of the Berne Convention which provides that the enjoyment
and exercise of rights to be free of any formality75.
Another method is to take the permissive note of A.17 which allows the state to
control, permit or prohibit the circulation, presentation or exhibition of any work or
production. This Article may be invoked for a number of reasons, inter alia, to
prevent obscenity and pornography, to protect national security, particularly in times
of war and as a means of regulating political and social activity76.
The control of unwanted works can be further strengthened through judicial means.
It has been earlier shown that certain kinds of works which do not conform to Islamic
concept of ethics and morality and works which are against the Islamic religion may
not be considered as valid subject-matter for commercial transactions within the
definition of 'mal'. On this basis, courts may refuse the validity of transactions
involving these works as they are vitiated with illegality under the Shari'ah. The
filtering of works through this process is not contrary to the Berne Convention as the
tenor of A.5(2) allows the country of origin to determine "the extent of protection,
as well as the means of redress afforded to the author". Arguably, non-recognition
through judicial means concerns the extent of protection and not the existence of
protection, as would be the case in a registration system.
August, 1994. See Trade Marks and Patents Bulletin, Issue No.26, Sept. 1994. See also comments made
by WIPO in WIPO comments on Copyright Law During Ma y Copyright Seminar, World Intellectual
Property Report, Vol.7 No.8 August 1993, p.216; and comments made by Loutfi, Dr. Mohamed-.Hossani;
Reform of Egypt's Copyright Law and Copyright Future in the Arab World, World Intellectual Property
Report, Vol. 7 No.2 February 1993, p.44-47.
See A.5(2) of the Berne Convention which stipulate:
such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in the country of
origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection,
as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively
by the laws of the country where protection is claimed".
76 See Ricketson, Sam, The Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-
1986, (1987), Kluwer, London par.9.69-9.71.
See Ricketson, op. cit, para. 5.86.
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7.	 Authorship
Because of the varied nature of the subject matter of copyright, each category of
work has its own definition of the "author". Consistent with the requirement of
originality, authorship, unlike in the case of works done under hire 78, normally
belongs to the person who creates the work such as:
(a) in relation to literary works, means the writer or the maker of the works;
(b) in relation to musical works, means the composer;
(c) in relation to photographs, means the person by whom the arrangements for the
taking of the photographs were undertaken;
(e)	 in relation to films or sound recordings, means the person by whom the
arrangements for making of the film or recording were undertaken;
(t)	 in relation to broadcasts transmitted from within any country, means the person
by whom the arrangements for the making of the transmissions from within
that country were undertaken;
(g) in relation to any other cases, means the person by whom the work was made.
The definition of 'author' in the above context indicates the importance of creative
link between a work and the author79. With the exception of works done under hire
or by employee, the person who normally brings something into existence, be it
literary, artistic or technical works, is the author. In this regard, it is apt to quote
the statement by Lord Justice Cotton's in Nottage v Jackson80. He states that
"author" involves originating, making, producing, as the inventive or master mind,
the thing, the thing which is to be protected whether it be a drawing, or a painting
or a photograph".
This emphasis on the definitive link between the work and the person who creates it
78 S.26 of the MCA provides that works done in the course of employment and works done under
commission, both belongs to the employer or to the person who commissioned the work.
For the ideological basis of 'authorship' see Jaszi, Peter, op. cit.
° (1883) 11 Q.B. 627, at p.635.
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is consistent with our earlier proposition that 'ama!' (economic labour) is the basis of
ownership rights in intellectual property 81 . Using the yardstick of creative labour, it
is the person who has expended time and effort in engaging in a work who should be
rightly compensated and rewarded.
8.	 Originality
To be eligible for protection, a work has to be original82. The requirement of
originality here does not indicate totally new in the sense of novelty but in the sense
that it is not obtained by mere copying from other works. The law requires a certain
amount of effort and endeavour for it to be capable of protection.83
The term used by the Muslim scholars in this context is 'ibtikar'. Al-Darrini defines
'ibtikar' as something which is new; not being a reproduction of previous works8'.
Although he did not advance any test as to the requirement of originality, he is
careful to observe that absolute originality will never arise as knowledge is built on
the accumulation of past stocks of information. The 'isaiah' (the strength of
originality) in copyright, he argues, is relative.85
In common law jurisdid.ons, the test of oginality is a low one. Originality here does
not imply originality of idea and thought in the sense that nobody has never thought
of it. It is sufficient that the work originated from him and is not copied from others.
See ch.3 of the thesis.
82 The operative provision on originality is S.7(3) of the MCA. S.7(3) states that:
A literary, musical or artistic work shall not be eligible for copyright unless:
(a) sufficient effort has been expended to make the work original in character.
83 The requirement of originality also applies to derivative works. See Byrne v. Statist Co. (1914)
1 KB 622, Cummins v. Bond (1927) 1 Ch. 167. In Malaysia before the 1990 amendment, protection
of derivative works was based on common law. See Longman Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. v. Pustaka Delta
Pelajaran Sdn. Bhd. (1987) 2 MU 359.
' See p.9 Ibtikar, op.cit.
85 See footnote p.17, Ibtikar, op.cit.
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In Lau Foo San v. The Government of Malaysia 86, certain engineering drawings done
by the plaintiffs were held as original despite similarity with other engineering
drawings produced by other engineers. Such similarity arose as all engineering
drawings of the government schools, as in this case, have to comply to certain basic
features. In Hardial Singh all Han Singh v. Daim Zainuddin & 56 others87, the
court rejected the claim of originality in a compilation work of import and export
duties which are mainly derived from the statutory regulations on the matter. There
was no original effort in a simple compilation of facts which are derived from
statutory sources.
Hence, the requirement of originality under the MCA accords with that of para 2.5 of
the Berne Convention. 'Original' means something that is the author's own creation.
There is no qualitative or aesthetic requirement attached to a work unlike that of
France which requires a certain amount of intellectual contribution 88. In practice even
computer works89 have to satisfy the requirement of originality either in the selection
or arrangement of works or both. In the case of compilation of data, protection is
available only where there exist originality of selection and arrangement of data9°.
86 (1974) 1 Mu 28.
87 (1991) 1 CU 116. The court in this case had accepted the test of originality as laid down in
University of London v. University Tutorial Press Ltd (1916) 2 Ch. 601.
88 For a computer program to be protected under copyright in France and under the EEC Software
Directive, there should be evidence of an intellectual contribution of the author. Prior to the EEC Software
Directive, the German system required a high degree of individuality and creativity. The program had to
be significantly different from existing programs. Its design had to be above average as regards the choice
and arrangement of the information and the commands.
89 Under the MCA 1987, computer program means an expression, in any language, code or notation,
of a set of instructions intended to cause a device having an information processing capability to perform
any of these functions conversion to another language, code or notation and reproduction in a dfsrent
material. See S.3.
With regard to the position of photographs, see Lupton, Keith, Photographs and the Conce pt of
Originality in Copyright Law, (1988) 9 EIPR, 257. He maintains that the test of originality on photographs
is subject to different opinion especially on snapshots. Lahore sees no reason why the most haphazard
photograph of a scene in nature should not be regarded as "original" for copyright purposes. On the other
hand Sterling and Carpenter take the view that "the snapshot produced without the skill and labour or
discretion in arrangement of the subject is unlikely to be considered as protected by copyrighL Likewise,
Copinger questions the subsistence of copyright in simple snapshots of still scenes in nature.
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In chapter 3, it is argued that for the recognition of intellectual labour to take effect,
a certain threshold of originality must exist. It is argued that there must be a creation
of a different entity than the one existed. It is not within the premise of this thesis
to investigate the kind of originality which is assumed here. Suffice that there should
be distinctive factors which differentiate a given work from a previous one.
9.	 Ideal expression dichotomy, the requirement for fixation
In most common law jurisdictions, works should be expressed or reduced to a
material form for them to be eligible for protection. 9 ' This requirement of reducing
works into 'physical form' has been justified to accord with evidential rules which
requires 'physicality' for ease of proof. Likewise, it is difficult to be sure of the
scope or content of such a work, and without fixation the protection of such a work
may come close to the protection of the 'ideas' or subject of the work. It is immaterial
whether the work is recorded by or with the permission of the author 92. However,
such requirement ignores the special status of oral work in Islamic cultural and
educational framework. Nasr93, writes on the significance of the oral tradition and
memory as a vehicle of transmission of knowledge which came to complement the
written word contained in books, especially those books which became central texts
for the teaching of various schools of thought and which figured prominently in the
relationship between the traditional master ('al-ustadh') and the students ('tullab').
As far as books on philosophy are concerned, he points out that they are often written
in difficult language whereby the meaning of the text is transmitted orally. Hence,
only those of who are well acquainted with the oral tradition could elucidate the
Fixation for literaiy, musical and artistic work under the MCA means that the work has been written
down, recorded or otherwise reduced to material form. See also the UK CDPA 1988 S.3(2X3) and Inala
Industries Pty . Ltd and others v. Associated Enterprises Pry Ltd.(1960) Qd.R 562. Material form is defined
in section 3 to include any material form (whether visible or not) of storage from which the work or
derivative work, or a substantial part of the work or derivative work can be reproduced.
See Copinger and Skone James on Co pyright, (edited by E.P Skone James) 13th. ed. London, Sweet
& Maxwell, 1991 par. 3-49.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossem, Oral Transmission and the Book in Islamic Education: The Spoken and the
Written Word., Journal of Islamic Studies 3:1 (1992) pp.1-14.
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meaning or the levels of meaning of the technical vocabulary ('al-istislahat'). In this
manner, the students often propagated the master's knowledge and wrote
commentaries based on these oral teachings.
The importance of oral transmission of knowledge is not only confined to the study
of philosophy as discussed above but also extended to jurisprudence, scientific and
technical works. Even technical and craft skills are personally transmitted.
Therefore by excluding oral works, the importance of oral transmission of knowk4ge
is ignored. Although this means that the work has only a transient existence, its form
is not less complete than when it existed in some material form. One way to avoid
such dichotomy is by excluding the criteria of fixation such as the approach adopted
in the Saudi Arabia95 . A.3(b) of the Saudi Arabia Copyright Law confers copyright
on works expressed orally such as lectures, speeches (oratory), sermons and similar
things such as poetry and songs.
Further the elimination of the boundary between oral and expressed works is
consistent with the stand adopted in the Beme Convention which does not impose the
criteria of fixation on the member counthes. We could further emulate the present
boundaries which are drawn in some member countries that only spoken works of a
more formal or considered kind delivered before or to an audience are covered.
Therefore, oral transmission of knowledge and technical skills is covered but leaving
aside more aleatory or spontaneous forms of oral expression.
See Hassan & Huh, p.269 op.cit.
See Copyright Law issued under the Prime Minister's Decision No. 30 dated 25th. september 1989.
See Business Laws of Saudi Arabia, 4 Vols., (1992), Graham & Trotman. See also the commentary by
Hanson, Maren, Saudi Arabia- Recent Developments in Copyright Protection, Copyright World, Issue
Forty Five, November, 1994 p.38- 41.
The present A.2(2) of the Berne Convention is merely permissive in form, allowing the stipulation
of 'fixation' while not imposing others in civil law jurisdictions from changing their approach. A.2(2) of
the Convention reads:
"It shall, however, be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in
general or any specified categories of works shall not be protecled unless they have been fixed in some
material form".
See Ricketson, op.cit par. para. 6.15.
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10.	 Exclusive rights
Because of the nature of intellectual property which can be covertly copied and
infringed, the law has couched the ambit of exclusive right in copyright in wide
terms. With the creation of new technologies, more methods of copying are
introduced and hence copyright has to be expanded to cover possible copying which
may prejudice and defeat the legitimate expectation of authors.
Therefore, in Malaysia, the reproduction , distribution or the communication to the
public of a work constitutes an infringement. This occurs when the work is
reproduced, or shown to the public by way of broadcasting, communication by cable
or distribution by lease and rent. In this respect, the Malaysian court has
interpreted the term "reproduction" generously. In one instance the court held that
reproduction of engineering drawings into a three-dimensional works constituted an
infringement of copyright as the drawings comprise an artistic work98.
As far as Islamic law is concerned, the author is the original owner of the 'manfa 'ah'
in a work. Therefore, any kind of reproduction constitutes an infringement of his
right. In this respect, an analogy can be drawn with the ownership of land. An
owner of a piece of land owns the exclusive ('mutlaq') and comprehensive ('shamil')
rights to use the property'. The owner should be entitled to stop any form of action
which may defeat his exclusive rights over his land. Therefore, it is logical that in
respect of intellectual property right this would include all form of reproduction which
exploits and defeats the right-owner's legitimate entitlement. Further, reproducing
See S.13, 14, 15 & 16 of the MCA 1987.
98 See Peko Wailsend Operations Ltd v Linatex Process Rubber Ltd (1993) 1 MU 225. Such an
interpretation in this case brought the undesirable effect of holding utilitarian articles as artistic work. See
the commentary by Azmi, Ida Madieha, Slurry Pumps and the Obscurity of Artistic Copyright Works: Peko
Wallsend Operations Ltd v Linatex Process Rubber Bhd., 3 EIPR (1994) p.123-129.
See p.114 of Ibrikar, op.cit.
See Mahmassani, Subhi, At-Nazaii yyah al-'Ammah hl-Mujibat wal-Ugud fi aI-Shan'ah at-
Islamiyyah (1946) p.23. A.1 194 of the 'majaliah' states that whoever is 'mulk' owner of a piece of land is
the owner of what is above it and what is below it.
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other's work also constitutes an unlawful act under the Shari'ah on the basis of the
rule against unjust enrichment and unlawful competition. Thus the author should be
rightly compensated in any instance of reproduction of his work and for the
infringement of his work. The basis for compensation for such cases is the general
principle that no one should cause damage to others ('Ia dharar wa Ia dhirar').
In the case of copyright in photographs, while copyright belongs to the person who
arranged the production of the photograph, S.85(1) of the UK CDPA 1988 confers
a new moral right entitling a person to a right of privacy in respect of photographs
which were commissioned for private and domestic purposes.'°'
While the right of privacy in the U.K CDPA is only confined to photographs produced
under commission, sanctity of privacy in Islam is a moral obligation' 02 and covers
a larger area than only photograph works. As far as the rights of the person being
photographed is concerned, Al-Sanhuri advances the view that his picture cannot be
published in any manner unless his consent is sought. This argument depicts the
assurance against unneccessary encroachment of privacy 103• He qualifies his
argument with regard to those photographs which would be in the public interest for
them to be published. In such cases, if there has been refusal to allow publication of
the photograph, such refusal has to be justifiable.
11.	 Alienation of rights
As elucidated in chapter three, the proprietary nature of Intellectual Property emanates
from its alienability and transmissibility of rights to others. This stand has been
This is the position in the U.K. Malaysia does not have the same provision. S.85 of the U.K CDPA
1988 allows the person who authonsed the taking of photograph to oppose to the issuing of the copies of
his photograph to the public, exhibiting and showing to the public and the broadcast or inclusion in a cable
programme service.
102 The ethical foundation of right of privacy stems from the duty to respect other's personal privacy
as expressly stated in the Qur'an 24: 58-62.
103 Al-Sanhuri, op.cit, p.354.
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recapitulated by Muslim scholars. As Intellectual property rights can be considered as
103A.
nghts of 'mutaqarrir', iil-Damni maintains that they are transmissible upon
death)°4 It follows then that the successor of the author will inherit both economic
and moral rights from the original owner of a protected work. The same stand can be
seen from the MCA 1987. Section 25 of the MCA 1987, gives the inheritor or
personal representative of the deceased author the same rights as the owner as far as
action against infringement and recovery is concerned'05.
As far as transmission of rights upon death is concerned, due to the complexity of
Islamic Law on succession, it has been argued that this entails division of rights to
a number of family members who may not be interested in pursuing the author's
interest. Al-Sanhuri suggests that the best way to avoid the above problem is to
appoint a single person to manage the economic rights of the author and to distribute
the income to other heirs'°6.
Transfer of right can also be done through contractual agreement, either by licensing
or assignment. Muslim scholars have considered the legitimacy of sale or contracts of
publication ('muqawala'). The general view is that in a contract of publication, a
publisher stands in the position of licensee, empowered only to publish the work
within the terms of the agreement'° 7. This would mean that a contract of
publication is not to be understood as assignment under the common law where the
total rights of the owner is absolutely assigned to third party. A publisher may not
reassign the publication to someone else on monetary consideration as naturally he
- 
103A. c/f to p.82 at note 92._
104 The view is based on the reported 'hadith': Whoever dies leaving property or rights, such rights
axe transmissible to the heirs (translation mine)
105 S.27 of the MCA provides:
(1) Subject to this section, copyright shall be transferable by assignment, testamentary disposition, or by
operation of law, as movable property.
(2) An assignment or testamentary disposition of copyright may be limited so as to apply only to some acts
which the owner of the copyright has the exclusive control, or to a specified country or other geographical
area
' See p.397, Al-Want, op.cit. See also p.85, Ibtikar, op.cit.
See p.113 Ibtikar, op.cit.
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does not own the original 'manfa 'ah' to deal with the work'°8. Al-Nadawi describes
the publisher's position in a contract of publication as that of an agent'° 9. It would
seem therefore that a publisher may sue a third party for infringement without naming
the author as the party suing, as this is within powers of an agent under Islamic Law.
An author may sell his publication rights through sale contracts ('bay"). In this
instance, Al-Sanhuri argues that moral rights remain with the author as they are
inalienable"0. Al-Nadawi observed the possibility of current practices in contractual
agreements relating to publication may offend the prohibition of 'gharar". This
is because most publication contracts do not have a fixed amount of royalty stipulated
in the contracts. The normal accepted practice is that the amount of royalty is left
undetermined at the conclusion of the contract. These practices lead to uncertainty of
subject matter whereby authors in this instance would have to take the risk of losses.
In Islamic law, the general principle is that, during the conclusion of a contract, the
subject-matter of the contract and the price involved should be ascertained' 12. One
way to avoid this unnecessary uncertainty, is to adopt the practice in France whereby
an agreed consideration may be re-opened by way of judicial litigation if the work
proves to be more successful than the parties thought it would be and enables the
108 See p.114 Ibtikar, op.cit.
See p.153 Ibtikar, op.cit.
See p.409 Al-Wasit, op.cit.
See p.151 Ibtikar, op.cit.
112 Imain Malik illustrated the disapproval of contractual agreement which contain uncertain terms.
At page 301, he related:
Yahya related to me from Malik from Abu Hazim ibn. Dinar from Sa'id ibn aI-Musayyab that the
Messenger of Allah. may Allah bless him and grant him peace, forbade the sale with uncertainty
in it. Malik said, "A similar case is the selling of ben-nuts for ben-nut oil. This is an uncertain
transaction because what comes from ben-nut is ben-oil. There is no harm in selling ben-nuts for
perfumed ben because perfumed ben has been perfumed, mixed and changed from the state of raw
ben-nut oil." See Malik Ibn. Anas, Al Muwatta. The First Formulation of Islamic Law, Diwan
Press, (1989).
See also Rayner, S.E, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law: A Comparative Analysis With Particular
Reference To the modem Legislation in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates;, (1991), Graham
& Trotman, London par.p.290.
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court to award a complementary sum"3.
For an assignment to be effective, the contract must be in writing, in Malayia•I4
The author thereafter cannot interfere with the transferee's rights except where the
transferee has exceeded his powers designated under the contract. An oral assignment
is, however, not void; it will be treated as an agreement to assign, giving the
assignee an equitable right over the work" 5. As the equitable owner, he does not
enjoy the reliefs which are available to the legal owner as prescribed under S.37 of
the MCA, unless the latter is joined as a party to the proceedings.
Reducing the contractual agreement into writing is highly recommended in the
Quran" 6. However, an oral agreement is equally accepted as valid and binding,"7
so long as the essential requirements of a contract are fulfilled." 8 Thus, jurists view
that the document itself does not give rise to any additional legal obligation. Written
document acts as a confirmation that all the essential requirements are satisfied-; to
lessen the possibility of conflict between the parties and to endorse the terms of the
See in particular A.35 of the 1957 Law which provides that the author should be remunerated
periodically, but the law allow lump sum sales where periodical payments would be excessively difficult
or expensive to administer or determine. A.37 allows the challenge of a lump-sum payments if the work
is much more succesful than the party anticipated. See Hudson, A.M, France, Practical Commercial Law
(1991), Longinan, U.K par. at p.18.
" S.27(3) of the MCA 1987 states that," No assignment of copyright and no licence to do an act the
doing of which is controlled by copyright shall have effect unless it is in writing."
See Khaw, para 5.3.1, p.75 op.cit.
116 See Sura 2:282.
Sura 2:282: "it is not sin if you do not write it down".
Under the common law, oral promise creates an equitable right or interest if supported by consideration.
For an illustration of common law principles, see Western Front Ltd & Anor v. Vestron Inc. & Ors (1987)
FSR 66.
The essentials of a contract in Islamic jurisprudence are the 'aqad'-effective offer and acceptance,
eligibility of the contracting parties, certainty of object of contracts and certainty of consideration. The
essentials of a 'muqawala' contract are:
1.	 description of the subject matter of the contract.
ii. particulars of the type and amount.
iii. the manner of performance.
iv. the period over which it is to be performed.
v. consideration.
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contract. Theoretically, there is no difference between written and oral contracts,
both giving rise to a valid obligation, enforceable under the Shari'ah. Inspite of this,
most modern legislation in the Muslim Ilslamic countries have stipulated for the
fixation of these agreements in writing on the acceptance that modern commercial
reality dictates the most effective and easy to prove methods of transaction.
Section 27 of the MCA further allows disposal of rights of a future work, or an
existing work in which copyright does not yet subsist"9. Assignment of future work
vests in the assignor equitable interest in the work, as soon as the work is created,
sufficient for him to sue for infringement of copyright' 20. Assignment of non
existent future work will not be valid under Islamic law due to uncertainty of the
subject matter' 21 . The assignment of future works may not vest any equitable or
legal interests to the assignee. This is because trading something which is not owned
or not yet owned is forbidden according to strong authority of 'hadith'.'22
However, assignment of the copyright in the second instance enumerated in S.27 of
the MCA may be valid in Islamic law as the subject matter already existed. This is
because even if the copyright in a work does not yet subsist; for example in the case
of works originating from members of the Berne Convention before the effective date
of accession to that Convention; the relevant subject-matter of the assignment is
already in existence.
119 See also CDPA 1988 S.91.
120 See also the old case of Macdonald (E) Ltd v Eyles, (1921) 1 Ch. 631, where Petersen J held that
publishers who had an option to publish the next three future works of an author had an equitable interest
to restrain another publisher from publishing the work.
121 See A.205 'Majallah'. A.205 states that the sale of a non-existing thing is invalid ('Batil'). A.1 10
defines a 'batir transaction as a transaction which is not good ('sahih') in its foundation ('asi').
See also Al-Wasit, p.389, op.cit.
It is narrated by Tawus; ibn Abbas said: Allah's Apostle (p.b.u.h) forbade the selling of foodstuff
before its measuring and transferring into one's possession. "I asked Ibn. Abbas,"How is that?', Ibn
Abbas,'replied,"It will be just like selling money for money, as the foodstuff has not been handed over to
the first purchaser who is the present seller."
It is also narrated by Ibn. Umac the Prophet (p.b.u.h.) said:"He who buys foodstuff should not sell it till he
has received it"'Sahih Muslim. Abd. Hamid Siddiqi (trans) vol ifi, 1973, S Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri
Bazar, Lahore par.p.831.
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While 5.10 and 5.11 illustrate the nature of exclusive rights, the copyright has long
needed to strike a balance between control and access. The higher right for education,
information and personal use has circumscribed the periphery of copyright domain in
the form of exceptions and permitted use; which will be the subject of our following
discussion.
12.	 Exceptions to exclusive right
The concern that there are certain legitimate uses which might be unnecessarily
curtailed by copyright leads to the allowance of non-profit uses in copyright. The
argument is that such use should be allowed so long as the use does not deprive the
authors of their legitimate expectations. In Malaysia, the list of exceptions has been
expanded in 1990. The exceptions seek to allow legitimate uses for the purpose of
education, such as the use of a work in schools, universities or educational
institutions. Under the law it is allowed to use the sound recording of a phonographic
works for educational purposes; the use of the work by the National/ state Archives,
national library, state library or other public libraries and educational, scientific or
professional institutions. The scope of educational use is fairly wide. It includes the
reproduction of the typographical arrangement of a published edition for the purposes
of research and private study'23.
The use of reproduction material of copyright works for purposes of study is subject
to it being a 'fair dealing'. The Act does not define the term 'fair dealing'. Neither
has it been defined judicially in any case in Malaysia. It is therefore, pertinent that
precedents and case law be sought from other common law jurisdictions to illustrate
the scope of educational use allowed under the law. From case law decisions in other
common law jurisdictions, a few factors can be discerned in determining 'fair
dealing'. The act must be judged in relation to one of the stipulated purposes
enumerated in that provision. The proportion of the work taken in relation to the
whole work is also taken into consideration. Lastly, the motive of the defendant in
123 Private study only covers the case of a student himself copying out a book for his own use, but
not copying by anyone else on his behalf, nor the circulation of copies among other students.
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doing the act is an important factor in deciding whether the dealing is fair''.
In New Zealand, the issue of the extent allowed for reproduction for purposes of
education became the issue in Longman v Carrington'. The case concerns a
compilation of reproduction of text books prepared by a tutor for his students. The
court held that the provision only excused reproduction done by students for the
purpose of private study. Therefore the tutor's compilation was a teaching aid and not
something produced for research or private study even if capable of being so used.
The case emphasized the fairness of reproduction as the statutory provision should be
used to balance the competing interests of copyright owners and the legitimate
demands of the educational sector on the other hand.
As far as reproduction for educational purposes by educational institutions is
concerned certain conditions must be considered. The first, that there should be
requests to supply and consequential supply. Secondly, the copying had to be a
reasonable proportion of the copyright works. Thirdly, that persons to whom the
copies are supplied shall not be required to make a higher payment that cost together
with a reasonable proportion of the school's expenses. The reproduction should also
be done in the course of instruction. In this case, the copying was done a year prior
to its use in class. Therefore it is not in the course of instruction 126. It would seem
therefore that while copying by students is excepted under the law as being a form of
private study, copying by educational institutions may not necessarily be justified as
a "fair dealing".
The law also makes allowance for reproduction of work to enhance the diffusion of
information. Included in this group is the reproduction of press, criticism or review,
124 See Khaw p.107-108, op.cit.	 -
' (1991) 2 NZLR 574.
126 See the commentaries by Katz, John, Reprography and Fair Dealing - Co pying for Educational
Use: Longman v Canington, (1993) 2 EIPR 67. See also University of London Press v University Tutorial
Press (1916)2 Ch. 601; Sillitoe v McGraw Hill Co. (UK) Ltd (1983) FSR 545 at 558; De Gariss v Neville
Jeffress Pidler (1990) 18 IPR 292.
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reporting of current events and the use of work for the purposes of any judicial, legal,
legislative and official proceedings.'21
The defence of criticism and reporting of current events may not extend to the
copying of news among competitors in journalists and neicpapers as this may not be
considered as "fair dealing". In this case, the MCA 1987 further provides that fair
quotation for purposes of review, is allowed if it is compatible with fair practice and
its extent does not exceed that which is justified by the purpose. This exception is
subject to mention being made to the source and the name of the author and that
reproduction is compatible with fair dealing. The exact scope of 'fair dealing' with
regard to criticism was reconsidered in a recent case in the U.K in the Express
Newspaper pie v News (U.K) plc'28 which concerns the copying of news among two
competing newspapers. In this case it was argued that the fair dealing defence did not
apply where there had been no acknowledgment of authorship. Secondly, it was
argued that the public interest defence did not apply since the information had already
been disclosed and was not in any event something the public needed to know'29.
The third group of exceptions pertains to personal use of works for private and
domestic use such as the making of a film of a broadcast, or a literary, artistic,
127 This provision only envisages the use of such works in the course of legal and judicial proceedings
and does not cover a situation where copyright works are being copied for future references when
proceedings have not commenced. See Khaw, p.1 15, op.cit.
(1991) FSR 36. Where the court questioned whether there existed between newspapers an implied
licence to use each other's stories with or without acknowledgement. The court held that the mere reporting
of another's words may give rise to a reporter's copyright if skill and judgement were employed in the
report's composition.
See also Time Warner Entertainment Co. Ltd v Channel 4 Television Corporation Plc., 28 IPR
459. The case concerns a documentary on a film entitled 'Clockwork Orange' which had been produced
without the copyright owner's consent. The film was banned in the U.K. The defendant obtained a copy
of the film in France, where it was legitimately on sale. The plaintiff alleged that since the copy of the
work was obtained without his consent, the defendant cannot claim that the production of the documentary
was allowed as fair dealing. The plaintiff further alleged that the documentary had misrepresented the film
by focussing on the violent parts of it. The Court held that criticism of a work already in the public domain
which would otherwise constitute fair dealing will rarely be rendered unfair because of the means by which
the work had been obtained. The way in which the defendants had obtained the film did not therefore affect
the question of fair dealing. It was not relevant to the question of fair dealing that the documentary might
have misrepresented the film's content.
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dramatic or musical work or a film included in the broadcast. Finally, the law allows
the incidental reproduction of broadcasting work through the making of temporary
reproduction of work for purposes of broadcasting.
Besides these exceptions which are explicitly provided for in the Act, it is arguable
that the law may imply certain accepted allowances such as reverse engineering and
the implied licence to repair'30. These implicit exceptions have been accepted
judicially in countries such as the U.K and the U.S. Reverse engineering is to
disiisemble portions of software object code in order to learn information necessary
to develop interoperable products. In the U.S, the Federal Court stated that reverse
engineering is allowed as fair use in the case of Atari Games v Nintendo of
America' 31 . At page 19-20 the court stated the underlying policy of reverse
engineering;
"The legislative history of S. 107 suggests that courts should adopt the fair use
exception to acco.odate new technological innovations ..... . Section 107 also
requires examination of the nature of the work when determining if a
reproduction is a fair use. When the nature of a work requires intermediate
copying to understand the ideas and processes in a copyrighted work, that
nature supports a fair use for intermediate copying. Thus reverse engineering
object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is a fair
use".
130 See the explanatory note to the 1990 amendment of the MCA 1987, whereby it was written that
the purpose of confining writing to exclusive licence only is to preserve the acceptability of implied licence
to repair or to replace damaged parts. Source: Intellectual Property Unit, Ministry of International Trade,
Malaysia.
131 No.91-1293 (Fed. Circ. 10 September 1992). See also Sega Enterprise Ltd v Accolade mc, No.92-
15655, 9th. Cir., Decided on 20th. October 1992; 977 F.2d 1510 (1992). Where the US Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's judgement, holding that it is 'fair use' to disassemble object
code of a computer program when that is necessary expedient to gain access to the ideas and functional
concepts of the program. Although Accolade disassembled Sega's program to be able to sell video game
programs compatible (interoperable) with Sega's microcomputer hardware, and therefore in general
competition with Sega's programs, Accolade's use was nonetheless fair, since the programs did not compete
directly. Furthermore, Sega's monopolistic attempt to make rivals' video games incompatible with Sega's
hardware tilted the equities against Sega. For further analysis see Stem, Richard H., Reverse Engineering
of Software as Copyright Infringement - An Update: Sega Enterprise Ltd v Accolade mc, (1993) 1 EIPR
34. The appellant further moved for reconsideration of the case by the entire Ninth Circuit. The Court
declined to reconsider its ruling. See (1993) 4 EIPR D-91.
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Finally, the law allows the parallel importation of copyright works into the
jurisdiction. By allowing import of legitimate copyright works, this would create an
internal market with healthy competition, thereby resulting in reasonable pricing.
Under the MCA 1987, parallel importation cannot be deemed as an act of
infringement. This is because under the Act, copyright is infringed by any person
who, without the consent or licence of the owner of the copyright, imports an article
into Malaysia for commercial purposes' 32. Arguably, if the imported works are
genuine copyright works, the right-owner would deem to have consented to the
exploitation of such works.
13.	 Duration of protection.
In most jurisdictions, copyright remains valid throughout the life time of the author
plus a certain period after his death ('post-mortem auctoris'). In the U.K, the current
duration is 50 years p.m.a' 33. It has often been justified that the term 50 years is
chosen out of the need to provide for two suessive generations. The impermanency
of copyright emanates from the policy objective of providing the authors ample reward
for their effort while at the same time ensuring that these works will be freely
accessible when they eventually fall into the public domain after the termination of
the duration.
The duration is set differently to different subject matter. For works which originated
primarily from the effort of 'authors' the term commences from the authors'
death''. For technical works, whereby they are not generally the product of
individual authorial endeavour, the term is set upon the publication of the work. Thus
we see in Malaysia, for literary, musical and artistic works, copyright subsists
132 S.36(2). See also the explanatory note to the MCA, Source: Intellectual Property Unit, Ministry of
International Trade, Malaysia.
133 This duration will be extended to 70 years in the near future when harmonisation of copyright laws
in the E.0 takes effect. See Ricketson, Sam, The Copyright Term, BC, vol. 23 No.6/1992 p.753-785.
This is provided that his work is published before his death. If his works is published after his
death, copyright subsists from the publication of his death. See S.17(2) MCA 1987.
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during the life of the author and fifty years after his death' 35. For other works,
copyright subsists for fifty years from its publication'36.
In this respect, as far as Islamic law is concerned, it has been argued in chapter three
that Intellectual property rights are rights of 'manfa 'ah'. Thus Al-Darrini, maintains
that being a right of 'manfa 'ah' the duration of the right is temporary' 37. He accepts
that the impermen2ncy ('mua 'qat') of intellectual property rights as justifiable in
balancing the rights of the author to the rights of the public. Al-Darrini, by drawing
an analogy of intellectual property rights to rights of dwelling on 'waaJ' lands and
long lease of buildings ('hikr'), argues that the duration should be 60 years after the
demise of the author' 38. 'Hikr' which is the usufructiry rights of 'waqf' lands was
formulated by jurists to allow exploitation of 'waqf' land in return of payment of
lease. The duration of 'hikr' subsists throughout the lifetime of the lessee and is
transmissible after his death to his successor for a further 60 years. Rights of 'hikr'
being real interest, can be disposed of and transmissible by inheritance.' 39 The
similarity of 'hikr' and usufructory rights of Intellectual Property can be seen in three
aspects; firstly both are usufructory rights, secondly, both are created by jurists due
to necessity i.e on the rule of 'maslaha' and finally both are real rights.
' See S.17 MCA 1987.
Works under this category includes published editions, sound recordings, broadcasts, photographs.
films and works of Government, government organizations and international bodies. See S. 18-23 of the
MCA 1987.
See p.109 Ibtikar, op.cit.
138 See p.121 Ibrikar, op.cit.
139 See p.64-68 of Ziadeh, Farhat 3, Property Law in the Arab World; Real Rights in Egypt. Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon. Libya. Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, (1979) Graham & Trotman, London.
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14.	 Conclusion
It is often admitted by Muslim jurists that writing is one of the main forms of
disseminating knowledge. lbn Khaldun' 4° observes the position of writing in these
words:
"the art of writing and book production, which depends on it, preserve the
things that are of concern to man and keep them from being forgotten. It
enables the innermost thoughts of the soul to reach those who are far and
absent. It perpetuates in books the results of thinking and scholarship".
Copyright is borne out of concern to safeguard the authenticity of written works and
to confer the authors proper recognition for his endeavour. These two constitute the
root to copyright both in the Muslim world and its western counterparts. Even though
copyright laws have differred substantially since then, the objective of these laws
remains. The most important concern in copyright is to counterbalance the scope of
control with the availability of access.
The comparison with Islamic law dictates that certain aspects of the copyright law as
practised in Malaysia have to be improved. Firstly, the control on offensive materials
which are against the Islamic religion or against the public conception of ethics and
morality should be tightened. The present regulatory framework, which allows the
curtailment of such works through censorship, results in no nexus between copyright
and censorship. Such a stand is clearly not acceptable if compared to the Islamic
standards, whereby according to Islam, these works lack the capacity to be a valid
property right. However, imposition of content-based restriction by denying certain
kinds of works through registration would not be acceptable to the Berne standards.
Censorship is important in Islam as copyright itself cannot be regarded as a positive
right but rather a right given under the Shari'ah. Therefore, the non-recognition of
works against Islamic conception of ethics and morality can be vigorously eliminated
through judicial means whereby the court may refuse to entertain claims related to
'Muqaddunah', op.cit. p.356.
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these works on the basis that the rights of the owner over these works are vitiated
with illegality of the subject-matter.
Secondly, the present stand on moral rights in Malaysia should be further improved.
It has been shown that the Islamic approach would encompass the right to control the
disclosure of work. The primary concern in Islamic approach, as illustrated in this
chapter, is the safeguarding of authors' personal responsibility over their works. In a
wider context, it would also be deemed necessary to enact laws to stand guard over
authors, who are, often, the weaker party in a publication contract. The welfare of
authors should be effectively secured under the aegis of copyright.
Thirdly, the current MCA is silent on the issue of privacy rights of the person who
commisions a photographic work. Laws should be enacted to that effect as the
probability of misuse of copyright in this instance is eminent.
Fourthly, the law should extend to oral works. As illustrated in the above discussion,
the discrimination against oral works may create a critical gap in our treatment of
'works'. Furthermore, conferment of copyright to oral works has long been the
tradition in civil law countries. Thus, there is a plenty of precedents set in other
countries which Malaysia could benefit from and emulate with.
In other aspects, the copyright law in Malaysia, to a certain extent, conforms to the
Islamic standards. The requirement of originality substantiates our earlier proposition
that a certain threshold of distinctiveness is indispensable in differentiating the product
of intellectual labour and those ideas existing in the 'common'. The definition of
'authorship' and the emphasis on the person who is personally responsible for
producing a work, accords with the discussion of attainment of priority rights in
intellectual labour. On a similar scale, the extension of exclusive rights to all kinds
of reproduction in any form and version falls squarely within the legitimate
expectation of the authors.
More fundamentally, the balance between control and access should be maintained.
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This reorientation of control and access constitutes the foundation of copyright in
Islam. To learn and to disseminate is the cornerstone of Islamic scholarship and
therefore they must be preserved. Should the law further expand the scope of
exclusive rights, the scope of access should also be drawn on an equal scale.
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CHAPTER SIX
PATENTS AND MONOPOLY
I	 Introduction
Much discussion and debate has taken place on the role of patents and its linkage to
inventive activity and innovation. Most stimulating are the discussions by scholars
such as John Stuart Mill', Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Arnold Plant 2
 and many
others who have contributed to the debate. These debates coupled with current
economic studies in the U.K. U.S, Canada and Australia question the accuracy of the
economic theories and the philosophy behind patent systems. The significance of
these theories cannot be dismissed lightly. This chapter will initially discuss these
theories and their influence on the shaping of the current patent system.
The chapter then proceeds to question the acceptability of patent systems from an
Islamic perspective. For the purpose of this study, issues pertaining to the role of
labour and profit motivation, wealth and economic parameters are examined. As the
most important objection against patents is their likely association with monopoly,
we have also endeavoured to explain the meaning and understanding of monopoly
both in the context of modern western economics and the discussion of Muslim
scholars.
The preoccupation with economic theories is prominent in patent rights and most
discussions on the scope of patents depend on economic reasoning. Economic
considerations not only determine the initial existence of a patent right, but constantly
shape and influence the scope of patents, particularly in areas where there are
1 See, Mill, John Stuart., Principles of Political Economy. With Some of Their A pplications to Social
Philosophy, University of Toronto Press, par. Book 5 p.929.
2 Smith, Adam, Wealth of Nations; Bentham, Jeremy, Observations of Parts of the declaration of
Rights, As Proposed by Citizens Sieyes. For a discussion of their works see Plant, Arnold, The Economic
Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, Economica, (1934) Vol.! p.30-5! par.p.3l.
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conflicting interests such as food, medical products and methods of medical
treatment. The main economic concern in a patent is the need to recoup expenses
involved in the research and development of a new marketable product. In this
chapter, it is argued that while profit motivation and private property are accepted in
Islam, other non-economic values play an equally significant role in economic
parameters. These non-economic values, which comes in the form of general ethical
and moral concerns, constitute an important moral filter to economic criteria. On this
basis, this chapter adopts the approach postulated by Al-Ghazali and Al-Shatibi in
balancing economic interests with other higher objectives.
The discussion will now turn to the elucidation of economic theories underlying the
patent system. Later, the position of economics and wealth returns will be examined
from an Islamic point of view.
2	 Patent theories
The role played by economic theories in the discussion on patent system cannot be
underestimated. Economic theories are not only used to defend the initial allocation
of rights in patents but also the scope of rights. It is in this sense that economists
differentiate between tangible property rights and intangible property rights.
According to this notion, property rights assume scarcity of resources. The idea that
a thing is owned comes from the fact that the owner holds it to the exclusion of
everyone else. This yardstick of scarcity however cannot be applied to intangible
property. For this, Plant (1934) argued that Intellectual Property is " not a
consequence of scarcity but a deliberate creation of statute law"3.
Plant argued that;
"it is the peculiarity of property rights in patents (and copyrights) that they do not arise out of the
scarcity of the objects which become appropriated, they are not a consequence of scarcity. They
are the deliberate creation of statute law; and whereas in general the institution of private property
makes for the preservation of scarce goods, tending....to lead us to "to make the most of them",
property rights in patents and copyright make possible the creation of a scarcity of the products
appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained".
See Plant, Arnold, op.cit. See also the discussion in the classical work of Machlup, Fritz & Penrose,
Edith, The Patent Controversy, Journal of Economic History, May 1950, No.! p.1-29.
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Plant's proposition was not agreed by Steven (1970). He distinguished between
inventions which would have been produced in the absence of any property rights
protection and those that would not have been produced without protection. Plant's
view may be true with respect only to the former class. For such inventions, the
patent grant will, under certain pricing arrangements, inhibit the widespread use of
an already developed idea. Scarcity may then be said to have been 'created' by
protection. However, for ideas which would not have been produced without the
same form of protection, Plant's view is in error. That is, for any invention which
would not have been produced at all in the absence of property rights, the scarcity
is not in "ideas" as such; rather, the scarcity lies in the resources required to develop
the ideas themselves.4
Another economic theoiy is that of incentive. This theory is widely accepted in
common law jurisdictions and originated from the eighteenth century idea of contract,
where society and the inventor made a bargain, one offering temporary protection and
the other offering knowledge of new techniques. The disclosure of new techniques
contributes to the accumulation of technological knowledge and enhances
technological capacity. In this way an inventor's contribution to society should not
be underplayed and hence the monopoly which is granted to him is jusfly deserved by
him. This theory played a sinficant role in England during the Elizabethan period.5
The importation and establishment of foreign industrial methods was seen as deserving
of incentives.
Most economists agree that patents stimulate research and the development of
Steven, N.S. Cheung, Property Rights and Inventions, Research in law and Economics (1986) p.5-18
par.p. 10.
This theory has played significant influence in socialist block as well. As a special aspect of the so-
called "principle of material interest" the incentive effects of inventor remuneration are recognised early by
the socialist doctrine of invention protection. By combining pecuniary reward with additional moral
recognition, for example. in the form of government awards, certificates, letters of recognition, or public
honors, the moral effect inherent in tangible recognition is further increased. This leads reform in many
socialist countries such as Rumania and Bulgaria whereby no secondary exploitation of inventions is allowed
without compensation. See Beler, Karl Fiiedrich, Traditional and Socialist Concepts of Protecting
Inventions, 1 IIC, 3/1970. 329.
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inventions. They disagree however, on the real effects of patents. Arrow and Plant
provide illuminating views in this respect. Whereas Plant argued that patents
(verreward basic research (excessive appropriability) Arrow is of the opinion that even
under patent laws, basic research is bound to be underrewarded. Kenneth Arrow6
(1962) did not doubt that the patent system would encourage invention. He did,
however, doubt that patent systems alone could achieve optimality in research and
invention. For this he quoted three reasons for failure to achieve optimality; i.e
uncertainty, indivisibility and inappropriability. He claimed that underinvestment in
invention is inescapable with or without a patent system and that this problem could
be best be mitigated by expanded government investment in innovative activities.
Meanwhile Steven argued that patents did not result in blocking the improvement and
development of other inventions. His argument hinged on the distinction between
development right and production right. Development right might be obtained through
contractual agreement or licensing. To him," patent confers production rights on the
patentee but only to the extent that the improvement is at least in part dominated by
the original invention. On the other hand, a patent grant of production rights does
not prevent anyone from thinking about the patented idea or using it to produce a
different, improved product not embodying the original invention".7
Another economic theory links patent with competition. Lehman, a strong proponent
to this school of thought, argued that a patent is deemed necessary as it provides the
requisite competitive restriction in the promotion of a competitive economic order8.
Patents provide "the restraint in competition by way of property rights on the
production level. For example, patents, which lead to the creation of competition on
6 Arrow, Kenneth, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions, (1962) in The
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Princeton, N.J, National Bureau
of Economic Research. See the discussion in Steven, op.cit, par. p.10.
Steven, op. cit par. p.13.
8 Lehman, Michael; Property and Intellectual Property - Property Rights as Restrictions on
Competition in Furtherance of Competition. IIC, No.1/1989 Vol.20 p.1- 15.
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the next higher level, namely the level of innovation. If the improvement of technical
knowledge is regarded as an essential factor for the growth of the economy and
consequently competition between innovators and inventors is deemed desirable, then
property rights protecting technology can kindle the growth of competition in the
production and economic exploitation of this matter." According to this view, patents
"restrict universal free consumption or production in order to encourage economically
meaningful, productive activity on the next higher economic level". Set on this
background, Lehmann explained the antagonism between the competitive restraints
of monopoly-like exclusive rights on the one hand and their economic efforts (in
particular by antitrust and competition law) to ensure the proper functioning of
competition. To him, there exist no fundamental contradiction as both economic
theories are set to counterbalance competitive restrictions and the promotion of a
competitive economic order9.
Current research undertaken in the U.K, Australia and Canada have proven that these
economic theories may not be significant. Among the findings is the overemphasis
of the role of profit motivation in research and development. The reports also doubt
the incentive provided by patents. For example in a report by Taylor, the fmding is
that patents provide only a very limited inducement for industrial invention and
innovation) 0 Another report in Canada found that the impact of patents on the rate
and direction of inventive and innovative activity undertaken by both industrial and
non industrial research is minimal. The report concluded that the incentive theory was
not conclusive. Secondly, with regard to the effectiveness of patent as stimulating
disclosure of inventions is also minimal. The present practice is inadequate as it does
not encourage disclosure of know-how which constitutes an important element in the
innovation process. The same finding is arrived at for the analyses of advantages of
Lehmann does not regard efforts taken to regulate markets as interventionist as to him," with the
correct quantitative allotment of property rights to the various economic levels of consumption, production
and innovation, the costs of legal protection and the enforcement of these powers of disposal can be an
important regulator, because only when the expected marginal revenue rises above the marginal costs of
market exploitation guided by competition in the economic good protected by a property right, will it be
reasonable for a profit-maximizing participant in the economy to become active", op.cit, p.12-13.
10 Taylor & Silberstone, The Economic Impact of the Patent S ystem: A Study of the British
Experience, Cambridge University Press, London, 1973 par. p.365.
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patent as an incentive to innovation". These reports confirm the findings of Machiup
which illustrate the apparent difficulty in understanding the behaviour of the inventive
process and the influence of patent protection.
From the above discussion, we have seen that profit motivation is central to the
economic analyses of patents. Despite the findings of recent reports on the link
between patent and inventive activities, the importance of profit motivation cannot
be easily be dismissed. Our discussion now turn to the association of patents and
monopoly.
3.	 Patents and monopoly
The most common misunderstanding of patents is their association with monopoly.
The linkage of patents and monopolies is probably of historical significance. In the
Elizabethan era there was a practice of granting monopoly rights in perpetuity to
encourage the importation of technology from outside. Unfortunately this practice
lead to abuse'2. The grant of letters patent which was a prerogative of the Sovereign,
was found to be a useful tool to increase revenues and also to introduce foreign
industry. The use of the word 'monopoly' may be accidental and is not reflective of
the power granted. The objection against the practice lies basically in that it was an
unregulated prerogative. In many instances, monopoly was granted for 'everyday
necessities' including coal, fruit, iron, leather, salt, soap and starch. After the case
of Darcv v. Allin' 3, there were attempts to restrict unregulated monopoly practices.
See also the report of the "Working Paper on Patent Law Revision,' Canadian Department of
Consumers and Corporate Affairs, 1976; and Schmookler, Jacob, Invention and Economic Growth,
(1966), Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
12 See Davenport, Neil, The United Kingdom Patent System, a Brief History, with Bibliography,
(1979).
' (1602)11 Co. Rep. 84b. The case concerns an infringement action for a monopoly in the production
of playing cards. Instead of confinning his rights, the Court of Queen's Bench declared the patent invalid.
].77
This lead to the passing of the Statute of Monopolies in l624'.
This illustrates that while unregulated monopoly may be objectionable, regulated
monopoly is not. It has been explained earlier that to associate patents with monopoly
is a simplistic view and cannot be sustained. Firstly, it is important to understand the
nature of monopoly in economic terms. In this sense, monopoly is achieved only if
a certain market power is achieved to emulate and influence or control prices.
Objectionable monopoly is a term which describes a position where a person or a
body is able to dominate the market, control prices and effectively dismiss any
competition. To borrow the definition given by Webster;
"The ultimate test by which the character (of a monopoly) may be ascertained
is, whether the monopolist benefits himself without injuring others....with a
monopoly of existing trade all others are excluded from that which the public
were already in the possession and practice of, which is a clear violation of
public right and policy, but with the manufacture of a new invention.., nothing
is taken from the public which it before possessed."5
In the same terms, Burke arrived at the same conclusion. To him,
"monopoly is an odious term, (but a patent) is not making a monopoly of what
was common. It is the direct reverse, for the condition of the patent,
compelling a discovery, makes that common which was private before".'6
To associate patent with monopolies will only be true in circumstances where there
14 S.1 rendered all monopolies illegal. S.6 provides one of the exceptions - allowed the grant of
monopolies' for the term of 14 years or under, hereafter to be made of the sole working or making of any
manner of new manufacturers, which others at the time of making such letters patent and grants shall not
use, so as also they be not contrary to the law nor mischievous to the State by raising prices of commodities
at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient".
Cited in Dutton, H.1,The Patent System and Inventive Activity During the Industrial Revolution
(1750-I 852), (1984), Manchester University Press, Manchester, p.22.
16 Cited in Dutton, H.I, op.cit.p.23.
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are no easily available substitutes of the patented product in the market.' 7 Patents
do not deprive the public of anything which they had previously enjoyed.
However, it has been accepted that the practice of patenting may lead to monopolistic
tendencies. Firstly, patents are capable of being used to create a dominant position
in market and compulsory licensing is inadequate to safeguard against the harmful
exploitation of patent monopolies.' 8 Theoretically, upon the expiration of the patent,
this dominant position will diminish and there is the possibility of takeover by new
entrants in the market. In practice, the competitive position enjoyed by the patent
holder out of his exclusive rights obtained under his patents may be difficult to
surmount. After 15 years, it is very likely that the patent owner develops a lead in
know-how and hence a natural head start over its competitors. Secondly, new
entrants can be deterred by their inability to match large incumbent's cost. Thirdly,
there is also the possibility that the patentee may prolong patent protection through
patents of addition.
The practice of patenting and licensing may also result in the increase of prices and
limitation on supply and hence may stifle competition. Patents can be the subject of
abuse and used instead to strengthen market domination as in the case of large firms
blocking effective competition in the market from smaller ones. It is to this
recognition that in the U.K and the U.S principles of fair-competition and anti-trust
are developed to eliminate patent monopoly. In circumstances where patents are
subject to the possibility of abuse,- as in pharmaceutical inventions - governmental
intervention is necessary.
Hence, while a patent itself is not comparable to a monopoly, the monopolistic
tendency of patents needs to be controlled. It is in this perspective that Malaysia has
a long way to go. Currently, there is no legislation controlling patent pooling,
See the skilful presentation of economic understanding of monopoly and patents in Cornish, B,
Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, Sweet & Maxwell, London,
1986 par 1-016 -1020.
18 Taylor & Silberstone, op.cit., p.35.
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cartels, unfair trade practices in licensing and other anti-competitive conduct.
Our discussion will now turn into the position of ownership of patents from an Islamic
perspective. The focus of the study will be the position of profit motive and the
prohibition of hoarding and concentration of market power in Islamic scholarship.
4.	 Islam and ownership of patents
It has been pointed out in the previous chapters that ownership of intellectual property
is consistent with the concept of rights and ownership in Islam' 9. While there is no
disagreement among scholars in support of the acceptance of copyright, patents do
not receive the same treatment. Many reasons can be given for this. First is the
difficulty of applying property concepts to patent. Unlike copyright, patent rights are
not automatic. The prevailing practice among common law jurisdictions is to reward
the person who files the patent first. Secondly, the parameters of patents are
determined by economic considerations and hence, many scholars refrain from
discussing patents from an Islamic economic point of view. As far as the legal
discussion of patents from the Shari'ah point of view, many scholars simply justify
patents on the basis of ',naslahah' without any indepth discussion as to whether
patents fit into an Islamic economic framework.
The Qur'an and the Sunnah do not contain detailed prescriptions on economic matters.
The Prophet himself discouraged Muslims from asking too many questions to avoid
rigidity. Muslims are constantly asked to use their own intellectual skills and
knowledge in conducting their worldly affairs 20. This does not mean that there exists
See ch.3 & 4 on the theoretical framework of ownership of Intellectual Property in Islamic Law.
20 It is obligatory to follow the Prophet (p.b.u.h) in all matters pertaining to religion, but one is free
to act on one's own opinion in matters which pertain to technical skill. Anas reported that the Prophet
happened to pass by the people who had been busy in grafting the trees. Thereupon he said: "If you were
not to do it, it might be good for you (so they abandoned this practice) and there was a decline in the yield.
He (the Prophet) happened to pass by them (and said), "What has gone wrong with your trees? They said:
You said so and so. Thereupon he said: You have better knowledge (of a technical skill) in the affairs of
the world. See Sahih Muslim, (rendered into English by Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, (1975) Sh. Muhammad
Ashraf, Kashmiti Bazar, Lahore, par. Vol 1V ch. cmlxxxvi p.1259.
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a demarcation between worldly and religious affairs. In so far as economic matters
are concerned, ample guidance can be sought from the Qur'an and the Sunnah.
In the first place, ownership of patents can be examined from the perspective of it
being a form of private ownership. At the outset, private ownership and the profit
motive are well accepted in Islam. In many instances the Qur'an urges man to work
and persevere and promise him returns commensurate with his effort. In another
ayah, the Qur'an explicitly enjoins man to seek beneficial returns in the Hereafter
without forsaking material gain22 . The recognition of profit motivation is implicit in
the recognition of private ownership as one of the forms of ownership rights.
At a certain level, this is consistent with the patent system which assumes a free
enterprise system, whereby private ownership is considered as the norm. As the
above economic discussion illustrates, patents are felt as a necessary instrument to
induce private enterprise into engaging in invention and innovation. In contrast, in a
socialist system, private ownership is considered as subsidiary to public ownership
and hence any effort towards material progress should contribute first to the progress
of the society as a whole. 23 Hence, in an inventor's certificate system, inventions
are deemed as state property. As a token of the inventor's contribution, the inventor
will be given monetary compensation for the use of his invention. Conceptually,
while the reward thesis demands the appropriation of private ownership in the
capitalist system, in socialist systems the reward comes in the form of monetary
compensation. Under that system, an inventor has to request a certificate of
21 See for example Q :9:105,
"And say: "Work (righteousness): soon will Allah observe your work, and His Messenger, and the
Believers: Soon will ye be brought back to the knower of what is hidden and what is open: then
will He show you the truth of all that ye did."
22 See Q: 2877,
"But seek, with the (wealth) which Allah has bestowed on thee, the Home of the Hereafter, nor
forget thy portion in this world: but do thou good to thee, and seek not (occasions for) mischief
in the land: for Allah loves not those who do mischief'.
23 Even though the 'modus operandi' of patent and inventor's certificate system differ, Beier argued
that the basic conceptions of patent system are in conformity with the latter system. See Beier, Karl
Friedrich, op.cit.
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authorship from the state. Once the certificate is issued, the use of the invention
shall be vested in the state. The state assume the responsibility of exploiting the
invention with proper returns given to the inventor.24
These distinctions between the Islamic, capitalist and socialist positions are central
to the understanding of the Islamic ownership system. 25 The philosophical
differences stems from the conceptual differences in the understanding of property and
ownership26. While a 'homo islamicus' is encouraged to strive for material progress,
he is constrained by moral and ethical limits. Among others, a 'homo islamicus' is
also expected to contribute towards distributive justice. In this respect, distinction
should be drawn with the socialist system. In the latter system, common ownership
is taken as the norm and an individual is not expected to strive for individual material
progress.
To a certain degree the basic philosophy underlying patents as a tool for material
progress is acceptable and valid. The only problem is the way patent systems operate
nowadays which rewards only the first person to register, as in the case of common
law jurisdictions. The practice may not only be contrary to the concepts of 'adi' and
'ihsan' but also of the labour theory of value as well. However, it has long been
accepted in Islamic scholarship that it is within the privilege of the state to govern
economic matters of the state. Provided that such a practice may lead to a higher goal
24 Compared to the patent system, the inventor's certificate system has its pros and cons. For further
discussion, see the Working Paper On Patent Law Revision, Canadian Department of Consumer and
Corporate Affair, 1976 and other references cited therein.
An Islamic system, it is said, would be free on the one hand of the exploitation and severe
inequalities that characterise capitalism, and on the other hand of the class struggles and intolerable
restrictions that are the hallmarks of socialism. For extensive comparisons, see Yusuf al Qardhawi,
Economic Security in Islam, trans. Muhammad Iqbal Siddiqi (Lahore:Kazi Publications, 1981, first Arabic
ed. 1966) ch.2; Mohammad Abdul Mannan, Islamic Economics; Theory and Practice (Lahore: Sh.
Muhammad Ashraf, 1970), ch.3; Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, Ethics and Economics: An Islamic Synthesis
(Leicester The Islamic Foundation, 1981.
For a detailed exposition of these philosophical distinctions between Islamic economics system,
capitalism and socialism, see as Sadr, Muhammad Baqir, Igtisaduna (Our Economics), (English
translation) World Organization for Islamic Services, Tehran, 1984. See also Beheshti, Ayatollah,
Ownershi p in Islam, (1988) (English translation by Ali Reza Aighani), Foundation of Islamic Thought,
Tehran.
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there is no reason why it should be rejected.
5.	 Islam, wealth and economic parameters
One of the main objective of Shari'ah is the attainment of objectives of religion or
'maqasid'. Among the classical scholars who have discussed this are al-Ghazali27,
Ibn. al Qayyim28 and al-Shatibi. According to this notion, the Shari'ah is
prescribed by God for man for the fulfilment of certain objectives, principally to
advance human interest ('maslahah')30.
For the furtherance of the 'maslahah', Muslim scholars took recognition of the five
essential 'maqasid' as enunciated by al Ghazali i.e faith, life, intellect, posterity and
wealth. 3 ' The order of the five essentials or 'maqasid' is not without significance.
Faith comes first, then come the rest. The application of these rules to patents can
be seen from the weighing process in determining the scope and ambit of patent.
Patents are important as they protect inventors from free riders and unfair competition.
To a certain extent, patents also signify a token of recognition of inventor's rights
over his intellectual creation. In the perspective of the 'maqasid' such an action is
desirable as it is an enhancement of intellect and wealth. However, if the decision
27 Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa mm 'Jim al-Usul, (1937), Cairo. vol.1 pgs. 139,140, cited in Chapra,
Islam and Economic Challenges infra, p.!.
Ibn Qayyim a! JawziyyaltMuhammad ibn. Abi Bakr, J'lam ai-Muwaggi'in, tahqiq Taha Abd Al-Rauf
Sa'd, Bayrut, Dar al-Jil, 1973. vol.3 p.14, cited in Chapra, Islam and Economic Challenges, infra, p.!.
29 See al Shatibi, Abu Ishaq, Al-Muwafagat fi Usul as-Shari'ah, Vol 2. pgs.3-5.
See these 'ayah's:
Al-Anbiyaa: 107,"We sent thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures". 	 -
A1-Jathiyah:20,"these are clear evidences, to men, and a Guidance and a mercy to those of assured faith".
Al-Nahl:90,"AIlah commands justice, the doing of good, and giving to kith and kin, and he forbids all
indecent deeds, and evil and rebellion: he instructs you that ye may receive admonition".
A1-Nisa':58,"Allah doth command you to render back your trusts to those whom they are due and when you
judge between people that you judge with justice:venly how excellent is the teaching which he giveth you!
For Allah is He who heareth and seeth all things".
A1-Anfal:28,"And know ye that your possessions and your progeny are but a trial; and that it is Allah with
whom lies your highest reward".
' See al-Buti, Muhammad Said Ramadhan, Dhawabit aI-Maslahah II as-Shari'ah aI.lsla,niy9ah,
Muassasah al risalah (1982) particularly from pages 75-79 on the authority of the doctrine.
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to grant a patent involves a sacrifice of certain principles of religion, then such
exercise should not be taken. From the order of priority, matters of faith take
precedence, and thus any action or policy which contradicts faith will not be
adopted. We will discuss this further in the context of patenting of human biological
material.
The scholars go further to classify the 'maqasid' to three levels: 'daruriyyah',
'hajiyyah', and 'tahsiniyyah'. What is considered as crucial to the existence of all
the five objectives is of highest importance and classified as 'daruriyyah'
(necessities).32 The 'hajiyyah' pertains to matters which are not essentially pertaining
to the existence of the subject matter but whose non-existence will produce much
hardship. The 'tahsiniyyah' are matters which relate to the embellishment of a right
such as issues of ethics and good conduct in human relations.
Hence, when two competing values are at stake, the one which is of higher level
takes priority. Policy issues which involve matters which are of necessity presides
over 'hajiyyah' and 'tahsiniyyah'. Among matters which are considered as crucial to
the existence of life and intellect of mankind, depending on the level of economic
development in a particular place, must be considered as a basic need. Everything
which is necessary to ensure its fulfilment in all facets of life such as food, medical
facilities and medicine, clothing, housing, education, transport, must be available
for all.
Wealth is considered as one of the objectives of the Shari'ah. Islam encourages the
growth of wealth and supports any initiative taken to improve material progress.
However, market or economic forces alone are not the sole determinants of resource
allocation. While it is valid to use economic criteria in determining the ambit of
patents, other issues should not be forsaken.
32 Islamic scholars put the criteria of 'mm haithu a! wujud wa mm haithu a! ma 'm" (whatever is
essential for the fulfilment/existence of life and whatever deprivation of which, the existencelfulfilment of
life cannot be sustained), for the determination of this classification.
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In the perspective of weighing of interests in determining the scope of patents, it
should be borne in mind that the position of patents within this hierarchy will be
under the last category. Therefore, it is arguable that, the exemptions from patenting
of inventions relating to medicine, pharmaceutical goods and food forms part of
public interest. Even though, the present international agreements, particularly
GAiT, no longer accept those policy criteria, such criteria, if observed, would be
valid in Islam's worldview. However, if distributive justice succeeds in establishing
the threshold standards in a given economy, patents for such subject matter may be
consistent with Islam.
In the understanding of this 'weighing of interests' muslim scholars have developed
these criteria:
(i) what is considered as public interest will take precedence over private interest.
(ii) matters pertaining to 'al-fardhu '(mandatory) will take priority over matters
pertaining to 'al-nawafil'.
(iii) in policy choices which act as a restraint (as contrasted with promotion of
values), the choice is to avoid the greater evil.
(iv) in the field of economic transactions, what is commonly held as the presiding
interest of the whole community of traders ('ahi al-suq') prevails over the
interest of individual traders.
(v) the scholars also look at the chances or the probability of occur'rnce. Hence
one which has the highest chance of occurting should be given priority.33
From the above discussion we have seen the role of profit as a reward to work and
labour. We have also seen that wealth is one of the objectives of the Shari'ah.
Chapra argued that the five essentials of Shari'ah can be adopted as a moral filter
to a well balanced economic system. For the purpose of this chapter, we will apply
the five policy criteria in determining the scope of patents. Analyses have been made
See Al-Buti, Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan, Dawa bit al-Maslahah fi al-Shari'ah al-!slamiyyah, (1986),
Muassasah al-Risa lab, Beirut.
See Chapra. M. Umar, Islam and Economic Challen ges, (1985), The Islamic Foundation,
Leicester.
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to apply natural law and economic theories to delineate the scope of patents. A work
of this kind, being the first of its own, cannot pretend to be comprehensive. Before
that, we will turn to another issue pertaining to patents, i.e that of the association of
patents and monopoly.
6.	 Islam, patents and monopoly.
Islamic sources have laid down rules governing economic activities 35 . One of the
most important behavioural norms in Islam in the field of economic activities is the
rule against hoarding and monopolistic practices36. From Prophetic traditions,
hoarding is forbidden as an act of manipulation of market 37. Hoarding is abhorred
as it increases prices of goods and hence leads to oppression. Most 'hadith 's
concerned relate to the act of hoarding food for consumption. Due to this scholars are
in disagreement as to the scope of the prohibition in the manipulation of circulation
of other goods besides food.
For an exposition of early economic practices in the days of the Four Righteous Caliphs, see
Hasanuz Zaman, S.M, Economic Functions of an Islamic State (The Early Experience) International Islamic
Publishers, Karachi, 1991.
See Quran (ifi: 180) "That which they hoard will be their collar on the Day of Resurrection'.
1. 'Hadith' from al Muwatta- Imam Malik p.296-297
i) Yahya related to me from Malik that he had heard that Umar !bn. al Khattab said:
"There is no hoarding in our market, and men who have excess gold in their hands should not buy up one
of Allah's provisions which he has sent to our courtyard and then hoard it up against us. Someone who
brings imported goods through great fatigue to himself in the summer and winter, that person is the guest
of Umar. Let him sell what Allah wills and keep what Allah wills."
ii) Yahya related to me from Malik from Yunus ibn. Yusuf from Said ibn al-Musayyab that Umar ibn al
Khattab passed by Hatab ibn. Abi Balta'a who was underselling some of his raisins in the market. Umar
ibn. al Khattab said to him," either increase the price or leave our market".
Yahya related from Malik that he had heard that Uthman ibn. Affan forbade hoarding.
2. Sahih Muslim. Abd. Hamid Siddiqi (trans) vol ifi, 1973, S Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar,
Lahore, p.845 Ch.DCXXXIV
i) Ma'mar reported that Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: He who hoards is a sinner.
It was said to Said ibn. al Musayyib): you also hoard, Said said: Ma'mar who narrated this hadith also
hoarded.
ii) Ma'mar ibn. Abdullah reported that Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: no one
hoards but the sinner.
This hadith has been transmiUed on the authority of Sulaiman b. Bilal from Yahya.
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The problem in understanding the nature of monopoly as understood in these Prophetic
'hadith's lies behind the debate on the meaning of 'al-ihtikar'. Even though the
'hadith' specifically prohibits piling of food by merchants as a way of cornering the
market, Muslim scholars have extended that prohibition to any kind of economic
activity which may manipulate the market through the increase of price of goods38.
This is the view of later jurists of Hanafites and modem scholars. 39 The Shaflites
and the Malikites however confme the understanding of 'al-ihtikar' to the literal
meaning and other goods which are considered as main commodities for
consumption40. Such disagreement arose due to the vagueness of the meaning of 'a!-
ihtikar' in early Islamic literature.4'
Modem muslim scholars have outlined three criteria with regard to the prohibition of
hoarding,
(i) included within the prohibition are goods which are within the category of
'essential items'. The meaning of essentials here differs from 'hajiyyah' as understood
within the hierarchy of values mentioned above. One view is that what is considered
as essentials include what is in demand at a particular period. Hence during the time
of war necessary items include armaments and weaponry.42
38 Sadr has broadened the concept further to include hoarding of factors of production. According to
this view if an enterprise produces output lower than the maximum capacity in order to acquire higher
prices, this is hoarding. Hence, leaving a land idle can also be considered as an act of hoarding. His view
has not gained acceptance by other scholars. See Sadr, Muhammad Baqir, Igtisaduna (Our economics),
Vol.2-part 2, (1984) WOFIS, Tehran.
See the views of Abu Yusuf in al-Kharaj The view
is taken from 3 hadiths reported by Ahmad, Abu Maslamah and Umar which condemn the act of increasins'
the price of goods above the market price. See also the views of Ibn al-Qayyim in al-Turug al-Hukmiyyah
at.p.284 who wa at the forefront in the extension of the concept of al-ihtikar
to aLl economic activities which are oppressive. See all these views in al-Sahi, Dr. Shauqi Abdub, al-Mal
wa-Turug Istithmarihi fi al-Islam, (1975) Matha'ah Hissah, Ummul Qura, p.148-ill.
The examples which are quoted beside food are olives, cotton and wool. Support of this
proposition is sought from a hadith reported condemning hoarding of food for a period of forty days, see
al-Sahi, p.153 op.cit.
41 Lisan al-Arab defines hoarding as an act to inflate price. Qamus al Munir defines 'al-ihtikar' as
unjust and eppressive conduct, see al-Sahi, op.cit p.148.
42 See lbn. Taymiyyah, Majmu Fatawa in al Sahi, op.cit.
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(ii) Some scholars stipulate that the activity should take place for at least one year
to be oppresive. This view is based on the literal meaning of the Prophetic 'hadith'
and is not accepted by all jurists.
(iii) Another requirement is that there are no substitutes ready for use in place of
such goods. In this case, Muslim scholars have allowed compulsory purchase of the
hoarded goods. The owners of the goods should be compensated not on the basis of
the inflated price but on the basis of market price. 43 While most scholars agree that
the rights of the owner of the goods should also be safeguarded through monetary
compensation, they differ as to whether compulsory purchase should be done without
the consent of him. Abu Hanifah requires consent or 'al-itt:faq' be sought. Ibn
Nujaim, on the other hand, views that compulsory purchase can be enforced on
owners of goods.
Contemporary scholars have assimilated modern economic understanding of
monopolistic practices to broaden the concept of 'al-ihtikar' to include practices which
are considered as abuse of fair market practices such as restrictive trade practices,
pool agreements, cartels, dumping practices and net price agreements.45
Contemporary scholars agree that the interpretation of the Prophetic 'hadith 's have to
be understood in the context of modern economic practices. These views call for
intervention of government by way of regulating prices to reduce the ill-effects of
unfair trade practices.
See the views of Ibn a! Qayyim, al Qarshi and Ibn Hajar al Haithami in al-Sahi, p.158 op.cit.
See Zaydan, Abdul Karim, Al-Quyud al-Waridah ala al-Milki yyah al.Fardivyah lil-Maslahah a!-
Amah fi ash-Shari'ah al-tslamiyyah, (1982), Jami'ah Ummal, Amman. pgs. 67-68.
4'
See al-Sahi p.154.
The Righteous Caliphs resorted to price control of goods as a move to enjoin fair dealing among
traders and to protect consumers. Regulating price in ordinaiy times are discouraged as the Prophet did not
like imposition of price while market mechanism is the method preferred by him. For a detailed exposition
of this, see in Hasanuz Zaman, S.M, Economic Functions of An Islamic State (The Early Experience),
International Islamic Publishers, Karachi, 1981 Ch.3. Price control is one as the many public duties of
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As far as the nature of patents itself, it is clear that patents per se do not constitute
monopolistic practices. Even though it is arguable that certain practices in patents
have monopolistic tendencies, from the point of view that these monopolistic
tendencies can be curtailed through forms of anti-trust or competition rules, then the
argument that patents necessarily are a form of 'al-ihtikar' is not sustainable47.
With the Islamic prohibition on 'al-ihtikar' we now come to the discussion on the
scope of patents. In this part, we will be arguing that the five essential objectives of
Shari'ah can be taken as a tool for determining the scope of patents.
Part II Factors in determining the sco pe of patents.
In this part we will apply the criteria of policy objectives proposed by al-Ghazali in
determining the scope of patent rights. The order of discussion will be in accordance
to the hierarchy of values enunciated by al-Ghazali. Analyzing patents in this
perspective is important as defining the scope of patents is not a clear cut issue. In
Western literature, the yardstick used to draw the line between patentable and non
patentable subject-matter, with the exception to matters pertaining to public policy,
is principally economic.
7	 Patentability of matters which may be in conflict with 'din' or faith
The first objective of the Shari'ah is the advancement of religion and matters
pertaining to faith. One area in which patenting may result in the conflict with
a state in Islam. See Ibn Taymiyyah (1982) Public Duties in Islam (English Translation b y Mokhtar
Holland), Islamic Foundation, Leicester. 1)4758
It is submitted that the view that authors and inventors rights are forms of monopoly is not valid
and cannot be substantiated with current interpretations of the term 'aI-ihtikar'. See the views by Vadillo,
Umar Ibrahim & Khalid, Faziun M in Trade & Commerce in Islam in Khalid, Faziun & O'Brien, Joanne
(ed) Islam & Ecology, Cassell (1994). The authors argue that the exclusive right of an author or an
inventor is a legal right which guarantees a monopoly. Patents restrict the access of industrial products to
the market and artificially raises the price of patented products by controlling supply. Further, the concept
of Intellectual Property is contraiy to the concept of knowledge whereby all knowledge comes from God.
Finally they argue that it is a means to control the market and therefore is against the Islamic principle of
freedom of transaction.
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religious tenets is that of biotechnological inventions. The argument is that by
allowing patenting of life-forms, man is assuming God's power of creation and hence
raises the theological question of man's relationship with God over other life forms.
Man's dominion over other creatures does not justify the modification, creation and
commercialization of new life forms. Patenting reflects an inappropriate sense of
human control over animal life and an underestimation of the value of non-human life.
Different theological arguments and philosophical theories are embroiled in the issue,
particularly on the ontological status of man vis a vis other life forms. Lower forms
of life such as micro-organisms are not capable of perception and hence can be
manipulated without causing suffering. Certain higher life forms have a restricted
sense of perception and hence due care should be taken to avoid the imposition of
unnecessary suffering. On this point, critics have raised the issue of animal
suffering. Man has long assumed the right to dominate animals for consumption,
transport and experimentation. However, the traditional method of control and
exploitation do not result in the same kind of suffering as that of creating a new genus
of animals through bio-engineering. Many question the development of transgenic
animals in which outcome cannot be predicted in relation to the animals' health and
welfare. Further, critics are also concerned with the environmental impact of releasing
transgenic animals into the wild.
The debate also raises the issue whether by so accepting bio-engineering, man is
reducing life forms to pure matter49. Kass questions the whole concept of creation
See Hoffmaster, Barry, The Ethics of Patenting Higher Life Forms. 4 IPJ, 1988 p.1; Brody.
Baruch A. An Evaluation of the Ethical Arguments Commonly Raised against the Patenting of Transgenic
Animals, unpublished; Moufang, Rainer,Patentability of Genetic Inventions in Animals, 20 UC (1986)
p.823; New Developments in Biotechnology. "Patenting Life",Report by the Congress of the United State
Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, April 1989.
See the view by Kass, Leon Toward A More Natural Science; Biology And Human Affairs,(1985)
The Free Press, New York. He argued that the philosophy behind the current debate over patentability of
life forms is the reduction of all life to mere composition of matter. At p.149 he said:
"consider first the implicit teaching of our wise men, that a living organism is no more than a
composition of matter, no different from the latest perfume or insecticide. What about other living
organisms- goldfish, bald eagles, horses? What about human beings? Just composition of matter?
Here arise deep philosophical questions to which the Court has given little thought; but in its
eagerness to serve innovation, it has, perhaps unwittingly, become the teacher of philosophical
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involving the product of nature. To him, man's ability to change nature is veiy
limited. He argues that "the laws of nature permit prediction and control phenomena,
but they are not of our making and cannot be transgressed. One might say, what
nature's God keeps asunder, no man can put together. Man's ability to change nature
is, in principle and in practice, always consistent with and limited by nature's
unchanging ground.50"
The debate focusses on the issue of whether life forms constitute the proper subject
matter of manufacturing and industry. Further, there is the Judeo-Christian conception
that creation is in essence held in trust and there are limitations to what humans can
do. Man is responsible for preserving the integrity of creation and for working with
it in order to preserve its intrinsic values.
More difficult issues arise in patenting of inventions using human tissues and by
products. Philosophical issues arise as to whether parts of the human body can be
combined with genetic traits of animals. One philosophical argument is to distinguish
between part of human body which constitute man's identity and consciousness and
other parts of human body. The introduction of genes of the human growth hormone
into farm animals to produce greater growth questions the fundamental issue of
sanctity of human worth. Patent law does not contain avenues for theological,
ethical, and methaphysical issues except that of inventions against ordre public and
morality in the EC. It has been argued that patenting of animals should be considered
as unethical. The European Patent Office has been slow to accept such
generalisations5t . On a similar vein, the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabartv
was reluctant to entertain the philosophical question whether patenting of living
materialism - the view that all forms are but accidents of underlying matter, that matter is what
truly is- and therewith, the teacher also of the homogeneity of the given world, and at least in
principle, of the absence of any special dignity in all living nature, our own included."
He argues on page 152:
"Even in true compositions of matter, that is, when chemicals are placed together to produce a
new mixture or compound, nature is commanded only as she is obeyed. The potentialities of given
matter may be exploited, but they cannot be artfully created".
See the decision of the Examining Division in Harvard Onco-Mouse, (1991) 1 EPOR 525.
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matters is morally permissible52.
In Harvard Oncomouse53 's case, a transgenic rodent had been inserted with cancer
virus at an embryonic stage. These transgenic rodents were capable of reproducing
further mice which carried the cancer virus. Arguments were forwarded in the court
on both risks and benefits of genetic engineering for human beings. The court
questioned whether the harm to animals was offset by the prospect of benefit for
human beings. fronically, the court, in balancing the relative risks and benefits was
convinced that allowing patenting of transgenic animal would reduce pain and
suffering of animals by reducing the number of animals used in laboratory researchM.
In interpreting A.53 (a) and (b) of the European Patent Convention 55 , various
propositions came to light56. One view was that the whole field of genetics belonged
to the realm of biology and that consequently, all genetic processes and methods were
-as essentially biological processes - excluded from patents. Another view suggested
52 See the comment at p.23,
"Whether the genetic engineering of animals and human beings is morally pennissible is, on the
other hand, a harder question, one that continually needs to be asked, the objections to genetic
engineering are not, at present compelling. The factors to which these objections require constant
scrutiny, however, and changes in them would warrant a careful reappraisal of genetic
engineering's status. What genetic engineering requires, above all, is moral vigilance."
Decision Onco-Mouse/Harvard, l4thJuly, 1989 (OJ EPO 11/1989, 451; (1990) 1 EPOR 4, OJ
EPO 12/1990, 476; (1990) 7 EPOR 501, (1991) 1 EPOR 525. Opposition has been raised by 16 parties
against the grant of this patent and is still awaiting decision. The grounds of the opposition and the parties
involved are discussed in Jaenichen, H.R and Schrell, A, in The 'Harvard Onco-mouse' in the Opposition
Proceedings before the European Patent Office, (1993) 9 EIPR 345.
The decision by the Examining Division, op.cit above.
A.53 EPC reads: European patents Shall not be granted in respect of:
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to 'ordre public' or morality,
provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited
by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States.
(b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals;
this provision does not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof.
56 Article 53(a) EPC prohibits the grant of European patents for - inventions, the publication or
exploitation of which would be contrary to 'ordre public' or morality, provided that the exploitation shall
not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the
Contract States.
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that biological processes should be confined to natural or uncontrollable processes57.
The view preferred by many is the second one.
With the exclusion of A.53(b), more importance is attached to A.53(a) in filtering
inventions which may be considered as "contrary to 'ordre public' and morality". The
emphasis on A.53 (a) brings forward major difficulties. Beyleveld 58 (1993) highlights
the various interpretations of the section by the differing meaning of the word
'morality', 'ordre public', 'exploitation' and 'publication' 59. The term morality may
refer to cultural morality; or some specified philosophical theory of morality such as
that of utilitarianism, Kantian or Hegelian; or the critical cultural morality which
refers to the manner of the 'right thinking' or 'reasonable man'. While the term 'ordre
public' may refer to the English idea of "public order" offences against which are
constituted by various common law offences such as breaches of the peace, riot,
affray and so on.
Beyleveld suggests that 'ordre public' refers to the structure of social relations
governed by the Rule of Law itself, to the foundations of civil government as such,
whereas "morality" refers to matters of public morality that were not directly
implicated within the idea of the Rule of Law itself. This means that, under Article
53 (a), the examiners must ask, first, whether publication or exploitation of an
invention would threaten the Rule of Law itself, and then whether it is contrary to
public morality.
As to the criterion to be employed in this test of objective morality, he suggests that
of the European Cultural morality as the examiners are not only operating within the
terms of the European patent system but also against the backdrop of an emerging
European Cultural morality.
' See Moufang, op.cit above.
58 Beyleveld, Deryk and Brownsword, Roger Mice, Morality and Patents, CLIP, 1993.
This point will be elucidated in section 7.10.
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He further adds that the current pure technical conception of A.53(a) and (b) is
untenable and maintains that the moral conception of invention involving
biotechnological invention is the preferred approach. He rejects the argument that the
patent office or the court is not the proper forum to resolve the difficult issues of
ethics and morality. To him, the Rule of Law is a matter of concern in any legal
order, regardless of the content of legislation that is enacted within that order.
Thus the examiners have two tasks; firstly, once the biological invention satisfies the
technical requirements, there should be a presumption in favour of granting
application. Secondly, the examiners should carry out a moral balance of the relevant
interests before concluding that the arguments weigh in favour of granting the Onco
Mouse application. The position of the presumption is that it operationalises A.53(a)
in such a way that patentability is barred only where an invention is shown to be
clearly 'contrary to 'ordre public or morality'.
He further argues against the conception that A.53(a) only operates against inventions
which "use" could be against morality. Instead he suggests that 'publication' should
be given its natural meaning and "exploitation' be read broadly to cover the use,
access, and monopolistic concomitants of a grant of a patent.
Beyleveld's view and his interpretation of A.53(a) and (b) reflects the overall concern
of bio-ethics in regulating bio-engineering research. It also illustrates the unsatisfactory
state of moral and ethical concerns in many jurisdictions, particularly the U.K and EC
today. The balancing mechanism proposed by GATT goes even further to include
considerations of "protection of human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid
serious prejudice to the environment"62.
Within this framework and against the uncertainty of the meaning and understanding
of morality in western jurisprudence, it would be totally impossible to adopt the
60 P.63 op.cit.
61 See Beyleveld, p.122. op.cit.
62 Subsection (3) and (4) of A.60.
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approach in the U.K and the EC in this issue without being embroiled with the same
jurisprudential debate. Currently, there exist no direct derogations in the Malaysian
Patent Act 1983. S.13 (b) of the Act excludes plant and animal varieties or essentially
biological processes for the production of plants or animals, other than man-made
living micro-organinzs, micro-biological processes and the products of such micro-
organism processes. In so far as the meaning of the term 'variety' within this
exclusion, Malaysia has adopted the approach in the U.K. With the opening of the
door to biotechnological inventions, a structured approach and philosophy on this
matter is needed.
In this matter, it is submitted that Islam, with its philosophy and views on the
sanctity of life and the relationship between animate and inanimate matter, can be a
possible paradigm. The approach in Islam is not dependent on what is perceived as
immoral according to the popular understanding of 'public morality' or 'critical
morality'. In Islam, moral issues and law are intertwined and therefore moral
concerns are of high significance in Islamic jurisprudence. The criterion of morality
in Islam is God-revealed and hence is free from matters of personal aversion or taste,
arbitrary stands and the like which plague the modern understanding of modern
concept of morality. Before we go deeper into the discussion of Islamic principles on
treatment of animate matter, we now turn to another related issue, that of the
patentability of microorganisms.
7.1	 Patentability of microorganisms
The first case to consider the patentability of microorganism was Diamond v.
Chalcrabarty63 . In this case the U.S Supreme Court held that a bacterial strain in
which a plasmid from another strain had been inserted is a patentable subject matter.
The Court recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and animate
things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human made
inventions.
63 206 USPQ 193-202 (1980).
195
Before that case, inventions involving products of nature were not considered as
patentable as they fell within the domain of nature. The argument was that this type
of invention could not be seen as an invention in the sense of something which is
created and hence coming under the category of discoveriesMt. This has been the
view in the U.K Patent Office and the EPO till the recent breakthrough in genetic
engineering. In Canada, the policy of the Patent Office is that,
"All new life forms which are produced en masse as chemical compounds and
are prepared and formed in such large numbers that any measurable quantity
will possess uniform properties and characteristics are patentable. Patentable
subject matter includes micro-organisms, yeasts, moulds, fungi, bacteria,
actinomycetes, unicellular algae, cell lines and viruses or protozoa."
To overcome the initial objection against patenting of products of nature, the law
draws a distinction between products pre-existing in nature and products which, by
virtue of human intervention can no longer be considered the same as the natural
products67. In that sense, even if the invention involved products in nature, it could
still be considered as an act of creation, i.e creating something which had never
existed before.
The same arguments arose before the Court of Appeal in the U.K in the Genentech's
64 Geneva Treaty on the International Recognition of Scientific Discoveries define the term 'discovery'
as;
"a discovery is the recognition of phenomena, properties or laws of the material universe not hitherho
recognised and capable of verification."
65 See the report prepared by Straus, Joseph for WIPO; Industrial Property Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions, BIG/281 July 1985. He summarised three different approaches to the
distinction between discovery and inventions for products and processes which involved or contained living
matter. Fu-stly, such products represented discoveries and were not patentable inventions. Secondly, if
the pre-existing mixture was of natural origin, such as plant or animal material or a soil sample, such
products were natural materials and therefore not patentable subject matter. Thirdly, such a product/process
was not new since the product existed before. This position did not apply to products which were isolated
or synthetized to be physically different from the mixture available to the public prior to the invention.
Re Application of Abitibi Co. 62 CPR (2d) 81. The claim in this case is directed to a microbial
culture system.
67 See the report by Straus, Joseph, op cit above.
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case. In this case the principal claims of the patent in suit related to a method of
producing the synthetic version of human tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA). By
means of genetic engineering, using a particular route of recombinant DNA
technology, the patentees took the relevant genetic information from the cell line and
expressed it in microorganisms capable of producing t-PA as a therapeutically
acceptable product.
In this case, the applicant's claim depended primarily on whether an invention which
relates to a discovery of phenomena of nature was a patentable subject matter. It was
conceded in the course of argument in the court that the invention would not have
been possible if not for the discovery of the nucleotide sequence of the dNa
corresponding to t-PA. Once this information was known, anyone knowledgeable with
the process of genetic engineering would be capable of producing the synthetic version
of t-PA. The technique which was used to do this was known as part of 'prior art'.
The claim was rejected by Purchas, Dillon L.JJ and Mustill L.J but on different
grounds. Both Purchas L.J and Dillon L.J conceded that a patent which claims the
practical application of a discovery did not relate to the discovery as such and
patentability was not excluded by section 1(2) even if the practical application might
be obvious once the discovery had been made. They however rejected the claim on
technical grounds. Parts of the claims were not claims for the practical application
of the discovery of the sequences but were claims for the discovery itself.
Mustill L.J had no difficulty in accepting patentability of inventions involving
discovery of the laws of nature. To him, whether the combination of a new idea
conceived by an inventor and an obvious application of it could lead to a patentable
new article or process or not, was not germane to the patentability of an invention
founded upon the ascertainment of an existing fact of nature, i.e a discovery. If the
identification of a discovery as a foundation of a patent was not fatal to its validity,
the only available means was reliance on the words "which consists of' in the claim.
Genentech Inc's Patent (1989) R.P.0 147.
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It is now almost settled law that inventions involving new forms of microorganism is
a patentable subject matter provided that the legal and technical requirements of
novelty and non-obviousness are fulfilled. In the U.K itself, patents pertaining to
recombinant DNA molecules of Hepatitis B and C viruses have been recently
upheld. Beside these legal issues, concern has also been raised on the dangers
posed by biogenetics on the environment. These problems may be eliminated through
strict requirements and supervision of bio-genetic research.
With the above discussion on the legal position of bio-genetic inventions, we now
turn to an Islamic conception of nature and the relationship between man and nature.
7.2	 Islam and the concept of creation
This world and whatever in it is an object of dominationtaskhir') from Allah to
mankind and includes animals and plants70. Man is free to exercise this 'taskhir' but
is held responsible for his action 71 . Man can own animals for his own benefit either
See Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc., FSR April 1994, Pt.4 Vol 21 p.202, Pt.4 Vol 21 p.252. p.258, Pt.7
p.448, pt.4 p.458; and Chiron v. Organon (no.2) (1993), F.S.R 324. See also commentary by Jones, Nigel,
Biotechnology Patents: A Change of Heart (1994) 1 EIPR 37 and Kelly, Helen, Biogen's Hepatitis B Patent
Held Valid and Infringed (1994) 2 EIPR 75.
70 22:65 ,"Seest thou not that Allah has made subject to you (men). All that is on earth and the ships
that sail through the sea by His command? He witholds the sky (rain) from falling on the earth except by
His leave: For Allah is Most kind and most merciful to man".
35:39, "He it is that has made you inheritors in the earth, if then, any do reject (Allah), their
rejection (works) against themselves; their rejection but adds to the odium for the Unbelievers in
the sight of their Lord: their rejection but adds to (their own) undoing".
14:33, "And He Hath made subject to you the sun and the moon, Both diligently pursuing their
courses; and the night and the Day hath he (also) made subject to you".
31:20, "Do you not see that Allah has subjected to your (use) all things in the heavens and on earth
and has made His bounties flow from you in exceeding measure, (both) seen and unseen? yet
there are among men those who dispute about Allah without knowledge and without guidance,
and without a Book to enlighten them."
7:32, "Say: Who bath forbidden the beautiful (gifts) of Allah Which he hath produced for His
servants, and the things, clean and pure (Which he hath provided) for sustenance? Say: they are,
in the life of this world, for those who believe, (and) purely for them on the Day of judgement.
thus do we explain the signs in detail for those who understand".
71 7:32, op. cit. foot note No.70.
87:1-2, "Glorify the name of thy Guardian-Lord Most High who hath created and further given
order and proportion".
90:8-10, "Have we not made for him a pair of eyes and a tongue and a pair of 11ps and shown him
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for consumption, transport, labour for work and even for experimentation. Since
man's dominion over nature is a trust from God72, man is held accountable for his
actions. There are limits to these rights and man is consistently asked not to create
'al-fasad' (corruption) out of his economic endeavour. Scholars have used this
authority to support the proposition that among the limits of human's dominion over
nature are:
(i) the duty not to abuse our control over natural resources and nature,
(ii) the duty to preserve the environment,
(iii) the duty to avoid cruelty to animals.
There is thus no fundamental objection against patenting per se of higher life forms
particularly animals and plants. Traditional breeding has long been accepted. There
is no reason to reject genetic engineering simply on the basis that in doing so we are
assuming to 'play God' as long as the purpose of genetic engineering is for a positive
benefit such as producing animals with higher growth and activity, to heal sickness
or any other benefit to mankind.
In this economic endeavour, like other economic endeavours, there are moral
constraints to man's action and these moral constraints outline man's relationship with
nature. Man is expected to respect animals and kindness to animals is a meritous act.
It is recognised in Islam that animals have 'spirit' or soul'. If that is so, there is no
basis in Islam for the conception that animals are merely compositions of matter.
Hence man should take care that experimentation with animals should not subject the
the two highways".
43:10, " (yea, the same that) has made for you the earth (like a carpet) spread out, and has made
for you roads (and channels) therein, in order that ye may find guidance (on the way)".
45:13," And He has subjected to you, as from Him all that is in heavens and on earth: behold, in
that there are signs indeed for those who reflect."
11:6-7, "There is no moving creature on earth but its sustenance, dependenth on Allah: He knoweth
the time and ple of its definite abode and its temporary deposit,, all is in clear record. He it is who
created the heavens and the earth in six days- and his throne was over the waters- that He might uy you
which of you is best in conduct. But if thou went to say to them "Ye shall be raised up after death," the
Unbelievers would be sure to say, "This is nothing but obvious sorcery!"
87:1-2, "Glorify the name of thy Guardian-Lord Most High who hath created and further given
order and proportion".
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animals to unnecessary suffering73.
Secondly, it is reiterated in the Qur'an that the universe and all creation are created
in a sense of order and proportion.74 The Qur'an explicitly recognizes the existence
of laws of nature which cannot be changed by man 75. In this sense, there is an
implicit limit to man's interference with laws of nature76.
Thirdly, it is also acknowledged in the Qur'an that all creations are created in the best
form. These shapes and sizes are not without function. The Qur'an repeatedly warns
of the consequences of interfering with this 'fixed' and 'permanent' reality77.
The Prophet (p.b.u.h) once stopped a group of children who were using a live chicken for target
practice by throwing stones at it and told them that animals are to be treated kindly. According to another
tradition of the Prophet, Allah reserved a place in Hell for a woman who locked her cat out to find her own
food. The Prophet's concern for animals was such that the Prophet insisted that jugular veins be ruptured
using razor-sharp knives to reduce animal's pain.
67:2-3, "he Who hath created Death and Life, that He may try which of you is best in deed and He
is the exalted in Might, Oft-Forgiving. He who created the seven heavens one above another No want
of proportion Wilt thou see in the Creation of Allah Most Gracious, so turn thy vision again: Seest thou
any flaw?"
40:64, "It is Allah who has made for you the earth as a resting place and the sky as a canopy and
has given you shape and made you shape and made your shapes beautiful- and has provided for
you sustenance of things pure and good such is Allah your Lord, so Glory to Allah, the Lords of
the Worlds".
65:12, "Allah is He Who created seven firmaments and of the earth a similar number through the
midst of them (all) descends his command: that ye may know that Allah has power over all things,
and that Allah comprehends all things in (His) knowledge."
10:5-6, "It is He who made the sun to be a shining glory and the moon to be a light (of beauty),
and measured out stages for it: that ye might know the number of years and the count (of time).
No wise did Allah create this but in truth and righteousness (thus) doth He explain His signs in
details, for those who understand. Verily in the alternation of the night and the day and in all that
Allah Hath created, in the heavens and the earth, are signs for those who fear Him."
15:16, "It is We Who have set Out the Zodiacal Signs in the heavens and made them fair-seeming
to (all) beholders".
76 Here we tend to agree with Kass proposition that man cannot claim in any invention involving
natural products/process as entirely his own creation. This however does not mean that man cannot claim
rights over his sweat and labour.
54:59, "Verily, all things have we created in proportion and measure".
36:38-40, "And the sun run its course for a period determined For it, that is the decree of (Him)
the exalted in Might, the All knowing. And the Moon- we have measured for it Mansions (to
treverse) till it returns like the old (and withered) lower part of a date stalk. It is not permitted to
the Sun to catch up the Moon, nor can the Night outstrip the Day, Each (just) swims along in (its
own) orbit (according to Law)".
67:2-3, "he Who hath created Death and Life, that He may try which of you is best in deed and
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The question whether modification of animate matter through genetic engineering is
morally permissible in Islam would depend on the interpretation of those ayahs. One
view would be that the warning against interference of nature would indicate the
absolute prohibition of all kinds of such activities. This rigid approach towards science
has been ruled out and rejected by many scholars in the context of narrow
permissibility of use of contraception methods. It is submitted that the preferred
approach would be a cautious one. While Islam allows the use of science to change
what is in existence in nature, the Qur'an warns us of the danger and risk of changing
what is created naturally. The attitude of Islam is that of caution, allowing the
interference of nature when it is necftssary and safe, taking into account all factors.
It has been elucidated earlier that there exist numerous risks to bio-engineering
particularly in relation to the suffering of animals and the risks to the environment.
It is often recognised that modern science has not come up with a method which
guarantees the absence of harm to animals. There is a need to be mindful of the
disasters that have occurred in bio-engineering research such as that of pigs which
have been inserted with a human growth hormone gene78 or that of daiiy cattle which
were injected with growth hormone to improve milk yields79.
Further, as is clear from the Prophetic 'hadith's, Islam asks for the observance of
certain rules over the treatment of animals, such as that against unnecessary suffering.
Our treatment of animals would have to satisfy this basic requirement. The approach
is not that of rigid prohibition against harm to animals. The preferred approach which
He is the exalted in Might, Oft-Forgiving. He who created the seven heavens one above another
No want of proportion Wilt thou see in the Creation of Allah Most Gracious, so turn thy vision
again: Seest thou any flaw?"
87:1-2, "Glorify the name of thy Guardian-Lord Most High who hath created and further given
order and proportion."
25:2, "He to whom belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth: no son has he begotten,
nor has He a partner in his dominion, it is he who created all things and ordered them in due
proportions."
pigs that result grow faster and are leaner than naturally bred pigs, but they suffer from crossed
eyes and severe arthritis in the joints and are susceptible to disease. See Hoffmaster, p.8 op.cit.
After the injection of Bovine Somatotrophin, the dairy cattle tended to keel over after two years
of gargantuan production. Pigs, injected with a similar wonder drug, froze to death because they grew so
much lean meat they couldn't keep warm. See Hoffmaster, p.8 op.cit.
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has been adopted by Muslim scholars in cases like this is that of 'weighing of harm
and benefit'. In this matter, there is a grain of truth in the proposition tendered in the
court in Diamond v. Chakrabart y8° that what genetic engineering needs is a constant
moral vigilance81 . Hence the call for a more detailed study to be carried out at the
community level into the use of transgenic animals, effective inspection arrangements,
the question of what constitutes an animal species, a stock or a breed is a sensible
one indeed.
Having established the cautious middle approach of Islam, the next concern would
be the forum to address these issues. In this perspective, it is difficult to sustain the
proposition that the court is not a proper forum for assessing all the advantages and
ill-consequences arising from patenting of higher life forms82. In Islam the
resposibility to uphold religious precepts of law and justice is a 'lard kfayah'
(community obligation). Therefore, in relation to the court, all factors should be
considered, not only calculating the economic advantages but also the moral
constraints set up above83 . The proposition given by Deryk is particularly attractive
in this respect. He argues that not only the use of bio-genetic inventions should be
regulated but also its exclusionary and monopolistic aspect, access and publication.
In this way, not only is the process of bio-engineering supervised but also its potential
use.
80 Op.Cit. See note 63.
81 See the Court's comment in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, op.cit.
82 The Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty commented that:
"the grant or denial of patents on micro-organism is not likely to put an end to genetic research or its
attendant risks. The large amount of research that has already occured when no researcher had sure
knowledge that patent protection would be available suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to
patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any more than Canute could
command the tides. Whether respondent's claims are patentable may determine whether research efforts are
accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want of incentives, but that is all".
83 The Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty op. cit was of the view that public forum was the best place
to conduct the debate about genetic engineering - the debate should be placed in its proper perspective on
the much broader concerns on the future of genetic manipulation in both sentient animals and humans. It
is submitted that this should not be the only forum available to adress the issue.
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Transgenic animals should be allowed if they are of overall use to man, particularly
in the field of scientific research, medicine and agriculture. This is in so far as the
transgenic animals are not produced from the combination of human genes and animal
genes. Combining human genes and tissues may give rise to other objections such as
that of sanctity of human dignity.
Having discussed Islam's point of view on bio-engineered animals, we now turn to
the patenting of human tissues, genes and parts of the human body.
7.3	 Patenting of human tissues, genes and other part of human body
In Western literature, the dispute between those who believe that commercialization
of the human body is justified and those who think it is not seems mostly to be an
argument between those who accept a dualistic view of the separation between body
(material, physiological being) and mind (immaterial, rational being) and those who
do notM. In so far as the religious views are concerned, the 'Judeo-Christian
tradition' emphasizes on the concept of "imago dei" or the image of GOd85.
Therefore there are limits on what human beings can do with their own bodies. The
study conducted by the United States Office of Technology AssTient concludes that
the religious implications of these views depends on the distinction between ethically
acceptable and ethically prefetlable policies and practices. Hence, according to the
report, even though these traditions preferred explicit gifts and donations, they did not
preclude tacit gifts, sales, abandonment and appropriation86.
The secular view focusses mainly on the recognition or refutation of proprietary rights
84 For example Paul Ramsey believes that human beings exist in their bodies and that respect for the
body is indivisible from respect for the person. While Joseph Fletcher argued that the body appears to be
merely a necessary condition for the pursuit of the truly important things about being human. Its
significance is only instrumental, not essential. For the whole arguments, see New Developments in
Biotechnology: Ownership of Human Tissues and Cells, Office of Technology Assessment Task Force,
Science Information Resource Center, 1988 ; par. Ch.8.
85 For an analysis of this issue in Jewish Law see Katz, P. Arie, Patentability of Living Within
Traditional Jewish Law: Is the Harvard Mouse Kosher?, American Intellectual Property Association, No.2
(1993) Vol.21:117.
See New Developments in Biotechnology: Ownership of Human Tissues and Cells, op.cit.
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in human tissue. The arguments analyse the various legal rights a person has over his
or on other's body. The argument is that the right vested in the surviving spouse or
next of kin of a deceased person is a quasi property right and not a mere executor's
right. The proponents of this view argue that human tissue can be regarded as
personal property so as to enforce possession, to prevent damage and destruction, for
the purposes of criminal offences such as theft, and for the purposes of bailment87.
While this view has its attractions, it is our view that the present debate of the use
of human body materials cannot be seen purely within the context of personal
ownership. Religious and ethical issues should not be disregarded.
The issue of ownership of human biological materials first became of concern in
Moore v. University of California88, a case involving the struggle between the
tangible ownership of tissues and the intangible right of Intellectual Property. The case
involved an allegation of conversion of bodily tissues. The plaintiff, John Moore,
underwent treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at the medical Center of the University
of California at Los Angeles. As part of his treatment, a certain amount of bodily
substances were extracted which included blood, bone marrow aspirate and other
bodily substances and later his spleen was removed. The removal of the spleen was
necessary to his health. The spleen was found to contain a special cell-line which
produced lymphokines at a very high rate. Unknown to Moore, his improved "MO
cells" were developed to produce lymphokines commercially and later patented by
Moore's physician and the university of California. The physician and the university
were quoted to be benefitting up to 3 billion dollars from the commercialization of the
MO cells. The court agreed that there was a breach of fiduciary duty and lack of
informed consent but disagreed whether a right of conversion exists. This is because
for a right of conversion to exist, there must be actual interference with one's
87 See Magnusson, Roger.S, The Recognition of Pro prietary Rights in Human Tissue in Common Law
Jurisdictions, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol.18 June 92 p.601 par. p.629. This view is gaining
popularity and is being reiterated by many other writers. It is not within the province of this chapter to
review the various cases on the legal position of human body parts. See also the reservations made by
Moufang on the proprietoiy approach, Moufang, Rainer, Patentin g of Human Genes. Cells and Parts of the
Body?the Ethical dimensions of Patent Law, UC Vol.25. No.4/1994.p.487.
15 USPQ 2d, 1753.
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property and ownership. Recognising conversion to arise in this case would have been
to confer rights of property over one's body, a result which the majority of the judges
in this case strongly opposed89.
Another reason which was given for the refusal of the recognition of proprietory rights
was the fear that this may impede research and free exchange of biological material.
Thirdly, they viewed an action for breach of fiduciary duty as adequate to remedy the
situation in this case. Fourthly, they viewed that there was no pressing need to extend
the conversion concept to cases like this. This was an area where legislative action
was the best mode9°. Fifthly, the proposition that Moore might own his cells was
contrary to patent law, which constitutes an authoritative determination that the cell
line was the product of invention.
The dissenting judgement of Broussard J emphasised different issues 91 . To him, the
case was not whether a patient generally retained an ownership interests in a body part
after its removal from his body, but rather whether a patient had a right to determine,
before a body part was removed, the use to which the part would be put after
removal. Broussard J made an interesting observation,
"as a matter of policy or morality, it would be wiser to prohibit any private
individual or entity from profiting from the fortuitous value that adheres in a
part of a human body, and instead to require all valuable excised body parts
to be deposited in a public repository which would make such materials freely
89 See Arabian J p.1768 of the case, op.cit,
"plaintiff has asked us to recognise and enforce a right to sell one's body tissue for profit. He entreats us
to regard the human vessel- the single most venerated and protected subject in any civilised society- as equal
with the basest commercial commodity. He urges us to commingle the sacred with the profane. He asks
much".
90 See the comments made by the judge at p.1765 of the case, op.cit, "Unfortunately, to extend the
conversion theory would utterly sacrifice the other goal of protecting innocent parties. Since conversion is
a strict liability tort, it would impose liability on all those into whose hands the cells come, whether or not
the particular defendant participated in, or knew of, the inadequate disclosures that violated the patient's
right to make an informed decision. In contrast to the conversion theory, the fiduciary-duty and informed-
consent theories protect the patient directly, without punishing innocent parties or creating disincentives to
the conduct of socially beneficial research".
91 For the purposes of this discussion, the observations made by Mosk J will not be dealt with here.
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available to all scientist for the betterment of the society as the whole".92
We now discuss the Islamic point of view on usage of body parts.
74	 Islam and the sanctity of human dignity
7.4.1 Islam and ownership of human body
In Islam, man cannot be said to own his body in the sense of an exclusive right to
deal, enjoy and dispose of his body. Muslim scholars have discussed the position of
the ownership of human parts in the context of donations of human organs. For the
purpose of this study, it is felt that the work by Professor Yaseen is particularly
instructive and illuminating93. Classical scholars were extremely cautious on the issue
of possible acts vis-a vis human organs. The basic rule in their discussion is that the
utilization of parts of the human body is forbidden ('haram'), whether such
transactions occur through sale or otherwise. The rationale of the prohibition is either
to protect human dignity and value or because no legitimate use can be made of the
parts.
It is pertinent to our discussion that the views of classical scholars on the selling and
buying of human parts is repeated here.
Al Mirghenani says:" It is not permitted to sell a human being's hair or utilize
it in any way, because humans are highly dignified, therefore no part
92 p i 774 of the case, op.cit. For an ethical analyses of genetic engineering involving human biological
material, see the analysis by Moufang, R in Patenting of Human Genes, Cells and Parts of the Body - The
Ethical Dimensions of Patent Law, 25 IIC No.4/94 p.487-5 15.
See Yaseen, Dr. Mohammad Naeem, The Rulings For The Donation of Human Organs In the Light
of Shari'a Rules and Medical Facts, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol.5, Part. 1 Feb 1990, p.49-87. See also the
discussion by Chaim, Vardit Rispler, Islamic Medical Ethics in the Twentieth Centur y, EJ.BriII, Leiden
(1993) Ch.4 on organ transplantation. See also the work of Isam, Ghanem, Islamic Medical Jurisprudence,
Med. Sd. Law (1981) Vol.21, No.4 p.275-287 for further details on Islamic junstic works and manuals on
Islamic medical jurisprudence. While the classical works have underlined the basic philosophical
underpinnings of medical treatment and methods, these principles can be further developed to answer some
of modern issues pertaining to medical jurisprudence. See Isam's further work in The Response of Islamic
Jurisprudence to Ectopic Pregnancies, Frozen Embryo Implantation and Euthanasia, Arab Law Quarterly,
pt. 4 Nov. 1989, p.345-349.
See p.51 of Prof.Yasseen's work.
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therefrom should be undignified or demeaned..."95
Al-Kassani says, "Human bones and hair should not be permitted to be sold,
not because of their uncleaness ('nadjassarihi'), as such parts are determined
to be clean in the Prophetic tradition, but out of respect for human organs;
the demeaning of such human organs through their sale is a form of
humiuiation".
Al Kassani also prohibits the sale of maternal milk. He says, "it is forbidden
to sell a mother's milk, as it is part of the human body, and as such it is
worthy of the highest respect and dignity, and it is not dignified or respectable
to demean the human body by making it an object of selling and buying"97.
The Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h) is reported to have said:" the breaking of
a dead person's bones is just like the breaking of his bones while alive"98.
Against the restrictive approach of classical scholars, Prof. Yaseen argues for the
permissibility of transplant and the donations of body parts for medical purposes. He
points out that acts involving human organs become a violation of human dignity only
when these are taken from him to be used in the way animals and inanimate objects
are used, such as the use of human skin to make garments or bags, or the cutting of
an organ to be consumed as food, or the use of bones to make tools and instruments
or the use of human blood as a drink, dye, etc.
Secondly, he argues that the classical jurists' position has to be understood in the
Al-Hidavati, Part II, p.34 cited in Yaseen, p.5! op.cit.
A1-Badai, Part V. p.142. cited in Yaseen p.51 op.cit.
A1-Bada'i, Part V p.145, cited in Yaseen, p.5l, op.cit.
98 Reported by Ahmed and Abu Daud, aI-Fareh a1-Rabbai Part VIII, p.89; cited in Yaseen p.53
op.cit.
See Yaseen, p.58 op.cit.
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context of the amount of knowledge available at their time regarding diagnosis,
therapy and surgery.
He suggests a cautious approach to the issue. First, he calls for the assessing of the
relative risks and benefits and the rule of choosing the least of two harms in order to
reject the worse of the two. The permissibility of donating human biological material
must not cause harm to the donor. Secondly, the process of transplantation should
likely to be successful. Thirdly, the rule varies for the type of organs donated. Most
importantly, he argues against the commercialization of body parts as to "demean
human dignity". To him human organs cannot be evaluated in terms of financial gain.
Attributing financial gains ('al-maliyyah') to something, presupposes the fulfilment
of two conditions for the jurists, these are first, that this object should in fact be
exploitable and useful; second, that Islamic religious law should have permitted its
exploitation in many possible ways and not under compulsion or a need that demeans
it'®.
7.4.2 The case for a cautious approach towards patenting of inventions involving
parts of human body
The above discussion on the permissibility of donations of human parts carries many
observations which are of importance.
(i) The law recognise that for purposes of protection of human dignity, certain
use of body parts are not permitted. This does not mean that research for good causes
are not allowed, only that they are qualified.
(ii) As part of this protection of human dignity, sale of body parts is not allowed.
In the context of donation of human organs, it is by way of gift and not sale. In this
context it has been pointed out earlier that there should not be any profit ing from any
wealth produced by the commercialization of human body parts. As human body
parts are not considered as legitimate property, any purported sale involving those
Sec Yaseen p.67 op.cit.
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materials would not be valid.
(iii) The body of a person is linked with two types of rights; that of the individual
and that of God'°'. The former comes in the form of the limited rights to be
washed before burial, shrouding, prebunal prayers, absolution prayers and keeping
the body from being mutilated. The latter comes in the form of right against suicide
and against harming oneself. The right of God can only be waived in certain
circumstances such as in the case of saving other lives. Hence in this context, and
in the light of (i) and (ii), the usage of body parts is restricted only to good cause.
Usage of body parts for the purpose of researching the causes of, and to heal, sickness
is allowed so long as the benefit to mankind offsets its possible hann. In all instances,
the rule of choosing the least of two harms will be applicable.
(iv) With the restrictive interpretation of man's ownership over his body, it is
questionable that body parts can be the subject of property rights or exclusive rights
in Intellectual Property. The preferred view is that as research using human materials
is allowed, it should not be the subject of private ownership.
(v) As stated earlier, a person does not have an absolute right over his body due
to the linkage with God's right. Muslim scholars have, however, drawn
circumstances whereby these rights can be waived and transferred provided that the
requirements in the Shari'ah pertaining to them are fulfilled' 02. Among the
requirements is that this right to waive God's right in a body belongs only to that
person. Thus only he has a say in determining the use of his body parts, both during
his life and after his death. This rule is particularly important in the context of
Moore's case above.
101 See Yaseen, op.cit p.59 where he cited the view of AL-hz ibn Abd al-Salaam of Qawa'id a!-
'Ahkam. Part 1, p.30.
102 See the views of Ibn a!-Jawziyya, Al-Qaraffi and Al-hz Ibn Abd al-Salaam cited in Yaseen p.63
op.cit.
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(vi) The Qur'an describes man as 'the best of all creations' 103• Compared to
animals, man is endowed with intellect and is repeatedly asked to act in accordance
with his dignity. To introduce human genes into animals to enhance the growth of
animals may not be acceptable as it is contradictoiy to human dignity. The objection
against such practice in that we are using human parts in the way animals and
inanimate matter are used and hence by so doing we are blurring the distinction
between man and animals. Hence to exclude patenting of inventions which are against
the dignity of man accords with the dictates of the Qur'an.
7.4.3 The need for specific derogations for inventions contrar y to the dictates of
Shari' ah
Earlier, it has been submitted that the approach adopted by the EC and GATF is open
to too many shades of interpretations as to concepts of morality. Here, it is suggested
that the approach adopted by the Gull Cooperation Council ('GCC')'° 4 would be
more in line with the dictates of the Shari'ah. In Saudi Arabia and Oman, direct
derogations of inventions contrary to the dictates of Shari'ah is provided. Article 9 of
the Saudi Arabia Patent law states;
A patent shall not be granted if the invention itself or its use is contrary to
the Islamic 'Shari'ah'; any patent to the contrary shall be abrogated. Save
those patents which are contrary to Islamic 'Shari'ah', the granting of a patent
to an interested party may not be withheld according to this Law."
Article 2(1) of the Oman Patent Law states that:
103 32:7, "He who has made everything which he has created most good: he began the creation of
man with (nothing more than) clay".
22:5, "0 mankind! If ye have a doubt about the reurection, (Consider) that We have created
you out of dust, then out of sperm, then out of a tech-like clot, then out of a morsel of flesh,
partly formed and partly unformed, in order that we may manifest (Our power) to you; and We
cause whom we will to rest in the wombs for an appointed term, then do we bring you out as
babes, then (foster you) that ye may reach your age of full strength; and some of you are called
to die, and some are sent back to the feeblest old age, so that they know nothing after having
known (much) and (further), thou seest the earth barren and lifeless but when we pour down rain
on it, it is stirred (to life), it swells, and it puts forth every kind of beautiful growth in pairs".
104 The GCC members are : Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
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"The patent of invention shall be patentable in accordance with this Law and
its Implementing Regulations if it is novel, inventive, and industrially
applicable and if is not incompatible with the provisions of the Islamic
'Shari'ah', public order or public morals in the GCC countries."
Within this framework, the recommendations given by the former European Council
report on the legal protection of biotechnology were sound and va1id'°. According
to the report, on principle the group saw no ethical grounds for opposing the
patentability of inventions relating to living matter, even though there were certain
types of genetic manipulation which should in its view, be strictly prohibited. These
were:
i. processes for modifying the genetic identity of the human body for non
therapeutic purpose which are contrary to the dignity of man (implicit
reference to cloning and chimera-production, etc)
ii. patenting of the human body or parts of the human body per Se.
8	 Patentability of matters affectin g life
8.1	 Patentability of food and pharmaceutical inventions
It has been pointed out earlier that items which are essential to the preservation of life
are considered as 'hajiyyah', even though not 'daruriyyah'. In the context of patent,
the same concern arises in inventions pertaining to food items and pharmaceutical
product. Not many countries still exclude food and medicine from patents with the
105Ethical Questions Arisin g From the Commission's Proposal For a Council Directive on Legal
Protection for Biotechnological Inventions.(Date 30.09.1993). It should be noted that the Commission's stand
on this matter have been overturned in the European Parliament in Feb this year prior to the regulation's
rejection by the European Parliament recently. Under the terms of the January 23 compromise agreement,
there will be a possibility to patent an invention including parts lending themselves to industrial application
and obtained by technological means from the human body in such a way that they are no longer directly
related to a specific individual. Source: European Intelligence, February 7, 1995 This European Directive
has been axed by the European Parliament in Brussels. See Science, Vol. 267, 10th. March 1995 p.1417.
For reasons underlying the rejection see the comments by Roberts, Tim, The Former Biotech. Patents
Directive; Council Common Position 4/94: Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions,
Patent World, May 1995 p.27-33.
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exception of a few, among them Korea and India' 06. Under the old law, Korea
excluded inventions relating to food and drinks or articles appealing to the sense of
taste as well as inventions of substances manufactured by the process of
transformation of the atomic nucleus'°7. Under the Indian Patents Act 1970, in the
case of inventions claiming substances for use, or capable of being used, as food or
as medicines or drugs; or inventions relating to substances prepared or produced by
chemical processes no patent is granted in respect of claims for the substances
themselves but patents can be granted for the method of manufacture.
The old U.K Patent Act of 19 19-1946 excluded claims for substances intended for
food or medicine. After the repeal of the law in 1949 patenting of food and medicine
was made possible. Stringent provisions were added to prevent the owner of a patent
relating to food or medicine from restricting the use of the invention. It was easy to
obtain compulsory licence. The onus of proof was on the patentee to show that there
were special reasons why the compulsory licence should be refused. The Comptroller
also supervised the price of food and medicinal items to ensure that these items were
available to the public at the lowest price consistent with the patentee's deriving a
reasonable advantage from the patent rights'08.
In Islam, one of the social duties of the state is to guarantee a minimum level of
living. A part of this social duty is to ensure that food and medical items are well
circulated and easily accessible. This collective caring obligation stems from the fact
that Muslims are a community in faith and as a community they are obliged to help
one another'°9. Further, Muslim scholars are in consensus that if a person is caught
106 For a list of countries which exclude pharmaceutical products, see the survey by Sinnott, John,
Pharmaceuticals IP Portfolios, Managing Intellectual Property, issue 36/94 p.20.
107 This is the position under the old law of No.950 of Dcc 31, 1961). The 1990 Act has wholly
amended this law. Under the current law, patents on food products is allowed.
See Meinhardt, P., Inventions, Patents and Mono poly, Stevens and Sons, London, 1950.
109 See Surah 5:2 ; "....help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another
in sin and rancour Fear Allah: for Allah is strict in punishment"; and
Surah 9:71; "The Believers, men and woman, are protectors, one of anothec they enjoin what
is just, and forbid what is evil; they observe regular prayers, practice, regular charity, and obey
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stealing during famine he should not be punished with 'hudud'.
This duty of need fulfilment should not be seen as a strong reason to deny patenting.
As long as patenting does not affect the supply of food and medical items, there is
no reason to deny patenting altogether. Hence we see in many countries, strong rules
of compulsory licensing and licences of rights are provided to ensure that the supply
of food and medical items are sufficient.
However, there is one concern from the patenting of medical items, that is the price
of patented drugs. The problem is particularly serious in countries which depend
totally on foreign pharmaceutical goods such as Malaysia. From an old report in
Malaysia, 74% of the drugs used are imported. Drugs produced by transnational
corporations dominate the market; vitamins and tonics, antibiotics, analgesics and
anti-tussives. These problems can be satisfactorily resolved through a comprehensive
drug policy whereby the price of essential drugs items are regulated.
8.2	 Patentability of methods of medical treatment
The case against patenting of food and pharmaceutical products may not be as
compelling as the case against methods of medical treatment. Patenting does not
necessarily lead to restricted availability of the items but it may lead to the increase
of prices of the patented products compared to the non-patented ones. So long as the
price of patented food and pharmaceutical items are regulated, the normal rule would
be that there was no substantive objection against the patenting of these two items.
In other circumstances such as famine or the outbreak of war, which necessitates the
availability of patented products and processes the rule would be that compulsory
licences should be allowed and easily obtainable to avoid hardship.
The approach to inventions pertaining to methods of medical treatment of the human
Allah and his Messenger. On them will Allah pour His mercy: for Allah is exalted in power,
wise.'
110 See Utusan Konsumer Jan.1986.
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body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal
body, are treated differently. As the court in NRDC v. Conmlifsoner of Patents"
rightly observed:
"Part at least of the premises on which the observation were made was that
surgery or other processes for treating the human body were of their nature
essentially non economic. The national economic interest in the product of
good surgery and therefore in the advancement of its techniques - if in no
other respect than that the repair and rehabilitation of members of the work
force, including management in that grouping, is both obvious and may be
regarded as sufficiently proximated, in my opinion, as to be capable of
satisfying the economic element of an invention, if no other elements are
present and no impediments exist to the grant"."2
Public health and social ethics demand that any treatment be made free without having
to consult the inventor of the treatment. It is inconceivable that a surgeon is not free
to make the choice of treating his patients with whatever methods he deems proper.
A surgeon is committed to the Hippocratic Oath to tend to his patients by whatever
methods available. It is thus legitimate in this case that the interests of the public are
weighed to those of the proprietor of medical treatment. Secondly, the patenting of
the medical process causes harm to physician-patient confidentiality. If a medical
process is subjected to a patent licence, hence requiring the disclosure of patient's
condition. This will inhibit a patient from giving full disclosure of his condition to
the doctor and will obviate accurate diagnosis. Thirdly, patenting may affect the
methodology of scientific interest. If an innovation of medical treatment is
monopolised by an individual, this will inhibit disclosure or the publication of the
research findings. It could also restrict independent, unbiased evaluation by other
investigators who might be denied a licence to confirm or refute the observation of
' I ' (1973) RPC p.59.
112 NRDC V. Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, par. p.62. In this case claim for cosmetic
treatment for changing the appearence of the human body or of parts of it is patentable and is not of a like
kind of medical prophylactic or therapeutic processes or methods.
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the group having the patent." 3 Faced with this weighing duty, many jurisdictions
particularly in the common law countries, deny the patentability of medical
treatment' This rationale is accepted in the Commonwealth jurisdictions in the
case of Joos v. Comniisioner of Patents In Canada, the same principle can be
seen in Re Application of Regents of the University of Minnesota."6 The Patent
law in Malaysia has a specific exclusion for methods of medical treatment."7
113 See Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer The Perils of Patenting, Hastings Center Rep, June 1984,
at 26, quoted by Burch, Gregory.F, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical Process. 65 Texas
Law Review, 1987 p.1 139.
"i' A.52(4) of the European Patent Convention
"Methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practised
on the human or animal body shall not be regarded as inventions which are susceptible of industrial
application. This provision shall not apply to products, in particular substances of compositions, for use
in any of these mathods".
UK PA 1977, S.4(2):"An invention of treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy or of
diagnosis practised on the human or animal body shall nt be taken to be capable of industrial application".
See also the former E.0 Draft Directive on Legal protection of Biotechnological Inventions (October 1988)
Draft Art. 18: (note that this Draft has been axed by the European Parliament, see footnote 104 ibid):
"Any exclusion from patentability or from the field of industrial applicability or surgcal or diagnostic
methods practised on an animal body shall apply to such methods only if practised for a therapeutic
purpose."
A.8 of the Common Position provides:
"A process comprising a succession of steps shall not be excluded form patentability merely on the grounds
that on or more of the steps involve a method of treatment of the animal body by surgery or therapy or a
diagnostic method practised on the animal body. This treatment or diagnostic method shall not, however,
be protected as such".
" (1973) RPC p.59. Court held that cosmetic processes and methods for improving the human body
or part of it can satisfy the requirement of an invention under the Patents Act 1952-1966.
116 (1990) 10 EIPR D-195, 29 CPR (3d) 42. The Court rejected a claim for a method for inhibitng the
side effects in live mammals and other multicelular organims when treated with certain platinum compounds
to inhibit tumour growth. See also the case of Wellcome Foundation Ltd v. Commisioner of Patents(1979)
2 NZLR 591 in New Zealand .On appeal the decision was reversed, see (1983) NZLR 385. On the basis
of a 'balancing exercise', Cooke J described that there was a deep seated sense that the art of the physician
or the surgeon in alleviating human suffering "does not belong to the area of economic endeavour or trade
or commerce" (p.388 and 389).
See S.13(1) (d) of the 1983 Act.
(1) Notwithstanding the fact that they may be inventions within the meaning of S.12, the following shall
not be patentable:
(d) methods for the treatment of human oranimal body by surgery or therapy, and diagnostic methods
practised on the human or animal body:
provided that this paragraph shall not apply to products used in any such methods"
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Many criticisms are levelled against this policy. Their argument lies on the fact that
if innovation in the medical process is not given the proper reward, no effective
incentive would be available for any research in the medical process especially with
the increase of the cost of innovation of new medical procedures. Secondly, it is
illogical that pharmaceutical products can be patented and not methods of medical
treatment' 18 Thirdly, since the main ethical objection against patenting of medical
treatment is the issue of access, patenting should be allowed provided such medical
treatment be made available easily.
Burch rejected the deontological analysis whereby medical process patents are
inherently bad because they derogate other ultimate values. Instead he applied the
instrumentalist view on the basis that people do not value the interests infringed by
the medical process patents as ends in themselves, but rather as instrumentalities to
the greater good of improved health. As a matter of principle he argued that at the
juncture between property rights and human health, there should be a bias in favour
of the greater availability of medical innovations, privacy of the patient, and
openness of research methodology. Thus, given, that all these ethical objections are
alleviated, the practical effect of patenting should be acceptable. One of the option
is to dictate mandatory/automatic licensing requirements. This will facilitate the
expectation of the proprietor of the patent for a reasonable profit. No discrimination
in terms of the prospective licensee occurs and hence a surgeon would be able to
fulfill his obligation effectively. To facilitate access, once patented, such treatment
should be made easily available through a system of automatic licensing"9.
Another critic Moufang, argued that the present difficulties posed by patenting of
medical treatment is not sufficient to justify its prohibition.
"The main question is whether protection for medical methods would result in
118 See Gruber, S and Kroher,J., Patentabilit y of Pharmaceutical Inventions- a Comparison of the
Legal Situation in Germany and Some Common Law Countries, Pt.! (1984) 15 UC 588; Pill (1984) 15
UC p.726.
119 See Butch, Gregory F, Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical Processes, 65 Texas
Law Review 1987 p.1'39.
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the serious danger that in a concrete case members of the medical profession
would have to deny medical treatment or make do with inferior method.
Every attempt to find a definitive answer to this question necessarily contains
an element of speculation."
According to him, the difficulties posed by allowing patenting can be overcome
through the present available methods such as compulsory licensing or an order for
use in the interest of public welfare. Privilege of necessity can always be relied on
in instances of emergency and when there is no sufficient time to seek the licence or
consent of the patentee'20.
The policy prohibition against the patenting of medical methods has been construed
narrowly in case law decisions. Hence, a distinction is drawn between treatment for
therapeutic and cosmetic purposes' 21 . The test is whether " the purpose of the
application of the body whether of a substance or a process must be the arrest or cure
of a disease or diseased condition or disabiity") Hence methods of contraception
are not considered as 'medical treatment' in the strict sense of curing or preventing
disease, and hence, patentab1e.'
If the claimed invention is not directed solely to a cosmetic effect, but is also
necessarily defining a treatment of the human body by therapy as well, such a claim
120 Moufang, R, Methods of Medical Treatment Under Patent Law, I IIC (1993) Vol.24 p.18.
121 c & W's Application (1914) 31. R.P.0 235. The case concerns a patent application for process of
extracting metals of living bodies was denied. In this case, it was clear that the process was used to extract
lead from persons suffering from lead poisoning and therefore constituted a method of medical treatment.
122 Joos v. Commisioner of Patents (1973)RPC p.59 at page 63. A claim for a process of improving
the strength and elasticity of keratinous material, especially human hair and finger nails was allowed.
123 See Schering's Application. In contrast see London Rubber Industries Ltd's Patent (1968) R.P.C.
31 where a claim to a process of birth control involving taking certain hormonal drugs at a specific time and
in a specific order was refused. However, in another case Organon Laboratories Ud's A pplication (1970)
FSR 419, a claim to a card with pills attached to it in a particular order coupled with instructions on how
to take them was allowed. In another case Upjohn Co. (Kirkton's) Application (1976) R.P.0 324, a method
of inducing abortion was also held as a method of treatment of the human body and not a prophylactic
method in the same sense as contraception.
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is excluded from patentability. Whether such an invention is excluded depends on
whether the method would have a beneficial effect to the health of the person. If it is
not, then the claim does not fall within the exclusion.'24
The exclusion of patentability of methods of treatment is also extended to animals.
The same policy objective arises here and for reasons of public health, it is necessary
that any veterinarian should not be inhibited to use any methods of treatment by the
existence of patents. This was the rationale for rejecting a claim for a method of
immunising pouluy against coccidiosis by adding viable occysts in subclinical doses
to the feed of poultry.' On similar grounds, a method for improving the tenderness
of meat by injecting an enzyme solution into the live animal shortly before slaughter
is unpatentable.' 26 Seemingly, this exclusion includes methods of treatment carried
out by farmers on individual anjmals.' 27 No distinction can be drawn between
medical treatment carried out by a veterinarian and treatment activities which are
normally routinely carried out by a farmer.
The meaning of 'therapy' has been construed widely, to cover all medicament for
relief of all kinds of pain. Irrespective of the origin of pain, discomfort or incapacity,
its relief, by the administration of an appropriate agent, is to be construed as
See Blendax Gmbh v. Imperial Chemical Industries PLC No.6/1992 IIC Vol.23 p.815. In this case,
the European Patent Office rejected a claim of a method of cleaning plaque and/or stains from human
teeth.The court in this case distinguished the case of Appetite Suppresant T144/83 OJ EPO 1986, 301. A
claim for a method of loss of weight which had both cosmetic and therapeutic effect when used to treat
obesity was patentable.
See Unilever Limited (Davis's) Application (1983) R.P.C. p.219. The word "therapy", is to be
understood in its wider sense of the medical treatment of disease. See also the case of Duphar/Pigs H T
19/86 (1988) 1 EPOR, whereby the word 'therapy' should be understood in the sense of 'maintenance or
restoration of health'
' See Swift & Co's Application (1962) RPC. P.37.
See Welcome! Pigs I (1988) 1 EPOR 1.
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"therapy" or of "therapeutic use" in the sense of A.52(4) EPC.'28 It does not only
relate to a treatment of disease in general or to a curative sense (in the narrow sense)
but also includes the alleviating of the symptoms of pain and suffering.' 29 Thus it
includes any non-surgical treatment which is designed to prevent or reduce the
possibility of contracting any malfunction of the animal body.'°
The exclusion relates only to those methods which directly allow a decision on
medical treatment. Methods which merely give intermediate results are not diagnostic
methods within the meaning of A.52(4), even if they can be used for making a
diagnosis.'3'
In contrast, the meaning of surgery is not confined to therapeutic surgery in the sense
of treatment for cure of diseases or disability. The court in Occidental Petroleum
Application 132 held that the concept of surgery under S.4(2) of Patents Act 1977
must not be narrowly interpreted in the sense of therapeutic surgery. Rather, it
included every method of surgery, whether for curative, prophylactic or cosmetic
128 See Re Rorer (1988) 19 IIC 803 which ivolves a claim for the use of a medicament for relief of
menstrual discomfort. The court outrightly rejected the distinction between pain and discomfort which are
caused by natural circumstances (e.g menstruation, the pregnancy or age etc) and reactions to situations in
the human environment (e.g atmospheric condition provoking tiredness, headache etc).
129 See Jorg Schultz & Partner (Patent Application No. 8221174) The Court held that therapy here
must be construed in a wide sense and includes methods which are directed towards alleviating, at least
temporarily, the symptoms of a particular disease. (1986) IPD 1003.
130 See Salminen/ Pigs ifi (T58/87) 3 EPOR 1983 125. The case involved a claim for preventing
piglets from suffocating under the dam in a brooding pen.
See Siemens/Diagnostic method (1988) 6 EPOR 365 for a claim directed to an electrochemical
method in determining sugar in the presence of foreign substances, and especially of the concentration of
glucose in body fluids. See also Bruker/Non Invasive measurement (1988) EPOR 357 and Siemens/Flow
Measurement T245/87 (1989) 5 EPOR 241 for a method of measuring the rate of flow of small quantities
of liquid passing through a tubular element, used in controlling drug administration.
132 (1985)IIC 216. The case involved a method claim for a solution to the problem of the implantation
of an embryo from a thoroughbred female animal, a so-called donor mammal, into an animal of similar
race but with indifferent genetic make-up, a so-called recipient mammal, for the purposes of shortening
the thoroughbred animal's natural term of pregnancy.
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purposes. Secondly, it did not matter whether a treatment was carried out by a nurse
or a surgeon'33.
All the above arguments for and against patenting of methods of medical treatment
were reviewed in Australia, in the case of Rescare Ltd v. Anaesthetic Supplies Pty
Ud.'' The Federal Court reviewed the long held policy and the line of cases
against the patenting of this kind of invention and held that what was/not patentable
should be construed consistent with the language of Statute Of Monopolies. Hence
methods of medical treatment should be exempted if they are generally inconvenient
and contrary to public policy. The Court noted that inventions as to methods of
medical treatment in Australia belonged to the area of economic endeavour or trade
and commerce. The case is interesting as the long-held rationale for denying patents
for medical treatment was dismissed by the courts.
8.3	 Second medical use
In the U.K and the EC, another compromise was set on the non-patentability of
methods of medical treatment. Where an invention pertained to a discovery of further
therapeutic treatment of a substance already known for some therapeutic use, this was
held patentable in the EEC in the case of Switzerland' 35. The rationale was that
pharmaceutical research devoted to synthesis was even more complicated and more
costly to prepare'. In the U.K, this 'Swiss form' claim was held to be valid in
In George Sewell Allen (Patent Application No 9113 228.2)IPD 16040, a claim for a method of
fixing implants into patients for purposes of imaging the human body, a process which can be done either
by a surgeon or a nurse.
' 25 IPR 119. The observation made on the patentability of processes of medical treatment was
affirmed on appeal by the Federal Court of Australia. See Anaesthetic Su pplies Ny Ltd v. Rescare Ltd.
28 IPR 383. LoCkhart .1 held that there was no justification in law, logic or principle why a treatment of
the human body was not a manner of manufacture.
' onr'o 11/1984, 581.
See the arguments in White, Alan W, Protect The Known, Explore The Unknown, Managing
Intellectual Property, October 1991 p.18.
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the case of Scherin g 's and John Wyeth's Applications' 37. This development was
further followed by the EPO's decision in Mobil's case' 38 which allowed the claim
for further use of a known chemical compound.
In Malaysia, with the recent amendment to the 1983 Patents Act, second medical use
of a known suksLance is patentable. S. 14(4) provides that " any substance or
composition comprised in the prior art, for use in a medical treatment for the purpose
of paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of Section 13, if its use in any such method is not
comprised in the prior art" is patentable.
It would be difficult to disregard the above discussions on the unacceptability of
patenting of methods of medical treatment in stating the Islamic point of view.
Preservation of life and alleviation of pain and suffering is a social obligation or part
of 'fard kfayah' in Islam. During the Umayyad period, medical care was provided
for by the state. As a part of this obligation, a person should be able to alleviate the
pain of others in whatever method that is available. In this sense, the reservations
made by many commentators on the patentability of medical treatment and its effect
on the freedom of physicians should be taken into consideration. A mandatory system
of licensing may not be a satisfactory alternative as it may subject the physician to
discriminatory pricing.
9	 Patentability of matters pertaining to the intellect
Part of protection of the intellect is the exclusion of discoveries from patents. Matters
which are in the realm of ideas are considered as essentially non-economic and hence
non-patentable' 39. The rationale of this rule is the recognition that ideas, as
'' (1985) RPC 585.
138 Mobil/Friction Reducing Additive, T59/87, (1989) 2 EPOR p.80. The application of this case has
been narrowed down in the case of Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. and anr. v. H.N. Norton & Co. Ltd.
(1994) RPC p.!.
139 See S.13 which contains the list of non-patentable subject matter including, discoveries, scietific
theories and mathematical methods and schemes, rules or methods for doing business, performing purely
mental acts or playing games.
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opposed to applied theory, are part of scientific truth and therefore are synonymous
to nature'40. Included within this realm of unpatentable subject matter are
discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical methods, schemes and rules or methods
for doing business, performance of purely mental acts or playing games. The
rationale behind this policy is that all the above involve ideas as opposed to execution
of ideas'41 . In practice, the exception has been construed only to the extent that the
patents relate to the conceptions as such. Inventions which consist of a method for
the practical application of a discovery does not fall within the purview of the
exception'42.
10.	 Matters pertaining to protection of posterity
This is an area with which the patent stjstem has no direct connection. In Islam,
within the five objectives of the Shari'ah, protection of posterity comes in many forms
such as through the institution of marriage and the imposition of 'hadd' in cases of
adultery. In relation to patents, advancement of posterity, arguably, comes indirectly
- if not accurately - by the dissemination of technical knowledge through the
requirement of patent disclosur& 43. It is an economic theory that the requirement
of disclosure ensures that technical information embodied in patents is not concealed
140 See the observation made by Burton I in Funk Bros. Seed Co v. Kalo Innoculant Co. 333 U.D 127
at p.130 above.
141 See Hughes, Justin, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 The Georgetown Law Journal,
p.287.
See also Diamond v. Diehr USPQ (1981) 1;
"While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scietific truth may be.' The mathematical algorithm
in Diehr was the known Arrhenius equation, and the court held that when the algorithm was incorporated
in a useful product, the subject matter was statutory.
142 See Genentech Inc's Patent (1989) R.P.0 p.147.
143 Failure to give complete and clear disclosure may be a ground for invalidating patents. For a
complete discussion of sufficiency of disclosure, see Cornish, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright,
Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 2nd. ed, (1989) Sweet & Maxwell, London, 5-0585-063. See also S.56
of the Malaysian Patents Act, 1983 and S.12 of the Regulations thereof.
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from others to use for further innovative processes' 44. Hence, the patent system not
only rewards the individual inventor but also guarantees the dissemination of
technology to society at large and the succeeding generations to benefit from. Without
patent systems, most technical knowledge and invention would be kept secret and
concealed from society. More fundamentally, the law also recognised the need to
control the publication of information, from patent applications, which might be
prejudicial to the nation'45 . In simple words, patent information cona,tutes a basis
of technological development for future generations and thus of economic and social
progress of the society at large'.
11	 Matters pertaining to wealth - the concept of distributive justice
It has been elucidated at length above that patents are deemed necessary as an
incentive to invent, develop and market new inventions. It has often been argued that
the justification of patents is deontological in nature in that patents advance a higher
benefit to the society i.e promotion of technological progress.
In Islam, wealth is not an end in itself but is a means to achieve other objectives. The
concept that property and wealth are social tools, is given the recognition by the
obligation to pay 'zakah' and 'sadaqah' to those in need'47. In the perspective of
144 For further deliberations see Beier, F.K, Strauss, J, The Patent System and Its Informational
Function- Yesterday and Today, Vol. 8 No.5/1977 p.387.
Beyleveld.
145 See S.30A of the Malaysian Patents Act, 1983. In this respect, /..	 suggested that the law should
also filter biotechnological inventions, if the publication of such technical information is contrary to 'ordre
public' and morality. See Beyleveld
	
This obligation can be further extended to include other type of
information which may be considered as prejudicial to the Shari'ah.
146 See the findings of the economic report of Canadian Department of Consumers and Corporate
Affairs, op.cit. See also Yusing Ko, op.cit.
147 See Surah 59:7, "What Allah has bestowed on his Messenger (and taken away) from the
people of the townships- belongs to Allah -to His Messenger and to kindred and orphans,
the needy and the wayfarer, in order that it may not (merely) make a circuit between the
wealthy among you. So take what the Messenger assigns to you, and deny yourselves
form which he witholds from you. And fear Allah; for Allah is strict in punishment";
Surah 9:60: "Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those employed to administer the (funds);
For those whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled (To the truth); for those in bondage and
in debt; in the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarer, (Thus it is) ordained by Allah, and Allah
is full of knowledge and wisdom"; and
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patents, distributive justice can be achieved through the balancing of material wealth
with need fulfilment. These have been dealt with earlier in our discussion on society's
right of food, essential items, medical care, information and knowledge.
Another concern of distributive justice which arises out of the effect of granting
exclusive rights over sources of nature is the issue of a farmer's privilege to use
traditional breeding methods and to save seeds for further re-seeding. Under the
former proposed regulation on biotechnological inventions, further multiplication is
not allowed' 48. Under Article 10 of the regulation, the first and all subsequent
generations of material obtained by multiplication or propagation are prohibited,
provided the crucial characteristics of the original are retained. Such a practice is
unfair and discriminates against farmers and inhibits them from deploying traditional
agricultural methods.
The proposed regulation on biotechnological inventions was revised on this issue
before its rejection by the European Parliament. Prior to the rejection, concessions
were reached on 'farmers' right' and farmers were allowed to use seeds for further use
in limited circumstances. In pursuance to that the Parliament had been able to
persuade the Council of Ministers to accept the farmers' privilege (allowing farmers
to continue using an "invention"- such as seeds from their own crops - on their own
behalf, once the plant variety rights have been paid for). What remained was to
guarantee this right for the use of livestock on behalf of the farmer. The new
European Commissioner for the Internal Market, Mario Monti, had made a statement
on behalf of the Commission so as to stress that once an EU legislative provision on
the production of animal species allowed a fanner to use protected animals for
reproduction purposes on his own farm so as to renew his stock, the Commission
should undertake to take due account of the purposes of including such an exemption
Surah 70:24-25; "And those in whose wealth is a recognised right. For the (needy) who asks and
him who is prevented (for some reason from asking)".
148 The UPOV Convention had also been recently revised to reduce the scope of 'farmer's right in
respect of the use of the product of the harvest obtained by planting for propagating purposes. See A.15 of
the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants of Dec. 2, 1961, as revised on
March 19, 1991.
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in the framework of the Directive'49.
12.	 Conclusion
In this chapter we have attempted to analyse the legal theories which are relevant to
the justification and parameters of patent systems, within an Islamic perspective. It
should be mentioned again that our study, being the first of its kind, is not
exhaustive. At the outset we have examined the economic justifications of patents and
the Islamic point of view on wealth and property.
It is felt that the most important factor in understanding patents for inventions is their
role in stimulating research and technological progress. It has been pointed out that
the profit motive should not be the only concern in a healthy competitive progressive
economic system. There is a great role for the concept of 'distributive justice' here.
This role of 'balancing of interests' should be given more prominence both before and
after the granting of patent rights.
It has been established that the five objectives of Shari'ah are central to the Islamic
position. It is argued that the weighing of interests within the scale suggested by Al-
Ghazali, Al-Shatibi and as developed by contemporary scholars are imperative if we
are to have a patent system which is equitable. By adopting this moral filter, it is
shown that many of the problems facing the determination of patent scope can be
resolved.
As far as protection of matters pertaining to faith is concerned, this can be seen
through the present debate on the patentability of transgenic animals and human
tissues. While patenting of transgenic animals may not lead to a direct conflict with
the dictates of the 'Shari'ah', patenting of human body parts does. In this chapter,
the position of exploitation of human biological materials was examined in the context
of discussion on the ownership of human biological materials. It was shown that
Source :European Intelligence, February 7, 1995. It should be noted that this EC Draft Regulation
has been thrown out by the European Parliament, see f/n 104 ibid.
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classical Muslim scholars have classified any dealing relating to human biological
material as 'haram'. In this chapter, it was argued that the question pertaining to
patentability of these matters should not be answered in the context of ownership but
in the context of ethical and moral concerns. The controversy over the patent
application of the human genome project illustrates that the patenting of human genes,
cell lines and parts of body material will lead to insurmountable ethical problems.
The discussions on patentability of food items, pharmaceutical products and methods
of medical treatment is linked directly to the second objective of Shari'ah, that is the
protection of life. It has been argued in this chapter that patenting of food and
pharmaceutical products need not adversely affect the supply and availability of these
two items. Other consequential effects such as pricing can be satisfactorily addressed
through strong compulsory licensing rules. Inventions pertaining to methods of
medical treatment, however, are not suitable as a patentable subject matter, given
the difficulties posed by patenting such methods. These difficulties outweigh other
positive factors such as the need for material reward for further research and
innovations.
The protection of matters pertaining to the intellect can be seen from the exclusion of
discoveries and pure ideas from the domain of patents. As far as protection of
posterity is concerned, the benefits of patent may come indirectly in terms of patent
information. The statutory requirement of disclosure ensures a rich source of
technological innovation for others to use. Finally, it is also shown that patents are
consistent with the Islamic objective of enhancement of wealth, so long as the
requirement of distributive justice is fulfilled.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
TRADE MARKS: AT THE JUNCTURE
OF PROPERTY FUNCTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION.
1	 Introduction.
The deployment of marks as a designation of goods, adopted by manufacturers in
trade can be traced back from ancient history'. The earliest discernible use of marks
are found in the ancient Chinese, Roman and Greek pottery. Marks have also been
used in trade and manufacture in early Islamic civilisation. This is evident by the
Islamic literature, whereby marks are used to indicate confonnity with certain quality
requirements as illustrated by the use of the 'muhtasib' 2s seal on measures, scales and
mints during the Abbasid period3.
The proprietary nature of trade marks differs from that of copyright and patents.
Unlike copyright and patents which are temporal, trade marks are perpetual. Despite
this, trade marks can hardly be characterised as monopoly rights. The modern trade
mark paradigm is characterised by the inhibition of the use of a same or similar trade
mark for the same or similar goods to avoid confusion in the identification of products
in the market. This chapter will begin with the analysis of the proprietary nature of
trade marks in both common law and Islamic law 4. In understanding trade marks, it
For an historical account on the use of trademarks, see Schechter, Frank I., The Historical
Foundations of The Law Relating to Trade-marks, (1925), Columbia University Press, New York;
Diamond, S.A, The Historical Development of Trademarks, Vol.65 T.M.R p.265; Ruston, Gerald, On
the Origin of Trademarks, Vol.45 T.M.R., 127; Paster, Benjamin, G, Trademarks - Their Earl y History,
Vol.59 T.M.R 551 and Elliot, Harrison, Watermark Held Unlikely to Have Cryptic Meanings; Early
Papermakers' Devices Religious Modem Usage Is Like Trademark, 37 T.M.R p.21 1.
2 
'Muhtasib' is the term used to denote a 'market inspector'.
See footnote 106 infra.
It has been argued in chapter 3 and 4 that Intellectual property is consistent with the concept of 'mal',
'haqq' and 'haqq aI-milkiyyah' in Islamic jurisprudence.
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is crucial that proper knowledge is grasped on the role played by trade marks both as
indication of origin and indication of quality of products in the market. Therefore, in
this part, the focus of our inquiry are the followings:
I.	 the proprietaiy nature of trade marks,
ii. the deployment of marks in advertisement,
iii. the function of trade marks as an emblem of quality.
The nature of ownership of trade marks is unique because of its association with other
rules and principles of trade and commercial dealing. Due to this, this inquiry will
address other significant principles which may influence and proscribe the proprietary
rights of trade marks. The second part of the chapter questions the 'locus' of consumer
protection in common law and proceeds with a discussion on the conflicting interests
between manufacturers and consumers in trade marks. To this end, the nature of our
inquiry necessitates the examination of these two basic issues:
i. the deployment of consumers' participation in the determination of confusion
and deception in establishing infringements of trade marks.
ii. protection of well known marks and measures against the dilution of marks
which is based on the protection of consumers.
The chapter, then proceeds with an elaboration of consumer standing in Islam. Often,
trademarks have to accommodate both the conflicting interests; in most instances in
favour of the consumers. This symbiosis between consumers and competitors will be
addressed in the third part of the chapter. The conflict between consumers rights and
trade mark owners rights is more apparent in two instances; parallel importation and
that rule against unfair competition which is known in common law jurisdictions as
passing off.
With this short introduction, the chapter will begin with the theoretical framework of
property rights in trademarks.
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2.1	 Theoretical framework of proprietary right in trade marks.
A trade mark5 is an incorporeal property right 6, serving to protect the labour, skill,
effort and investment of time and money of the proprietor in creating and promoting
its mark. The property concept of trade marks in the U.K was first evolved by the
Courts of Equity. This notion that equity would intervene to protect a right of property
in a trade mark had been established in Millington v Fox 7. It was noted that in
extending protection to marks the court of Equity drew analogy to copyright 8. The
clearest formulation of the property analysis was given by Lord Chancellor in The
Leather Cloth Co. Ltd v The American Leather Cloth Co Ltd9;
"The representation which the defendant is supposed to make, that his goods
are the goods of another person, is not actually made otherwise than by his
appropriating and using the trade mark which such other person has an
exclusive right to use in connection with the sale of some commodity; and if
the plaintiff has an exclusive right so to use any particular mark or symbol,
it becomes his property for the purposes of such application, and the act of
the defendant is a violation of such right of property, corresponding with the
piracy of copyright or the infringement of the patent. I cannot therefore assent
to the dictum that there is no property in a trade mark.
A mark is defined in the Malaysian Trade Mark Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as MTMA) as"
including a device, brand, heading, label ticket, name, signature, word, letter, numeral or any
combination thereof. Trade mark is delmed as to mean " .........a mark used or proposed to be used in
relation to goods for the purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate, a connection in the course of trade
between the goods and same person having the right either as proprietor or as registered user with or without
any indication of identity of that person". In an old 1955 case, under the old Trade Mark Ordinance in P.P
v.Tan Keng Siew, the court accepted that a detachable mark which is to be fixed on goods and not
embossed on goods is within the definition of a trade mark or property mark. (1955) 21 MU 59.
6 See S.20 of the U.K Trade Marks Act, 1994. There is no equivalent provision under the MTMA 76.
' (1838) 3 My & Cr 388. See the elaboration on this principle in a series of judgements by Lord
Westbuiy LC during the 1860s, starting with Edelsten v Edelsten(1863) 1 Dc GJ & 5 185; 46 ER 72. See
also Hall v. Barrows (1843) 4 Dc GJ & S 150; 46 ER 873, M'Andrew v. Bassett (1864)4 De GJ & S 380;
46 ER 965 and The Leather Cloth Co Ltd v The American Leather Cloth Co Ltd (1965) 11 HLC 523, 11
ER 1435, affirming (1863) 4 De GJ & S 137; 46 ER 868.
8 Lupton, Keith, Trade Marks as Pro perty, 2 (1991), Intellectual Property Journal, 29-39.
(1863) 4 Dc GJ & S 137 at 142; 46 ER 868 at 870.
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It is correct to say that there is no exclusive ownership of the symbols which
constitute a trade mark apart from the use or application of them, but the
word 'trade mark' is the designation of these marks or symbols as and when
applied to a vendible commodity, and the exclusive right to make such user
or application is rightly called property. The true principle therefore would
seem to be, that the jurisdiction of the Court in the protection given to trade
marks rests upon property, and that the Court interferes by injunction,
because that is the only mode by which property of this description can be
effectually protected".
With the introduction of registration system, this notion of property rights in trade
mark themselves was transformed to a statutory footing. Lord Diplock was instructive
on this when he pointed out, referring to the 1875 Trade Marks Act in General
Electric Co (of USA) v General Electric Co. Ltd'°
"(that the Act) did not itself create any right of property in trade marks. ..it
simply provided for (their) registration and spelled out the consequences of
registration and non-registration upon the proprietary rights of the owner and
the remedies available to him for (their) protection"."
From the above discussion, it is clear that the concept of a trade mark as property was
initially advanced by the Courts of Equity in the U.K, even in the absence of deceit.
At common law, property in goodwill remains the subject-matter of passing off.
These rights grew from the need to provide redress against counterfeit and imitation
products. Our next inquiry is the acceptance of proprietary nature of trade mark in
Islam. In the course of our discussion, it will transpire that the juristic discussions on
'° (1971) 1 WLR 729, par. at 741
See also Loudoun Manufacturin g Co Ltd And Another v Courtaulds plc (trading as John Lean and
The Times, February 14, 1994. In this case the opponents argued that the applicant for the trade
mark were not entitled to register the mark, because the applicant was not the true proprietor to the mark.
The applicants claimed to be its proprietor but went further, submitting that section 17 was not concerned
with who was its true proprietor, it only required an applicant to have a bona fide claim to be registered.
In this case the court commented that Mr Justice Lloyd-Jacob in Vitamins Ltd's Application for a Trade
(1956) RPC 1, was mistaken in suggesting that such a right could be obtained by origination; there
have never been any property in an unused mark until it had been used, deemed to be used, or registered.
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the acceptance of trade marks in the Muslim countries arise from the same concern.
2.2 Recognition of property ri ghts in trade marks in Muslim countries.
In some Islamic / Muslim countries, the protection of trade marks originated from the
extension of the concept of consumer protection' 2. This extension is substantiated by
the Qur'anic 'ayahs' and 'hadiths', prohibiting deceitful practices which have been
interpreted to include cases of deception through imitation and counterfeit products.
Such extension is certainly desirable as the safeguarding of the consumer's cause is
a religious obligation.
This philosophy is further echoed by current Muslim writers such as S.H.Amin
(1992)', Mangalo (1982) ' and Irshad Kadir (1989)15. Mangalo, reviewing the
UAE cases on this, advocates for the recognition of trade marks as property rights
"which are recognised under the principles of prior usage rights, that is the act of first
use. Such right is acquired by possession ('hiyazah') which takes place at the time
there is an intent to appropriate the mark by first user.' 6" From this proposition, two
principles can be extracted:
i)	 when a particular mark or sign is adopted by a manufacturer to distinguish his
goods from others, he acquires ownership of the mark by possession when
such intention to appropriate the mark exists.
See AI-Nayal, Ma' wia al-Tahir, Agency Contracts & Consumer Rights, Arab Law Quarterly, Pt.4 August 1986 p.401.
13 Amin, S.H Intellectual and Industrial Property in the Middle East, Royston Publishers, 1992,
Intellectual Property Under A Religious Law: Experimentations in Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates,
Religion and Law Review, Summer 1992 p. 39-64.
14 Mangalo, N, Trademarks and Unfair Competition Law in the United Arab Emirates, An Overview
With Special Emphasis On The Development Of The Legal System, ifi Vol 13, 1982 p.588.
Kadir, Irshad, Trademark Protection in the United Arab Emirates, Arab Law Quarterly, Vol.4 P11
Feb l989,p.3l.
16 Mangalo, op.cit at p.609, citing Mc Donalds (I), Civil Court of Abu Dhabi, June 30, 1980, 13 IIC
656, Mc Donalds (II), Federal Ct. of Appeals of Abu Dhabi, March 18, 1981, 13 IIC 658 (1982), Prophecy
& Cachet, Civil Court of Dubai, Oct. 27, (1980), 13 IIC 665, Pif Paf, Civil Court of Dubai, May 10, 1981,
13 UC 661 (1982).
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ii)	 when there are two similar marks, the claimant who is the"first in time to use"
the mark is entitled to the ownership of the mark.
From the first principle, it is presupposed that the differences of opinion on the
possibility of possession on intangibles are ignored. The Hanafis insist on physical
possession and refute the idea of possession of usufructuary right ('manfa 'ah').
According to this view, ownership of 'manfa'ah' is derived indirectly from the
recognition of any dealings involving such rights. The other main schools of law like
Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali have no such objections against possession of intangibles.
The Hambalis view possession of intangibles as possible through indirect possession
of the tangible to which the usufruct attaches.'7
Implied in the second principle is the seeming support for "the first in time" rights and
not "the first to register" rights. This dichotomy is important as most of the modern
trade mark systems in the world are "the first to register" system although many
countries do provide for concurrent user of a mark to accommodate innocent prior user.
In countries which have a dual system, (i.e registered trade mark and passing off),
the' first in time " is an important consideration in the tort of passing off. Even then,
the first user has to establish "reputation" in the mark in the sense that the mark has
been associated exclusively to him'8.
All the three writers illustrate the experimentation in the United Arab Emirates
whereby resort is made to Islamic jurisprudence to hold against passing off in
the absence of any codified legislation. Even though, this development has been
followed with the introduction of enactments on trade marks in these countries, the
cases remain important as they illustrate the recognition of rights in 'names' or marks'
by the application of principles of Islamic Law, in the absence of any direct rulings
from the Qur'an and the Sunnah.
For further discussion see ch. 3 and 4.
18 See also Imperial Group Plc & Another v Philip Morris Limited & Another, (1984) R.P.0 No.17,
p.293. In this case Mr. Justice Whitford dismissed an action of passing off on the ground that the plaintiffs
had not established that their mark was distinctive and was exclusively associated with their product.
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In Rainbow/Rainshow' 9
 the UAE court accepted the recognition of rights to marks,
stemming from principles of equity and justice under Islamic jurisprudence. These
principles require the protection against deception of consumers in the form of
imitation of goods. The court accepted the view of Prof.Sanhun 2° and Prof Mustafa
Kamal Taha2 ' on the importance of trade marks as the indication of origin and
quality and as "the most important means available to the manufacturer and the trader
of making himself known to the consumer of his goods". In determining the test of
resemblance, the court again referred to the view of Prof.Sanhuri. The most
important element of the mark is the literal description or symbol. If this element
appears in another mark, this constitutes true counterfeiting ('tazwir')22 or imitation
('taqlid')23, irrespective of any modification or addition which may have been made
to certain secondary parts of the marks. This view seemingly supports a blanket
prohibition against adoption of any kind of similar mark24. This broad principle of
equity and justice was later applied in Bry1creem, to provide remedy for a foreign
trade mark owner against counterfeit activities. The court held that importation of
imitation products of a known international mark, which is registered in another
19 Case No 320172, Abu Dhabi Civil Court, 12 IIC 883 (1981).
'Al Wajizfl al Qanun a! Madani' (Commentary on Civil Law), Cairo 1952. vol.8, p.465, 466.
21 
'Al Mugazfi a! Qanun a! Tigari'(handbook on Commercial Law) 559, Alexandria, 1974. p.559.
Tazwir' is fabrication of a mark which corresponds exactly with the original mark even if the
imitator adds other words.
23 
'Taqlid' is the creation of a mark similar in its totality to the original in such a nature as to deceive
the public.
24 This distinction between 'faqlid' and 'tazwir' is based on French law and has to do with the degree
of offence. While 'tazwir' causes misappriopriation of property to occur, 'taqlid' only affects the
distinctiveness of the trade mark. The common law system however approaches counterfeit and imitation
differently. In Malaysia for example dealings with counterfeit goods are a criminal offence appropriately
dealt in the Criminal Act while the Trade Marks Act 1976 also concerns the second part of offence or
'taqlid'. This implies that the main concern of a common law trade mark system is an imitation of mark
which may lead to the confusion and deception of the public. Such difference of approach is however not
significant as it is more of the difference between the common law and civil law system and does not reflect
Shari'a principles.
Civil Court of Dubai, October 27, 1990, 13 IIC 668 (1982).
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country, eventually leads to unfair competition against the original merchandise26.
The two abovementioned cases can be criticised in that they do not, explicitly,
establish the foundation of protection of trade marks in Islam. The court did not
elaborate on the issue of extension of property concepts to intangibles. Further, there
was no attempt to consider how such rights are justified under Islamic Law. Rather
they illustrate the "dynamicity of Islamic law to accomodate justice and sanction
against what is apparently unjust." 27
The property concept is more apparent in Sharikat Versailles IMuassassat
Versailles.28 Here the court clearly held that a mark is a property right which may
be not used other than by its owner. The basis of this proprietary right is prior use as
enunciated in the case of Mc Donald29.
In determining 'confusion', the court in Pif Paf 3° held that the whole general
appearance of the products must be observed. As to the degree of confusion, the court
applied the yardstick of the ordinary consumer ('mushtari 'aadi'). Proof of deception
26 This association of passing off and unfair competition is also seen in Sharikat Versailles/Muassassat
Versajlles(1980) Abu Dhabi case no 570/80, Federal Court of First Instance, Appeal No 174/80, Fed. Ct.
of Appeal, Abu Dhabi, 13 UC (1982) p.605 and Prophecy and Cachet(1979) 13 IIC 665 (1982). In the
former case the court held that the need for trade mark protection is to inhibit the use of same or similarly
designed designation, colours or symbol of products which serve the same intended use in order to prevent
deception and unfair competition.In Prophecy and Catchet the court observed the importance of trade mark
as an emblem of the goodwill of an enterprise.
27 Further in finding for passing off by importation of imitation products of an internationally
established trademark whose trade mark is not registered in UAE, the court did not even consider whether
the international company has established reputation in UAE for the mark to be associated exclusively to
it. In economic arguments, the consumer at large may benefit from these imitated goods in circumstar ces
where the genuine product is difficult to get and is too expensive for public consumption.
28 (1980), see Mangalo op.cit.
29 Civil Court of Abu Dhabi, June 80, 1980. 13 UC 656 (1982), Federal Court of Appeals of Abu
Dhabi, March 18, 1981, 13 IIC 658 (1982). In this case passing off was found even though the plaintiff
international company was not engaged in any commercial activity in Abu Dhabi.
3° See Mangalo op.cit.
234
is important. Where this is missing, the court will be reluctant to extend
protection31 . This is because, as "trademarks had not been so far addressed by
Islamic Law, nor did trademarks constitute property as defined by Islamic Law,
therefore they did not warrant protection from usurpation in the same manner as
property would"32.
These cases illustrate the willingness of the UAE courts to extend classical Islamic
jurisprudence to redress the injury caused by counterfeit and imitation products. The
courts have also accepted, prima facie, the importance of proof of confusion and
deception in proving 'injury'. Therefore, the court concluded that the rights of a
trade mark owner are proprietary and the nature of protection is based upon proof of
deception and confusion.
The experimentations of the UAE and Saudi Arabia Courts in extending the Islamic
principles of equity and justice are seen as a method to recognise and enforce the
rights of trade marks owners. In the course of establishing the foundation of trade
marks in Islam, the Court of Appeal of Dubai has accepted the uniqueness of trade
marks as compared to ordinary property right. These developments were followed in
both the common law world and the Middle East by the promulgation of enactments
on trade marks statutes. Before considering the statutory system, we will explore the
role of trade marks in the market place.
3	 Trade marks and product differentiations.
A trade mark performs the role of an affirmative link between the consumer and
31 In Lux/Luv Case No 451/1981, Dubai Civil Court of First Instance, Appeal No 116/81, Dubai
Court of Appeal, the court of appeal reversed the decision of the lower court ordering a local manufacturer
to refrain from manufacturing and selling soap products which trade name is similar to an international
manufacturer. The court found that there was lack of confusion and deception as there were sufficient
differences between the packaging, labelling and prices of the products.
32 Per Dubai Court of Appeal, TidelTi pe Case no 3/1981, Dubai Civil Court of First instance. Appeal
no 17/82.
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market. S.A.Ozga (196O) points out that for perfect competition to arise, both the
buyer and seller must have perfect knowledge of the market. Smaliwood (l979)
argues that where consumers are not fully informed, there would be uncertainty as to
product quality.
The economic analysis of trade marks concentrates on the function of trade marks in
facilitating consumers' choice 35. Trade marks enable the communication of the
unobservable differences in quality and variety of goods in an analytical form,
enabling consumers to choose the product with the desired combination of features.
Historically, marks were used as an indication of source as in the case of police
marks and guild marks. Later, the quality or differentiation function plays a more
prominent role. Schecter describes the function of a trade mark as to identify a
product as satisfactory and thereby stimulate further purchases by the consuming
public. Trade marks, to him, are not merely the symbol of goodwill but often the
most effective agent for the creation of goodwill, imprinting upon the public mind
an anonymous and impersonal guarantee of satisfaction, creating a desire for further
satisfactions. The protection and preservation of this differentiation role, therefore
enhances consumers' information about the product in the market.
The maintenance and preservation of the distinguishing role of trade marks has been
justified as it lowers consumer search costs in searching for the quality wanted 37. The
u S.A.Ozga, Imperfect Markets Through Lack of Knowledge, Vol.74 Quarterly Journal of Economics. P.29-52.
D.E. Smallwood & J. Coulish, Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers Are Inadequately
Informed, 1979, Vol 93 Quarterly Journal of Economics, p.1.
See also Shanahan, Dan, The Trademark Right: Consumer Protection or Mono poly ?, Vol. 72
(1982) The Trademark Reporter, 233-250.
36 Schecter, Frank I, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, Vol.60, (1970), Trade Mark
Reporter, 334-347.
Landes and Posner's views are explicit on this. See Landes, W.M, Posner, R.A, The Economics
of Trademark Law, The Trade Mark Reporter Vol. 78, (1988) 267-306.
"..yet an important and widely recognized benefit of trade marks is that they give firms an incentive to
improve the quality of their products. Without an exclusive right to use one own's trade mark, a firm that
was producing a lower-quality brand could hope, by duplicating the trademark of a superior brand, to
mislead consumers into believing that the brands were equivalent. By making it more costly for consumers
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minimisation of search costs can be further assisted with the exclusion of non-
distinctive marks. Allowing exclusivity of non-distinctive marks will increase search
costs. Cutting off trademark protection when a trade mark becomes generic will
reduce the cost of communication by making it cheaper for competitors of the first
producer to inform the consumer that they sell the same product. Similarly, a
functional feature is unlikely to identify a particular brand and hence may increase
consumers' search cost.
In order to achieve this role of product differentiation, three factors have to be
present:
(a) the consumers's ability to recall the mark and its associated features,
(b) the inability of others to use a confusingly similar mark; and
(c) the reluctance of firms to change the variety and quality features of the trade-
marked product.
There are, however, observable detriments which may occur from the advertising
practices. Firstly, the deployment of trade marks in advertising can create distortions
such as the distortion out of perception advertising. It distorts decisions by changing
the minds of consumers regarding the desirability of the product. Further, the
association of products with quality can reach mythical stage whereby the consumer
buys a certain product to seek a certain identity 38. Due to this, it has been claimed
that trade marks create a barrier to entry for newcomers, as brand loyalty is likely to
reduce the number of differentiated products39. The effect of this is the creation of
dominance in the market whereby a strong trade mark owner is able to curtail new
and existing competition. Some justified this dominance on the ground that the trade
to distinguish higher quality from lower-quality brands, this duplication would reduce a firm's incentive
to incur the added cost that would be necessary to produce a higher quality."
38 See Drescher, Thomas D, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks - From Signals to
Symbols to Myths, Trademark Reporter, Vol. 83, p.301-340.
In this respect, Economides, N.S, in her article, The Economics of Trademarks, Vol.78 (1988)
Trade Mark Reporter, 523-539, defends trade marks. She argues that the effect of small barners to entry will
be to reduce the number of differentiated products towards the surplus maximizing number, and thus
increase social welfare.
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mark owner has spent money in bt1ding up the mark, monitoring quality and after-
sales service. Furthermore, dominance can only take effect if there were very
sustantial economies of scale, or if the capital required from a new brand owner were
large or if there were specialised knowledge about marketing available only to the
existing name owners40.
Secondly, often the information channelled by the manufacturers is incomplete and in
the absence of other forms of information consumers are often misguided as to the
differences between goods. Such distortion can be remedied by developing an
independent source of information, such as by mandatory use of marks and labelling.
Labels should contain all information that is relevant and comprehensible for the
average consumer.4 ' In addition there should be special laws regulating advertising
to enhance the product differentiation role of trade marks.
From the foregoing discussion, it has been illustrated that despite certain reservations
pertaining to the importance of product differentiation in a free market system, trade
marks are often the simplest mechanism whereby differentiation of products can be
effected. The detriments of trade marks, as discussed above, are related basically on
advertising practices which could be overcome by other regulations. In the next
section, we will address the second economic function of trade marks i.e their quality
function.
See Fuller, C.W.F.Baden, Economic Issues relating to Property Rights In Trade Marks: Export Bans,
Differential Pricing, Restrictions on Resale and Repackaging. 6, Eur. L.R, 162, 164-165 (1981). He denies
the possibility of the creation of dominance even among the famous and well known marks. At P. 166 he
argues that in practice, brand owners face competition from many directions. First there is the threat from
existing brand owners already selling similar products to the same customer groups. Secondly, and more
serious, there is the threat from existing brand owners selling the similar products in other markets. Lastly
and most serious is the threat from brand owners which are well established in selling other product tines.
41 In Malaysia, labelling can be categorised as trade descriptions governed by the Trade Description
Act 1972. The Act defines instances whereby a trade description is false, if it is likely to be taken as an
indication that would be false to a material degree. (S.5(2). Applying false trade description on goods is
a criminal offence under S3(1) TDA 1972. There are separate laws which lay down the minimum
requirement of information in labelling and trade descriptions such as the Price Control (Labelling by
Manufacturers, Importers, Producers or Wholesalers) Order 1989.
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4	 Trade marks as the guarantee of quality of goods.
Trade marks not only encapsulate knowledge of goods but also expectations about the
quality of goods. Trade marks symbolize a psychological function in motivating
consumers to choose and associate goods with quality42.
Despite that, and even though this economic function underlies the philosophy of
trade marks43, ordinaiy trade mark law does not usually provide avenues for
consumers to challenge the validity of such marks if the goods do not measure to their
expectations. One reason why modern trade mark laws seldom adopt stringent
measures is that if a product's quality is reduced, the consumer will detect them and
this will affect the demand for such goods.
Regardless of the above reservations, laws often deal with some of the problems
relating to quality particularly when a mark is licensed to a third party especially from
a different jurisdiction. These measures are necessary as without them, diminution of
quality may occur as goods produced under licence often cater for different localities
and often have variation in quality and ingredients. Some countries require the
promotion of local trade marks to be used together with the foreign marks. This
measure while encouraging the diffusion of foreign technology, does not effectively
eliminate the problem of quality consistency of goods produced under licence.
Because of these problems, there are suggestions that other sanctions should be
adopted such as the cancellation of the said mark, refusing relief against piratical
42 See Oddi, A. Samuel, Consumer Motivation in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law: On The
Importance of Source, Vol. 31 Villanova Law Review, No. 1 Feb. 1986, p.1-79. His main thesis is that
a consumer may purchase a product primarily to satisfy an emotional need for what the product represents
rather than what it does or how it appears.
u It is said that a consumer's choice of a particular product is inimical to his own personal measures
of quality and expectation. See Elmer William Hanak II, Quality Assurance Function of Trade Mark, Trade
Name Reporter, Vol 65, p.318.
See for example Francesco Cinzano & Cie GmbH v Java Kaffeegeschafte GmbH & Co. Vol. 2
(1974) C.M.L.R p.21.
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imitations of the mark45, ordering the information be made to public when such
reduction in quality is taking place or provide a fiat for consumers to take action
against the trade mark owner when this occurred. Cancellation of marks has been
criticised as being too drastic and having adverse effect on consumers 47. More and
more countries have taken up the policy to regulate the maintainance of quality of
goods produced under licence. In Malaysia, for example, the recent amendment to the
Trade Marks Act 1976 has introduced a provision for the control of quality to be
undertaken by the registered proprietor when a mark is licensed 48. However, this
does not require quality to be set at any particular level49.
From the above two sections, it has been illustrated that trade marks are crucial to a
modern market system whereby all goods compete freely on equal stand. By having
trade marks, consumers may differentiate between one product and another and
thereby making their choice by relating a product with its desired attributes. Without
trade marks, it will be more difficult for consumers to distinguish between one
See Menendez v Faber, Coe & Gregg Inc. 345 F.Supp. 527 (1972) where the court had refused relief
to the trade mark owner who had significantly reduced the quality of his goods on the basis of the equity
doctrine of "unclean hands". See also Urecal Corp. v Masters, 413 F.Supp 873 (1976). In Malaysia, see the
old case of Webster Automatic Packeting Factory Ltd v Chop Kim Leong Thye, S.S.R Vol. II, 61.
Whether a trade mark itself contains a false representation calculated to deceive the public or if the trade
itself is fraudulent, no action can be maintained to restrain the imitation of such a mark. When, however,
the misrepresentation is merely collateral and the defendant is himself guilty of misrepresentation, the
plaintiff will not be deprived of his remedy.
See Sanders & Maniatis, A Consumer Trade mark; Protection Based on ori gin and Quality, (1993)
11 EIPR 406. See also the recommendations given by WIPO that government should play a role in
alleviating consumer education, setting up a tribunal for the speedy and inexpensive disposal involving
consumers and combating piracy and counterfeiting. More noble is the suggestion of the setting up of a
consumer ombudsman as in Sweden and Norway. The Malaysian Government has recently set up a special
department dealing with complaints on infringement of trade regulations from the public. The department
gives legal advice and where necessary takes up legal action against the trader.
See Cornish & Phillips, The Economic Functions of Trade Marks Vol 13 No.1 (1982) IIC p.41.
See S.48(1) of MTMA as amended by S.36. The grant of licence to a registered user is subject to
the provision that the registred proprietor retains and exercise control over the use of the trade mark and
over the quality of the goods or services provided by the registered user in connection with that trade mark.
Some commentators have criticised quality control provisions. See Parks, Kevin, "Naked" is Not a
Four-letter Word: "Debunking the Myth of the Quality Control Requirement" in Trademark Licensing,
Vol.82 TMR 531 and Pendleton, Michael D., Excising Consumer Protection - The Key to Reforming Trade
Mark Law, (1992) 3 AIPJ, 110-121.
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product and another. In the following discussion, we will question to what extent
consumer participation is embedded in trade mark law. This analysis will be assisted
with the examination of decided cases in Malaysia50.
5	 Trade marks as a tool for consumer protection- the role of distinctiveness,
confusion and deception.
The property role and the consumer role of trademarks are complementary to each
other. Therefore, in establishing infringement of trade marks, it is very much
depends on the existence of confusion and deception of consumers. In Malaysia, like
many other jurisdictions, it is an infringement for a person not being the registered
proprietor and registered user to use a mark which is identical to or nearly resembles
a registered trade mark, as such practices amount to deception or to cause confusion
to consumers as to the origin of the product. 52 The test of infringement is whether
such a trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion to the public.53 Further,
the trade mark system allows post-registration attack on marks which resemble or
For the purpose of this chapter, the discussion on factors of confusion and deception will be
confined to decided cases in Malaysia. This approach is adopted to highlight the local variables in trade
mark infringement.
A consumer is defined in a WIPO document as a person who, for his or her own personal needs
or pleasure, buys or rents goods or services offer/ed by private or public enterprises. See The Role of
Industrial Property in the Protection of Consumers, WIPO, 1983. p.9.
52 S.19 & S.38(l) of the Malaysian Trade Mark Act. Dr. Zakaria Yatim J. in Fabrigue Ebel Societe
Anonyme v. Syarikat Perniagaan Tukan g Jam City Port & 5 Ors, underlines the requirement in S.38(l)(a)
which are as follows:
i. the defendant uses the mark identical with the plaintiffs mark;
ii. the offending mark is used by persons who have not been authorised or licensed by the plaintiffs;
iii. the defendant was using the offending mark in the course of trade:
iv. the defendant uses the offending mark in relation to goods in respect of which the trade mark is
registered;
v. the defendant uses the offending mark in such a manner as to render the use of the mark to be
taken as being likely used as a trade mark.
S. 20 of the Act allows concurrent use provided the concurrent user is honest and has continuously used the
trade mark before the use of the registered property or his predecessor or before such registration.
Registration by a concurrent use even if the mark is identical or nearly resembles, is allowed.
In Whang Tar Choung v.Kwoon g Foong & Co(1957) 23 MU 53, there were two identical marks
being used by the applicant and the opponent. Registration was denied as that would be likely to cause
confusion..
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partly resemble a registered mark through the process of opposition TM and
expulsion."
The participation of consumers in the determination of infringements is further
enhanced by the fact that the question of resemblance is a question of fact. In
determining the likelihood of deception and confusion, decided cases in Malaysia and
Singapore illustrate the importance of looking into the context of the market of the
product or the main consumer of the product. The High Court of Singapore in Hille
International Ltd. v. Tiong Bin Engineering Private Ltd,56 adopted the principle laid
down by the Privy Council in White Hudson & Co v. Asian Organisation Ltd, 57 that
emphasis should be given to the fact that "not all customers in Singapore speak
English or write English." The court held that the defendant's trade mark "Cilly" was
a deliberate imitation of the plaintiff's mark, which sounded like "Hille" that there
was a serious possibility of deception.
The court in Chong Fok Shan g & anor v.Lily Handicraft & Anor, 58 similarly took
into account the skills of persons of average intelligence. Level of illiteracy is another
factor which has been adopted in the recollection test. In M.I & M. Corporation &
Anor v A. Mohamed Ibrahim59 , it was held:
"the test to be applied is whether a person who sees the one trade mark in the
See In the Matter of an Application b y Messrs William Jacks & Co Ltd and In the Matter of an
Opposition by Messrs Fussell & Co. Ltd. (1946) 12 MU 97. An opposition was lodged against the use of
the mark pyramid. The opposition was rejected as the mark in respect of which the registration was applied
for by the applicants was not itself similar, and it was not shown that the use of the mark would be likely
to deceive or cause confusion.
" S.28 of the Malaysian Trade Marks Act. The onus of proof that registration ought to be refused is
on the applicant. This is held by Wilson J in Kwong Foong & Co v. Whang Tar Choung(1957) 23 MU
31. See also Ronuk Ltd. v. Sin Thye Hin & Co (1962) 28 MU 383.
56 (1983) 1 CL! 50.
(1965) 31 MU 186.
58 (1989) 2 CU 196.
(1964) 30 MU, 392.
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absence of the other trademark and in view onl y of his general recollection of
what the nature of the other trade mark was, would be liable to be deceived
and to think that the trade mark is the same as the other of which he has a
general recollection. This recollection test is to be applied having regard to the
sort of people who would buy the goods and the circumstances in which they
buy". (emphasis added)
In the present case the test to be applied is in relation to people who are generally
illiterate and who do their shopping in small dark grocers' shops where large
quantities of goods are crowded in a disorderly manner in a very small space60.
Another method is that of brand - conscious consumer. This test was rejected in Tong
Guan Food Products Pte Ltd v. Hoe Huat Hng Foodstuff Pte Ltd 61 . The court
criticised the learned judicial commissioner which had applied this test and rejected
its validity. The court lamented that the proper test was that of a purchaser using
ordinary caution. The court further held that:
"the test of comparison of confusingly similar names, marks or other
distingushing indicia is not to compare them side by side but to take into
account the fact that confusion which may occur will take place when the
customer has in his mind his recollection of the appellant's mark which may
be only an idea of the whole or actual mark".
Another method of proving similarity and resemblance is to compare the two marks
60 See also The United Kingdom Tobacco Ltd v The Malayan Tobacco Dictributors Ltd, Vol II (1933),
MU, 1. The plaintiffs company manufactured and sold since November 1929, a brand of cigarettes called
the "Golden Sword" brand. The cigarettes themselves each bore the number "21" in figures placed above
a device consisting of crossed swords with the word "Virginia" written below. This brand of cigarettes was
sold throughout Malaya to natives consisting of Malays, Chinese, Indians and others who do not know
English. It appears that the plaintiffs brand had become commonly known to its consumers as the
plaintiffs manufacture. The defendants, introduced into the market a brand of cigarettes contained in
packets often. Each packet was marked with the number "21" above a device depicting the Ace and King
of Hearts placed together fanwise as held in the hand of card player. The cigarettes themselves have written
upon their sides the number "21" in words.
61(1991) 2 MU 361.
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side by side62. Such occular test, has been dismissed by the Malaysian courts in
& M. Corporation & Anor v A. Mohamed Ibrahim 63 as being ineffectiveM. The
courts should be comparing the two marks through the eyes of the consumers who are
often unaware of minute difference or variations. Where the basic idea of two marks
are the same, even though there are differences, infringement can occur so long as
these differences are not substantial 65. Where the trade brands are more prominently
displayed on the front of the packages, an ordinary purchaser using ordinary caution
will rely on that and not simply on similarity of appearances. If the brand name is
not prominent and is overshadowed by the similarity in overall features, resemblance
can easily be made out67. Phonetic similarity often is a compelling factor to induce
confusion such as that of "Chop Sipoth" and "Chop Sipot Mas", "Karrinor" and
62 Wong Foong Shin v Regina (1955) 21 MIJ 176. This was an appeal against the Conviction Ofl the
charge of having possession for sale goods with counterfeit trade mark, affixed thereto, namely a mark so
resembling the "Arrow' trade mark, the property of the Parker Pen Company, as to be calculated to deceive.
The court held that there is no resemblance between the clips in the pens and pencils in this particular case,
if the clips were looked at in isolation from the rest of the articles, and therefore the conviction of the
appellant must be set aside.
63 (1964) 30 MU, 392.
(1975) 2 MU 213.
64 In Boh Plantations Sdn. Bhd. v. Gui Nee Chuan & Ors,,4he device of gold seal with the letters
"Boh" positioned between the words "gold" and "seal" are especially created and cleverly adapted to
distinguish the plaintiff's goods from other products.
65 In Shaikh Aly Sahib & Ors v. M.I & M. Corporation & Anor(1963) 29 MU 232, the basic idea
behind the two marks are flowers even though the colours of the petal differed. The basic idea would remain
with any person seeing them apart at different times.
See Malaysia Dairy Industries Pte. Ltd v. Yakult (Singapore) Pte Ltd(1980) 1 MU 205. In this case
both the brand names "Deer" brand and "Tong Garden" were prominently displayed in the front of the
packages. An ordinary purchaser using caution in Singapore would know enough to be able to read the
brand name, considering the "high level of literacy then".
67 js Staedtler & Anor v Lee & Sons Enterprise Sdn Bhd, (1993) 1 AMR 17 p.663. The presence
of the name "Staedtler Noris" or "NIKKI" or "120-2W' on the pencils was irrelevant. In an infringement
action, the essential features were the competing marks, namely the striking black and yellow colours.
Based on the evidence and the court's own examination of the two sets of pencils, the essential features
in the defendant's NIKKI pencils closely resembled the plaintiff's pencil. Taking into account the nature
and kind of customers likely to buy these goods, namely students, and by occular compaiison among the
students, it is likely that the defendant's pencils could be mistaken for those of the plaintiff.
S.Yuvaran Sf0 Sreeamulu & Anor, (1994) 3 CLI, 253.
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"Karrimor" 69, but not in the cases of "Ram Zan" and "Zam Zam" 70; "Anakku" and
"Comelku" ; and "Mister" and "Sister"72.
Besides post registration attacks on marks which are similar or resemble, the
Malaysian trade marks system provides another avenue to eliminate the use of such
marks, for the advancement of consumer's cause. The Registrar has the power to
vary, extend or cancel registration of a registered user7 3 if the use of the trade mark
is contrary to the permitted use or in such a way that may cause deception or
confusion. The policy reason to such post registration attack is the need to protect the
public from confusing and deceptive marks74.
The extent of consumer participation in trade marks, as our discussion above
illustrates, comes generally in the form of the determination of consumer's confusion
in infringement cases75 . Some may argue that the role of consumers in trade marks
are minimal, but the significance of their participation cannot be dismissed lightly.
There have been instances whereby principles are drawn, in trade marks, in the name
69 Karrimor International Ltd v Ho Choon g Fun t/a Ah Hwa Trading Co. (1989) 3 M1[J 467.
(1952) 18 MU 149.
K.E Mohd Ibrahim v. M.Mohanied Ibrahim./.jn this case the court looked into the meaning of the
two words. Both are well known words in Hindi and Arabic which carry different meanings, therefore,
both are not identical and can be distinctive in their own nature.
71 Anakku Baby Products Sdn Bhd v Comelku Baby Products Sdn Bhd & Anor, (1992) 1 AMR 4 p.
21.
72 Tohtonku Sdn. Bhd v Superace (M) Sdn. Bhd (1992) 2 SCR 300.The court held that the two words
are different, despite the similarity in the second syllable.
S.49 of the Malaysian Trade Mark Act.
See the case of NSW Dairy Corp v Murray Co-operative Co Ltd (Moo), (1990) 18 IPR 385; 97
ALR 73.
Pendleton, disagrees with the expansion of the concept of consumer protection to that of
subordination of the trade marks owner's interest. He concludes that trade mark today has not adequately
serve to protect the labour, skill and effort and investment of time and money of the proprietor in creating
and promoting its mark. Irrelevant considerations of consumer protection in the form of a test of
infringement based on misrepresentation rather than misappropriation and functional qualifications to a
proprietor's mark, such as subsequent loss of distinctiveness, all serve to dilute the value of a mark to the
proprietor. Pendleton, Michael D, Excising Consumer Protection- The Key to Reformin g Trade Mark Law,
(1992) 3 AIPJ, 110.
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of consumer, even if they are adverse to the trade mark owners. Such trends can be
seen in the philosophy behind the policy for the preservation of well known marks and
the steps taken against the dilution of such marks.
6	 Avoiding consumer confusion and deception, the role of well known marks
and anti dilution measures
The practice of free-riding on the reputation of well known marks 76 may induce the
consumers to a false association of a product with the well known marks. Buyers may
believe that the product is produced with the consent or under a license of the well-
known mark". This form of unauthorized use of well known marks and trade
names for identical or similar goods and services is prohibited under article 6 bis of
the Paris Convention78.
Furthermore, unauthorized use of a well known mark may diminish or eliminate the
differentiation function of the mark and in this instance the mark is said to have been
76 There are various approaches to the determination of 'well known'. Article 16 of the French
Intellectual Property Code (Act of 4 January 1991) distinguishes between the 'well-known' marks which
is recognised by a large fraction of the circles concerned with the production, sale or use of the goods in
question and which is clearly perceived as indicating a particular origin of these products; and the 'famous'
('renomme') marks which would be known internationally or worldwide. The WIPO's Trademark Law
Treaty adopted the criteria of well-known and exceptionally well-known mark.(A.103(2) of its June draft).
Article 16(2) TRIPs Agreement take account of "the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of
the public". See Blakeney, Michael, Well-known Marks, (1994) 11 EIPR, 481.
See Lehmann, Michael, Unfair Competition - Trade Mistatements, Competitor and Consumer, No.6
(1986), IIC Vol. 17, p.747. He advocates that the promotional aura is the subject of the protection of famous
marks. "In competition one is not permitted to plow using others' oxen. Anyone who uses trademarks that
are similar to famous marks wishes to tap the positive force, the goodwill of these marks, and divert it to
promote his own sales". p.751.
78 S.6 bis reads:
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, 'ex officio' if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an
interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which
constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by
the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as being
already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar
goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential pail of the mark constitutes a reproduction of
any such well-known or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.
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deteriorated into generic names 79. This occurs when, in the public's mind, the name
or appearance primarily identifies the product as a genus rather than indicating a
product from a single source (as a species of a broader genus). When this happens,
the mark is held "generic" and hence must be in the public domain. The process
whereby a trade mark may become generic is said to be adverse to consumer's
interest. Schecter rationalises this by emphasizing that the protection of generic marks
will increase the consumer's search cost as the marks no longer ease consumer in
choosing the product with the required characteristics as they would want80.
In legal practice, consumers play a major role in determining genericisation of marks.
In decided cases in the U.S, the test of 'genericisation' is the consumer's motivation
in purchasing a particular product. If the primary consumers' motivation in buying
the product is the utilitarian function of the product rather than the distinctive origin,
then the mark has lost its uniqueness81.
With the above danger of dilution of marks, most jurisdictions have adopted measures
to reduce such possibility from occurring. Dilution of marks can be eliminated by
introducing the requirement that a mark will not be reproduced unless it is clearly
stated that it is a registered trade mark. Such measure may not be effective if the mark
is not used by competitors in the way of trade such as in the case of Johnson &
Johnson Australia Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd.82
See Wall v Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F2d 333 (CA 3 1925) (the American Radio Tubes cases)
and Eastman Kodak Co. v Kodak Cycle Co 15 RPC 105 (1898)(the British bicycles cases). To avoid the
dilution of well known marks, certain states in the U.S have since promulgated anti dilution laws.
See Schechter's article, op.cit.The validity and soundness of dilution doctrine has been attacked by
academicians. See Pattishall, Beverly W, The Dilution Rationale For Trademark - Trade Identit y Protection,
Its Progress and Prospects, Vol. 67 TMR, 607-624.
8! This consumer motivation test has been applied in the Anti-Monopoly, Inc v General Mills Fun
Group, Inc (Anti Monopoly III), 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Kellog Co. v National Biscuits
Co 305 U.S 111(1938). The test adopted by Anti-Monopoly's case has been criticised for failure to give
precise indication of the extent of effective elimination of the origin function of the mark. See Swann, Jerre
B, Anti-Monopoly: An Exercise in Economic Futility, Vol. 78 TMR 65.
82 (1991) 21 IPR 1. In this case the Federal Cowt held that the use by the appellant of the
respondent's trade mark "Caplet? (registered in respect of pharmaceuticals), in describing the packaging
of its pharmaceutical Tylenol as containing 24 caplets, did not infringe the mark. Lockhart i held that
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While the common law jurisdictions emphasize the effect of unauthorised use of well
known marks on the differentiation function of trade marks, the detriments of such
practices can be criticised on a different angle as far as Islamic pepective is
concerned. The practice of free-riding on a well-known marks amounts to deceit in
Islamic law and hence such fraudulent practice should be vigorously forbidden. It is
a fraudulent act to sell goods under the disguise and pretence of another mark. These
practices, therefore, fall under the prohibition against fraud and deceit in commercial
transactions which will be further elaborated in this chapter.
It has been pointed out earlier that, in some instances, the law has drawn the balance
between consumers and trade marks owners interest by favouring the former. Another
instance where the consumers' interest reigns supreme is in the case of parallel
importation which will be elaborated in the next section.
7	 Parallel importation, the juncture of consumer protection and indication of
origin.
Several theories are formulated to define the linkage between parallel imports and
consumers. One theory is that by allowing parallel imports, intra-brand competition
is amplified, thereby encouraging price competition and benefit the consumer83. On
the other hand, not only the practice affects the trade mark owner's interest, there
may be unnecessary ill-consequences in allowing such practices TM. The grey market
Caplets is so essentially and inherently descriptive that it is incapable of functioning as an indication of
origin and thus could not be infringed.
83 Fuller, argues that allowing parallel importation would have the adverse effect of impeding
competition in the long run, consumers to suffer and markets becoming more divided. He argues that dual
pricing structure should be allowed as long as those who supply the product, or those who distribute the
product do not have a dominant position. Fuller, Baden, Economic Issues Relating To Property Rights
in Trade Marks; Export Bans, Differential Pricing, Restrictions on Resale and Repackaging 6 Eur. Law
Rev. (1981) 162-179.
Hiebert, Timothy H, maintains that parallel imports impinge upon the basic duality of trade mark
protection - of proprietor as source and of origin. Consequently the violation of property in trade-marks
involves a twofold injwy. Thus he suggests that when a divergence occurs in a trademark's twofold
function, the courts should decline to offer protection. "If trademarks are to continue to serve both private
and public interests, if goodwill is to retain both its proprietary and psychological dimensions, then
trademark doctrine should continue to accomodate elements of both territoriality and universality".
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goods may not be of the same quality of the goods produced locally under the same
brand85 . To eliminate the ill-effects of parallel importation, several steps can be
taken. Clear information of the origin of the grey market goods and the product
differences vis-a-vis the local products should be given 86. The same guarantee should
also be given with respect to after sales service and supply of spare parts.87
Measures should also be taken to ensure that parallel importation is not simply an
exercise of dumping defective and default goods.
Subject to these reservations, the practice of parallel importing is often seen as pro-
competitive. In the E.U, the practice of prohibiting parallel imports contravenes the
basic foundation of economic union within the European market. In a line of cases,
it has been established that national Intellectual property rights should not be used as
Foundations of the Law of Parallel Importation: Duality and Universality in nineteenth Centur y Trademark
Law, Vol. 80 TMR (1990) 483, p. 512.
85 In cases where there has been substantial dimrivtion of quality which will mislead the consumer to
origin and quality, the courts have not been hesitant to stop parallel importation. See Colgate Palmolive
Ltd & Anor v Markwell Finance Ltd & Anor (1988) R.P.0 No. 14. In this case the Brazilian toothpaste
products which were imported into the U.K were of inferior quality both as regards cosmetic and
prophylactic properties. The consumers in the U.K were aware of flouride toothpaste and expected them
to be such and were generally aware of the value of flouride in toothpaste as a protection against tooth
decay.
86 In Dansk Supermarked A/S v Imerco A/S. Case 58/80 (1981) 3 CMLR 590, where sub-standard
china wares were sold in the U.K with the prohibition of their sale in Denmark. A Danish importer them
imported them albeit differently packaged into Denmark. The Danish Supreme Court referred the question
to the ECJ as to whether the exercise of rights was permitted.
The ECJ held that as the goods had been lawfully distributed in a Member State with the proprietor's
consent, without prejudice to consumer protection laws, then his rights were exhausted and thus the owner
of a trade mark or copyright could not exercise his rights to prevent the import of such goods. The court
further observed that in this case there was no likelihood that Danish consumers would have been confused.
87 S.218 of the New York General Business Law requires the retailer to warn the consumer of the
shortcomings in the grey market product which he is selling. Such requirement can also be imposed through
other judicial means such as the court in Son y KK v. Saray Electronics (London) Ltd (1983) FSR 302,
where the defendant was ordered to make clear to its customers that the defendant was not an authorised
dealer and that the modified goods were not covered by Sony guarantees. See also the comment made by
the German Supreme Court in Francesco Cinzano & Cie GmbH v. Java Kaffeegeschafte GmbH & Co Case
I ZR 85171, Vol 2 (1974) Common Market Law Reports, p.21 par. p.30. "....(i)t must be pointed out that
it is in principle the right, and, in case of danger of error, also the duty, of the producer to indicate the
differences in such goods marketed under a common trade mark, which are relevant to consumer
expectation; on the other handTM.
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an obstacle to the freedom of movement of goods 88 within the single market. With
the exception of certain instances89, the European court has developed the doctrine
of 'exhaustion' of rights whereby once products with valid trademarks are released in
any country within the single market, the trade mark owner can no longer prohibit
the importation of those goods into another territory. The court regards goods which
are manufactured by enterprises of common origin as of a single source.
"For the trade mark to be able to fulfil (its) role, it must offer a guarantee
that all goods bearing it have been produced under the control of a single
undertaking which is accountable for their quality.9°"
The underlying principle of the exhaustion of rights in trade marks was the concept
of "unitary control" -the function of a trade mark was that it is a guarantee that all
goods bearing it must have been produced under the control of a single undertaking -
the origin which a trade mark is intended to guarantee is not defined by reference to
the manufacturer but by reference to the control of manufacture91.
88 See Deustche Grammophon, Case 78/70 KG (1971) ECR 487, EMI Records v CBS U.K Case
51/75, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd v Terranova Industries C.A Kapforer & Co (1979) 2 CMLR 482.
89 Case 192/73 Van Zuylen v HAG (1974) ECR 731 (HAG 1) reversed by Case C-10/89 CNL-SUCAL
v HAG (1990) ECR 1-3711 (HAG H)- where there is no foundation for the doctrine of common origin in
the case of expropriation in a Member State. See also IHT Internationale Heitztechnik GmbH and Another
v Ideal Standard GmbH and Another, (1995) F.S.R, 59 where the ECJ applied jjg's doctrine to voluntary
assignment of mark to an independent third party. For the doctrine of consent to apply, the owner of the
right in the importing state, directly or indirectly, should be able to control the quality of the products to
which the trade mark may be applied in the exporting State. That control was lost when the mark was
assigned to a third party having no economic link with the assignor. The decisive factor guaranteed by a
trade mark was the possibility of control over the quality of goods, not the actual exercise of that control.
See the comment by Tritton, Guy Articles 30 to 36 And Intellectual Property: Is the Jurisprudence of the
ECJ Now of an Ideal Standard, (1994) 10 EIPR, 432. See also the cases on repackaging and relabelling
of the grey market goods such as Hoffman La Roche V Centrafarm, (1978) ECR 1139 and American Home
Products v Centrafarm (1978) 1823; (1979) 1 CMLR 326. For further analysis see chapter 8.
Case 192/73 Van Zuylen v HAG (1974) ECR 731 (HAG I) and Case C-lO/89 CNL-SUCAL v HAG
(1990) ECR 1-3711 (HAG H).
' IHT Internationale Heitztechnik GmbH and Another v Ideal Standard GmbH and Another, (1995)
F.S.R, 59. See also Centrafarm v Winthrop (1974) ECR 1183, where different marketing subsidiaries were
held as within the legal, financial, technical or economic link; Van Zu ylen Freres v Hag (1974) ECR 731,
(1974) 2 CMLR 127; Francesco Cinzano & CIE Gmbh v Java Keffeggeshafte GmbH & Co CMLR (1974)
Vol 2 where three separate subsidiaries in Italy, Spain an Italy were considered as one entity. The court
recognized that trademark can be an indication of origin in multinational concern.
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The 'exhaustion' doctrine has been applied in other jurisdictions as well. In Malaysia,
for example, the practice of parallel imports has been allowed92.
While competition and consumer's interest are the main rationale for the acceptance
of parallel importation in common law, the same basis can equally be applicable in
Islamic perpective. This is because most contemporary Muslim scholars have
advocated for a free enterprise system, whereby state interference is only allowed in
restricted circumstances93. Such interference is allowed when justice and equity
cannot be upheld except by way of intervention. In the case of parallel imports, all
the economic advantages and disadvantages of parallel import, as discussed above,
should be relevant factors in influencing policy objectives. Consumers' desires for
intra brand competition and information as to the different attributes of the grey
market goods should, on a similar scale, be catered for.
The discussion now turns to the 'locus standi' of consumers in Islamic principles of
commercial dealing. It will be shown that most principles on commercial dealing in
Islam are pro-consumer. These principles exist on four basic foundations:
(i) the consumer standing in commercial transactions,
(ii) the enjoinment for fair trade and dealing,
(iii) the institution of 'hisbah' in Islam,
(iv) the rule against any form of unjust enrichment.
In Malaysia see the decision of V.C.George J. Winthrop Products Inc. & Sterling Drug (M) Sdn.
Bhd. v. Sun Ocean (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Maltown Ltd,(1988) 2 MU 37:
"the legal ownership of the trade mark Panadol enables the proprietor to protect in Malaysia the
reputation and goodwill of the owner and of the group of which the member by enswing that the
number of goods are sold with the mark unless they are produced and labeled by the Sterling
Company. The legal ownership of the mark does not go further and enable the owner or registered
owner to ensure that products manufactured elsewhere (eg in the United Kingdom or in the USA)
are not sold within the territory of Malaysia. Neither common law nor the statute law of Malaysia
allows this".
In Australia see the case of Fender Australia Pty Ltd v Berk (1989) 89 ALR 89. See also Revlon Inc. v
Cripps & Lees (1980) F.S.R 85.
For further discussion see Ch.6 on the economic methodology in Islam.
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8	 Consumer standing in commercial dealings in Islam.
Compassion for the weaker members of society, fairness and good faith in
commercial dealings, incorruptibility in the administration of justice are the
cornerstone of the Shari'ah. Not sprisingly, Mangalo maintains that any forms of
unfair competition is by nature a "damaging conduct" and should thus be regarded as
illegal conduct ('fl'l ghair mashru'). Therefore, in all instances whereby damage
have been done, the person causing damage ('musabib') must repair or make amends
for the damage ('ta'wid ad- darar').
It can be argued that the principles of unfair competition in the Shariah are wider than
the conception of unfair competition in common law. Firstly, there are numerous
calls in the Qur'an for fair dealing in trade and condemnations of fraud and trickery.
Secondly, in promoting fair competition, the use of unfair practices is discouraged in
Islam. This rule is particularly important in comparative advertising, disparagement
of another's good reputation in advertising and promotional tactics. These general
rules which lay down the norm of behavioural conduct are more of encouragement of
fair competition than rules of unfair competition per Se. These principles will be
further analysed in the following sections.
8.1	 Fair dealing in trade.
Prohibition against fraud, trickery and misrepresentation can be seen in the following
verse of the Qur'an:
Surah a! Mutaffifin: 1, "Woe to those that deal in fraud".
Surah Yusuf:52, "this (say I) in order that he may know that I have never been
false to him in his absence, and that Allah will never guide the snare of the
false ones".
Al Nisa' :107, "Contend not behalf of such as betray their own souls, for Allah
loveth not one given to perfidy and crime".
The association of property theory and unfair competition theory is particularly noticeable in the
decided cases in the UAE as has been illustrated earlier in this chapter.
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Among forms of fraudulent commercial practices which have been mentioned
specifically in the manuals on trade in Islamic scholarship are adulteration of food,
fraud in weights and measures and hoarding. These fraudulent practices are all
prohibited as part of measures ensuring fair trade and dealing. This obligation to
uphold honesty in commercial dealings is expressed in the Qur'anic injunctions
commanding others to be truthful in measures and weights in the following 'ayah 's:
Surah al-Isra': 35, "Give full measure when ye measure and weigh with a
balance that is straight: that is the most fitting and the most advantageous in
the final determination"
Surah al-A 'raf: 85, "To the Madyan people. ..Give full measure and weight,
nor withold from the people things that are their due and do no mischief on
the earth
Surah Hud: 84,85, "... And 0 my people! Give full measure and weight, nor
withold from the people the things that are due;..."
Surah Yusuf : 59 "...see you not that I payant full measure and that I do
provide the best hospitality"
Surah al-Shu 'ara': 182, " Give just measure and cause no loss (to other by
fraud).
So important is the duty to uphold uprightness in commercial transactions that we can
find support from the Prophetic 'hadiths' which are expressive on this:
(i) Malik reported to me that Yahya ibn. Said heard Sai'd ibn al-Musayyah said,"
When you come to a land where they give full measure and full weight, stay
there, when you come to a land where they shorten the measure and weight,
then do not stay there very long.95"
(ii) Malik said about a man who bought camels or sheep or dry goods or slaves
or any goods without measuring precisely, " There is no buying without
Imain Malik ibn. Anas, Al Muwatta, The First Formulation of Islamic Principles, (English
translation), (1992) Diwan Press, England, par. at p.308.
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measuring precisely in anything which can be counted."
Despite the emphasis on just measure and weights, many scholars have interpreted
these Qur'anic injunctions and Prophetic 'hadith's, to enjoin all forms of unjust
commercial dealings and scrupulous commercial practices. Arguably, this includes all
forms of deceptive conduct such as promoting a merchandise by fraudulent means and
describing the object differently from its characteristics97. Dressing a product with
a different trade mark and copying the get-up of another product, should in this
instance, be enjoined. Firstly, the person who does that is not being truthful about
the origin and the quality of the product. Secondly, it is a form of active fraud as the
intent of the person is to sell his goods, by deceiving the public as to the nature of
his goods. The institution of 'hisbah' is another illustration of the zealousness to
certify the threshold of justice and compassion to the public.
8.2	 The institution of hisbah.
The emphasis on fair trade and dealing can be further seen in the role of 'hisbah 'as
the enforcement of market and public moral. The concept of 'hisbah' as formulated
by the jurists is based on the general command to do what is moral and desirable ('al-
ma 'ruf) and the avoidance of what is not desirable and condemned ('al-munkarat').
The Qur'anic support for the establishment of an institution for the maintanence of
good and the abhorrance of evil conduct is the following:
Surah al-Imran: 110, "Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind,
enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong'.
Surah al-Imran: 104, "Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to
all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong; they
are the ones to attain felicity".
Imam Malik ibn. Anas, Al Muwatta, ibid.
Jaafar, Zainuddin, The Concept and Application of 'Daman' in Islamic Commercial Law, April,
1994, Ph.D thesis submitted to the University of Edinburgh (u.p) p.17. The concept of 'dasnan '(liability) has
been utilized in Islamic junsprudence as a basis for restitution in any unjust commercial dealings.
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Surah al-Taubah : 7, "How can there be a league, before Allah and His
Messenger, with the pagans, except those with whom you made a treaty near
the sacred mosque? As long as these stand true to you, stand ye true to them:
For Allah doth love the righteousness".
Sura al-Taubah : 112, "Those that turn to (Allah) in repentance; that serve
Him, and praise Him; that wander in devotion to the cause of Allah; that
bow down and prostrate themselves in prayer; that enjoin good and forbid
evil; and observe the limits set by Allah- (those do rejoice). So proclaim the
glad tidings to the Believers.
The early conception of 'hisbah' is exemplified by the Prophet himself where he
would take occasional visit to the market making checks on business practices. Umar
the Second Caliph even took night duties in the market98.
It was in the Abbasid Empire that an inspector known as a 'muhtasib' canied out the
duty of quality control in all trades and crafts and supervised professionals such as eye
doctors, millers and bakers' guilds. Hassan and Hil1i account that, in Damascus,
blacksmiths, bookbinders, booksellers and the production of foods were all subjected
to quality control. From other writings, it is evident that all known professional crafts
existing at that time were subjected to supervision and quality control. Buckley'°°,
recount the trades and professions dealt with by the 'muhtasib' which included:
butchers and slaughterers; fryers of fish; sausage makers; perfumers; tailors;
educators of boys; confectioners; bakers; grainsellers and millers; silk manufacturers,
apothecaries; blood-letters; doctors and so on. As regards doctors, the 'muhtasib' was
98 See Ibn al-Ukhuwwah, Diya al-Din Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Qurashi (d.729H), Ma 'aiim at-
Ourbah fi Ahkam ai-Hisbah (edited by Muhammad Mahmud Sha'ban (1976), A1-Hai'ah al-Misriyyah al-
'Ammah lil-Kitab. pgs.228240.
Hassan, A.Y. and Hilli, D.R., Islamic Technology : An illustrated History, (1988), Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge. pgs.189, 200, 219, 272 & 277.
'°° Buckley, R.P, The 'Muhw.sib', Arabica, Mars 1992 Vol. XXXIX. p.59-ill.
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enjoined to make them swear the Hippocratic oath'°'.
The most important function of the 'muhtasib' was to ensure that all market practices
and commercial dealings conformed to the principles of the Shari'ah. Among the
maipractices which were prevalent among merchants and which were cited in the
manuals of the 'hisbah' were the mixing of white dust with flour of wheat by
millers'02 and the adulteration or the fraudulent alteration of goods. The 'muhtasib's
duty was to carry on strict vigilance, such as periodical inspection, official measures
and weights, malpractices of different workshop owners, 'dallals' (brokers,
contractors), sale of bread, horses and slaves.' 03 In exercising his duty, the
'muhtasib' exercised a constant inspection of weight, measures and mints and used
a certain seal to indicate conformity with the market requirement.'° 4 So established
was the institution that there were written guide books and manuals containing
information on the various quality standards of various crafts and manufactured goods
to enable the 'muhtasib' to carry out his duties'° 5. It is clear therefore that the duty
of the 'muhtasib' went beyond mere inspection of weighs and measures and this is
certified in the written manuals of 'hisbah'. In 'Nihayat al-Ratabah', a 'muhtasib' is
reported to have 40 separate duties. While the text of Ibn. Ukkuwwah reported 70
The doctors were also enjoined to swear not to administer any harmful medicine, nor to prepare
a poison nor amulets for any of the people; nor to mention to women the potion which makes the embryo
fall; nor to mention the medicine which stops the begetting of offspring; and to avert their eyes from the
women-folk when they enter unto the sick, and not to disclose secrets and pull up veils. Al-Shayrazi,
Nihayai al-Rutba /1 Talab al-Hisba, Cairo, 1946, cited in Buckley op. cit p.95. Al-Shayrazi's account
differs from Ibn Taymiyyah's account on the specific account of trade which were under the control of
'hisbah'. For detailed discussion see, Abdul Mun'im, Subhi, A1-Hisbah fl-Islam, Bayna al-Nazarivvah
wat-Tatbig ; Dirasatun Mugaranah ,(1993) Matba'ah al-Shuruq, Cairo. pgs.86-1 18.
102 On the account of Abu Abdullah b Abu Muhammad al-Saoati, who lived in Malaga, in the 14th.
century, in his book on 'hisbah', cited in Imamuddin, infra, p.26.
103 See Imamuddin, S.M, Al-Hisbah in Muslim Spain, Islamic Culture, Vol. XXXVII (1963), 25-29.
104 The 'muhtasib's seal indicated authenticity and conformity to the market regulation. Forgery of
mark was taken very seriously. See Amedroz, H.F, The 'Hisba' Jurisdiction in the Ahkam Sultani yya of
Mawardi, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain, (1916)p 77-101, 287-314.
105 Al-Jarsifi, in another manual, recounts the quality contml of craftsmanship particularly potters and
paper makers by ensuring the exact mixture of ingredients. These step are taken to secure conformity to
"that required by the principles of craftmanship in a degree attained (only) by conscientious effort". Wickens,
G.M. Al-Jarsifi on the 'Hisba', The Islamic Quarterly, Vol. III no.3 p. 176-187, par.183.
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different functions' 06. With the width of the 'muhtasib's duties, it is arguable that
'hisbah' should be effected whenever there is a need to uphold righteousness which
applies equally to other economic functions in the field of trade and manufacturing.
Another important characteristic of the 'hisbah' as practised during that period was
the emphasis on the independence of action. Even though 'muhtasibs' were employed
by the state, they were at liberty to take action against errant traders. Therefore, that
institution was an important mechanism to enforce justice and fairness and more so
to enhance consumers interest. This is further reinforced on the fact that their duties
were intermediate between those of the 'Qadi' and those of the 'Mazalim'
tribunals'07. Furthermore, they were entitled to investigate in the absence of any
complains armed with the invested power to enforce any of the state's regulations.
From the above discussion, it is thus clear that the ambit of 'hisbah' comprises three
main categories of action: what concern Allah or religion' 08, what concern
mankind'°9, or what may partake of both.
From the foregoing , the nature of the 'muhtasib 's duty, particularly the combination
of supervision of market practices and religious observances, illustrates the importance
of upholding justice and fairness in the market as a form of religious duty"°. Not
See Ibn al-Ukhuwwah, op.cit.
107 In terms of enforcement, the 'muhtasib' was assisted by the institution of 'mazalim', as a forum
for complaints against injustices committed by the strong against the weak. For a detailed discussion see,
Nielsen, Jorgen S. Mazalim and Dar al-Adi Under the Early Mamluks, The Muslim World, Vol. LXVI
(1976) p. 114-132.
108 For example neglect of Friday prayers.
109 Besides market supervision, a 'muhtasib' was also responsible to the general public for such as
failure of water supply, ruinous city walls, or the arrival of needy wayfarers whom the people of the place
failed to provide for. His duties also included compelling guardians to sanction a widow's remarriage, on
request with a suitable person; secwing the interval between a woman's divorce and remarriage, and
enforcing parental duties.
110 See Amedroz where he argues that the 'hisba' jurisdiction is based on the duty imposed on
Moslems in the Qur'an, i.e of enjoining good and forbidding evil actions. For an illustration of the scope
of powers of a 'muhtasib', see Serjeant, R.B, A Zaidi Manual of Hisbah of the Third Century (H), Rivista
Degli Studi Orientali (1952) Vol. XXVII 1-34.
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suprisingly, contemporary scholars have accepted 'hisbah' as the most important
institution of an Islamic stateW. The institution of 'hisbah' exemplified the
preciousness of equitable environment for the exchange of goods. This duty is further
reinforced with the legal duty to amend any unjust enrichments in commercial
transactions.
8.3	 The rule against unjust enrichment and unfair competition.
The basis of this principle is that no person may take the property of another without
lawful cause.u2 Everyone who comes into possession of that which does not belong
to him is liable to the true owner. Consequently, anyone who makes profit unlawfully
will have to compensate the original owner. In the context of trade marks, on the
assumption that trade marks are property, reaping benefit by imitating an established
trademark, or by passing off, constitute an act of unjust enrichment. If the principles
of the Shari'ah are applied in such cases, anyone who engages in such illegal activity
should be held subject to damage ('ta 'awid') which could either be actual damages
or other additional damages.
Sanhuri" 3 views unjust enrichment as not being a general theory of law in Islamic
Law as compared to common law and civil law system. He maintains that the
existing principles of unjust enrichment can only be read in their own context and
should not be extended to any forms of unjust and unlawful conduct. Despite the
above view, it is submitted that principles of unjust enrichment should not be narrowly
interpreted. A wider interpretation of unjust enrichment is consistent with the above
Qur'anic injunctions and Prophetic 'hadiths' is to endorse the promotion of 'ma'ruf'
and the prohibition of 'munkar'.
Ibn. Taymiyyah, Public Duties in Islam : The institution of the 'Hisba' (translated from Arabic text
aI-Hisbah /11-Islam by Mukhtar Holland) (1982), The Islamic Foundation, Leicester.
112 See A.318 UAE Civil Code 2/87.
113 
'Al Wasit fiAt Oanun a! Madani' (Commentary of Civil Law), Cairo 1952. vol.1 p.1107-I 108.
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One form of unjust enrichment is the unfair advantage drawn by traders by blemishing
the product of other traders. Such unfair practices by and between competitors, even
though little support can be obtained in Islamic literature on this, arguably, can
constitute 'najash' in the wider sense, even though not in factual sense.
The prohibition of 'najash' has been discussed in the context of unilateral and
collaberative price-raising in the following 'hadith's:
Yahya related to me from Malik from Nafi' from Abdullah ibn. Umar that the
Messenger of Allah said:"Do not let one of you bid against the other."
Malik said from Nafi' from Abdullah ibn. Umar that the Messenger of Allah
forbade 'najash'. Malik said,"Najash is to offer a man more than the worth
of his goods when you do not mean to buy them and someone else follows
you in the bidding"."4
The popular interpretation is to narrow the context of 'najash' to actual price jacking
cases as explicit in the 'hadith's" 5. However, it is submitted that 'najash' should
not be confined to those factual situation and should cover other instances whereby
a trader has manipulated the market by disparaging the product of another trader. To
this end, we would argue that the underlying rationale of the prohibition of 'najash'
is the promotion of fair competition among traders, in the name of fairness and
justice in commercial dealing. Within this framework, these 'hadith's could form the
basis of enjoining unfair competitive practices as well as anti-competitive practices.
If this wide interpretation is adopted, unfair disparagement, creating confusion,
deceiving and possibly misappropriation is seen to be prohibited. Therefore, any form
of unjustified disparagement of another manufacturer's product, would constitute
unfair practices in the light of the above 'hadiths'.
114 Imam Malik ibn. Anas, a! Muwatta, First Formulation of Islamic Law, English translation, 1979.
Diwan Press, p.307.
" For an illustration see the views of Sanhuri, Abd. al-Razzaq, Masadir a! Hagg fi al-Figh a!-
Jslamiyy, Dar al-Fikr, (1954), Cairo, 6 vols. in 2, Book.2 p.75-77.
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This discussion of protection of manufacturers against the unfair practices by another
competitor necessitates the elaboration of the passing- off action under common law.
A person who has passed-off his product as the property of others, should by virtue
of his unjust enrichment, be made responsible to his action.
Unlike the notions of unfair competition prevalent in some jurisdictions, there has
been a reluctance to extend protection in common law for disparagement of a
competitor unless there has been deception to the public" 6. The common law in
Malaysia deals with the creation of confusion (and possibly some type of
misappropriation) by tort of passing off. Being a common law action, the right of
passing off in Malaysia is in 'pan materia' with the common law of passing off in the
U.K" 7 . Therefore, this study is confined to the discussion of the application of
common law principles on passing off in Malaysian cases.
9	 Passing off
In addition to protection given to registered trademark, the common law protects
unregistered marks if these marks have been associated exclusively to the person who
has built up a reputation in them. The law of passing off could be summarised in one
general proposition: no one may pass off his goods as those of another.
The following factors are of concern in determining the tort of passing off:
i. similarity of get-up, trade name, trade mark and
ii. such similarity will lead to deception to the public and the likelihood that the
116 The courts in the U.K have made it clear that unfair competition is not recognised, despite recent
assertions that passing off could expand to cover some types of unfair competition as in Mirage Studios v
Counter-feat Clothin g (1991) FSR 145 and Waterman v CBS (1991) 20 IPR 185.
Being a common law remedy for unfair appropriation of another's goodwill, the essentials of
passing off are the same as the U.K. See Warnick v Townend (1979) AC 731; (1980) RPC 31. See also
Reckitt and Colman Products Ltd (1/a Colmans of Norwich) v Borden Inc and Others, (1990) 1 A11.E.R 865,
(1990) RPC 341 where the House of Lords dismissed the claim that providing protection to a lemon-shaped
lemon juice would achieve, in effect a perpetual monopoly in the lemon juice market. For a current
analysis, see Firth A, Cushions & Confusion : The Ro Ho Passing Off case, (1994) 11 EIPR 494; Karet,
Ian, Passing Off and Trade Marks: Confusing Times Ahead (1995) 1 EIPR 3.
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public will be confused into believing the respondent's goods to be that of the
applicant.
Similarity can occur due to phonetic similarity of the Chinese characters to the trade
mark' 18. Confusion and deception can easily arise due to the relationship of the
parties particularly if the alleged product and the genuine products are distributed by
the same group of companies" 9 or where both the plaintiff and the defendant are
engaged in the same field of activity.'20
Deception and confusion are normally factually proven in the court' 21 . If the
products are exactly similar, there is no need to prove intention to deceit, it will be
implicit in the copying', otherwise deceit should be proven'23.
118 Haw Par Brothers International Ltd & Anor v. Jack Chiarapurk & Ors (1991) 2 MU 428. In this
case the defendant, who was a partner in a join venture to manufacture and trade "Tiger Balm", later
produced his own balm under the brand name "Lion Balm" which had the same shape, get-up and size of
"Tiger Balm". The court held that there was a deliberate attempt to take advantage of the goodwill of the
Tiger Balm products.
"This is all the more so when we bear in mind that a fairly substantial proportion in Singapore are
Chinese educated and quite a proportion of of the elderly people in Singapore are illiterate."
Haw Par Brothers International Ltd & Anor v. Jack Chiarapurk & Ors (1991) 2 MU 428. See
also Regent Decorators CM) Sdn. Bhd & Anor v. Michael Chee & Ors (1984) 2 MU 78 where the former
employee of the plaintiff had set up another company under the same trade name engaging in the same
business with the former employee. There could easily be confusion among members of the public entering
into transactions with the defendants thinking that in fact they were dealing with the plaintiff. In Excelsior
Pte Ltd.v Excelsior Sport (S) Pte Ltd (1986) 1 MU 130, the plaintiffs and the defendants carried on the
same business activities i.e the supply of a variety of swimwear, sportswear and other clothing.
120 See Regent Decorators (M) Sdn. Bhd & Anor v. Michael Chee & Ors (1984) 2 MU 78. If the
defendant is engaged in a different field of business the court has been slow to hold passing off as in
Loong Co Sdn. Bhd. v. Chai Tuck Kin ,(1982) 1 MU 356. In this case there is no calculation to deceive
by diverting customers from the plaintiff to the defendant or cause confusion to the customers. 	 -
121 What the parties normally do is to call consumers to testify in court. In Nestle Product Ltd. &
Anor v. Asia Organization Ltd. & Anor (1965) 2 MU 195, the case was dismissed because the plaintiff
failed to prove that the labels used by the defendants had caused deception and confusion. In this case even
though the defendants had been in competition for nearly 10 years, only 5 instances of confusion were
shown.
As held by the Privy Council in White Hudson & Co v. Asian Organization Ltd. (1965) 3 MU 186
and in the case of Haw Par Brothers Inter. Ltd & Anor v. Jack Chiara purk & Ors (1991) 2 MU 428.
Lee Kar Choo v. Lee Lian Choon (1967) 1 MU 167.
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A third condition is:-
iii.	 proof of reputation in the get-up: it must be distinctive of the goods and
business and be associated or identified with them'24
Exclusivity of use in a trade mark is easier to make up if the mark is distinctive and
not commonly used in trade. The design of the get-up or packaging need not be
novel, provided that the get-up was distinctive of the appellant and had been
identified with them' 26. Where the design of the get-up or packaging is not
distinctive the court will not provide protection'27.
Where exclusivity of use of common word or phrase may lead to monopoly in that
word, the court may refuse a claim of passing off.' 28 For foreign trade marks,
there should be proof of reputation such as the use of the trade within the jurisdiction;
otherwise protection cannot be extended to such marks.'29
124 See Clairol Incorporated v. Too Dit Co (1980) 2 MU 112, where the particular get-up had not been
associated exclusively with the plaintiffs goods as the goods had not been in the market long enough, so
as to be identified in the course of time with the plaintiffs goods and with no others. Sinnathuray J. held
that (p.11 3) in considering passing off the labels, "the two ingredients which the plaintiff must prove,
reputation and deception or confusion become inseparable".
125 Excelsior Pte Ltd. v.Excelsior Sport (S) Pie Ltd (1986) 1 MU 130.In this case, the court held that
the trade name "Excelsior" is not a common word, neither it is descriptive of the business. It is a fancy
word which the plaintiffs have used for 34 years. The close resemblance of the two names has caused and
is likely to continue to cause confusion.
126 White Hudson & Co v. Asian Organization Ltd. (1965) 31 MU 186. This was a passing off action
between Hacks and Pecto medicated cough sweets. The wrappers of the respective sweets bore the
respective trade names, but the wrappers were of similar colour. The Privy Council's decision was a
reversal of the Court of Appeal case which clearly held against monopoly of colour on wrappings. Buitrose
J. held in the Court of Appeal that the distinguishing feature of the plaintiffs sweets was the words "Hacks"
and not the colour of the wrapper, and the plaintiff had no right to the monopoly of orange, red or other
coloured paper for wrapping sweets because they were common to trade. 	 -
127 Tong Guan Food Products Pie Ltd v. Hoe Huat Hng Foodstuff Pie Ltd (1991) 2 MU 36.
128 Mun Loong Co Sdn Bhd v Chai Tuck Kin(1982) 1 MU 356 where the court refused to grant an
injunction to stop another trader from using the trade name "Mun Loong". The court observed that the words
'Mun Loong" are known Chinese words meaning " a lot of prosperity". "It is the common objective that
all business enterprise to be prosperous".
129 See Tan Gek Neo Jessie v. Minister for Finance & Anor (1991) 2 ML! 301, where an American
Corporation whose mark "Penneys" had not been used in Singapore since the expiry of the registration of
the mark in Sept 1983.
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Finally the fourth condition is:-
iv.	 proof of damage. Where there is no proof of damage, the court is slow to
uphold a claim for passing off.DO
In most cases, these four conditions are neccessary to constitute an act of passing off.
These conditions are imposed by virtue of the transitory nature of passing off. Unlike
registered trade marks, passing off exists as long as the mark is distinctive in the eyes
of the public or a class of the public.
10	 Conclusion and recommendations.
The analysis of trade marks in common law and the emphasis of trade and dealing in
Islam, as discussed in this chapter, can be represented in the following table:
GENERAL FEATURES OF THE MODERN TRADE MARK SYSTEM IN
MALAYSIA AND THE PROTECTION OF TRADE AND DEALING IN
ISLAM._______________________
TRADE MARK REGISTRATION 	 PROTECTION OF FAIR TRADE
SYSTEM AND PASSING OFF	 AND DEALING.
1. protection on the basis of	 1.protection as part of social
registration.	 function of an Islamic state.
2. protects property rights	 2.emphasis on consumer
link with consumer indirect.
3. even protects defensive trade marks. 	 3.protection on the basis of actual
use.
4. provision for compulsory licensing
	
	
4. state has wide power
to encroach personal property to
___________________________________ protect public 'maslaha'.
See Tong Guan Food Products Pte Ltd v. Hoe Huat Hng Foodstuff Pte. Ltd. (1991) 2 MU 361.
In this case the appellant's sales figures showed that in fact the monetary value of sales increased. The
goods were also not in direct competition with one another. If the goods are in direct competition with one
another, the court will readily infer the likelihood of damage to the plaintiff's goodwill, not merely through
the loss of sale but also through the loss of exclusive use of his name or mark in relation to the particular
goods or business concerned.
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5. provision for regulatory body.	 5.institution of 'hisba' (ombudsman)
6.mislabelling, misrepresentation in	 6.wide prohibition against any kind
advertising provided for under other 	 of dishonesty, fraud and
regulations.	 misrepresentation in trade.
7.not against parallel importation.	 7.pro free movement of goods.
8.power of owner absolute 	 8.power of owner relative
The above diagram epitomises the analysis of the features of a modern trade mark
regime and the principles on trade and dealing in Islam. Firstly, not$withstanding
rights of passing off, the basis of protection in a modern trade mark regime is based
on registration. On the other hand, the emphasis on fair trade and honesty in
commercial transactions in Islam would entail that all kinds of scrupulous malpractices
are curtailed. Thereby, the need to check on the use of trade marks comes indirectly
under such obligation. It has been established that forging or counterfeiting goods of
a registered trade mark is clearly a form of forgery and deceit which is forbidden in
Islam. By selling counterfeit and imitation products, the intention of the seller is to
mislead the public as to the characteristics of the product. Added with the proposition
to extend the concept of 'daman' (civil liability) to cover all forms of unjust
commercial dealings, the expansion of Islamic jurisprudence to provide redress against
counterfeiting and imitation is suported with valid grounds in the Shari'ah. Such an
extension has taken place in some of the Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates' 31 . These cases provide the impetus for the introduction
of a proper trademark system. All these countries have since introduced a full
See E!-Nayal, Ma'wia al-Tahir, Agency Contracts and Consumer Rights, Arab Law Quarterly Part
4 August 1986, p.40! and Amin, op.cit.
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registration system' 32 as opposed to claims of rights by individual advertisement.
This proposition impinges upon the appreciation that trademarks play an effective role
in their differentiation function. It is also assumed that all the above-mentioned
distortions created out of advertising and mis-information are effectively eliminated.
Economic theory holds that consumers demand the most reliable information available
and that firms convey the information which consumers demand. Hence, within this
realm of prohibited deceitful practices in Islam are incorrect advertising, unfair
I32A.
competition, false advertising and dilution of qualiiy. Measures should be taken to
ensure that promotion of goods by advertisement does not contain false assertions.
Advertisements should give accurate and fair information of the attributes of the
products. This requires additional regulation on the use of labelling and indication of
origin. Quality of products should be constantly monitored to check against any
surreptitious dilution of quality.
It has been shown that trade marks play a balancing role to accommodate both the
consumers and trademark owners interests, both whom trademarks continue to serve.
The development of trademarks law, thus far, has proven that the two interests are
not entirely discordant. Rights of competitors are also rightly served by rules of unfair
competition, or even to a limited extent by passing off. In this context, the Islamic
prohibition against 'najash' can be broadened to cover all forms of unfair practices.
The present trade mark laws can still be further tightened for the furtherance of
consumers' cause. Even though, these laws essentially grow to enhance the interest
of trade mark owners, the assimilation of consumers' interest would not only improve
the present laws but also achieve the basic philosophy behind the Islamic principles
on trade and commerce. The furtherance of consumer's cause can be accomplished by
132 See Meyer-Reumann & Schackel Torsten, The Trademark Law of the United Arab Emirates
(Federal Law 37/1992) And An Outline of the Legal Protection in the Gulf Region, Arab Law Quarterly, pt.3 Sept.1993
See also the discussion by Hanson, Maren, Counterfeiting and Infringement; The Gulf View, Trade Mark p.236-240.
World, Feb. 1993 p.25; Gaya, Javed, Reforming the Law in Dubai, MEED, Middle East Business
Weekly,3 July 1992 p.24; Al-Taznim, Essam, The New UAE Federal Trademark Law, 4 Sept 1992.
MEED, p.31. See also Registration of Trade Marks Law, enacted by High Decree No. 8762 of 28/7/1358
AH, Karam, Nicola H. (ed) Business Laws of Saudi Arabia, 4 vols, Graham & Trotman, (1992).
I 32A	 Except for the Hanbalis, all Sunni schools penalize verbal misrepresentation ('taghrir qauli aw lafdzi') only
when accompanied with lesion ('ghubn').
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the introduction of various measures.
Firstly, the use of both indication of source and appellation of origin which will
further assist consumers in making their choice. Sanctions can be imposed for false
indication of source and appellation of origin as provided under Article 10 (1) of the
Paris Convention' 33. There can be four methods of protection of these special
marks; registration system, system of special orders, combined system or protection
without registration and system of special orders. The scope of protection should be
broad enough to cover both direct and indirect uses, false and misleading indications
and goods and services. Where necessary, such use of indication of source and
appellation of origin be made compulsory. To avoid any geographical sign which
indicates a unique commercial source from deteriorating into a generic name, strict
measures should be taken to indicate that such geographical sign is used as a trade
mark.
Secondly, there should be more checks on advertising. Advertisement should be
truthful, contain all complete information which is necessary and should not try to
potray mythical images or promote lavish lifestyles.
Thirdly, one way to overcome the problem of inconsistency and dimunition of quality
of trade marked goods which are produced under licence, is to encourage the use of
collective and certification marks' both at the national and international level in
133 A. 10 of the Paris Convention provides:
(1) The provisions of the preceding Article shall apply in cases of direct or indirect use of a false indication
of the source of the goods or the identity of the producer, manufacturer, or merchant.
(2) Any producer, manufacturer, or merchant, whether a natural person or a legal entity, engaged in the
production or manufacture of or trade in such goods and established either in the locality falsely indicated
as the source, or in the region where such locality is situated, or in the country falsely indicated, or in the
country where the false indication of source is used, shall in any case be deemed an interested party. See
also Article 22 of the TRIPs Agreement.
' S. 25(3) & (4), S. 56(11) of the Malaysian Trade Mark Act and Rules 27 & 28 of the Regulation
provides for formal examination and substantive examination of certification marks which includes a search.
The use of collective marks which indicate a traders' membership of an organisation are not provided for.
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the light of article 7 bis of the Paris Convention' 35 . Use of such marks should be
opened to anybody who complies with the relevant quality requirements'36.
Fourthly, on the assumption that parallel importation is pro-competition, the present
stand on parallel importation should be maintained. Extra measures must be taken that
in our endeavour to encourage competition, the consumer's needs should not be
forsaken. For example, importation of grey goods should not justify the dumping
defective, faulty goods which do not pass the quality standards in other countries.
Furthermore, the public should be informed of the grey goods' origin and their
differences with the original goods, if any. Whenever possible, the same after sale
service for such goods should be offered to the consumer as well. These measures are
necessary as while the practice of parallel importation does not constitute a form of
misrepresentation to the consumer as they are genuine products, misinformation of
the nature of the goods would.
Fifthly, measures should also be taken against the unauthorised use of well-known
marks. The mechanism adopted in Malaysia to this effect is by allowing the
registration of well-known marks as defensive marks' 37 . A more stringent method
has been introduced by the U.K Trade Marks Act 1994 which allows the restraining
Article 7 bis provides for the registration of collective marks. Each countiy shall be the judge of
the particular conditions under which a colltive mark is contrary to the public interest.
136 Some Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq provide standardisation services by introducing
quality marks. This special mark serves the consumer, who needs a simple, practical and reliable means
approved by a neutral specialized body- that guides him to choose the best commodity, helps him to avoid
any hazards to health or safety and protects him from being subject to commercial adulterations, without
having to pay any testing expenses or to go through technical details of standards and tests etc. See 4j
Arabia: Quality Mark and Certificate of Conformity Regulations, Feb. (1987) Arab Law Quarterly, Vol.
2, p.75. See also, Iraq, Regulation of Trade Names and the Register of Commerce, No.6 of 1985.
137 See S.22 of the MTMA. The 1993 amendments has further strengthened the well-known trade
mark owner's interest by eliminating the requirement of use.(S.57(l). In the UAE, a third party is not
allowed to register well-known marks without the consent of the original owner. See World Intellectual
Property Report, Vol.7 P.45. Such a provision is not effective enough to stop unlawful use of well-known
marks.
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of the use of a well-known marks by a third party'.
Finally, further rules on unfair competition and competition should be enacted to
provide a healthy environment for commercial transaction by curbing the abuses by
trade marks owners. These measures which maintain competition can either be
incorporated in the present trade mark regime or be separately provided for.
138 S.56(2) provides that;
"The proprietor of a trade mark which is entitled to protection under the Paris convention as a well-known
trade mark is entitled to restrain by injunction the use in the United Kingdom of a trade mark which, or
the essential part of which, is identical or similar to his mark, in relation to identical or similar goods or
services, where the use is likely to cause confusion".
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CHAPTER EIGHT
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC INTEREST AND
COMPETITION
I	 Introduction
Intellectual property is a property right which is intrinsically limited in many ways.
The two most important factors involved in the process of delimitation of intellectual
property are public interest and the need to maintain market competition. It has been
reiterated throughout this thesis that intellectual property is not a form of monopoly
right but a form of property right. Like other forms of property right, the ambit of
ownership in Intellectual Property depends on the power to exclude. The law draws
certain constraints on these exclusive rights and imposes certain behavioral limits to
obviate the creation of monopolistic situations and the perceived danger of abusing the
competitive advantage conferred by Intellectual Property.
This need for a balancing exercise is expressed in Art 27 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which provides:
(i)everyone has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the Community,
to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits;
(ii)everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is an author'.
In the previous chapters, we have deliberated on the existence of intellectual property
and their justifications on a theoretical plane, both in common law and Islamic
scholarship. In this chapter, we will proceed to discuss the process of defining the
perimeters of Intellectual Property. An exercise of this kind will not be valid without
looking into the delimitation of rights assumed within the theoretical conception of
right or 'haqq' and even within the natural law conception of property rights. Within
1 See Dworkin G & Taylor RD. Blackstone's Guide to the Copyright. Designs & Patents Act 1988:
The Law of Copyright and Related Rights, (1989), Blackstone, London. Quoted for discussion at p.3.
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Islamic scholarship, this periphery is known in the concept of 'su isti'mal a! haqq'.
To that end it is important to note that, certain limitations are imbued in the
legislations relating to Intellectual Property itself. These restrictions, which will be
defined briefly later, support our proposition that Intellectual Property, is constructed
to achieve a suitable balance between private property rights and other important
goals, principally, the advancement of public interest. For that purpose, this study
will not be a comprehensive one and not all instances of limitation will be outlined
here.
We also propose to describe in this chapter the various mechanisms which are
developed to resolve the anti-competitive effects of Intellectual Property. As opposed
to the previous-mentioned limitations, these mechanisms exist and evolve
independently of the Intellectual Property regime. A cursory examination of
competition rules in the United Kingdom and United States is given. It is not within
the ambit of this chapter to evaluate the basic framework and philosophy of these two
mechanisms nor to give an extensive analysis of competition and antitrust laws in the
U.K and the U.S.
With the above introduction and a brief outline of this chapter, we will proceed with
the discussion of theoretical conception of parameters of Intellectual Property right.
We propose to begin with the analysis of the concept of 'su isti 'ma! a! haqq' in
Islamic jurisprudence.
2	 Theoretical delimitation of property rights- the property theory
2.1	 the concept of 'su 'isti 'ma! a! hag'
Conceptually, the nature of right ('haqq') in Islamic jurisprudence, being a God-given
right, is not absolute. Firstly, all rights, existence and exercise should be consistent
with the dictates of the Shari'ah. Secondly, the exercise of any right is underpinned
by recognised 'maslahah' (considerations of public interest). Nobody can exercise his
right adversely to the 'maslahah' upon which the right rests. Thirdly, even in cases
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of strictly individual rights ('haqq adami') in the various classification of rights in
Islamic jurisprudence, these rights are circumscribed by the boundary set by
considerations of 'maslahah'. Fourthly, in similar terms, right of ownership
('milkiyyah') are not free from this constraint. The exclusive rights prescribed by the
Shari'ah to an owner does not mean that an owner of right may exercise his right as
he likes. Fifthly, imposition of limits on the capacity to exercise a lawful act
('ibahah') is accepted in Islamic jurisprudence if circumstances demand it. Umar, (the
second Caliph after the Prophet) for example restricted the consumption of meat for
two consecutive days during famine and the restriction of the right to many
'kitabiyyah' woman. Muslim scholars have discussed the various limitations to the
concept of right and ownership at length, particularly in relation to rights of
neighbours.
Among these restraints ('quyud'), the avoidance of harmful exercise of rights
Constitutes the most important boundary and varies from case to case according to the
degree of harm inflicted2. In instances where the exercise of a right involves the
promotion of 'maslahah' to the right-owner but at the same time results in
nnecessary harmful consequence ('mafsadah') to others, that 'mafsadah' being of
equ'r greater sttngth, this calls for the reorientation of the initial right. If no
middle ay is met, non-exercise of the right is preferred. The terms which are used
by most 5 olars to describe this area of jurisprudential principle is 'su isti 'mal al
haqq' or 'ta 'a#ffi isti'mal a! haqq' (wrongful exercise of right).
Classical scholars did not offer an9jenerãi Theory which would be understood as the
concept of limitation nor abuse of rights as it is understood now. Most instances
where curtailment of ownership rights had been drawn by the Muslim jurists were
confined to their factual applications. These instances are further taken up by modem
scholars who draw general principles to circumscribe the boundary of legal and
See also the elaboration of this concept propounded by Mahmasanni, Subhi, Ai-Nazariyvah al-A mmah Ii al-Mu jabat
wa al-Ugud fi al-Shari'ah al-!slarnivvah (1948), Dar al-Jim al-Malayin, Beirut (3rd.ed) p.44-55, Hassan, Hussein
Hamid in Nazarivyah al-Maslahah fi al-Figh al-Isiami pgs. 424-434; Al-Darini, Fathi, Nazari yah ai-Taasuf fi Isti 'mal
ai-Hagg (1977), Muassasah al-Risalah, Beirut, ch.1 par.pgs. 42-44.
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ownership rights. This chapter will adopt the views of modem Islamic scholars.
According to this conception, all rights are prescribed by the Shari'ah to promote
certain 'maslahah' (positive social or religious value)3. The basic rule is that where
there is a conflict between private or individual rights and public rights, public rights
take precedence.4
 The class of public rights differs from place to place and includes
all rights which are related to societal interest such as those of public health, national
trade, industrial, agricultural, manufacturing activities. The exercise of balancing
rights is done through the weighing of conflicting interests, giving preferences to
public interest when justice requires.
These constraints prescribed by the 'Shari'ah' under the wide rubric of 'maslahah'
firstly need to be distinguished from the concept of transgression of rights ('tajawuz
hudud al shar'iyyah'). Al Khafif, a r1(nown Hanafite scholar, defines 'su isti'mal
a! haqq' (wrongful exercise of rights) to cases where the exercise of the right itself
is per se valid and lawful ('jaizan masyru 'an') but may cause harm or damage to
others. Abuse of rights on the other hand, resulted in the nullification of the initial
right. Hence any abuse of rights will not be tolerated and the initial right will be void
ab initio. To elaborate further, the difference between 'wrongful exercise of rights'
and 'transgression of rights' depends primarily on the end results ('nata'ij' or
'athar')5.
The concept that the exercise of rights will be limited to the extent of avoidance of
harm to others is recognised by all scholars. Intention to commit harm is not
important. To the Hanafites, the restraint on the exercise of a lawful right may only
be done in instances where it results in 'dharar fahish' (excessive harm) -if the
exercise of right necessarily and in most instances leads to the infliction of harm to
See Al-Shatibi for his known and well argumented conception of 'masLahah' in Al-Shatibi, Abu
Ishaq Ibrahim b. Musa al-Gharnati (d. 790H), al-MuwafaQat fi Usul al-Shari'ah, Cairn: n.d 4 vols, vol.2 pgs. 3-5.
See p.101 of A1-Khauif, All, A!-Milkiyyah /1 Al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah Ma'a al-Muqaranah bi a!-
Shara'i al-Wad'iyyah,(1966), Ma'ahad al-Buhuth wa al-Dirasat al-A rabiyyah, Cairn.
P. 99 al Khafif, op cit.
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others. In this instance the Hanafites differentiate between three degrees of possibility
of occuntnce of harm; that which rarely results in harmful consequence ('nadir'),
that which normally results in harmful consequence ('ghalib'); and that which in most
occasions results in harmful consequence ('kathir')6. Most scholars agree to the
desirability to restrain the exercise of rights in the second and third instances. The
case is not the same with the first. The Hanafis and the Shafi'is scholars attach higher
significance to 'harm' which is definite ('qat'i). If the occurence of 'harm' is doubtful
('zanni'), the right of the rightowner will prevail. In contrast, the Malikis and the
Hanbalis attached higher significance to prevailing public interest even in the first
instance and allow for the waiver of private interest in such instances7.
Muslim jurists have evolved five legal maxims related to the concept of avoidance of
harm. Firstly, any harm which occurs need be redressed8. Secondly, what is
perceived as greater harm should be avoided even if resulting in inconsequential minor
harm9. Thirdly, general or unspecified harm should be given priority to specific
'harm'. In this instance, promotion of general interest is obligatory and presides over
specific or individual interest' 0. Fourthly, the avoidance of harm takes precedence
over promotion of interest". Finally, during emergency ('dharurah'), normal rules
of legality are waived and resort to unlawful acts are allowed.' 2
 Under all instances,
the relative benefits need be weighed against any ill consequences of the exercise of
rights.
6 See p. 102 of al-Khafif, A1-milkivyah, op cit.
P.103 aI-Khafif, al-Milkiyvah, op. cit.
8,AI-Dhararu yuzal.
Yatahanunalu al-dharar al-akhaffu Ii daf I al-dhara al-ashadu'.
10 
'Yatahammalu a! dharar aJ-khass Ii dafi a! dharar al- 'ainm or taqdim al maslahah a!- 'anunah 'ala
al-maslahah al-khassah'.
" 'Dafi al-mafasid muqad4unun 'ala jalb al-masalih' or in the language of 'majal!ah al-ahkam' as
'dar'u al-mafasid awla mm jaib al-manafi'.
12 
'Al-dharurat tubiha al-mahzura:'.
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Some classical scholars, with the exception of al-Shatibi, discussed this concept and
its application in very restricted ways' 3. Al-Darini, forcefully argued that this
balancing exercise should be given greater significance and should be considered as
one of the main theoretical delimitations to the concept of rights' 4. He argued that
it is the objective ('maqasid') of the Shari'ah to achieve justice ('adalah'). Hence the
exercise of right contrary to the objective of the Shari'ah and contrary to the concept
of 'adalah' would vitiate the basic purpose and function of right. A legal right is not
an end in itself ('ghayah'), but a means ('wasilah') to promote justice and to achieve
other higher objectives set by the Shari'ah. He justified the interference by the state,
either in delimitation of rights of ownership ('milkiyyah'), permitted acts ('ibahah'),
or other rights ('haqq' in general) in the name of promotion of public interest.
It has been mentioned earlier that Muslim scholars have articulated the various
restraints ('quyud') with regard to traditional property. The same principle, it is
submitted here, applies to Intellectual Property. The exclusive rights conferred to an
Intellectual Property owner should be curbed where the exercise of the right vitiates
the basic function of the grant of the right. This will depend ultimately on the
circumstances of the case.
2.2	 Theoretical framework of property rights
It is difficult to sustain the idea of limitless property rights.' 5 All the natural law
thinkers, who sought different grounds and justifications for property rights, have the
same 'caveat' to delimit property rights' 6. Lockeans for example would not hesitate
Concepts of 'maslahah' and 'adalah' are discussed by some scholars in relation to 'sadd al-zara 'f
and 'istihsan'.
Al-Darini, op.cit. p.10.
See the arguments in favour of limiting Intellectual Property tights in Vandevelde, Kenneth J, The
New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Conce pt of Property, (1980)
Buffalo Law Review, Vol.29 325-367.
16 For analysis of natural law arguments in relation to Intellectual Property, see Kitch, Edmund W.
Property Rights in Inventions, Writin gs and Marks, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol.13
p.1 19- 124 (Vol.13 Winter 1990), Palmer, Tom 0, Are Patents and Copyrights Morall y Justified? The
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to restrain property rights if the exploitation of such rights leads to 'waste' and
inequitable distribution' 7. Intellectual Property presents a peculiar problem of
allocation of rights, even though its similarity with traditional property can be
drawn.' 8 In the first place, contrary to some assertions that allocating property
rights in "knowledge" is basically contrary to the 'concept of knowledge itself"9,
this need to find a reorientation of protection and access, has been accepted and
recognised.
Within this perspective, the concept of property refers to a "bundle of rights" rather
than referring directly to a material object owned 20. One of the main attributes of
property rights is the power to exclude. The degree of exclusion may vary and there
may be valid grounds for pruning away this exclusive right without destroying the title
Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol.13 Pat
3 (Winter 1990) 817, Ko Yusing, An Economic Anal ysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, The Yale
law Journal (vol.102(1992) p.777-804, Gordon, Wendy J, An Inquiry Into The Merits Of Copyright: The
Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, Stanford Law Review, Vol.41 (4-6) 1989
p.1343-1409, Paul, Ellen Frankel, Natural Rights And Property Rights Harvard Journal of Law and Public
Policy, Vol 13, pt. I p.i0, Berg, Sanford V. Copyright, Conflict And A Theory Of Property Rights,
Journal of Economic Issues, (1971) 5 June 71-79, Hughes, Justin, The Philosophy On Intellectual
Property, The George Town Law Journal, (1988) Vol 77:281, Litman, Jessica The Public Domain, Emoiy
Law Journal Vol.39 (1990) 39.
See Hughes, Justin, op. cit.
See Dworkin, Gerald, "Property", Land Law; Industrial And Intellectual Property : Are There Any
Common Characteristics (1978), Ford Foundation Workshop on Property Law, Institute of Advanced Legal
Studies, London. See also the brilliant analysis by Gordon, Wendy J in An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: The Challen ges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, Stanford Law Review,
Vol 41(4-6)1989 p.1343.
Vaver argued that allocation of property rights in knowledge is impossible as knowie4is infinite
in time and space. Secondly, allocating property rights in ideas makes ideas artificially scarce and their use
less frequent- and from a social viewpoint, less valuable. Thirdly, it is difficult to dismiss the fact that we
all borrow from one another. Hence the boundary of that domain of ideas which can be properly be called
'mine or thine' is impossible to draw. See Vaver, David Some Agnostic Observations on Intellectual
Property, Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 6 No.2 June 1991 p.125-153. Contrary to his assertions, the
question of the correct balance of allocation of rights and access have long been recognised and efforts have
always been taken to come up to a suitable solution. These deficiencies cannot ignore the fact that exclusive
rights over the so called economic activities of "ideas" are sustainable.
"Ownership is not a single concrete entity but a bundle of rights and privileges as well as of
obligations." (Union Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equal) (1963) 60 Cal. 2d. 441, 447).
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of ownership21 . This area of non exclusion is described as "no duty" within
Hohfeld's schematic correlation of right and duty22.
With the above discussion, we continue with a brief outline of limitations imposed
in Intellectual Property rights relating to copyright, trade marks and patents.
3	 Delimitation drawn in the name of "public interest"
3.1	 Limits in copyright
Copyright presents the clearest case of a property right in which the balancing of
private rights, free access and public interest is most demanding 23. Justice Yates
described this tension in the historical decision of MiIJar v. Taylor24:
"all property has its proper limit, extent and bounds.. ..the legislature had no
notion of any such things as copyrights as existing for ever at common
law:...on the contrary, they understood that authors could have no right in
their copies after they had made their works public; and meant to give them
a security which they supposed them not to have had before......
The 1709 Statute of Anne itself represents a striking balance between the author's
right and public rights to have easy access to a work. by providing 21 years for
published works, 14 years for unpublished work and the stipulation that the price of
21 
"Since property or title is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities, the pruning
away of some or a great many of these elements does not entirely destroy the title..." People v. Walker
(1939) 33 Cal. App. 2d 18, 20.
22 See Bainbridge, David I, Intellectual Property, 2nd ed. (1994) Pitman Publishing, London.
According to this conception intellectual property is defined within Hohfeld's correlations and oppositions.
Intellectual property confers an exclusive right to certain kind of 'ideas' and at the same time imposing a
correlative duty on others not to infringe this right. There are also associated privilege and 'no right'. This
privilege comes in the form of the privilege given by the law to the owner to exploit his intellectual
property. The realm of 'no right' includes the exclusions and exemptions which are drawn by the law to
reach a balance between conflicting interest. pgs. 11-12.
23 See the various arguments forwarded by Davies, Gillian,in Co pyright and Public Interest,
Weinhem, New York, 1994 to support her proposition that the main objective of copyright laws, from
historical perspective is principally to achieve a suitable balance of the various conflicting interests.
(1769) 4 BUff. 2303. at.2390.
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the book is not set too high.
The concept of copyright has drastically changed since its inception. On the one hand
the scope of copyright is enhanced and new subject matter is protected.26 While on
the other hand, technological progress has made it easier to copy and duplicate and
hence, easier to undermine Intellectual Property rights. In the international sphere,
we see the call for the tightening of copyright enforcement and a greater campaign
against piracy and counterfeiting. Clearly, it is apt that the intensification of
copyright control is adjusted with proper control and counterbalanced with proper
access to certain acceptable activities.
3.1.1 Copyright, education and fair dealing
Among the limits set upon copyright to achieve this delicate balance of dissemination
of knowledge and the protection against piracy and copying are the limits due upon
the temporal nature of copyright and the evolution of the concept of "fair use" 27 . In
terms of duration, even though the given duration of copyright has been extended
progressively since the 1709 Statute of Anne, the arguments which are forwarded
against perpetual proprietary rights have always been that the public have a right to
25 The preamble of the Statute of Anne 1709 states the objective of copyright "for the encouragement
of learned men to compose and write useful subjects". See also Chapter XIX, Section IV "if any bookseller
or booksellers, printer or printers, shall....set a price upon, or sell, or expose to sale, any book or books
at such a price or rate as shall be conceived by any persons to be too high and unreasonable: it shall be and
may be lawful for any person or persons, to make complaints thereof' to the Archbishop of Canterbury,
Lord Chancellor (or to a number of specified dignitaries of church and bench) who were given powers to
enquire into the price and "to limit or settle the price of every such printed book...according to the best of
their judgements"
cf. the Copyright clause of the American Constitution which states the objective "to promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries".
26 For a critical discussion on the expansion of copyright and the necessary implications and ill-
consequence arising thereto, see Ricketson, Sam New Wine into Old Bottles: Technological Change and
Intellectual Property Ri ghts Prometheus, Vol 10, No.1, June 1992 p.53-82.
See the arguments forwarded by Ricketson against the plan in the U.K to extend the duration of
copyright to 70 (p.m.a) in the effort to harmonise copyright within the E.E.C. Ricketson, Sam, The
Copyright Term, IIC Vol 23 No.6 (1992) p.753-785.
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the access of a work as soon as possible. The argument is that the faster a work falls
in the public domain, the faster the work is freely accessible to all. Another concern
against long duration is the possibility that the owner of a work may unreasonably
create an obstacle to the dissemination of the work.
Secondly, the law tolerates certain kinds of conduct such as "minor borrowing" for
educational, private and personal use, news coverage, comment and criticism,
research, and certain forms of incidental copying on the basis of "fair use" or "fair
dealing"28. The law has developed the area of exemption which are necessary to
avoid unnecessary hardship to the dissemination of knowledge and the right of the
public for information. The exceptions fmd their blueprints in international treatises
governing copyright such as the Berne Convention and GATF and may vary from one
jurisdiction to another29. Normally the exceptions do not run counter to the 'normal
expectations of the owner of the work'30.
3.1.2 Reproduction of work and non-voluntary licensing system
The law allows reproduction of work through a non voluntary licensing system. The
basic premise of this scheme is that it is the most practical means of reproducing
works without the hurdle of seeking authorisation of the owners of the work. The
most striking example is in the area of reproduction of broadcasting and cable
transmission. For these works, subject to certain remuneration, a work may be used
28 Under the Malaysian Copyright Act, the provision dealing with exceptions to copyright is S.13 (2).
The various instances of exceptions are too numerous to be illustrated here.
29 See Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention which provides:
"It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works
in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with normal exploitation of the
work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the authors." This policy objective is
also recognised by the GAIT Trips's agreement in more or less the same language. See A.13 of the
Agreement.
3° See Article 13 to the GAiT Trips Agreement and A.9(2) of the Beme Convention as cited above.
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without the authorisation of the authors '. For these kind of works, licensing
schemes are the most suitable means of control as it is impossible for the user to
negotiate with all the right owners involved.
Another form of mandatory licensing scheme is that which is formed to resolve the
problem posed by modem photocopying. The law recognises that, up to a certain
extent, the public has a right to reproduce a work cheaply and easily for private and
educational use32. Malaysia would have her first licensing scheme for photocopying
soon with the setting up of a licensing body for copyright written work33.
3.1.3 Public domain and non-copyrightable work
The area of non-copyrightable work, presents another interesting limit to the concept
of copyright. Inclusive in this area are the idea/expression dichotomy, facts,
The validity of non voluntary licensing system can be supported by A. 11 bis(2) and 13(1) of the
Berne Convention, Paris Act 1971.
Article 11 bis (2) states that it shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine
the conditions under which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraphs may be exercised, but these
conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been prescribed. They shall not in any
circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable
remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority.
Article 13(1) states that each country of the Union may impose for itself reservations and conditions on the
exclusive right granted to the author of a musical work and to the author of any works, the recording of
which together with the musical work has already been authorized by the latter, to authorize the sound
recording of that musical work, together with such words, if any, but all such reservations and conditions
shall apply only in the countries which have imposed them and shall not, in any circumstances, be
prejudicial to the rights of these authors to obtain equitable remuneration which in absence of agreement,
shall be fixed by competent authority".
32 See A.9(2) of the Beme Convention.
From an interview with the Intellectual Property Unit in the Ministry of Domestic Trade and
Comsumer Affairs. This private company is awaiting approval by the Registrar of Societies.
The approach and understanding of the distinction between idea and expression vary in different
jurisdictions. In the United States, the distinction was given statutory recognition in the US Copyright Act
of 1976 S.102(b). The section further excludes from copyright protection any 'idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery' regardless its form of description or
illustration. In the U.K there is no similar provision, except that some of these principles are accepted
through judicial recognition. However, the courts in the U.K do not interpret this requirement strictly,
prefernng to reward 'sweat of the brow' rather than allowing the reaping of other's work. See j
Industries Pty. Ltd & Ors v. Associated Enterprises 1kv Ltd (1960) QCLR 562 and other cases concerning
compilations and tables. In Malaysia, the only requirement is for a work to be "written down, recorded or
otherwise reduced to material form". See S.7(3)(b) Malaysian Copyright Act.
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methods, systems, utilitarian objects, titles, themes, plots, words, short phrases
and idioms, literary characters and styles. The approach and understanding of the
'uncopyrightable part' differs in the United States, the United Kingdom and other
jurisdictions35 . Despite these differences, the idea behind excluding these elements
from the domain of copyright is the need to reward a certain amount of creativity and
originality36.
The need to differentiate between the 'idea' underlying a work and the 'expression'
of that work will not be easy in works of technical character particularly with the
extension of copyright to information technology. In addition, extending copyright to
the function of a work would obliterate the main purpose of copyright and the
dividing line between copyright and patents. In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. & Anor
v. Silverstone Tire & Rubber Co. Sdn Bhd. 37
 the High Court of Kuala Lumpur
rejected the attempt to use copyright to stop copying of the essential features of an
Aquatrip tyre allegedly through the reproduction of the two dimensional drawings of
the tyre. The tyre had a unique feature which had won a number of awards for being
'a revolutionary and breakthrough product of the first kind' in the tyre industry around
the world. Abdul Malik J, rejected the attempt to use copyright to estop copying of
the function of the lyre. In his submission he stated,
"It is my view that what the plaintiffs are in essence asking to protect the idea
of the function and not its artistic value." 38
 He further held that the principle
on which the tyre functions, which the plaintiffs were trying to protect,
constituted the idea of the work and hence was not protectable under
copyright.
See Pessa, Perttu, Evaluating The Idea-Expression Dichotomy: Rhetoric Or A Legal Principle,
Computer Law and Practice, March/April 1991 p.166.
The law requires however a minimal amount of originality in the sense that it is the work of the
author and is not copied fmm elsewhere. The yardstick here is not originality of idea and thought. See
University of London Press, Ltd v. University Tutorial Press (1916) 2 Ch. 601. For Malaysian judicial
recognition to the principle, see Lau Foo Sun v. The Government of Malaysia (1974) MU 28, Hardial Singh
a/I Han Singh v. Daim Zainuddin & 56 Ors (1991) 1 CU 116.
(1994) 1 MU 348.
P.354 of the case, op.cit.
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Another view is that the limits posed by the concept of "public domain" are important
as it "acts as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving raw
material of authorship available for authors to use". 39 One factor is the reluctance
to allow the monopolisation of facts, common words, methods and system. Had it
been otherwise, the process of authorship would not have been possible and the
concept of originality, inconceivable40. The dividing line between what should be
protected and what should not, is not a simple task, particularly in works of
compilation. One method is to give copyright to the whole work once the requirement
of originality is satisfied41 . Another method which was recently taken by the U.S
Supreme Courts case of Feist 42 was to accord protection to only the original parts.
3.1.4 Wider conceptions of 'public interest
Public policy reasons have been used to refuse copyright protection such as in relation
to publication of government secrets or confidential information. This defence is a
narrow one. As in the case of Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd43 , the
Court had to balance between dissemination of a work which contained certain
allegations of unlawful activities by M. 15 or to suppress publication of confidential
information. Lord Oliver of Aylmerton aptly observed on page 1021 that:
Litman, Jessica, The Public Domain, Emory Law Journal p. 968 op.cit. She argued that the concept
of "public domain" is the most important limits ever set on copyright.
The judicial reluctance in accepting property rights on 'facts' and 'information' leads to the problem
of protecting 'unfair taking' of databases. Efforts have been taken in the EEC to create a 'sui generis' right
to databases modelled on the common law principle of 'misappropriation of rights'. The rights are called
'unfair extracting rights".
See Football League v. Littlewoods Pools Ltd (1959) 2 All E.R. 546.
42 Feist Publications, lnc.v Rural Tel. Service Co. (1991) U.s 113 L Ed 2 d 358, 111 Sup. Ct. 1282.
In this case the Supreme Court held that alphabetical listing of subscribers in telephone directory white pages
is not copyrightable. Feist limited copyright in directories to the work's original and creative elements of
arrangement and selection and excluded protection to underlying data. In the U.K in a recent case, Ibcos
Computers Ltd Anor v. Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd (1994) FSR 275, the Chancery Division
had restricted the application of Feist's filtration test in the U.K. Mr. Justice Jacob noted that the United
States test of absraction and filtration of the core of protectable expression as not being helpful in English
law (p277).
' (1991) 2 WLR 994.
28].
"Whilst newspapers have a legitimate interest and an important and necessary
function in disseminating information, their rights are not higher than the right
of a private individual to preserve the inviolability of that which he has
imparted to another under another obligation of confidence and ought not to
be permitted to override that right save where the public interest compulsively
demands".
Perhaps, the most controversial application of the defence of public interest to refuse
copyright protection is in the case of the former premier Baroness Margaret Thatcher's
memoirs. The Daily Mirror succeeded in their defence of 'public interest' in
publishing extracts of Baroness Margaret Thatcher's memoir. Justice Forbes upheld
this defence on the basis that
"the public is entitled to have it placed before it at the earliest available
opportunity and particularly during a period of time when much political
interest will be focused on the activities of the Conservative party in
Blackpool, when no doubt matters such as this will attract political comment
by various public figures.." and latter ....whose views are, as far as I can see,
matters of considerable public interest and therefore of considerable interest to
the public, not of the type of interest that does not give rise to the appropriate
defence, but legitimate public interest or at least, strongly arguably so".
3.1.5 Public lending rights
The same balancing exercise is involved in the arguments advanced for the
establishment of public lending rights. The proponents of public lending rights argue
that the commercial rights of an author need not necessarily be prejudiced when his
work is being disseminated through public libraries. As far as the copyright laws are
concerned, lending of books is not a commercial activity. However, by the
establishment of such a system, an author will be compensated when his work is
On appeal, allegation of breach of confidence was considered. The court was not persuaded with
this argument and held that the information in the book was not confidential in any sense that the public was
never intended to learn of it. See the article by Lightfoot, L, How The Law Failed To Protect Thatcher From
The Predators, The Sunday Times, 10th. October 1993 p.6.
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being borrowed from the public library. Such a system will basically improve the
welfare of authors. Opponents to the system argue that the costs of rewarding the
author in such instances should be borne by the central government and not individual
consumers45.
As far as normal exploitations of intellectual property are concerned, this is an area
which is not regulated in Malaysia and in many other jurisdictions. In Malaysia,
there have been suggestions that the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer
Affairs should regulate the dealings between artists and auctioneers pertaining to the
sale of paintings and other works. The Malaysian Artists Association urged the
Ministry to draft a law to ensure artists get a fair proportion of the profits from the
auction of their works. The policy of the Ministry is that agreements and payments
between artists and their auctioning agents were personal matters and should not be
interfered with.
3.2	 Limits in trade mark right
3.2.1 Trade mark as an 'information tool'
Trade marks which are not capable of distinguishing goods and services, identical to
or similar with a registered mark, and those which are likely to cause deception and
confusion47 cannot be registered. It has often been said that the basic premise of this
principle is the need to protect consumers.48
See Seltzer, Leon E, Exemption and Fair Use in Copyright; The Exclusive Rights Tensions in the
1976 Act,, (1977) Harvard University Press, U.S. In the U.K, the cost of public lending rights is borne
by the Department of National Heritage. The basis of this right is the simple concept that the authors earn
their living by royalties on each copy of the book sold. When their books are borrowed from public libraries,
the result is unfair to writers since there is only a single royalty but dozens of readers. To correct this
unfairness, public funds are paid to authors in relation to the lending (or stocking) of their books by
libraries. See the report of the Public Lending Right Review (1992-1993), the Registry of the Public
Lending Right (1993) and Public Lending Rights in practice, a report to the advisory commission, report
by John Sumsion, 2nd. ed, June 1991.
NST, Friday, May 13, 1994.
' See S.1O, S.11(1), S.12(1), S.14(a), S.19 of the Malaysian Trade Mark Act.
See the article by Cornish & Phillips, The Economic Function of Trade Marks : An Analysis with
Special Reference to Developing Countries, (1982) UC Vol 13 N. 1/82 p.41.
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3.2.2 Trade marks and consumers
There has been a call for the delimitation of trade mark rights where the lawful
exercise of the mark jeopardises the consumer's valid expectation of trade mark goods.
The underlying philosophy is that as trade marks serve the consumer's interest, the
exercise of a trademark right should also serve this purpose. This understanding calls
for circumscribing trade marks in instances where grave injustice occurred to the
consumers49. This view has not been favourably received in the U.K and in other
common law countries50. In relation to this, under the recent amendment to the
Malaysian Trade Mark Act 1986, a registered proprietor is required to monitor and
check the quality of goods manufactured by a registered user51 . The amendment did
not go so far as to give consumers the necessary redress against misuse of a mark in
cases of dimiinition of quality. The new amendment only provides for the cancellation
of the mark, in such instances, upon application of the registered proprietor52 . Nor
does it penalise the registered proprietor for such misconduct53.
See Sanders & Maniatis, A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based On Origin And Ouality,
(1993) 11 EIPR p.406.
The case of Colgate-Palmolive Ltd v. Markwell Finance Ltd. (1989) RPC 497, is not a proper case
to advance the proposition that the function of trade marks is the enhancement of consumer's welfare. The
facts and ratio of the case illustrate instead the attempt of narrowing down the concept of 'parallel
importation' where the grey market goods are of inferior quality.
51 S.48(1) reads:
Subject to the provision of this section, where the registered proprietor of a trade mark grants, by lawful
contract, a right to any person to use the trade mark for all or any of the goods or services in respect of
which the trade mark is registered, that person may be entered on the register as the registered user of the
said trade mark whether with or without any conditions or restrictions, provided that it shall be a condition
of any such registration that the registered proprietor shall retain and exercise control over the use of the
trade mark and over the quality of the goods or services provided b y the registered user in connection to
that trade mark.
52 See S.49 (I) and (2) which allows for the variation and the cancellation of the registration of
registered user upon the application of a registered proprietor.
S.48 (5) to be read together with 48 (6). The use of the mark by the registered user in instances
where the registered proprietor fail to impose satisfactory quality control will not be deemed to be the use
of the registered trade mark by the registered proprietor.
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3.2.3 Genericisation of trade marks and the problem of mono poly over common
words
The law recognises that there are certain marks and trade descriptions or names which
should not be the subject of monopoly TM. Included in this list are marks of
geographical indications and appellations of origin. Appellation of origin refers to the
'geographical name of a country, region or locality which serves to designate a
product originating therein, the quality and characteristics of which are due
exclusively or essentially to the geographical area, including natural and human
factors' 55 . In contrast, geographical indication refers to that particular quality of the
foodstuff which is attributable to the area of production. While the argument that
geographical indications should not be monopolised by a single trader, misuse of such
indications lead to confusion and deception of consumers56.
From the viewpoint of consumers, a non-geographical mark should lose trade-marks
protection when it becomes generic and has become in everyday language the common
name of a product. This principle has been given recognition in the U.K, U.S and
Australia.57 The genericisation of a mark depends on local usage and hence different
results occur in different jurisdiction. The best example is the word 'champagne'. In
New Zealand, this word "has a special impact or impression on ordinary average New
See Kolia, Marina, Monopolising Names: EEC Proposals on the Protection of Trade Description
of Foodstuffs, (1992) 7 EIPR 233. Effort is on the way in the E.0 to regulate the use of geographical
indications and appellations of origin.
Article 2(1) of the Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their
International Registration, Oct.31, 1958.
56 The E.0 Commission had come up with a new regulation to protect geographical indications. See
EC Regulations On The Protection of Designation of Geographical Origin, C.Reg. 2081/92, OJ 1992
L208/1. The framework of the regulation exceeds that of Lisbon Agreement in that it provides protection
for 'indications of specific character as well'. The latter refers to products which presents 'specific
characteristics which distinguish it clearly from similar products'. See Certificates of Specific Character of
Foodstuff, C.Reg 2082/92, OJ 1992 L 208/9. For full discussion, see, Kolia, Marina, Monopolising
Names of Foodstuffs: the New Le gislation, (1992) 9 E1PR 333.
See Johnson & Johnson Australia Pr y ltd v. Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pry Ltd (1991) 21 JPR 1
where the word 'Caplets' (capsule/tablet) is so inherently descriptive and that it is incapable of functioning
as an indication of origin.
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Zealanders"58. Hence, in New Zealand, attempts to sell 'Australian Champagne' is
held as a misrepreseton of the goods as the word 'Champagne' exclusively refers
to wine of a particular region in France. In Germany the usage of the word
'Champagne' to describe mineral waters has been held as devaluing the reputation of
the real French's product by comparing water to champagne. To the Court the word
'Champagne' is a symbol of luxury and extravagance and must be viewed as a
metaphor of 'elegance', 'exclusiveness', 'expensiveness' and a status symbol 59'. On
the same line of arguments, the U.K courts in two cases; J Bollinger v. Costa Brava
Wine Ltd and Taittinger V. Allbev Ltd61 . held that the practice of trading on the
reputation of the name 'Champagne' as unacceptable.
3.4	 Limits in patent rights
Besides the accepted limits to patentable subject matter and duration, patent rights are
also limited to the specification of the application 62. The law also recognises the right
to use a patented product for scientific research63. The basic premise to this
58 See Jeffries J, in Comite Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne v. Wineworths Group Ltd (1991)
2 NZLR, 432, 446.
See EIPR (1988) 8 D-177. For cases which decided otherwise see the case in Canada in Institut
National des Appellations d' Origine des Vms v. Andres wines Ltd (1988) 40 DLR (4th) 239 and (1990)
71 DLR (4th) 575, this word has lost its exclusive protection. In Italy, the court went further to find that
the usage of the word 'champagne' to describe bathfoam was not as to generate confusion to consumers,
see EIPR (1990) 1 EIPR D-5.
(1960) Ch.262; (1961) 1 WLR 277, reversed by 1961 R.P.0 116 where the court prevented the sale
of sparkling Spanish wine under the name Spanish champagne..
61 (1992) IPD 15082, (1993) FSR 641, reversed by (1993) F.S.R 641 at 659 where the Court of
Appeal held that the use of the word 'champagne' in connection to beverages which are not in truth
'champagne' and which have no connection with 'champagne', could well be a serious cause of damage
to the reputation and goodwill attached to the word..
62 The details of specific non patentable subject matter, duration and method of construction of patent
application are beyond the scope of this chapter.
63 See S.37(1) of the Malaysian Patents Act, 1983. This defence of experimental use has been held
in Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. mc, 221 USPQ p.397 "where it is made or used as
an experiment, whether for gratification of scientific facts, or for curiosity, or for amusement, the interest
of the patentee are not antagonised, the sole effect being an intellectual character in the promotion of the
employer's knowledge in the relaxation afforded to his mind.
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exception is similar to that of educational use of copyright work. Patent rights should
not be an obstacle to further development of science and technology. Such defence
applies to pure scientific research and not for experimentation for commercial
purposesTM.
4.	 Limitations due to ethical conceptions.
Ethical reasons do, on a narrow basis, constitute a yardstick for the granting of rights
in common law jurisdictions. On this basis, the test of ethical conceptions, public
morality and public order is substantially narrower than those provided by the dictates
of the Shari'ah. This part will outline, the role of ethics and its influence on the
determination of subject matter of protection of copyright, trade mark and patents.
4.1	 Copyright and censorship
In the early days of copyright legislation, copyright functioned simultaneously as a
form of censorship. The courts were not reluctant to deny copyright on grounds of
morality. On this ground, works which were considered as immoral according to
common standards of morality were refused protection. Even though this ground may
no longer be relevant to most jurisdictions, its significance can still be seen in many
Muslim countries. However, this principle do not find support from both the Berne
Convention and the GATF's Trips Agreement65 . The underlying policy is that it will
be against the conception of 'natural justice' that 'offensive works' on general grounds
of morality are discriminated against. Another view is that the denial of content-based
restrictions ensures compliance with the trite requirement that the preserve of
copyright is merely the form of expression, not the content or the ideasTM. Despite
64 Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Inc. op.cit. The issue in this case is whether
experiments on a drug conducted with a view to adaptation of patented invention to satisfy the premarketing
requirement tests on drugs safety and efficiency for business purposes falls under the exception of
'experimental use'. The court held no.
See A.9 and 13 of TRIPS and A.1-21 of the Beme Convention.
See the views by Howell, Robert G, Copyright & Obscenit y: Should Copyright Regulate Control,
IPJ, Vol.8, No.2 p.139-188.
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this, it is recognised that there may be valid grounds in refusing to protect copyright
and even prohibiting the circulation of certain work. The Berne Convention itself
reserved the right of individual countries to self-regulate the circulation of any
works67. The language of A.17 is veiy wide and nowhere in the Convention does
it define the circumstances where such an exercise can be undertaken.
The Malaysian Copyright Act 1987 do not contain any content- based restrictions on
written works. This position is illustrated in the Federal Court's decision in
Television Ltd. Anor V. Viwa Video Sdn. Bhd. 69 All works are given automatic
recognition. The Federal Court rejected arguments that non compliance with the Films
(Censorship) Act vitiated the protection awarded under the Copyright Act. While this
contention may be legally valid and preferable due to our commitment in the Berne
Convention, strict requirements of the compliance of the censorship laws would be
more consistent with the Islamic values and sentiments of the majority of the
population in Malaysia. This is a preferable view as at present, due to strict rules and
requirement of censorship, most works which may offend Islam and general
principles of ethics and morality may not find an audience in Malaysia.7°
67 This derogation is affirmed in the GATF Trips's agreement. See A.9, "Members shall comply with
Articles 1-21 and the Appendix of the Beme Convention (1971).
Article 17 reads: "The provisions of this Convention cannot in any way affect the right of the
Government of each country of the Union to permit, to control, or to prohibit, by legislation or regulation,
the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work or production in regard to which the competent
authority may found it necessary to exercise that right."
69 (1984) 2 MU 407. In this case it was argued that video tapes which are uncensored should not be
given copyright recognition in Malaysia. The learned judge held that as no certificates of approval were
obtained as required under the Films (Censorship) Act there was no valid publication of the films within the
provision of the Copyright Act as the publication in Malaysia must be a lawful one. He accordingly
adjudged the publication of the films by the appellants to be unlawful, illegal and an offence punishable
under the Films (Censorship) Act and decided in effect that no copyright had been acquired as a result. On
appeal to the Federal Court the contentions were rejected. It was held on appeal that there was no
prohibition in either of the Acts which would preclude the appellants from acquiring copyright if they were
otherwise qualified although they were in breach of the provisions of the Film (Censorship) Act which is
concerned only with criminal liability and provides a penalty for breach of its relevant provisions. The court
further held that the non-compliance with the provisions of the Film (Censorship) Act does not affect the
acquisition of copyright under the Copyright Act. There is no express or implied prohibition linking the
respective requirements of the two statutes and accordingly no nexus to justify reading these conjunctively
and importing the requirements of one condition as a condition precedent to the operation of the other.
70 Such as Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses which is considered as blasphemous.
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4.2	 Trade mark and morality
Ethical issues may also find favour in trade mark laws, though with varying
emphasis. Marks which are scandalous or morally offensive are normally not
accepted71 . Normal notions of ethics and morality require that such marks be left out
from the domain of protection12.
4.3	 Patents, biotechnology and the dimensions of ethics
Old cases in the U.S state the importance of ethical issues in the granting of patent
rights. On such a basis, illegal, immoral and harmful inventions have been refused
on the ground of lack of utility. Among inventions which were refused were
gambling devices and products or processes useful only for perpetrating fraud 73. With
the changing perception of morality and the movement against a content-based filter
for patent rights, this view has changed considerably.
71 See A.14(a)(2) & (3) of the Malaysian Trade Mark Act. See also Article 8 of the Jordan Trade
Mark Law which provides for the non-registration of marks that are contraiy to public order and morality,
that are designed to deceive the public, that encourage unfair competition, or that contain false indication
of origin.
72 See the cases of Hallelujah Trade Mark (1977) R.P.C. 605 and La Marguise's Application (1947)
R.P.C. 27. In the former case, the application of the word "hallelujah" was refused for women's clothing.
The court in this case observed that
"to be contrary to morality, the use of a mark would have to offend the generally accepted mores
of the time, while the adverse use of the Registrar's discretion would be warranted if registration
would be reasonably likely to offend persons who might be in a minority in the community, yet
be substantial in number".
In La Marguise's Application (1947) R.P.0 27, the court allowed the application to register the word
'oomphies' for shoes. The Registrar had earlier objected to the registration on the basis that the word
'oomph' was an American slang term for sex appeal and hence its application to shoes would have, upon
morbid and abnormal people, an erotic effect. The Court held to the reverse as the word 'oomph' would
not in all circumstances carried a connotation contrary to public morality.
See Chisum, Patents S.4.03 on the requirement under the old Patent law that an invention had to
be useful to be patentable.In Lowell v. Lewis (1817) 15 F.Cas 1018 (no.8568) CCD Mass 1817 Justice Story
indicated that utility would be lacking if an invention was "frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good
policy, or sound morals of society. In Brewer v. Lichtenstein (1922) 278 F.512 (7th. Cir 1922) the court
rejected a patent claim involving a "punch board" with no apparent utility other than as a lottery. In Richard
v. Du Bon (1900) 103 F.868 (2nd. dr. 1990), the patent involved a process of artificially producing spots
on tobacco leaf used to wrap cigars. The cowt held that the invention did not satisfy the requirement of
novelty as it did not improve the quality of the leaf but to deceive the consumers into thinking that the leaf
were of good quality..
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In other jurisdictions, other than the U.S, particularly in the common law system,
ethical issues are gaining support particularly in the area of patenting of inventions
relating to animal and human tissues74. Due to the development of biotechnology,
by which inventions using biological materials are made possible, fundamental
reservations on this type on inventions developed. In the E.0 for example ethical
considerations relating to biotechnological inventions are embodied in A.53(a) of the
EPC.75
5.	 Limitation imposed to avoid abuse of right.
In section 2 and 3 above, we have discussed the various forces within Intellectual
Property involved in the process of circumscribing these rights. Despite these
limitations, there are other tensions involved in Intellectual Property rights. Various
methods have been adopted to extend the exclusive power beyond that contemplated
by Intellectual Property rights, particularly relating to licensing agreements. Within
this perspective, we now proceed with the discussion of doctrine of misuse of
copyright and patent in the United States. The doctrine, its application, and its
independence from anti trust rules, is pertinent to our present study as its similarity
with Islamic conception of 'haqq' and 'su isti 'ma! a! haqq' can be seen. From this
point of view, copyright and patent is confined according to its function.
5.1	 Doctrine of misuse of copyright and patent.
In the United States, the underlying policy that Intellectual Property should serve the
basic function of promoting progress as embodied in Article 1, section 8, clause 8
of the Constitution can be seen through the development of the concept of misuse of
patents and copyrights. The evolution of this concept, which runs parallel to the
evolution of anti-trust concepts take place through judicial decisions and not through
See Moufang, R, Patenting of Human Genes, Cells and Parts of the Body?- The Ethical Dimensions
of Patent Law., JIC, Vol 25 No.4/94 p.487.
The position of ethical consideration in patent laws and the normative construction of A.53(a) will
not be dealt with in detail here. See Ch.7 for elaborate analysis.
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legislation. The relationship between antitrust law and the misuse doctrine is a
complex one. 76 The philosophy behind this concept is that copyright and patents
should be circumscribed when the exercise of these rights are inconsistent with the
public policy embodied in their grant. This policy was aptly described by the
Supreme Court in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger 77in the following words;
But the public policy which includes inventions within the granted
monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention. It equally
forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly
not granted by the Patent Office and which it is contrary to public policy to
grant"78.
This doctrine is only invoked as a defence. The basis of this doctrine is the equitable
concept of unclean hands. Hence, on that basis, the court will refuse action against
infringement if the right-owner himself is tainted with illegality. The doctrine is
normally used to curb unlawful extensions of patent rights especially those involving
anti-competitive practices such as tying arrangements, price fixing and covenants not
to compete79. In a later case of Lasercomb America, Inc.v. Reynolds 80, the concept
of misuse was extended into copyright. In this case the patentor's licensing term in
restricting the licensee from improving the licensed product and developing competing
76 See United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S 457, 465, 77 S.Ct. 490, 494,
I L.Ed.2d 465 (1957);Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.Suppinger, 314 U.S 488, 62 S.Ct. 402, 86L.Ed.363 (1942);
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-51; United States v. Paramount Pictures, mc, 334 U.S
131, 157-159, 68 S.Ct.915, 929-30, 92 L.Ed.2d 1260 (1948); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema
Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 865 & n.27 (5th. Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 1277,
63 L.Ed.2d 601(1980).
314 U.S. 488, 62 S.Ct. 402, 86 L.Ed. 363 (1942). In this case the plaintiff licensed his salt-
depositing machine on the condition that the defendant use only salt tablets produced by him. The Supreme
Court held that, as a court of equity, it would not aid Morton in protecting its patent when Morton was
using that patent in a manner contrary to public policy.
78 At 490-92, 62 S.Ct. at 404-405.
For further analysis, see Goldstein, Paul, Copyright, Principles, Law & Practice, Vol II, Boston,
Little Brown (1989). pgs.177-182.
80 911 F.2d 970 (4th. Cir.1990). The appellate court found misuse in the license terms that extended
the prohibition against developing competing products beyond the duration of copyright protection, as well
as the extension of the scope of the restriction on creative activity to include all officers, directors and
employees of the licensee.
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products was described as "violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a
copyright". The United States Court of Appeal observed that the philosophy behind
copyright was parallel to patent; i.e "the public benefits from the efforts of authors
to introduce new ideas and knowledge into the public domain" 81 . The Appellate
Court found in no uncertain terms that the rationale in the concept of 'misuse' of
patents should also apply to copyrights. On this basis "the granted monopoly power
should not extend to property not covered by the copyright" 82. The Court further
observed that misuse of copyright need not be a violation of antitrust law in order to
be protected as the equitable defence to an infringement action; the question is not
whether copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust law but whether
copyright is being used in manner violative of public policy embodied in the grant of
copyright83.
The application of this doctrine was narrowed down in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart
Jiy84 The Court considered the validity of earlier decisions of misuse of the patent
doctrine on cases of price-fixing and tying in. While upholding them, the Court was
reluctant to extend them to cases of valid restrictions on the use of patented
products85 . In this case the restriction of single use of patented product was held to
be reasonable on the basis of a "rule of reason" and on the basis that the restriction
was inevitable for reasons of health, safety, and efficacy and it was not violative of
81	
op.cit.
82 P.976 op.cit.
83 See the discussion on pages 977 and 978 of the case, op.cit.
976 F.2d. 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), rev'g 15 U.S.P.Q 1113 (N.D ifi 1990). In this case the patentee.
sold its device that served as a container of radioactive material for application in diagnostic chest x-ray
procedures to hospitals with a single use restriction. The defendant, offered hospitals a recycling services
for these devices at less than half the cost of a new one. The plaintiff sued the defendant for patent
infringement and on 'first sale doctrine'.
The Court observed at p.708 that;" should the restriction be found to be reasonably within the patent
grant i.e that it relates to subject matter within the scope of the patent claims, that ends the inquiry.
However if the anticom petitive effects is beyond the power to exclude, these effects do not automatically
impeach the restriction. Anti competitive effects that are not per se violation of law are reviewed in
accordance with the rule of reason. Patent owners should not be in a worse position, by virtue of the patent
tights to exclude, than that owners of other property used in trade."
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public policy.
6.	 Limitation imposed to correct anti-competitive effects of ex ploitation of
intellectual property rights
With the exception of the United States above through its doctrine of abuse of
copyright and patent right, the prominent way of resolving the anti-competitive effects
of Intellectual Property are through competition policies. These rules are designed to
eliminate anti-competitive practices in licensing agreements, both relating to vertical
and horizontal agreements. The mechanism, philosophy and understanding of
competition rules differs from one jurisdiction to another. It will not be possible to
elucidate here the various spectrums of thought and economic theories. The
presentation here, thus, is confined to Malaysia, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
6.1	 Competition Law in Malaysia
Competition is an area which is under study in Malaysia. Unfortunately not much is
known of the proposed Competition Act as it is still being drawn up, except that it
will be similar to the competition laws of the U.K. Latest reports announced that the
Act will be tabled as soon as it is ready. The Government has also responded warmly
to the suggestion by the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) to hold
discussions with the private sector over the proposed Act 86. This Act will not only
regulate monopolies and unfair trade practices such as cartels, oligopolies and
dumping of goods, but will also provide a policy on competition 87. This is deemed
to be necessary as from a study conducted by the Central Bank (Bank Negara), it was
shown that oligopoly had increased from 77% in the 1979 to 80 % in 1989. With the
liberalisation of trade through trade agreement under GATT, there is a fear that the
figures will increase even further. At the moment, licence agreements with foreign
86 See NST Friday, May 13, 1994.
87 NST Jan.26 1994.
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companies are screened by the Ministry of International Trade and unfair trade
practices are filtered through this process88.
6.2	 Antitrust and competition
A main thrust of anti trust principles is to rectify practices resulting from the
exploitation of Intellectual property rights which are deemed to be anti competitive.
Most if not all of these policies grew specifically from the belief that consumers
mainly gain if perfect competition is maintained. According to this notion, both
antitrust laws and patents have a common central economic goal that is to maximize
wealth by producing what consumers want at the lowest cost 89. It is this need for
economic resources to be allocated between different goods and services in precisely
the quantities which consumers wish (allocative efficiency) using the lowest cost
possible (or productive efficiency) that anti trust principles are aiming to achieve. In
economic terms, the exercise of Intellectual property may lead to certain monopolistic
tendencies which may give rise to "output restriction" by diverting production from
more urgent need or from legal rules requiring inefficient methods of production."9°
From here it is apparent that certain behavioral constraints need be imposed to control
88 See The Policy and Guidelines on the Transfer of Industrial Technology, a guideline prepared by
the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority, Malaysia. The guideline explicitly provides that
agreement with foreign partners should not contain provisions that impose "unfair and unjustifiable
restrictions or handicaps" on the licencees or that would be "prejudicial to the national interest". However,
the guideline do not spelt out clearly what would be considered as "unfair and unjustifiable restrictions'.
89 For a lengthy discussion on the weaknesses of the economic theory of perfect competition, see
Whish, Richard, Competition Law, 3nd. ed, (1993) Butterworths, London, Edinburgh.
Bowman, Ward.S, Patent and Antitrust law; A Legal and Economic Appraisal, (1973) The
University of Chicago press, Chicago and London. Bowman's articulation of the 'consumer welfare test'
reflects the Chicago school of thought of promoting the use of economic theory and analysis in evaluating
all instances of anti-competitive practices. Bowman was sceptical of the perceived danger of vertical
agreements which to him may be a method of maximizing the competitive advantage afforded by patent.
These vertical agreements which are contracts not between competitors but between suppliers and their
customers or between buyers and their sources of supply. Many patent licensing contracts such as tie-in
sales, exclusive licensing, territorial division, discriminating licensing and price-restrictive licences
analyzed are often means by which patentees are able to "efficiently' recover the value which is measured
by customer evaluation of the competitive superiority afforded by patenL He argued also that these profit
maximizing devices are mostly efficient in the social sense, i.e they are means of getting more of what the
community wants at lower overall cost than if their use were prohibited.
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practices which are inhibitive to competition and attempts by dominant firms to abuse
their position and prevent new competition from emerging.
The Chicago school mooted the idea of 'consumer test' in determining the criterion
of what are acceptable practices. A consumer welfare test, applied to antitrust law,
patent law, or conflicts between them, constitutes a central criterion for making
decisions and appraising them- what consumers want at the lowest Cost-is to
recognize that the analysis of competition under antitrust law or of temporary
monopoly under patent law permits the conclusion that both are means and not ends.
Under such an approach the productive and allocative efficiencies associated with
particular industry structures or particular trade practices are exposed and given their
appropriate weight.
6.2.1 Vertical Agreements
Accordingly, in the pursuit of perfect competition, many agreements which have the
effect of restricting competition, either between themselves, or between them and
third parties, particularly in relation to licensing activities of Intellectual Property
rights, are worthy of control. There are two types of agreements which may be of
concern here; vertical agreements and horizontal agreement. Section 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits any contracts which are in "restraint of trade" or which
"monopolise, or attempted to monopolise a market". Even though vertical agreements
do not involve competitors but concern basically the licensee and the licensor, the
policy behind the restraint of vertical agreements is the perception that these practices
are seen as unwarranted extensions of the patentee's monopoly. Among practices
which are deemed as anti competitive are continual royalty payments, taking licences
of newly discovered technology, field of use restrictions 91 , non competition
clauses, no-challenge clauses93, or grant back requirements.
91 The clause restricts the licensee's authority to produce goods to a particular purpose.
This clause forbids the licensee from competing with the licensor or using rival techniques to
compete with the licensor.
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6.2.2 Horizontal Agreements
Horizontal agreements which involve undertaking between competitors are more
frowned upon. Among horizontal agreements which are under suspicion are cartels
and patent pooling among competitors such as agreements not to licence others. There
may be horizontal agreements which are not harmful such as collecting societies
although there are concerns that collecting societies should be the subject of the same
scrutiny as they represent insuperable bargaining power and can dictate the terms of
licensing.
Accordingly, evaluating whether certain patent licensing practices should be sanctioned
will involve the ascertaining of the proper scope of the legal monopoly. Is more being
monopolized than the patent grants, or is the practice merely maximizing the reward
attributable to the competitive advantage afforded by a patent?
63	 Competition policy in the EC and 'monopoly'
6.3.1 Freedom of movement of goods and parallel importation
One of the major objectives of the integration of economic markets in the EC is free
movement of goods enshrined in A.30 and A. 36 of the Treaty. A.30 prohibits
quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect". Even
though the practice of Intellectual property protection is not per se perceived as a
"quantitative restrictions', the exploitation and the exercise of Intellecual Property
may lead to the effect. To this end , the European courts have drawn fine
This clause stipulates that the licensee agrees not to challenge the validity of the licensor's
intellectual property right in question.
The clause requires the licensee to grant back to the licensor any know-how or Intellectual property
rights acquired during the licensing agreement.
A.36 provides certain exceptions to the free movement of goods. The provision reads: "the provision
of article 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit
justified on grounds of...the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or
restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitraiy discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between member states".
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distinctions between the existence of Intellectual property rights which are recognised
and the exercise of such rights which may fall foul of the policy of freedom of
movement of goods.
As the underlying objectives behind the economic policy of the EC is the free flow
of services and goods regardless of national barriers, any attempt to use intellectual
property to restrict the movement of goods is considered as an unwarranted restriction
on competition. Hence where a national Intellectual Property owner attempts to rely
on his national rights to stop parallel imports, this is considered as unnecessary
"quantitative restriction' for the purposes of A.30 to 36. It is to this end that the
European court has developed the notion of "exhaustive right' which was developed
in the case of Deustche Grammophon and later affirmed and extended in other later
cases such as Centrefarm v. Sterling Drug 97. In this case, a Netherland patent
owner tried to stop the parallel importation of drugs bought in the United Kingdom.
Stopping parallel importation, thus, constitutes an unwarranted extension of patent
right and no local patentee can be allowed to rely on this right to stop parallel
importation even in situation where goods are imported to a jurisdiction which does
not give protection to such goods.
Exhaustion rights only arise if the goods are first put in the market by a company
Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon GmbH mbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co KG,
1971, E.C.R 631.
Case 15/74, Centrefarm BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 1974, E.C.R 1147, 2 C.M. L.R 480 (1974).
The case concerned parallel importation of drugs bought in the U.K into the Netherland. The patent holder
of this drug in the Netherlands tried to stop the parallel importation relying on its (Netherlends) patent. The
European Court held that the specific subject matter of a patent is the guarantee that the patentee, in order
to reward his creative effort, has the exclusive right to use the invention, for manufacturing industrial
products and putting them into circulation for the first time, whether directly or indirectly by the grant of
licenses to third parties, as well as the rights to impose infringements.
98 See Merck & Co Inc v. Stephar B y, 1981 E.C.R 2063, 3 C.M.L.R 463 (1982) where a person had
marketed pharmaceutical products in Italy. At that time it was not possible to obtain a patent for such
products. The court held that he could not rely on his patent in another member state in order to oppose
the importation of those goods. In cases whereby the products have been repackaged prior to parallel
importation, the courts have been reluctant to assume exhaustion of rights. See Hoffman-La Roche v.
Centrafarm (1978) 3 CMLR 217; Bristol-Myers Squibb. C.H. Boehringer Sohn and Bayer AG v Paranova
A/S (1994) 9 E1PR D-247; F.Hoffman- La Roche v Paranova (1994) 10 ELPR D-258 and MPA Phanna
GmbH v. Rhone-Poulenc PHarma GmbH Case C-232194 (undecided).
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which has links with the national Intellectual property owner. For this purpose, the
court develops the doctrine of common origin, whereby the act of exhaustion only
takes place if the goods are placed in the market by him or with his consent.
Consent means there should be a link between the two owners of Intellectual Property.
The link must be "legal, financial, technical and economic". Hence when the goods
are marketed on a compulsory licensing basis, there is no consentim.
6.3.2 Undertaking under A.85
A.85 applies to agreements, decisions and practices by associations of enterprises and
associations that affect trade between member states and result, intentionally or not,
in restrictions in competition within the Common market, which are prohibited.
These include: the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other
trading conditions; the limitations or control of production, markets, technical
development or investment; the market sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or the subjecting of
the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of additional supplies which,
either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the
subject of such contract. S.85 applies basically to licensing agreements which may
contain terms which are anti-competitive -subject to certain block exemptions laid
down by the Commission'°'.
The restrictions include territorial restrictions with the exception of exclusivity
Hag I and Hag II. The EU held that the holder of an Intellectual property right in one member state
may not prevent the importation of goods protected by that right from another member state if the goods
were marketed there by him or with his consent, for the first act of putting the product on the market in
th bitter member state exhaust the holder's rights.
Van Zuyjen v. Hg (1974) ECR 731 (HAG I); HAG II (1990) ECR 1-3711.
See Pharmon BV v. Hoescht AG, (198) E.C.R 21111, (1986) Common Market Rep. (CCH)
14,206. See also Phil Collins where an exception has been read in this rule of freedom of movement of
goods. In this case the applicant is unable to stop the sale of bootleg CD's in Germany, as under German
law foreigners are not given such a righL The court held that this sort of discrimination is contrary to the
treaty. Joined cases C-92/92 and C-326, Phil Collins et al, 1993 E.C.R 1-5145.
Commission Regulations 151193.
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provisions granting a licensee territorial protection against the licensor, and to some
extent, against other licensees. Under some circumstances, territorial restrictions are
allowed as in the case of Maize Seed's'°2. In this case, the restriction in terms of
open exclusive licensing agreements was held as not a restriction for the purpose of
A.85 as the grant of exclusive rights in this case is capable of providing an incentive
to innovate efforts. In another case CoditellCine Vog-II'°3
 an exclusive license to
exhibit a film within a member state was held as "not to prevent, restrict or distort
competition".
6.3.3 Abuse of dominant power under A.86
A.86 involves the determination of whether a particular practice will affect trade
between member states. The European court again draws distinction between the
exercise and the existence of rights. The basic premise is that the exercise of a right
is not in itself an abuse of market power unless resulting in anti competitive effects.
Such a distinction was expressed in RTE v. Commission'° 4
 by the Court of First
Instance in the following words:
"However, while it is plain that the exercise of the exclusive right to
reproduce a protected work is not in itself an abuse, that does not apply when,
in the light of the details of each individual case, it is apparent that right is
exercised in such ways and circumstances as in fact to pursue an aim
manifestly contrary to the objectives of A.86. In that event, the copyright is
no longer exercised in a manner which corresponds to its essential function,
Case 258/78 LC Nungesser KG v. Commission (Maize Seed), 1982 ECR 2015, 1 CMLR 278
(1978).
103 Case 262/81, Coditel SA v. Cine-Vog Films SA (Coditel 11), 1982 E.C.R 3381, 1 C.M.L.R 49
(1983).
See the Court of First Instance's observation in RTE v. Commision Case T-69/89, 1991 E.C.R at
11- 519-21. In this case the applicant's conduct in refusing to license competitors to publish weekly
television programme, an act tantamount to the preventing of the emerging of the market of a new product.
namely weekly television magazine which will be in the position to compete with its own magazine,
thereby excluding all competition from the market solely in order to secure the applicant's monopoly". The
court ordered the applicant to permit third parties to publish its weekly program listings by granting
compulsoiy licences. An appeal was dismissed by the European Court of Justice on 6 April 1995. See joined
cases C-241/91 p and C-242/91 p.)
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within the meaning of A.36 of the Treaty, which is to protect the moral rights
in the work and ensure a reward for the creative effort, while respecting the
aims of, in particular, A.86....In that case, the primacy of Community Law,
particularly as regards principles as fundamental as those of the free movement
of goods and freedom of competition, prevails over any use of a rule of
national intellectual property law in a manner contrary to those principles".
For purposes of A.86, a particular practice should result in preventing potential
markets from entering the relevant market'° 5 and affect trade between member
countries. Mere refusal to license will not constitute an abuse of dominant position
unless "it involves, on the part of an undertaking holding a dominant position,
certain abusive conduct such as arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent
repairers, the fixing of prices for spare parts at an unfair level or a decision no longer
to produce spare parts"°6.
7.	 Unfair trade practices and monopoly in the U.K
Besides the policy of integration of markets within the E.C, U.K also has laws against
unfair trade practices and monopoly'°7. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission
See case T-51/91, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. commision, 1990 E.C.R 11-309,4 C.M.L.R 334 (Court
of First instance) the issue whether the acquisition of a licence to a milk sterilization process effected in
the creation of a dominant position under A.86. The effect of the acquisition was to prevent the potential
competitors from entering the relevant market.
(1988) ECR 6211,4 CMLR 122 (1989).
See AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) LtdLan English case which is referred to the ECJ on the question
whether the conferral of the sole and exclusive right to make and import replacement body panels by
national law upon a substantial car manufacturer a dominant undertaking within the meaning of A.86 of the
Treaty. The issue was whether it was prima facie an abuse of dominant position for the manufacturer to
refuse to license others to supply such body panels, even when they are willing to pay reasonable royalty
for all articles sold under the licence. The court refuse to hold that "it follows that an obligation imposed
upon the proprietor of a protected design to grant to third parties, even in return for a reasonable royalty,
a licence for the supply of products incorporating the design would lead to the proprietor thereof being
deprived of the substance of his exclusive right, and that refusal to grant such a licence cannot in itself
constitute an abuse of a dominant position".
107 See the report prepared by the Department of Trade and Industry, Opening Markets: New Policy
on Restrictive Trade Practices, July 1989, Cm 727, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London. The report
recognised that in normal circumstances the grant of licences relating to Intellectual Property right do not
constitute anti competitive effects so long as the restrictions they contain do not go wider than the subject
matter of the licence, for example tying-in the supply of other goods or services.
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carry out investigation of monopolization and inappropriate use of Intellectual Property
rights. The Commission assumes powers to remedy these situations by either
cancelling or modifying these conditions by granting compulsory licences. The U.K
CDPA mentions two instances where such powers may be carried out; restrictive
conditions and refusal to licenc&°8.
8. Limits set for socio-economic welfare
The need to limit Intellectual Property rights for the advancement of certain socio-
economic welfare is recognised in the recent GATT Trip's Agreement in A.7. A.7 is
couched in very idealistic terms. Not only the link between intellectual property rights
and technological innovation, transfer and dissemination of technology is recognised,
but also the need to tailor intellectual property right to suit social and economic
welfare. A.8 further reserves the power of member states to formulate laws which,
"are necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development". In the U.K, a limited reservation of rights is provided for the purposes
of services of the Crown which includes internal and foreign defence and health
service purposes'°9.
9. Analysis and Comparison.
At the outset we have underlined the basic premise and function of a 'right' within
Islamic jurisprudence. The views advanced by the renowned Maliki scholar Al-Shatibi
and the modern scholar Al-Darini demonstrate the importance of tailoring Intellectual
Property rights to accommodate other objectives. To guide us in this task and to draw
the dividing line between what is acceptable and what is not, will, ultimately depend
on the circumstances of the case. In the case of copyright, the greatest tension
108 See S.144 of the U.K CDPA for copyright S.238 (& Schedule 4 S.10) for design right and S.51,
S.295 and schedule 5 & 14 on patents.
See S.240 of U.K CDPA 1988.
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involved here is the conflict with others' right of information, education and easy
access to knowledge. These tensions have been dealt with to a greater extent through
the expansion of exceptions within the copyright legislation. There are numerous
other compromises, some of which have been mentioned earlier such as duration, fair
dealing, reproduction of works and public domain. In terms of patent, the
compromise are in the form of reverse engineering and the defence of experimental
research. Using the yardstick proposed by Muslim scholars, as discussed above, this
compromise is valid. What is perceived as public right is given precedence over
individual right. Right of information, education and knowledge is one of the
fundamental rights recognised in the Qur'an.
Secondly, the balancing mechanism proposed by Muslim scholars goes beyond that
of redressing inconsequential harm when it arises. The concept contemplates the
evaluation of the proper function of a right. Hence a particular right must be enforced
in a way which gives a coherent meaning to the function of the right rather than
unintelligible conflict when they overlap. Even the misuse doctrine in the United
States does not come close to the above paradigm. The understanding of the concept
of 'haqq' and 'su isti 'ma! al haqq' necessitates the accommodating of all the tensions
and conflicts arising from Intellectual Property. This necessarily demands a full scale
examination of the needs of a particular society.
At the theoretical level, the idea of 'haqq' is imbued with inbuilt restrictions and
limitations in Islamic scholarship. Ownership, as defined by Muslim jurists is an
aggregate of rights in relation to a thing. With regard to ownership, the restriction
governs all elements of ownership such as use, enjoyment and disposition. Such
aggregate of rights may be waived, refused and even terminated in certain
circumstances without defeating the title of the goods"°. Hence, the idea of
For an illustration of the principle in real property see Egyptian Civil Codes and Lebanese Civil
Codes. The idea that the use, enjoyment and disposition of ownership of real property be consonant with
"the social function" of the right of ownership is distinctive in legislations pertaining to real property in some
Arab countries. For detail arguments see Ziadeh, Farhat 3, Property law in the Arab World; Real Rights
in Egypt, Irai, Jordan, Lebanon, Lib ya, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, (1979) Graham &
Trotman, London par. Ch.3.
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demarcation between the existence and the exercise of right has long been recognised
and accepted in Islamic scholarship.
Thirdly, with regard to content-based restrictions, the validity of protection depends
on whether a particular 'thing' is a valid property under Islamic law. Here, the
demarcation and differences with the common law is most remarked. As has been
pointed out earlier, anything which is forbidden under the Shari'ah cannot be
accepted as a valid property. The current trend in the U.K and even in Canada to
control publications perceived as against public policy is through refusal of
inconsequential relief or enforcement of copyright as in the case of Spycatcher and
Aldrich."
Fourthly, with regard to competition policies and the need to eliminate the anti-
competitive effects of Intellectual Property, we have seen above the differing
philosophy and approach between U.K and the United States. In the last chapter, we
examined Islam's point of view on monopoly and hoarding, made explicit through
numerous Prophetic's tradition. These 'hadith 's specifically prohibit stockpiling of
food by merchants as a way of cornering the market. Contemporary Muslim scholars
have extended the prohibition to other market activities which resulted in the
manipulation of price and supply of goods. Arguably, the list of activities which are
perceived as monopolistic is an open one. The demarcation between acceptable and
unacceptable economic activities depends on the end-result and the effect of the
agreement. In contemporary Islamic literature, among economic activities which have
been defined by Muslim scholars to be under the prohibitions are cartels, pooling
agreements and other types of market monopoly. In the same vein, commercial
practices relating to both vertical and horizontal agreements which involve output
restriction or the manipulation of free market forces can easily fit under the above
categorisation of monopoly and market hoarding. Any unwarranted extension of power
beyond those recognised by Shari'ah and beyond those implied through the function
of Intellectual Property rights have to be curtailed. Unfortunately, it is not known
See the comment by Howell, Robert G, Co pyright & Obscenity : Should Copyright Regulate
Content., IPJ Vol.8, No.3 p.'39-188.
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whether there exist any concerted effort to draw competition policies in line with the
above Islamic paradigm.
Fifthly, beside the rule against monopoly and hoarding of goods, there are numerous
Prophetic' traditions regulating behavioural conduct in market place. Suffice for us
to say that there are ample principles for a schematic study of Islamic paradigms of
competition and unfair competition relating to economic activities. These rules are
general and peripheral in nature and it would be impossible for us to enumerate with
precision its application to modem economic practices in detail.
In addition to this, the Islamic law gives more flexibility for the courts to remedy
contracts which partakes of inequitable bargaining power. This calls for the
readjustment of rights and duties involving contracts whereby a party of insuperable
bargaining power exploit the other party" 2. Even though the principle is not
regarded by the Muslim jurists as a distinct principle in Islamic theory of contract, its
application can be invoked in the present circumstances.
Sixthly, the legality of licensing agreements which contain restrictive terms, will have
to be evaluated in relation to the restriction against combination contracts and the
imposition of restrictive conditions in Islamic scholarship. In relation to this, there
is a divergence of opinion between Hanafi's and Shafi'is on the one hand and the
Maliki and the Hanbali on the other. The Hanafi's and the Shafi's are cautiously
restrictive and argue that extrinsic conditions are generally invalid subject to stringent
principles laid down by the jurists of these schools. The Maliki and the Hanbali, on
112 In the U.K. the court had set aside agreements made between parties of unequal bargaining power
as against public policy as being restraint of trade. See the cases of Schroeder Music Publishin g Co Ltd
(1974) 3 All E.R 616; (1974) 1 WLR 1308; Clifford Davis Management Ltd v. WEA Records Ltd (1975)
I All E.R 237; (1975) 1 WLR 61, Elton John & Ors v. Richard Leon James & Ors (1991) FSR 397;
O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Co Ltd (1985) QB 428, (1985) 3 All ER 351, (1984) 3 WLR
488 and Panayiotou & Ors v. Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd , The Times, 3OthJune 1994. In
Malaysia the defendants in the case of Polygram Records Sdn Bhd v the Search & Anor (1994) 3 MU 127
attempted to invoke this doctrine to set aside their agreements with the plaintiffs. The court accepted the
view that there is some support for the view that, public policy may, in some exceptional cases, demand
that certain contracts which are grossly unfair to one of the partoes ought to be set aside on the grounds of
inequality of bargaining power. However there has been to date, no leading case in which this doctrine has
been invoked by the Malaysian courts.
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the other hand argue that the basic rule is to admit whatever conditions the parties
deem requisite, subject to exceptional cases of invalidity" 3. The prevailing view is
that conditions in contracts should be in accordance with the tenor of the contract, be
lawfully	 by Shari'ah standards.
sanctioned by custom or usage or bekeneficial to either of the contracting parties
subject to the considerations of public policy and morality.
The basic premise to the first view is that additional or extraneous acts which do not
naturally result from the contract will not be valid. The position is the same where
the seller stipulates for the reservation for himself of any advantage from the sale. On
this view, terms such as no challenge clause, no competition clauses, grant back
requirements, arguably, are invalid. Secondly, the terms can be invalidated on the
basis of their inequitable effects arising from the imbalances of bargaining power.
10.	 Conclusion
In this chapter we have outlined the various tensions involved in Intellectual Property
right and the various limitations which have evolved, both within and without the
Intellectual Property regime. The comparisons between the theoretical framework of
limitations of rights in Islamic law and the common law is represented in the
following table.
113 See Riyner, S.E, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law: A Com parative Anal ysis With
Particular Reference To the modem Legislation in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates; Graham
& Trotman (1991). pgs.352360
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TABLE OF COMPARISON
COMMON LAW	 ISLAMIC LAW
theoretical limits to the concept of	 concept of 'su 'isti 'ma! al-haqq'
ownership, concept of abuse of rights	 ___________________________________
content based restriction, concept of 	 subject matter of protection has to fulfill
morality and public order. In copyright,	 the requirement of 'halal' and 'haram'
the resriction are carried out in the field of
enforcement only. In trade mark, the test
of morality is that which is accepted within
public circles. In patent, the application of
the restriction is very narrow, mostly in the
fieldon biotechnological inventions. 	 ___________________________________
competition rules, against any form of 	 rules against hoarding or 'ihtikar'
monopolisticpractices	 ______________________________________
rules against restrictive trade practices	 rules pertaining to behavioural conduct
in market, rules against combination
contract and the imposition of restrictive
conditions in contractual agreements.
rules against unconscionable bargaining 	 readjustment of contracts where there is
power in contractual agreements	 gross unequal bargaining power.
copyright- right of the public for education the religious emphasis on diffusion of
_____________________________________ knowledge and right of education.
trade mark's role in protecting consumers 	 general principles in Islam to protect
consumers, emphasis of 'adalah'.
In the first place, we have seen the concept of 'su isti'mal al haqq' which marks the
boundary of a legitimate right. Secondly, is the content-based restrictions which may
not find legitimacy according to current international practice with the exception of
the narrow limitation to ethical considerations involved in biotechnological engineering
inventions. Such issues have been raised earlier in the chapter on subject matter of
protection.
Contrary to popular belief, Intellectual Property rights are beset with numerous
limitations. Those related to competition are drawn for economic grounds and may
find convergence with Islamic principles of 'adalah' and economic practice. These
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behavioral constraints attempt to resolve anti-competitive practices, cartels and
pooling, all of which may be parallel to an Islamic concept of business ethics.
The protection of Intellectual Property must not forsake the need to advance the socio-
economic welfare of a particular country as delineated by the GA1'T Trip's agreement.
It is unfortunate that this area of boundary is almost neglected in other international
treaties. The most probable reason is that all of these international treaties are drawn
by developed countries. Intellectual Property rights should not sacrifice other noble
goals such as economic and technological development, which may vary from one
country to another.
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• In the light of the discussion in this thesis, it is apparent that the basis and the foundation of
the present intellectual property laws is unsatisfactory from a Muslim Malaysian viewpoint.
These laws, were initially introduced during colonial
times to enhance the British's vested interest. Despite many changes to these laws,
the thereotical framework remains substantially the same, i.e based on secular laws
and secular orientation of legal system. The features of the laws take no consideration
of any local factors. Furthermore, these laws are still lacking in terms of their
conceptual content. Such a vacuum can be filled with a proper understanding of the
framework of ownership rights of Intellectual Property under the Shari'ah. Islam being
the religion of the Federation and professed by the majority of the citizens, is but the
best form of paradigm which we should emulate.
Furthermore, the reformation of Intellectual property laws in accordance to Islamic
perspective is timely, considering the GATF -Trips agreement that colours the
international scenario which demands us to reconsider our present laws. In this
important task of providing a set of laws which reflect the religious, cultural and
social values of Malaysian society, as well as taking into account the corresponding
economic and political factors, it is important to consider the basis of these rights,
"what, whom and how" these rights conform to Islamic law without forsaking any of
our international obligations.
While it is difficult to predict when total integration of Islamic law and common law
will take effect, or if it ever will, it is not too early to analyse our positive laws from
an Islamic perspective. Such an effort is consistent with the prevailing resurgence of
Islam and Islamic law in Malaysia. The hypothesis of this thesis is that such effort
can be achieved without resulting in drastic structural changes and at the same time
conforming to the international standards. Stemming from these concerns, the
intellectual property laws, as practised in Malaysia, is examined in terms of its
structure, concept and basic philosophical underpinings from the Islamic perspective.
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From chapter three and chapter four of the thesis, it has been proven that a coherent
and logical conceptual framework of ownership of intellectual property can be derived
from an Islamic perpective, which are further developed to explain the basis of these
rights. From the analysis of certain fundamental concepts from authentic sources of
Islamic scholarship, a sound philosophical base can be discerned which not only
offers the basis of rights but also defines the parameters of these rights.
As far as the theoretical framework of ownership of intellectual property is concerned,
it is submitted that their intangible rights are forms of usufructuary rights within the
definition of 'manfa 'ah ' These rights being dispensable with their origin and of
separate value are capable of being traded separately. The protection of these
intangible rights, does not contravene the injunction against concealment of
knowledge as the subject matter of intellectual property cannot be equated with the
meaning of "knowledge" at the highest level of abstraction even though intellectual
property does allow a person to control to whom, how and when to depart with
information. Furthermore, there are Prophetic 'hadith 's allowing a person to be
selective of the recipient of information and therefore a person has the right to control
the disclosure and the audience of his works. In this respect, it is submitted that the
propertisation of 'ideas' does not lead to the monopolisation of 'ideas' but only the
exclusive control of them.
Despite their being intangible rights, in many ways the usufructuary rights of
intellectual property conform to the accepted characteristics of property. The value
of intellectual property, even though is temporary, is easily quantifiable according to
accepted practice. These intangible rights, on equal basis to tangible property, can
be transferred, transacted upon, inherited and disposed of through will. Their only
difference with tangible property is that these intangible rights are in the intangible
sense and are not attached to the physical medium. Because of this, these
usufructuary rights are independent of the physical embodiments and are not affected
by the alienation of the latter.
With the exception of the Hanatis, see pgs.63-65 above.
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It is further established that the ownership of intellectual property can be justified on
the basis of 'amal' (doctrine of economic gain through labour) which finds much
support in contemporary works. Such justification is necessary as there exists a
vacuum in authentic sources as to the basis of these rights. (This lack of coverage can
be explained in that the Qur'an does not contain and cannot be expected to contain
a blueprint of all basic rights and liberties.) From our investigations, it is clear that
creative labour theory, applies equally to mental exertions, as well as physical
endeavour, on the premise that intellectual creations which owes their birth entirely
to combinations found in human mind, and which but for his ingenuity, would not
have existed are loftier and more worthy of recognition. The premise of creative
labour in this instance is dependant on the existence of many criteria; the creation of
something new, something which has not existed in common.
The scope of each subject matter within intellectual property varies and this requires
separate examination. Copyright is a non-monopoly right which in many aspects is
intertwined with dissemination of works. In this thesis, we have examined the various
moral justifications which shape the evolution of copyright in a historical perpective.
The historical parallelism between the birth of copyright in western jurisprudence and
Islamic scholarship points to the conclusion that copyright is necessary to stimulate
intellectual and academic growth. It is only from this appreciation that one can realise
the parallelism between the two worlds, particularly on factors and roots of recognition
of moral rights and their linkages to the growth of intellectual academia. One aspect
which the similarity is so striking is the condemnation of plagiarism, copying and the
moral anathema attached to these practices, in the days when moral stigma carries
more weight than legal responsibility.
It has been argued in this thesis that the threshold of moral rights in Islam is higher
than those in common law. These rights emanates from the right a person hold over
'knowledge' or the ideas which he brainchilds. Being the person who initiates the
work, he in entitled to control to 'whom, how and when' to divulge a work. The role
of moral rights of knowledge in Islamic scholarship lies in the deep appreciation of
the intellectual linkage between authors and their works, the responsibility of the
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authors to guide others and the need to check the legitimacy and accuracy of
transmission of knowledge.
The common law, on the other hand, places emphasis on the work, the amount of
effort and expenditure which is poured in creating a work which rightfully should be
remunerated and recognised. The emphasis is on the right to copy and not on
authorship. In contrast, the central notion of 'authorship' in Islam, is on the author,
even though less individualistic than that of Romanticism. The emphasis of
'authorship' in Islam is on the premise that it is an obverse of responsibility, carries
with it the notion that his work should be preserved, not as a recognition of his
personality but to preserve the authenticity of his work.
Moving to economic rights, these are ancillary and incidental to the author's moral
right for recognition, attribution and authorship. In Islam unlike their Western
counterparts, there is no absolute freedom of expression of ideas. Copyright is not a
positive right, but a right which is conferred under the Shari'ah. One important
feature that springs from this, is the emphasis on the legality of subject-matter. On this
premise, the existence of right would depend, in the first place, on the non-
contravention of the Shari'ah. Using this yardstick of legality, works which are
against morality, Islamic ethics and the fundamental concepts of Islamic religion
cannot be valid subject-matters for copyright. This yardstick may be stricter than that
of, or even contrary to the prevailing international obligations. However, with the
help of effective censorship control the same effect can be achieved. This would mean
that the courts, an important mechanism in enforcing rights, would always consider
the views of the censorship board. In this way, non-conformity of censorship rules
will affect the existence and subsistence of copyright. By creating the necessary nexus
between copyright and censorship, such works cannot be enforced because they are
vitiated with illegality.
Another area in which the present copyright laws should be reformed is that of the
extension of copyright to oral works, by taking into consideration the importance of
oral transmission of knowledge in Islamic scholarship. Further the elimination of the
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boundary between oral and expressed works is consistent with the stand adopted in
the Berne Convention which does not impose the criteria of fixation on the member
countries. It is further suggested that the present boundaries which are drawn in some
member countries be adopted so that only spoken works of a more formal or
considered kind delivered before or to an audience are covered. Therefore, oral
transmission of knowledge and technical skills are covered leaving aside more aleatory
or spontaneous forms of oral expression.
Further, since the emphasis in Islam is on 'authorship', contractual disposition of
authors' work should be the subject of regulation, especially since they are often the
weaker parties in negotiations. In this respect it is suggested that the practice which
is adopted in France is emulated, whereby an agreed consideration may be re-
opened by way of judicial litigation if the work proves to be more successful than the
parties thought it would be and enables the court to award a complementary sum.
Such a practice is more consistent with Islamic law, as under the latter, readjustment
of contractual agreements is allowed to do justice.
In other aspects, it seems that there is more consistency in Islamic law, particularly
the way on which the law is shaped to mediate between control and access. In fact,
the main philosophy behind copyright in Islam is the recognition of 'authorship' and
the moral and economic rights inci$dental thereto, while at the same time
emphasizing on disclosure and dissemination of works.
In chapter six, we have criticised the current economic paradigm which does not only
determine the initial existence of patents but also shape and influence the scope of
patents laws in the common law jurisdiction. From our analysis, it is clear that profit
motivation and private property, which constitute the main philosophy behind the
protection of patents, are accepted in Islam. However, as it has been pointed earlier
other non-economic values play equally significant role.
In this chapter we have adopted the scale of hierarchy of values as enunciated by al
Ghazali to determine the parameters of patent rights. By adopting this scale of values,
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certain policy prescriptions can be derived at. From this exercise, it was established
that in areas where patenting may result in direct confrontation with the tenets of
Islamic religion, they should not be within the confine of patents. One area in which
patenting may result in conflict with religious tenets is that of biotechnological
inventions of human biological materials. The patenting of these products encourages
the commercialization of human body parts which are not allowed in Islam. This is
because, a man does not have an absolute right over his body in the sense of a right
of ownership or property, therefore any purported sale of body materials is not valid.
Such practice may also be contraly to the dignity of human kind which is guaranteed
in the Qur'an. However, experimentation with human biological materials are not
prohibited if done with the purpose of saving other lives.
As far as inventions pertaining to biotechnological engineered animals, we have
dismissed the arguments that allowing such practices would raise the theological
question of man's relationship with God over other life forms as these are within the
permissitì ity of 'taskhir' (subjugation of nature). However, such practices should not
lead to the inappropriate subjugation of animals without any necessary purpose. We
should also take note of the Qur'anic warning against the upsetting of the order and
laws of nature, as the world is said to be created in a sense of order and proportion.
Furthermore, animals should be treated with respect and kindness as in Islam animals
are born with spirits and are not mere composition of matter.
The analysis also shows that another area which, upon a balancing of values, should
not be within the confine of patents is in relation to the inventions pertaining to
medical methods. The preservation of life is 'dharuri' and therefore takes priority
over other mundane concerns particularly that relating to financial rewards and
security to those involved in developing such inventions.
Other items which are necessary to the preservation of life are food and
pharmaceutical items. On a balancing exercise, so long as patenting does not lead
to the restriction of the supply of these items, they should be allowed. Different
countries have different staple needs, therefore it is very unlikely that patenting of
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food items would lead to the scarcity of food resources. One problem which often
arises with patenting of pharmaceuticals products is the restriction of supply as
patented drugs are often more expensive than generic products. This disequilibrium
can be satisfactorily resolved through a comprehensive price policy.
In other aspects, patents may even be consistent to the set of values proposed earlier
as they enhance the protection of intellect. This is particularly in relation to the
exclusion of discoveries and pure theories from the domain of patents and the benefits
derived from the statutory requirement of disclosure. Finally, it is proven that patents
fulfill the Islamic objective of enhancement of wealth, so long as the requirement of
distributive justice is fulfilled.
In chapter five, it is established that the conferpf'ment of property rights in trade marks
can bejustified as it is a means to uphold fairness in commercial dealings and to
eliminate unscrupulous commercial practices. This theory is based on the premise that
trade marks plays an effective role in communicating the unobservable differences in
quality and variety of goods in an analytical form, enabling consumers to choose the
product with the desired combination of features.
The prominence of protection of consumer in Islam is shown in the context of the
historical institution of 'hisbah' where the state takes upon the duty to regulate the
market and control public morals. On this premise, it is argued that imitating the
product and features of another manufacturer's product, may constitute an action of
active fraud, provided that actual confusion and association occurs even though such
practices have not been covered by classical Islamic jurisprudence. Likewise, on the
same basis, unfair competition among manufacturers and traders by the adoption of
unethical practices such as disparagement of another's product, comparative
advertising should be avoided.
Despite the marginal role played by consumers in delineating the scope of trade mark
rights under common law, the emphasis on consumers in Islam would indicate that
further measures should be taken to improve the present legislation in Malaysia on this
314
matter. This can be achieved by improving the distinguishing function of trade marks
by encouraging the use of both indication of source and appellation of origin. Further,
there should be more checks on advertising to ensure that advertisements are truthful
and contain all complete information which are necessary. The use of certification
marks has also been suggested, which is an effective method to overcome the
problem of variation of quality of goods which are produced under licence. In some
jurisdictions, collective marks are used as "quality marks". In others for example
U.K. collective marks are distinguishable from certification marks, but probably
provide a more immediate guarantee of quality than an exclusively licensed trade
mark. Further measures should also be taken if parallel importation is continued to be
allowed. Consumers should be informed about the nature of the grey market goods
and what they are paying for. The importation of grey goods should not justify the
dumping of defective, faulty goods which do not pass the quality standards in other
countries. Most important is the development of rules competition and unfair
competition which could either be incorporated in the present trade mark regime or
be separately provided for.
In chapter eight, it has been argued that intellectual property rights, being archetypes
of 'haqq', are circumscribed by a set of rules defined either within the intellectual
property regime or outside them. This chapter defines the various factors which have
shaped the scope of intellectual property. These barriers prune away these exclusive
rights without destroying the title of ownership. One factor which influences the
reorientation of rights is the need to maintain the balance between protection of works
and access to information. Another factor is ethical reason which influences the scope
of patent, trade mark and to a certain extent, copyright. Further limitations are
imposed to curb abuse of intellectual property rights, which if concentrated in one
hand and use incorrectly may lead to monopolistic tendencies. It has been shown that
certain behavioural constraints need to be imposed to control practices which are
inhibitive to competition and may result in an abuse of rights.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
At the outset, the present framework of intellectual property protection, as practised in
Malaysia, cannot be maintained as it is without necessary changes in order to achieve
compliance with the Shari'ah.
	 The assimilation
of Islamic principles does not necessitate the creation of a separate body of law in
place of the present regime. However, these laws must be adapted or supplemented
in certain specific respects in order to take fully into account the precepts of Islamic
religion and legal rules.
i) With respect to copyright, the threshold of moral rights should be further
improved. In view of the fact that the function of copyright is to reward the
author with an exclusive right for his creative efforts and thereby encourages
literary activities, the holder of the right should also be entitled to control the
disclosure and the publication of his work.
ii) Recognising the fact that copyright plays an important role in a broad range
of educational sector, hence to affect the balance between protection of
copyright and access to information, is definitely of a fundamental importance
for the community's overall development. On this basis, the community should
be guaranteed the access to fundamental works, against a fee, in the form of
compulsory licensing or translation rights, where the public interest demands
the disclosure of the particular work and the work represents significant
educational progress.
iii) The promulgation of laws is to ensure that copyright works are not used to
encroach other's privacy. This could be done by the introduction of a limited
form of privacy laws in copyright which can be confined to commissioned
photographs. A wider form of privacy laws could be introduced, outside the
intellectual property regime, through general laws guaranteeing the privacy
rights of others.
iv)	 In view of the fact that the function of copyright is to reward authors and their
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work, the present scope of protection should be extended to oral works by
eliminating the requirement of fixation. This would effectively diminish the
present discrimination against oral works.
v) Implementation of copyright laws, should be carried towards the fulfil ment
of the Shari'ah. The latter contains provisions on the criteria of legality of
subject matter of protection; including the provisions to the effect that a
copyright may not be granted in respect of works, publication or exploitation
of which would be contrary to Islamic concepts of expression, ethics,
morality, public policy and Islamic faith. There should be a set of censorship
rules which should be considered by national courts with a general guide to
interpreting the reference to Islamic religion, public policy or morality.
vi) In view of the fact that the philosophy "that anything under the sun can be
patented" may not be consistent with the Islamic concept of recognition of
legal rights, it is advisable to include in the present patent laws such a
reference to Islamic religion, public policy and morality. This is in order to
highlight the fact that some applications of modern technology, by dint of
their consequences or effects, are capable of offending against Islamic
religion. In view of the above there should be a set of rules or a body to guide
the patent office in interpreting the reference to Islamic religion and the
Shari'ah.
vii) In the light of the fundamental principle that the ownership of human beings
is not recognised in Islam, the human body or parts of the human body must
be excluded from patentability. Inventions which involve processes for
modifying the genetic identity of the human body must be excluded from
patentability as these are contrary to the dignity of man.
viii) With respect to patents involving bioengineered animals, there should be an
establishment of a public moratorium on the experiments, research and the use
of patented animals, where necessary. This filtering process can be done by
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'Majlis Fatwa' which gives religious ruling on other crucial issues by weighing
the relative ha.rrn and benefit of these patents, including the sufferings and the
physical handicaps of these animals. This would free the patent office from the
burden of interpreting matters pertaining to Islamic religion in which area
expertise is non-existent.
ix) In light of the view that preservation of life and curing of ailments is
'dharuri', methods of treatment of human or animal bodies by surgery or
therapy or of diagnosis practised on human or animal bodies are not
patentable. On this premise, the practice for allowing the claims for second
use of medical treatment should be monitored closely insofar as these practices
are not taken to obviate the pursuance of the above objective.
x) With respect to trade marks, in view of the fact that the function of trade
marks in Islam is the preservation of fairness and justice in commercial
dealings, further measures should be taken to further reorientate the present
trade marks laws to secure consumer's cause. This could include the
introduction of indication of source and appellation of origin which further
enhance the distiguishing function of trade marked goods.
xi) Realising the fact that the differentiation function of trade marks depends on
the accuracy, authenticity and truthful information, advertising practices
should be meticulously monitored.
xii) In view of the fact that consumers would be misled by the differences and
variations of quality of trade marked goods produced under licence, the
production of these goods under licence should be supervised by setting a
standard of quality. This could be done effectively by the encouragement of
the use of collective and certification marks.
xiii) Whereas the practice of parallel importation is theoretically pro-competitive,
effective measures should be adopted to inform the public the grey goods'
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origin and their differences with the original goods, if any. This measure is
necessary as while the practice of parallel importation would not constitute
misrepresentation to the consumer, misinformation of the nature of the goods
would.
xiv) In view of the fact that uncoordinated use of intellectual property could result
in the creation of monopolistic tendencies which could be disincentives to
trade to the detriment of further industrial development and to the smooth
operation of the free-markets, rules on competition and unfair competition
should be introduced. Measures to maintain the equilibrium in competition can
either be enforced through the incorporation of such necessary measures to
avoid the abuse of intellectual property within the present framework of
intellectual property laws or be separately provided for.
By the endorsement of these measures, the philosophical underpinnings of intellectual
property protection both in material and spiritual aspects can be accomplished. While
the country's need for material, technological and scientific developments are
undeniable, the need to be in line with the approbation of Islamic rules and legal
principles is equally important.
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